The American Political Science Review

Articles by David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Chong Lim Kim and Donald P. Racheter, Timothy A. Almy, Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, Richard Zeckhauser, Peter J. Taylor, Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp, Victor C. Ferkiss

---

A. H. Somjee
Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity

Richard S. Katz, Donald E. Stokes
The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns

Andrew T. Cowart
Electoral Choice in the American States

Susan Welch
The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature

Eugene R. Wittkopf
Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXVII September 1973 No. 3

political science

CHALLENGE AND DECISION: Political Issues of Our Time, Fourth Edition

REO M. CHRISTENSON

Lucid, concise, coherent, and well-rounded, this book focuses on the most crucial and controversial aspects of current political issues. Each issue is examined within its historical framework, contrasting views are presented and analyzed, political realities are explored, and possible policy directions are indicated. 227 pp.; $2.95: paper. August, 1973.

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONTEMPORARY DISARRAY

RICHARD E. DAWSON

This text uses public opinion and survey research data to analyze the distribution of political opinions in America over the past decade. Focus is on changes in political opinions and the consequences for American politics. Shifts in issue focus and the development of new issues which have led to intense conflicts in American politics are described. 224 pp. (tentative); $2.95: paper. September, 1973.

POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS

JAMES EISENSTEIN

This examination of the legal process as part of the American political system explores three aspects of the legal process: recruitment of personnel; the politics surrounding their decisions; and the impact of their decisions on who gets what. (A volume in *Harper's American Political Behavior Series*—David J. Danelski, advisory editor.) 356 pp.; $4.00: paper. August, 1973.

VIOLENCE AS POLITICS: A Series of Original Essays

HERBERT HIRSCH & DAVID C. PERRY

Original essays explore the centrality of violence in political and social behavior, answering questions about the rationality, normality, prevalence, and significance of violence. Essays are drawn from a variety of disciplines and offer broad and varying insights into the factors that govern political violence. Tentative: 320 pp.; $4.95: paper. November, 1973.

CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS

JOHN W. KINGDON

Based on a carefully designed and executed interviewing project which concentrated on specific decisions by congressmen on a variety of issues, this report illuminates factors which influence congressional decision-making. Tentative: 312 pp.; $8.95: cloth; $4.50: paper. October, 1973.

THE RULING ELITES: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy

KENNETH PREWITT & ALAN STONE

More than a general review of elite theory, this book examines how elite theory bears on the development of American democracy. The contributions of major classical and contemporary theorists are explained in detail. The authors also provide a basic understanding of the roles of business and capitalism in affecting American politics. 245 pp.; $2.95: paper. January, 1973.

from harper & row

10 East 53d Street, New York 10022

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXVII September 1973 No. 3

CONTENTS

799 Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity A. H. Somjee

817 The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique Richard S. Katz

829 Comment Donald E. Stokes

832 Rejoinder Richard S. Katz

835 Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces, and Divergent Partisan Majorities Andrew T. Cowart

854 The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature Susan Welch and Eric H. Carlson

868 Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study Eugene R. Wittkopf

889 Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle

906 Candidates' Perception of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates Chong Lim Kim and Donald P. Racheter

914 Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict Timothy A. Almy

924 The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson

934 Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality Richard Zeckhauser

947 A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns Peter J. Taylor

951 Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp

964 Communications

970 Editorial Comment

973 Book Reviews and Essays
Man's Tools and Man's Choices: The Confrontation of Technology and Political Science Victor C. Ferkiss

---

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1973, by The American Political Science Association

ARTICLES

799 **Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity.** The relationship between the traditional social organization of India, based on the principle of hierarchy, and the newly introduced democratic institutions and procedures, based on the principle of equality, has been a subject of diverse interpretations. The more significant of these interpretations are that the social organization has subsumed the new political system, and that the various units of social organization, namely, castes, have developed voluntary bodies or caste associations of their own in order to enter into an operative relationship with the new political system. The latter interpretation also implies that the democratic political socialization in India has been taking place by means of the caste associations. This study takes a hard look at such interpretations and points out that the internal cohesion of the social organization materially alters when it moves away from its primary social concerns—ritual, pollution, and endogamy—to nontraditional concerns. This change is reflected in the fact that highly fragmented decision-making processes of castes in nontraditional matters often lead to their substantial vote against candidates of their own castes. Such political differentiation within castes has occurred before the advent of certain caste associations, and in some cases despite them. These and other assertions are substantiated through data collected in a rural and an urban community where fieldwork designed to understand their political dynamics extended over a number of years.

By A. H. SOMJEE, Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University.

---

817 **The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique.** Swings in district vote for Congress are conditioned by many factors. An attempt is made here to apportion the variance in the partisan distribution of votes for U. S. representative among three levels of influence—national, state, and district—measuring the degree of nationalization, regionalization, and localization of voting. Previous attempts have defined "nationalization" of voting as the degree to which district interelection differences are numerically identical. Here this concept is defined in a two-stage regression model as the degree to which districts behave as if these differences were caused by the same factors. In contrast to previous research, national factors are found to be responsible for more than 50 per cent of the variance in local vote, with state and district forces accounting for 19 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively. Several analytic uses for this measure are suggested and illustrated.

By RICHARD S. KATZ, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Yale University.
Comment. By DONALD E. STOKES, Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Graduate School, University of Michigan.
Rejoinder. By RICHARD S. KATZ.

---

835 **Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces, and Divergent Partisan Majorities.** It is a relatively common occurrence in American politics for state electorates to divide their partisan majorities between different parties, depending on the office contest. Observations concerning these divergent aggregate patterns are usually accompanied by speculation that the theoretical propositions on individual voting behavior, developed and tested in the context of presidential voting, hold less relevance for voting in statewide contests. Evidence presented in this paper does not bear out that view of state elections. The candidate incumbency context of state elections is introduced as an aid in predicting the partisan direction of split-ticket voting at the state level. Setting respondents in various conflict situations with respect to (1) basic party loyalties, (2) net assessments of presidential candidates, and (3) incumbent partisanship yields reasonably accurate specification of split-ticket voting patterns in gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential contests; it also suggests at least one source of disparate partisan majorities among state electorates.

By ANDREW T. COWART, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo.

---

854 **The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature.** The Nebraska nonpartisan legislature serves as a control setting for testing several hypotheses about the impact of party and constituency on voting behavior in legislative bodies. Specifically, in light of the data obtained from a setting where party identification is present but party leadership and organization are absent, the following hypotheses are examined: that political parties are important in structuring voting behavior because of the influence of party leaders and organization; that party is important because party identification is a surrogate for sets of beliefs and attitudes that distinguish members of one party from another; or that party is important because party differences reflect different constituency bases of the party. In a roll-call analysis of five sessions utilizing Guttman-scaling and regression techniques, it was found that in the absence of party leadership and organization, voting is highly unstructured. Further, dimensions of voting that were found are largely unexplainable in terms of standard party and constituency variables. Thus, party identification and constituency influence appear to be insufficient cues for the organization of legislative voting behavior, in the absence of party leadership.

By Susan Welch, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska, with the assistance of Eric H. Carlson, Law Student, University of Oregon.

---

868 **Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study.** This study examines in a comparative foreign policy framework the relationship between bilateral foreign aid allocations and pairwise voting agreements between developed and developing nations in the UN General Assembly. The foreign aid donors considered include the United States, the Soviet "bloc," and the twelve other UN members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. Two different measures of aid allocations in two three-year periods (1962–1964 and 1965–1967) are correlated with two different measures of the percentage of agreements in the UN between each aid donor and its aid recipients, with both indices calculated on the basis of all roll calls taken in the 1963 and 1966 General Assemblies.

In general, the results of the analysis were found to be consistent with the hypothesized positive association between aid and votes only in the case of the United States. For many of the remaining donors the association was found to be negative rather than positive, suggesting either that enemies are rewarded more than friends, or, alternatively, that there is little relationship of substantive interest between aid and votes for most donor countries. Even in the case of the U.S., however, which of the two variables should be considered a cause and which a consequence remains unresolved.

By Eugene R. Wittkopf, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Florida.

---

889 **Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process.** This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of which alternative is most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals. We argue that the allocation of committee assignments affects the goals of all the participants in the process, and thus we consider the choices of actors in the process in terms of their goals; specifically the goals of re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy.

After first considering the process from the point of view of the member making requests, we show that the member's requests are related to the type of district he represents, and that the number of requests he makes is related to such considerations as whether he is a freshman, whether he faces competition from a member from his state, and whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee.

The process is also considered from the point of view of the members making the assignments. Decisions on assignments are found to be affected by seniority (where success in getting requested committees is inversely related to seniority), margin of election (where members from marginal districts are more successful), and region (where southerners are less successful than members from other regions).

By David W. Rohde, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis.

---

906 **Candidates' Perception of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates.** This study, based on the two-wave questionnaire data collected from legislative candidates in Iowa, attempts to test the "congratulation-rationalization effect," a highly provocative hypothesis that John Kingdon formulated regarding politicians' beliefs about voters. The hypothesis asserts that winning candidates tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losing candidates tend to develop beliefs deprecating to voters. The results of analysis indicate, however, no significant difference between winners and losers in terms of the direction and magnitude of changes in their beliefs about voters, suggesting that the hypothesis is invalid. When the hypothesis is reformulated in terms of "dissonance states" rather than "election outcomes," the evidence is strongly supportive. Among winners, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs about voters in a favorable direction. Conversely, among losers, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs in an unfavorable direction. Therefore, the "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis can be sustained only if cast in direct dissonance terms.

By Chong Lim Kim, Associate Professor of Political Science and Donald P. Racheter, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Iowa.

---

914 **Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict.** This study examines the assertions of urban scholars that the spatial arrangement of urban populations is important in determining the amount of conflict displayed within American cities. The article analyzes the spatial distribution of class groups within 18 cities and the degree of voting solidarity and conflict displayed within segregated and integrated sections of each community. Data were gathered from precinct voting returns for several local referenda in each city to test the following hypotheses: (1)

The residential distribution of social-class groups will significantly influence the degree of electoral cohesion these groups display; (2) The spatial distribution of class groups will significantly influence the amount of electoral disagreement between class groups. The study found that communities that displayed segregated class groups had a high degree of class electoral solidarity. Within cities that manifested spatially integrated class groups, however, the electoral cohesion of each class was low. A social-class group located in an area of a city possessing wide class dissimilarity was not likely to vote in agreement with other groups of the same class located elsewhere in the city. The findings of this article suggest that location may be one of the sources of urban political conflicts.

By TIMOTHY A. ALMY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.

---

924 **The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation.** This paper offers a critique and a reformulation of Brian Fry and Richard Winters's policy output study published in this *Review* June, 1970. Fry and Winters focused on the redistributive impact of public policy in the states. After devising a "redistribution ratio" that involves allocating state revenue burdens and expenditure benefits to families across income classes, they developed a model to explain the variance of this ratio from state to state. In contrast to the findings of many earlier policy output studies, they hypothesized that political variables would have more explanatory power than socioeconomic variables.

Unfortunately some methodological shortcomings detract from the potential value of the Fry and Winters study. In this paper, alternative methodologies are used to reformulate a redistribution ratio for each state, and the recalculated ratios are found to vary significantly from those obtained by Fry and Winters.

The shortcomings of the Fry and Winters explanatory model are discussed. Despite these shortcomings, however, the regression analysis employed by Fry and Winters is repeated using the reformulated redistribution ratios in order to test the impact of this reformulation. Again the results obtained in this paper vary substantially from those of Fry and Winters.

By BERNARD H. BOOMS, Associate Professor of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University and JAMES R. HALLDORSON, Accounting Management Trainee, Tax Department, F. W. Woolworth Company.

---

934 **Voting Systems, Honest Preference and Pareto Optimality.** The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.

By RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University.

---

947 **A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns.** The concept of shape is considered in abstract terms drawing on approaches outside the electoral districting literature. The concept is broken down into a series of four divergences from "compactness" relating to "elongation," "indentation," "separation," and "puncturedness." Given this conceptual framework, the use of shape measures in electoral districting is reconsidered and a new shape measure is proposed. This assesses the indentation of a district shape and is based on the internal angles within the shape. It is suggested that this measure may be particularly relevant to the evaluation of proposed new districting patterns. The technique is illustrated using proposed new Congressional Districts for Iowa.

By PETER J. TAYLOR, Lecturer in Geography, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England.

---

951 **Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process.** Recent quantitative studies vastly understate the political conflicts and policy choices that are embedded in the budgetary process. The reason for this lies in the way these quantitative studies have organized budgetary data. Thus far the units of analysis have been federal agencies, the administrative categories of government. The "striking regularities" that have been reported reflect—quite accurately—the great stability of the administrative structure of government. However, these categories do not describe the intense competition between programs and policies that takes place within the framework. We argue, further, that the entire metaphor of an inert bureaucratic machine doing this year essentially what it did last year is erroneous. Rather, priority setting in the federal bureaucracy more resembles the market situation of nineteenth century capitalism where aggressive "policy entrepreneurs," unequal in talent and resources, struggle to build and sustain support for their programs. The competition between policies is both reflected in and promoted by the budgetary process. By shifting the units of analysis to programs and transforming these data so that programs of different size are commensurate, we develop an index that reflects the relative growth and decay of programs as they compete for budgetary resources.

By Peter B. Natchez, Assistant Professor of Politics, Brandeis University and Irvin C. Bupp, Lecturer in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

---

964 COMMUNICATIONS

From Hwa Yol Jung, John D. Nagle, W. Phillips Shively, Howard Ball, Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., Richard Hsiuh Yang, Glendon Schubert, Samuel Krislov

---

970 EDITORIAL COMMENT

---

973 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

Man's Tools and Man's Choices: The Confrontation of Technology and Political Science. William Braden, *The Age of Aquarius: Technology and the Cultural Revolution;* Nigel Calder, *Technopolis: Social Control of the Uses of Science;* William G. Carleton, *Technology and Humanism: Some Exploratory Essays for Our Time;* Martin Greenberger, ed., *Computers, Communications and the Public Interest;* William Kuhns, *The Post-Industrial Prophets: Interpretations of Technology;* Emmanuel Mesthene, *Technological Change: Its Impact on Man and Society;* Herbert Muller, *The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern Technology and Human Values;* Eugene S. Schwartz, *Overskill: The Decline of Technology in Modern Civilization;* Alan F. Westin, ed., *Information Technology in a Democracy.*

By Victor C. Ferkiss, Professor of Government, Georgetown University.

---

981 Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology

Edward Arian, *Bach, Beethoven, and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Philadelphia Orchestra.* Kenneth Sherrill, p. 981
Hugo Adam Bedau, ed., *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice.* Richard Y. Funston, p. 988
C. Randolph Benson, *Thomas Jefferson as Social Scientist.* Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., p. 982
Carl Binger, *Thomas Jefferson: A Well-Tempered Mind.* Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., p. 982
William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, *Academic Scribblers, American Economists in Collision.* William D. Grampp, p. 984
April Carter, *The Political Theory of Anarchism.* R. L. Nichols, p. 985
Frances G. Castles, *Politics and Social Insight.* Stanley W. Moore, p. 987
Carl Cohen, *Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law.* Richard Y. Funston, p. 988
Morton A. Kaplan, *On Historical and Political Knowing: An Inquiry into Some Problems of Universal Law and Human Freedom.* Haskell Fain, p. 989
Richard King, *The Party of Eros: Radical Social Thought and the Realm of Freedom.* Robert Booth Fowler, p. 991
Martin Landau, *Political Theory and Political Science: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry.* Heinz Eulau, p. 992
Murray B. Levin, *Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression.* Robert Booth Fowler, p. 991
Maria Ossawska, *Social Determinants of Moral Ideas.* Ralph Ross, p. 994
Reimut Reiche, *Sexuality and Class Struggle.* Arnold A. Rogow, p. 995
Alice M. Rivlin, *Systematic Thinking for Social Action.* Howard E. Freeman, p. 996
Beatrice K. Rome and Sydney C. Rome, *Organizational Growth Through Decisionmaking: A Computer-Based Experiment in Eductive Method.* Michael D. Cohen, p. 997
Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay.* R. L. Nichols, p. 985
Leslie Sklair, *The Sociology of Progress.* Amitai Etzioni, p. 998
Ronald H. Stone, *Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians.* James F. Childress, p. 999
Jerome Tuccille, *Radical Libertarianism: A New Political Alternative.* Robert Booth Fowler, p. 991
Walter L. Wallace, *The Logic of Science in Sociology,* Neil J. Smelser, p. 1000

1001 American Government and Politics

George T. Blakey, *Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War.* Richard Polenberg, p. 1001
Donald F. Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy.* Harry C. Thomson, p. 1002
Leo Bogart, *Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion.* Bernard Hennessy, p. 1003
David S. Broder, *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America.* Allan P. Sindler, p. 1004
Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.* William R. Keech, p. 1005
Gordon C. Cameron, *Regional Economic Development: The Federal Role.* Lyle C. Fitch, p. 1006
Jonathan D. Casper, *Lawyers Before the Warren Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957–66.* Stephen L. Wasby, p. 1008

Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building.* Ronald O. Loveridge, p. 1009
Richard C. Cortner, *The Apportionment Cases.* Karl A. Lamb, p. 1010
Richard C. Cortner, *The Arizona Train Limit Case, Southern Pacific vs. Arizona.* Jeffrey B. Morris, p. 1012
Richard C. Cortner and Clifford M. Lytle, *Constitutional Law and Politics, Three Arizona Cases.* Jeffrey B. Morris, p. 1012
Robert Eyestone, *The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership.* Earl M. Baker, p. 1013
Louis Fisher, *President and Congress: Power and Policy.* John F. Manley, p. 1014
Fred R. Harris and John V. Lindsay, co-chairmen, *The State of the Cities: Report of the Commission on the Cities in the '70's.* Richard D. Feld, p. 1016
Richard J. Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896.* James A. Meldrum, p. 1016
James E. Krier, *Environmental Law and Policy: Readings, Materials and Notes on Air Pollution and Related Problems.* J. Clarence Davies, III, p. 1018
Robert J. Lampman, *Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty.* William Niskanen, p. 1018
General Thomas A. Lane, *America on Trial: The War for Vietnam.* Dennis J. Duncanson, p. 1020
Leonard Lederman and Margaret Windus, *Federal Funding and National Priorities: An Analysis of Programs, Expenditures, and Research and Development.* Frank C. Colcord, Jr., p. 1020
Ronald O. Loveridge, *City Managers in Legislative Politics.* Jeffrey L. Pressman, p. 1021
John H. McCord, ed., *With All Deliberate Speed.* Robert S. Gerstein, p. 1022
Paul C. Nagel, *This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798–1898.* Richard P. McCormick, p. 1023
Terry B. O'Rourke, *Reapportionment: Law, Politics, Computers.* Karl A. Lamb, p. 1010
James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft.* Nelson W. Polsby, p. 1024
Edward Peeks, *The Long Struggle for Black Power.* Robert E. Martin, p. 1025
Randall B. Ripley, *The Politics of Economic and Human Resource Development.* Eugene Bardach, p. 1026
David H. Rosenbloom, *Federal Service and the Constitution.* Harry H. Wellington, p. 1027
Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965.* Donald Bruce Johnson, p. 1028
Allen Schick, *Budget Innovation in the States.* Ira Sharkansky, p. 1029
June Sochen, ed., *The Black Man and the American Dream: Negro Aspirations in America, 1900–1930.* Robert E. Martin, p. 1025
Joseph R. Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis, 1943–1957.* Theodore Draper, p. 1030
Norman C. Thomas and Hans W. Baade, eds., *The Institutionalized Presidency.* Philippa Strum, p. 1031
Sterling Tucker, *For Blacks Only: Black Strategies for Change in America.* Robert E. Martin, p. 1025
David J. Vogler, *The Third House: Conference Committees in the United States Congress.* Robert L. Peabody, p. 1033
Richard E. Wagner, *The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism.* Lyle C. Fitch, p. 1006

1034 Comparative Government and Politics

T. W. Adams, *Akel: The Communist Party of Cyprus.* Stanley Kyriakides, p. 1034
G. Adhikari, ed., *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. I, 1917–1922.* Marcus F. Franda, p. 1035
Robert F. Arnove, *Student Alienation: A Venezuelan Case Study.* Robert E. Scott, p. 1037
G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The United States and the Trujillo Regime.* N. Joseph Cayer, p. 1037
C. P. Bambhri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India.* Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, p. 1038
Rodney Barker, *Education and Politics, 1900–1951: A Study of the Labour Party.* F. M. Leventhal, p. 1039
Robert H. Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development: A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia.* Robert Melson, p. 1040
John Beattie, *The Nyoro State.* S. R. Charsley, p. 1041
Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949.* Harold Z. Schiffrin, p. 1042
Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World.* Francis H. Heller, p. 1044
Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Legislative Process: A Case Study of Two Transportation Bills.* Arthur Bruce Boenau, p. 1044
Brian Chapman, *Police State.* Samuel G. Chapman, p. 1045
Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule.* Keith R. Legg, p. 1094
Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation.* Wayne Wilcox, p. 1046
William B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa.* Edouard Bustin, p. 1047
Jean Claude Colliard, *Les Républicains indépendants: Valérie Giscard d'Estaing.* William G. Andrews, p. 1048
R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics.* Malcolm H. Kerr, p. 1049
Horst Duhnke, *Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945.* Henry Krisch, p. 1050
Howard L. Erdman, *Political Attitudes of Indian Industry: A Case Study of the Baroda Industrial Elite.* Richard D. Lambert, p. 1052
Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969.* Lawrence Ziring, p. 1052
P. Ford and G. Ford, *A Guide to Parliamentary Papers, 3rd. ed.* James B. Christoph, p. 1054
Meyer Galler and Harlan E. Marquess, *Soviet Prison Camp Speech: A Survivor's Glossary.* Gayle Durham Hollander, p. 1054

J. Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch, *L'An 40: La Belgique occupée.* Howard Bliss, p. 1055
Eli Ginzberg, *Manpower for Development: Perspectives on Five Continents.* John C. Shearer, p. 1056
Maurice A. Glele, *Naissance d'un Etat Noir: L'évolution politique et constitutionnelle du Dahomey, de la colonisation à nos jours.* Samuel Decalo, p. 1057
Richard Grunberger, *The Twelve-Year Reich. A Social History of Nazi Germany.* Peter Pulzer, p. 1058
John Patrick Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920–1939.* Marcus F. Franda, p. 1035
Theodore S. Hamerow, *The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871: Struggles and Accomplishments.* Glenn N. Schram, p. 1059
H. J. Hanham, *Scottish Nationalism.* Richard W. Mansbach, p. 1060
James J. Heaphey, ed., *Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration.* Alfred Diamant, p. 1061
Barbara Wolfe Jancar, *Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System.* Ivo D. Duchacek, p. 1063
G. Wesley Johnson, Jr., *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900–1920.* Irving Leonard Markovitz, p. 1064
Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies.* Donald V. Schwartz, p. 1066
Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo.* M. Crawford Young, p. 1068
Stefan Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry.* Thomas W. Simons, Jr., p. 1069
Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan: A Case of Political Naturalization.* George O. Totten, III, p. 1070
Herman Lebovics, *Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914–1933.* Annelise Thimme, p. 1071
Antonín J. Liehm, ed., *The Politics of Culture.* Ivan Sviták, p. 1073
Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War.* John F. Coverdale, p. 1074
Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson, *Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution.* Theodore H. Von Laue, p. 1076
Richard R. Nelson, T. Paul Schultz, and Robert L. Slighton, *Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia's Problems and Prospects.* R. A. Berry, p. 1076
S. J. R. Noel, *Politics in Newfoundland.* Steven B. Wolinetz, p. 1078
Erwin Oberlander, ed., *Russia Enters the 20th Century.* Alfred Levin, p. 1079
Robert J. O'Neill, *The Army in Papua-New Guinea.* Peta Colebatch, p. 1080
Nissan Oren, *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944.* J. F. Brown, p. 1081
J. Gregory Oswald, *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960–1968.* George I. Blanksten, p. 1082
Frederick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898–1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America.* William B. Bristol, p. 1083
Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland, 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government.* Edward D. Wynot, Jr., p. 1084
John P. Powelson, *Institutions of Economic Growth: A Theory of Conflict Management in Developing Countries.* David Nachmias, p. 1085
Peter Reddaway, ed., *Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union.* Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 1086
G. K. Roberts, *West German Politics.* Timothy A. Tilton, p. 1088
H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler, eds., *Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development.* Susan Kaufman Purcell, p. 1089
Robert C. Stuart, *The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture.* James R. Millar, p. 1090
Tamas Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment.* W. W. Rostow, p. 1091
Kotaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto (The Japanese Communist Party Bared).* George O. Totten, III, p. 1070
Goh Cheng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia.* B. Simandjuntak, p. 1093
Constantine Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy.* Keith R. Legg, 1094
R. K. Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia.* Fred R. von der Mehden, p. 1096
Jean-Claude Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo.* René Lemarchand, p. 1096
Dick Wilson, *The Long March: The Epic of Chinese Communism's Survival, 1935.* John E. Rue, p. 1098
Eugene Zaleski, *Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918–1932.* Holland Hunter, p. 1099

100 International Politics, Law and Organization

Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management.* Steven L. Spiegel, p. 1100
Michael Barratt Brown, *After Imperialism.* James R. Kurth, p. 1101
Martin Carnoy, *Industrialization in a Latin American Common Market.* Roger D. Hansen, p. 1111
Colin Cherry, *World Communication: Threat or Promise? A Sociotechnical Approach.* Ithiel de Sola Pool, p. 1102
Hungdah Chiu, *The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties.* James C. Hsiung, p. 1103
E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, eds., *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe.* Jan F. Triska, p. 1104
Frank Dawson and Ivan L. Head, *International Law, National Tribunals, and the Rights of Aliens.* Robert R. Wilson, p. 1105

Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International: 1919–1943, 3 Vols.* Alvin Z. Rubinstein, p. 1106
I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.* Burton M. Sapin, p. 1106
Larry L. Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing The United Nations for Peacekeeping.* Daniel S. Cheever, p. 1108
Louise Fitzsimons, *The Kennedy Doctrine.* Simon Serfaty, p. 1117
Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War, Vol. I: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917–1950; Vol. II: From the Korean War to the Present.* Paul Dukes, p. 1109
Ross Gregory, *Origins of American Intervention in the First World War.* David F. Trask, p. 1110
Joseph Grunwald, Miguel S. Wionczek, and Martin Carnoy, *Latin American Economic Integration and U. S. Policy.* Roger D. Hansen, p. 1111
Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace.* Gordon A. Craig, p. 1113
Kiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U. S.-Japanese Relations.* Donald C. Hellmann, p. 1114
Walter F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920.* James S. Magee, p. 1114
Leonid N. Kutakov, *Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Pacific War: A Soviet View.* Hans H. Baerwald, p. 1114
Joyce C. Lebra, *Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army.* Willard H. Elsbree, p. 1116
James E. McSherry, *Khrushchev and Kennedy in Retrospect.* Simon Serfaty, p. 1117
Mark Mancall, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728.* Donald W. Treadgold, p. 1119
John R. Niland, *The Asian Engineering Brain Drain.* Edwin P. Reubens, p. 1120
Riordan Roett, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast.* Kenneth D. Frederick, p. 1121
Fuad Rouhani, *A History of O.P.E.C.* Stephen D. Krasner, p. 1122
Arthur G. Rubinoff, *India's Use of Force in Goa.* Mukund G. Untawale, p. 1123
George Schwarzenberger, *International Law and Order.* Thomas M. Franck, p. 1124
Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism.* Kirk R. Emmert, p. 1125
Anthony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917 to 1930.* Howard J. Sherman, p. 1126
Francis O. Wilcox, *Congress, The Executive, and Foreign Policy.* Inis L. Claude, Jr., p. 1128

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President: Robert E. Ward, Stanford University; *President-Elect:* Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; *Vice Presidents:* Charles V. Hamilton, Columbia University; Ralph K. Huitt, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges; Ruth C. Silva, Pennsylvania State University; *Secretary:* Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan; *Treasurer:* Charles O. Jones, University of Pittsburgh; *Program Chairman:* Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; *Executive Director:* Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* Nelson W. Polsby, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1972–1973: Christian Bay, University of Toronto; Samuel Dubois Cook, Duke University; Valerie A. Earle, Georgetown University; Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester; Robert O. Keohane, Stanford University; Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota; Gerhard Loewenberg, University of Iowa; Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago. 1973–1974: Paul Y. Hammond, Rand Corporation; Donald G. Herzberg, Georgetown University; Matthew Holden, Jr., University of Wisconsin, Madison; Robert Horwitz, Kenyon College; H. Mark Roelofs, New York University; Roberta S. Sigel, State University of New York, Buffalo; Sidney Wise, Franklin and Marshall College.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernst Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Gardner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederick A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. MacMahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: Nelson W. Polsby, *Managing Editor, University of California, Berkeley;* Philip Siegelman, *Book Review Editor, California State University, San Francisco;* Shlomo Avineri, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* Brian Barry, *Nuffield College, Oxford University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* Samuel D. Cook, *Duke University;* Elmer E. Cornwell, *Brown University;* S. Rufus Davis, *Monash University;* Robert C. Fried, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Arthur S. Goldberg, *University of Rochester;* Nannerl O. Keohane, *Swarthmore College;* Peter Laslett, *Trinity College, Cambridge University;* Dale Rogers Marshall, *University of California, Davis;* Russell D. Murphy, *Wesleyan University;* Joan M. Nelson, *The Urban Institute;* H. Douglas Price, *Harvard University;* Robert D. Putnam, *University of Michigan;* Douglas W. Rae, *Yale University;* Austin Ranney, *University of Wisconsin;* Giovanni Sartori, *University of Florence;* Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii;* Stephen V. Stephens, *The Johns Hopkins University;* George E. Von der Muhll, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri;* Richard Winters, *Dartmouth College.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** Ellen Y. Siegelman. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Barbara Epstein, Barbara Kelly. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** Peter Cowhey, Craig Garrett, Yvonne Jones, Sam Kernell, David Laitin, William M. Lunch, Ian Lustick, Dan Metlay, Matthew Pinkus, Alex Radian, Brinton Rowdybush, Byron Shafer, Robert Stumpf, Stephen Van Evera, Arthur Trueger, Harry Williams.

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$20
$12,000–$15,000	$25
Over $15,000	$30
Student and Retired	$10
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$35

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $7.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1968 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; for issues 1968 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review to* Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 150 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page, and should also be doubled-spaced. Manuscripts that do not follow this format will be returned to the authors for retyping.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for revieew to Philip Siegelman, *American Political Science Review,* 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsjournal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June, 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index* of the *Review,* Volumes 1–62: 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity

A. H. SOMJEE

Simon Fraser University

The relationship between caste and democratic institutions in India has been the main focus of attention of the students of Indian studies for nearly a quarter of a century. It has presented a many-sided challenge to social analysts as a problem in structural-functionalism, social interactionism, and political dynamism. Invariably, in this relationship, the political element is thought to be growing progressively stronger and at times catalyzing other forces. It has as a result inspired a lot of lively writing on the theme of social change. At the theoretical level a variety of explanations have been offered for the understanding of the interaction between the traditional social organization based on the principle of hierarchy and the new political institutions inspired by the norms of equality. Some of the explanations have been motivated by a search for an all-explanatory theory of the Indian sociopolitical system, based on an all-pervading single factor, somewhat similar to the Marxian theory of *class*, the analogue, in the Indian contexts, being *caste*. Other explanations go in search of adaptive structures, which according to Parsons help societies out of their discordant situations. Adaptive structures in the Indian contexts are supposed to take the form of *caste associations*, which supposedly lessen the traumatic shock of political modernization by smoothly forging the operative relationship between the traditional society and the new political institutions. The single factor explanations treat caste as a cohesive unit even in politics, whereas the explanations based on adaptive structure, because of the inevitable power rivalries and cleavages within caste association, identify increasing political differentiation within the voluntary body. The theories of caste association also treat it as a vital means of political socialization.

I shall argue, however, that both these sets of explanations are simplistic and ambiguous, that they tend to treat caste in politics abstractly rather than examine the actual *involvement* of specific castes in their day-to-day politics in empirically testable situations over an extended period of time. The bulk of castes in India do not have caste associations: what they have instead are caste councils (caste panchayats) which merely address themselves to the primary *social* concerns of the caste—namely, endogamy, ritual, and pollution. A distinction, therefore, has to be made between those castes which add voluntary structures, such as caste associations, to their existing ascriptive body and those which do not. Here again, one must empirically determine the answer to the crucial question: To what extent is the primary social cohesion of the ascriptive structure available to such newly added voluntary bodies? Finally, one needs to take a hard look at the function of political socialization attributed to caste associations wherever they exist. In my view these associations do not always perform such a function. At times they even seek to set back the political clock. Indeed, the present research suggests that *fragments* of castes, dispersed in different areas, get inducted into the political system and receive far more effective grass-roots political socialization than they do through the efforts of caste association.

I shall substantiate these and other assertions with the help of material collected in fieldwork in Gujarat extending for seven years in a rural community and for six years in an urban community. It will be the argument of this paper that in order to explain the interaction between castes and democratic institutions in India we need a theory of cohesion which can identify the extent of caste solidarity when it is engaged in three different kinds of pursuits: (a) preserving itself as an endogamous unit with a distinct social identity of its own within the Hindu social organization; (b) seeking a predetermined social mobility and pressing for a higher social recognition; and (c) searching for better economic opportunities or a share in political power or both. The extent of cohesion that castes can muster in these three different pursuits is not always the same.

The paper, then, is divided into parts that discuss the following main topics: the Srinivas-Harrison model of the subsumption of the new political institutions into the caste system; the Weiner-Rudolphs model of caste association and the consequent increasing political differentiation within castes; my own model of levels of caste cohesion, leadership bifurcation, and decision-making fragmentation; political stimulus and response in a rural community; social cohesion and political difference in an urban community; and the emerging horizontal fragmentation of decision-making units.

The Srinivas-Harrison Model

Professor M. N. Srinivas, who has done a great deal of perceptive writing on caste as a cultural anthropologist, has expressed the view that the establishment of *Pax Britannica* provided the various castes with the opportunity of overcoming the "severe limits on the horizontal extension of .... ties,"[1] which were imposed on them by the pre-British fragmentary political kingdoms in India. Added to this were the increased facilities for communication and transport which brought together men of the same castes who were "scattered in far-flung villages."[2] Long before parliamentary institutions were established in India, the networks of social organization on caste lines had proliferated. Such networks in the postindependence period were used in order to influence votes, which in turn evoked "widespread condemnation of exploitation of caste-links for election purposes"[3] from the national leaders. Because the social organization of the castes on horizontal lines had *preceded* the introduction of democratic ideology, they found it easier to subsume the new political institutions.

This thesis of Srinivas was much more effectively articulated by Selig Harrison in his case-study of caste in Andhra politics. Harrison mainly concentrated on the politics of the castes in the Andhra state legislature. Pushing Srinivas' thesis to its logical conclusion, Harrison argued his case from a model of *caste-party* identity, according to which the two peasant castes of Andhra, namely, Kammas and Reddis, first united to dislodge the Brahmins from power, then fell apart as a result of political rivalry, and joined two different political parties. The Kammas joined the Communist Party and the Reddis joined the Congress Party.[4] In Harrison's view, therefore, the nature of political cleavage in Andhra was none other than the politically transformed social cleavage between the two peasant castes.

Harrison's work, despite its pessimism and its failure to provide a helpful model, was one of the finest contributions to Indian political sociology, unsurpassed to this date, in my view. So persuasive was his argument that a generation of students of Indian studies did not even get down to questioning his model of caste-party identity against the background of electoral data that he had provided—data that, in fact, did not fully substantiate his thesis.[5]

The Weiner-Rudolphs Model

From the point of view of the impact of the new political ideology on the traditional social organization of the castes, its induction into the political system, and its consequences, Myron Weiner and the Rudolphs presented some of the most sophisticated arguments. Their writings brought into the field of Indian studies a host of structural-functional perspectives and explanations. The Rudolphs actually concluded by means of their functionalist analysis, that the Indians had a genius for adaptation and assimilation when faced with the possibility of conflict and disruption.

Weiner rejected the traditional-modern dichotomy on the grounds that it regarded traditionalism as "temporary and reactionary" and

---

[1] M. N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 15, 16.

[2] Srinivas, p. 16.

[3] Srinivas, p. 2.

[4] Selig Harrison, *India, the Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 211–12.

[5] In substantiation of his argument, Harrison provided the following two tables (pp. 211–12):

Table III. Number of candidates by major castes in Andhra Delta Districts, in 1946, 1951 and 1955 State Assembly elections

Year	Communist				Congress			
	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other
1946	9	—	1	1	4	3	4	7
1951	22	2	3	15	17	7	2	20
1955	32	4	6	24	28	7	7	25

Table IV. Number of elected legislators by major castes in Andhra Delta Districts in 1946, 1951, and 1955 State Assembly elections

Year	Communist				Congress			
	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other	Kamma	Reddi	Brahman	Other
1946	—	—	—	—	4	3	4	7
1951	14	2	3	6	3	3	—	4
1955	1	2	3	3	24	7	7	25

modernity as "the wave of the future."[6] What is true, on the other hand, is that "as economic growth has occurred in India and political awareness had increased, the number of community associations has grown." Further, "within political parties ascriptive identifications are playing a prominent role" and the major social institutions, with the exception of family and kinship units, "have associations that articulate their interests." While each of these institutions does not have its own political associations, ". . . increasingly, such groupings have had their political manifestations."[7]

It is indeed impossible to confirm that each caste in India, and there are more than 3,000 of them,[8] has an association which articulates its interests. What probably the bulk of them do is merely to seek what guarantees the survival of their cultural identity within the Hindu social organization. It would also be true to say that the bulk of them do not aspire to play a political role *as castes*. What one comes across, time and time again in fieldwork, is that political parties and electioneering candidates in search of support explore the possibility of using the social cohesion and communication channels of various castes. In that fashion, fragments of certain castes get inducted into the political process, while others do not. What portions of localized fragments of a caste get mobilized by parties and their candidates can be empirically determined. It would be, therefore, misleading to suggest that the whole caste *as a caste* gets politically mobilized and comes out with "political manifestations." In my view, empirical confirmation of the extent of political mobilization of certain castes such as the Kshatriyas, Nadars, and Jats, which did get massively involved in political activity, will dispel the en bloc view of caste politicization.

Weiner made a questionable inference that given the conditions of economic development and growth of political consciousness, castes in India came to acquire economic interests and political ambition of their own *as castes* and to give themselves voluntary associations to be able to pursue them. Nevertheless, he did raise a few pertinent questions: What in fact does happen to the primary social cohesion of a caste when it is confronted with a new set of problems? Does it always take on nonsocial and nontraditional functions as a caste? To what extent is it able to retain its primary social cohesion when it takes on new roles and functions? These and other related questions we shall examine in the next section.

Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph made a fascinating attempt at developing what they called "the sociology of caste associations." They started where Weiner had left off. While Weiner was engaged in identifying the emergence of caste association and its roles and functions, the Rudolphs in *The Modernity of Tradition* took for granted its existence in all parts of India.[9] The question they asked was: In what way do the norms of a voluntary body such as the caste association exercise influence on the caste itself? They contended that the influence of such norms and of the institutional facilities on the caste was enormous. In their words:

> Caste is losing the functions, norms and structure once associated with it and acquiring new ones.

These two tables indicate that the Kammas as well as the Reddis had contested the elections from both the political parties, Communist and Congress. In the 1946 election, there were more Kammas in the Congress than Reddis and none in the Communist party, although nine had contested the election on its ticket. While in the 1951 election the candidature of the Kammas on the Communist party ticket had more than doubled, their candidature for the Congress had gone up more than four times. The candidature of the Reddis on the Congress ticket had just about doubled itself. While in terms of the *1951* election results the Kammas had won a great number of seats on the Communist ticket, their strength within the Congress party remained at par with their caste rivals, the Reddis. In the 1955 election the Kammas had outnumbered the Reddis, inside the Congress, by more than three to one. Simultaneously they were wiped out as a force in the Assembly as Communists: in 1955 instead of 14 Kamma Communist MLA's there was only one. These figures did not establish Harrison's thesis of caste-party identity. On the contrary they presented us with a picture of party inroads into castes. There were obviously more Kammas to go around for both the parties and subsequently the Kammas as well as the Reddis concentrated on the Congress. See Harrison, p. 219.

[6] See Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 37.

[7] Weiner, pp. 37–38, my italics.

[8] No one exactly knows what the total number of castes in India is. There are certain genuine difficulties: the problem of determining the status of breakaway fragments of castes, social mobility of certain sections of them, migrations and the emergence of sectional identity, uncontrolled assimilation of the groups of Adivasis into the Hindu social organizations, etc. It is well-nigh impossible to keep track of these continuing processes spread over the entire Indian subcontinent together with the areas of Indian migrations and arrive at a definite figure regarding the total number of castes. The above-mentioned rough total is taken from Robert Hardgrave's *The Nadars of Tamilnad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). He maintained, "There are in India more than three thousand castes, each culturally distinct endogamous community sharing traditionally a common occupation and a particular position in the localized hierarchy of caste ranking" (p. 2).

[9] Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 62.

> It is serving the ritual and occupational goals of traditional society less, the mobility and participation goals of modern society more. In doing so, it [the ascriptive-voluntary body] helps to substitute in the lives of ordinary Indians choice for birth, equality for hierarchy, and opportunity for fate.[10]

Once a voluntary body is added onto the caste, they argued, the norms of the former begin to prevail upon those of the latter. The Rudolphs, as a matter of fact, saw the "reincarnation"[11] of caste in caste association, and for all practical purposes they treated the association as an agent of change. By means of caste associations, they argued, the teeming millions of India, born in the rigid ascriptive structures of castes, are being homogenized, secularized, and democratized into the new ways of democratic society.[12] What makes such a transformation smoother is "corporatism" all the way: from the corporatism of caste to the modern corporatism of the caste association with little or no intervening "individualist" phase as in the case of western countries.[13]

The Rudolphs provided a sophisticated model of the political mobilization capacity of caste associations. The model helped them to identify three different types of mobilizations: vertical, horizontal, and differential, depending upon the stage of development and internal integration of particular castes.[14] The vertical mobilization takes place through the effort of "traditional notables"; horizontal mobilization by means of integration of caste fragments spread over dispersed areas; and differentiated mobilization through the efforts of political parties, differently appealing to different segments of caste in terms of "ideology, sentiment and interest."[15]

Once an ascriptive body such as the caste "reincarnates" itself into a voluntary caste association, internal differences and cleavages within the caste come to acquire a *political* significance. Political parties further help articulate their differences. "It is in this sense," the Rudolphs argued, "that modern politics appears to be an instrument for both the revival and the supersession of traditional society."[16]

The Rudolphs' model rests on the assumption that caste means the same thing to all people belonging to the Hindu social organization. While they start off with the view that different castes possess different degrees of internal cohesion, their picture of *the caste* is largely deduced from a model of the rising peasant castes or groups of castes such as the Kshatriyas, the Nadars, the Jats, etc. These castes have certain common characteristics but it would be misleading to say that *all* other castes share them. Since some castes have caste associations the Rudolphs wrongly assume that all other castes also have them. Not all the castes in India have caste associations in the sense of voluntary organizations looking after economic and political problems. The bulk of them have *caste councils*, and they are integrally connected with the maintenance of the ascriptive character of castes.

Further, the Rudolphs have attributed the functions of homogenization, secularization, and democratization to caste associations.[17] Such an assertion is supported by them by means of broad generalizations about the activities of caste associations. This point being most crucial, specific empirical support in favor of their argument would have been most helpful. On the other hand, as we shall presently see, the fragments of castes attained a fair measure of political socialization and internalization of the norms of the new political institutions *despite* the self-seeking activities of some of the office-bearers of caste associations. Some of the leaders of the caste associations, such as the Kshatriya Sabha, wanted to *desecularize* whatever electoral differentiation and secularity had been attained through day-to-day political involvement by the Kshatriyas in a rural community in Gujarat. Finally, the Kshatriya Sabha as a caste association did not aim at the homogenization of the group of castes which called themselves *Kshatriyas,* nor did its activities have that result. On the contrary its domination by the princely order resulted in a revolt led by a leadership of humbler origin—a revolt which on the eve of the general election of 1967 finally split the organization into two groups: The Kshatriya Sabha and the Kshatriya Seva Samaj. In conclusion, then, one must recognize that in the process of homogenization, secularization, and democratization evident in rural as well as urban India, factors such as increased emphasis on education, accelerated pace of industrialization, better facilities for transport and communication, growth of regional language press, growing awareness of economic and administrative problems, intensely contested elections, and above all, political involvement in local situations, merit due recognition. These processes were *not* set in motion by caste associations, and the influence on political participation exerted on members of castes by existing associations requires specific and rigorous analysis. Broad theoretical formulations in these areas initially help us to identify problem situations: by themselves they do not make our knowledge certain. Certain knowledge requires the rigorous empirical test of hypotheses deduced from our theory.

---

[10] Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 103.

[11] Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 62.

[12] Rudolph and Rudolph, pp. 27–28.

[13] Disputing Marx's thesis that the British rule in India would eventually lead to the atomization even of Indian villages and castes, the Rudolphs argue that "India has shown a strong propensity to *transform* rather than *supersede* traditional corporate structures, to move imperceptibly from traditional to modern corporatism without so marked an intervening individualist phase as the West is said to have experienced" (Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 23, my italics).

[14] Rudolph and Rudolph, pp. 24–26.

[15] Rudolph and Rudolph, pp. 25–26.

[16] Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 97.

[17] Rudolph and Rudolph, p. 34–36.

A Model for Social Cohesion, Leadership, and Decision Making

The initial consumers of all scientific knowledge are the practitioners of the science itself: they check and test its explicit assertions and underlying assumptions. Such an exercise, however, cannot be undertaken if the theoretical formulations are couched in blanket terms. So far as the phenomenon of caste and democratic institutions is concerned, the blanket terms of "caste association,"[18] "caste federation,"[19] and "adaptive structure"[20] are used in order to explain the *entire* range of operative relationships between caste as a unit of traditional society and the superimposed modern democratic institutions and procedures. These at best explain one or a few specific aspects of their relationships.

Difficulties arise when caste *in* politics is taken to mean the participation by caste with its social cohesion and communication network intact. The problem is further complicated when voluntary dimensions of "association" and complex cooperative dimensions of "federation" are added on to a strictly ascriptive structure such as caste. Taken at their dictionary meanings "caste" and "association" are as much opposites as are "ascriptive" and "voluntary." The use of the term "caste association" can only indicate an association of some people of the same caste but not of the entire caste. In making such a distinction what is underlined is that the extent of cohesion and communication network available to a caste for its primary social concerns, which makes it an ascriptive body, cannot be taken for granted when only some members of it band themselves into an "association" and seek to pursue nontraditional goals.

Among others, the primary social concerns of a caste are endogamy, ritual, and pollution. In the realization of those goals a caste enjoys maximum internal cohesion and the most effective use of its communication network. Such traditional concerns are basic to the caste's survival as an ascriptive structure with a distinct cultural identity of its own within the Hindu social organization; when a caste moves from these concerns toward a search for higher social recognition, economic opportunities, and a share in political power, its internal cohesion becomes progressively weaker. Search for social recognition, which is an attempt in the direction of ascriptive regeneration and a more desired position within the social hierarchy, may be blessed, sectionally or wholely, with the same extent of cohesion and a sense of togetherness as exists in a caste when it pursues its primary social concerns. But a caste's economic and political drives necessarily lead it to an internal competition for enhanced status, material gain, and therefore, to dissensions in the pursuit of specific goals and rivalry for power positions in general. It is therefore pointless to talk about the presence of the same extent of cohesion in a caste for its economic and political pursuits as exists for its social pursuits. A caste engaged in the former is not even *caste-like* in its concerns, which traditionally speaking are primarily *social,* and therefore anything other than that becomes a concern not *of* the caste but on its behalf by a group of members. As opposed to the maximum cohesion arising out of the basic social concerns of a caste, its economic and political pursuits involve appeals to new identity, economic gain, power, and status, each of which is a potential divider. Hence, each of the new appeals is invariably prefaced with a call for unity.

In order to grasp the operative relationship between castes and the newly established democratic institutions in India, therefore, we require a model which can address itself to the following: differentiation in the internal cohesion of caste, differentiation in its leadership, and horizontal or factional segmentation of its decision-making units. Let me explain each of these in some detail.

---

[18] Rudolph and Rudolph, pp. 29–36.

[19] Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh Maru, "Federating for Political Interests: The Kshatriyas of Gujarat" in *Caste in Indian Politics,* ed. Rajni Kothari (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1970), pp. 70–101.

[20] Harold Gould, "Adaptive Functions of Caste in Contemporary Indian Society," *Asian Survey,* 3 (September, 1963), 427–438.

Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Levels of Caste Cohesion

It is important to note here that the quality and extent of cohesion of a caste changes from one kind of pursuit to another. A caste enjoys explicit or tacit concurrence and support of all its members when it is engaged in those functions which maintain its distinct cultural identity. It maintains this by its firm grip both on endogamy and, to a lesser extent, on matters relating to ritual and to pollution. It treats these three functions as its *raison d'être* and demands the support of the entire group towards their realization. Pursuit of these and the maintenance of norms implicit in them equally become the concern of all, although caste leaders, mostly venerated old men, became formally responsible for overall supervision through the caste councils.

When a caste strives for a higher social recognition within the Hindu social organization, it takes on itself a new nontraditional function. For such a purpose a caste has to demonstrate a higher ritual standard which becomes a responsibility of all its members.[21] To achieve such a goal the caste elders require the assistance of a new set of leaders to help them formulate a rationale for the drive, carry on public relations work, enter into complex and often tough negotiations with the leaders of other castes and administrators, formulate strategies, and execute tactics.[22] While the traditional and nontraditional leaders together launch such a drive, the outcome of their efforts affects all the members of the caste.[23]

Such a venture on the part of the caste is able to induce a secondary cohesion because while all the members are affected by such a drive and even have to conform to ritual norms higher than those they were used to, the bulk of its members remain passive participants. Their participation in such a venture obviously is not of the same quality, intensity, and scope as in the case of basic social concerns of the caste—namely, endogamy, ritual, and pollution. As a matter of fact in the caste's drive toward a higher social recognition, its internal cohesion is stretched to its optimum limits. Such a cohesion then is *secondary,* because it is not a part of a deeply ingrained mode of traditional behavior for the age-old social pursuits but is something that is *rationally* put across, with a sharper role distinction between the leaders and the followers, and is directed toward a social destiny which is new and unfamiliar.

Finally, there is a tertiary level of cohesion. When a caste is engaged in a drive to secure better economic opportunities or a share in political power or an appointment of a caste member to public office, not everyone in the caste is either involved in it or directly affected by it. In gossip groups among the rank and file one often hears a sharp distinction drawn between those who would directly benefit by such a drive and the rest. The leaders, likely to benefit by such a drive, exhort their followers to get behind them. Since such drives are thus out-and-out nontraditional and lacking in religious sanction and in social organizational reference, they evidence a *tertiary* level of cohesion of the caste or factions thereof. From start to finish such drives are considered suspect for being in the interest of the few, and therefore politically divisive. Castes which get involved in such drives progressively disintegrate whatever cohesion they are able to muster at the tertiary level without losing their cohesion at the primary social level. Even in a politically divided caste, the basic social function of supervising endogamy, ritual, and pollution remains unaffected.

The following chart summarizes the relationship between caste and level of cohesion.

Bifurcation of Social and Political Leadership in Castes at the Grass-Roots Level

The operation of grass-roots democratic institutions, now nearly a quarter of a century old, has brought about a significant shift towards leadership differentiation within castes. The venerated old leaders, who sat on the caste councils as well as the statutory panchayats, have by and large, withdrawn themselves from the panchayats. Relatively younger men have taken charge of the statutory bodies. The reasons for such a differentiation are manifold: new norms and new mechanisms of decision making introduced by democratic political institutions which remain inconsistent with the traditional ways of arriving at decisions; the decline of respect for age and in some cases familial status; a questioning political culture introduced by democracy; and, above all, the

---

[21] M. N. Srinivas has used the term "Sanskritization" in order to indicate a number of means used in order to gain recognition for higher social status. One of these is a conscious attempt to conform and be seen as conforming to higher ritual standards. See in this connection his *Social Change in Modern India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 6.

[22] See in this connection a fascinating paper by William Rowe, "The New Cauhans: A Caste Mobility Movement in North India" in *Social Mobility in the Caste System in India,* ed. James Silverberg (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). See also M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India,* pp. 1–45.

[23] See F. G. Bailey, *Caste, Tribe and Nation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960).

Caste and Three Levels of Cohesion

Extent of Cohesion	Extent of Involvement of its Members	Nature of Cohesion
(1) Maintaining a distinct cultural identity within the Hindu social organization by means of its basic social concerns: endogamy, ritual, and pollution.	All members of caste equally affected and equally involved. Formal role distinction between the caste veterans and the rest.	Traditional goals pursued through deeply ingrained behavior. Feeling of oneness on the part of the whole caste. Primary cohesion brought about by means of ascriptive togetherness.
(2) Seeking greater social recognition; emulation of higher ritual standards.	All members of caste equally affected but not equally involved. Some become effective leaders. Role distinction between leaders and followers clearly recognized.	Nontraditional goals rationally conceived and widely shared. Deliberately brought about group support and unity. Secondary cohesion.
(3) Seeking better economic opportunities and greater share in political power.	Few affected and fewer actively involved. The rest become onlookers, suspicious or hostile. Voiced or unvoiced distinction between those who would benefit and the rest.	Material goals and plea for identification with the cause. Mystique of group importance and benefit. Uncertain group support and potential divisions. Tertiary cohesion.

needed skill in coalition building *across* castes for which the elders had neither any experience nor aptitude.

The net effect of such a leadership differentiation on the general cohesion of the caste is worth noting. Traditional respectability remained with the social leaders and they continued to enjoy castewide support in social matters. *Political* leadership, on the other hand, came to be associated with the seamy side of politics where people with money, leisure, manipulative disposition, devious methods, etc. seemed to be caught in frictions and engaged in power games and the pursuit of personal glory. Consequently, the support received by the political leaders was for the caste per se rather than for what they did or stood for. Since politics did not and could not become one of the primary concerns of the caste, faction building and divisiveness could easily develop. What has finally emerged out of the bifurcation of leadership is an insulated social cohesion, on the one hand, and an ever increasing political differentiation, on the other.

Fragmentation of the Decision-Making Units of the Caste

The decisions about the primary social concerns of the caste are made by the caste council and affect all the persons belonging to the caste; it is difficult, however, to find any similarly binding decision-making machinery for the nonsocial matters of the caste. Once we move away from the basic social concerns of the caste what we notice is the fragmentation in its decision-making processes on horizontal and factional lines. Because of the attenuation of caste cohesion in nonsocial matters, and also because of the separation of its social and political leadership, the effective area of decision making often shrinks from the caste as a whole to its subunits. They are as follows:


Caste, a collection of endogamous units spread over several villages
An endogamous unit of the caste spread over few villages and having its own caste council
Kingroup spread over more than one neighborhood
Kingroup neighborhood
Extended Family
Family

Figure 1. Range of decision-making units

Of these, the most effective unit of social interaction and decision making on a large range of issues, including the *political,* is the kingroup neighborhood and factions within it, or those that cut across such neighborhoods. Within them, where to vote is decided in the same fashion as which school to send one's children to, which doctor or lawyer to consult, where to go shopping, which movie to go to, etc.—collectively and with one's circle of acquaintances. On all such issues group decision making in the neighborhood is a way of life in which decisions on political matters are no exception. In a multikingroup or a multicaste neighborhood, the framework of decision making would correspond to the framework of social interaction.

In such socially interactive decision-making groups, influentials play an important part. Such neighborhood fragments are often linked through the liaison of the influentials by political parties and electioneering candidates. In marshaling a wider support, the caste of a contesting candidate can be an important factor but not the sole factor. Innumerable instances can be found when such neighborhoods under the influence of their own leaders did not give their electoral support to the candidate of their own caste. To be effective in a caste or multicaste neighborhood a candidate must have the influentials on his side. The flow of political influence is directed essentially through them. In that sense the framework of electoral influence is no different from the one described in *The People's Choice,* especially in the theory of the two-step flow of communication, which holds that the media influence "the opinion leaders" first, and they in turn influence "the less active sections of the population."[24] The present analysis substitutes the electioneering candidate or his agents for the media, wherever the media are not a significant factor.

What is thought of as the "caste vote" or caste "vote bank,"[25] is essentially a successful piecing together of horizontally, geographically, and factionally segmented votes scattered over different neighborhoods of the same caste. Even in such instances, neighborhood electoral diversity is as much of a possibility as homogeneity.

En bloc caste vote and political homogeneity are rapidly disappearing in the contemporary Indian political culture. Instead, electoral diversity within castes is growing in the face of tireless effort on the part of certain "caste associations" and the adroit nomination of caste candidates to attract caste votes.

In the following section I shall illustrate, with the help of my field data, the significance of the bifurcation of social and political leadership for the political development of a rural community, especially for the growth within the community of a dynamic cross-caste political cleavage structure.[26] The section after that will illustrate the proliferating political differentiation, despite social cohesion, in an urban community. In both these cases the part played by the only politically active caste association, the Kshatriya Sabha, was marginal.

Political Stimulus and Response in a Rural Community

A continuing field study of a village near Baroda conducted intensively during four periods between 1959 and 1971 did not confirm the view that the castes get inducted into the democratic process by means of "caste associations." Out of the four politically significant castes—namely, Patidars (8 per cent), Kshatriyas (46 per cent), Vasavas (14 per cent), and Venkars (ex-Untouchables, 7 per cent)—only the Kshatriyas were approached by their so-called caste association, the Kshatriya Sabha, during the general elections of 1962, 1967, and 1971. On each occasion the bulk of Kshatriyas did not heed its electoral instructions and, indeed, branded the body as an organization of the upper-crust Rajputs interested in mobilizing political support on behalf of the vested interests and feudal elements. The Kshatriyas of the village were politically socialized into the ways of democratic politics like any other caste in the village: by means of actual political participation.

The village had undergone a major political change—from nonelected to elected political institutions—without the help of caste associations, political parties, or brokers. When the democratic institutions were introduced in the village, various castes, at different levels of political development and internal cohesion, responded differently to the structural changes.

---

[24] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 151.

[25] M. N. Srinivas first used the expression "vote-bank" in connection with political influence of patron over client. See his paper on "The Social System of a Mysore Village" in *Village India: Studies in the Little Community,* ed. McKim Marriot (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955). Later F. G. Bailey used the expression in order to refer to the electoral influence of the caste leader. See his *Politics and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

[26] For a detailed account of this process, see A. H. Somjee "Political Dynamics of a Gujarat Village," *Asian Survey,* Vol. 12 (July, 1972), 602–608.

Subsequently they learned a great deal about the new political system by means of their operational involvement and also by emulating one another.

The two peasant castes, the Patidars (the landowning and politically dominant) and the Kshatriyas (the numerically powerful) became continually involved in a struggle for power and office in the village. Through their strategies and counterstrategies they stimulated each other to become more politically flexible and skillful in building a multicaste base of political power. The Vasavas and the Venkars also learned, through social and political emulation, how to play effectively their role as auxiliary social groups. In the last analysis the twin teachers of democracy for these four castes were the gradual internalization of the norms of the new ideology, on the one hand, and actual political involvement, on the other.[27]

At the root of the political change in the village was the bifurcation of its social and political leadership, a necessary and sufficient condition of increasing political differentiation in otherwise socially cohesive castes. For after the major structural change in the mid-'fifties, which required the local council to be constituted on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics pushed into the background the old and the venerated leaders of the Patidars as well as the Kshatriyas. Until then these men had retained in their hands the dual role of social and political leadership. Since 1904, when the statutory local council was established in the village, the Patidar elders, belonging to the families with high status in the caste, had sat on the statutory body as well as on their caste council. The same was true of the Kshatriya elders whenever they got themselves nominated to the statutory council along with the Patidars.

One of the earliest repercussions among the Patidars of the introduction of the universal adult suffrage was an excessive questioning and criticism by their own younger men of their ability and role as members of the council. A similar barrage of criticism was directed towards the elder Kshatriya membership by its own younger men. For a long time the Kshatriya elders had accepted a position that was subordinate to the Patidars. That was clearly unacceptable to the politically ambitious, articulate, and restless younger Kshatriyas.

The Patidar elders faded away from the political scene without incident. The Kshatriya elders did not. The impatience of their younger men brought into play kinship differences among their two major groups. It therefore took a little longer for the Kshatriya elders to hand over power to their younger men.

The emulative framework of village politics also helped the Venkars to bifurcate their leadership along the lines of the Patidars and the Kshatriyas. Until 1971, the wave of bifurcation had not affected the Vasavas: this was because their involvement in village politics, till recently, was only marginal.

The Patidars as well as Kshatriya elders, however, relinquished merely the political leadership of their respective groups; they continued to be in command of the social leadership of their castes. Political leadership of the two castes was taken on by the younger men initially from the families which also had produced social leadership. Thus for a short period the familial status had continued to be the basis of the differentiated social and political leadership. It took another wave of change in these two castes to undermine the importance of certain families. And this happened more than a decade after the introduction of democracy, when familial status in the political realm also was challenged by still younger men in these two contending castes. The decline of familial status was marked by a corresponding rise in the importance of political skill in building intercaste, interclan, and at times even more diversified bases of political power. Henceforth the politically ambitious neither confined themselves to their own caste nor took for granted its support. Political support became for them a matter of skillful accommodation, manipulation, and contrivance. So far as local politics went, such skills had to be put to work within a highly structured situation of castes and regard for personalities. National electoral politics on the other hand, provided the politically ambitious with much greater freedom and scope for cross-caste political cleavages. A part of such cross-cutting political cleavages in national politics inevitably affected the style and character of local politics.[28] Differentiated political leadership thus became an agent of political diversification within the castes in local as well as national politics.

In their contest for seats in the village council the Patidars opposed Patidars with the support from the Kshatriyas and vice versa. The support of the rest of the castes in the village for these two contending groups became increasingly differentiated. But much greater diversity of support than in the elections of the village council was evident inside the council for the election of its chairmen and other positions. The Patidars and the Kshatriyas alternately got themselves elected to the chairmanship of the council by manipulating the cleavages in each other's ranks.

---

[27] For a detailed empirical support for the theory of stimulus-response within the framework of political emulation see A. H. Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972).

[28] See Chapter VII, "Village Politics and National Politics: The General Election of 1967" in Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India.*

The process of diversification of political support across castes was accentuated by the general elections of 1962, 1967, and 1971. Each time, because of the presentation of issues and the political pulls during campaigns, the cleavage structure of village politics changed. Instead of conforming to the existing political divisions in the village, the new cleavage structure preceding the general elections cut across such divisions.

Thus for example, in the general election of 1962, the bulk of the villagers, particularly the Patidars and Kshatriyas agreed to give their partial support to the Congress candidate for the parlimentary seat (the Maharajah of Baroda): but they refused to support its assembly candidate even though the village political actives, Patidars as well as Kshatriyas, were the members of the Congress party. Instead they gave their support to a "neighbor," an independent, who actually belonged to a neighboring village and in his capacity as the chairman of a cotton cooperative society had helped the villagers in a number of ways. On their part, the Kshatriyas had also rejected an electoral brief from the Kshatriya Sabha asking them to support a particular candidate.

The cleavage structure which emerged in the village at the time of the general election of 1962 had some interesting characteristics. The Patidars and the Kshatriyas, who by and large were at loggerheads in the local politics, jointly decided to split their votes between the Congress parliamentary candidate and the "neighbor" who stood for the assembly seat as an independent. As opposed to them, the satellite groups, such as the Vasavas and Venkars, and the rest of the village supported both the candidates of the Congress.

During the general election of 1967, the voting pattern of the village became further diversified, this time, within the caste. The Congress had nominated the Maharajah of Baroda for the assembly seat and the Mayor of Baroda for parliament. The mayor was extremely unpopular with the villagers because he had been instrumental through state legislation in acquiring a large piece of village land which he proposed to use for industrial purposes. Among those who lost their land were Patidars, Kshatriyas, Vasavas, and Venkars. On the other side, the Swatantra party and the Jan Sangh had jointly sponsored an industrialist and an industrial executive for the parliamentary and assembly seats, respectively. Together they provided a number of jobs for the factory-worker villagers. Caught between the cross-pressure of appeal of the Congress program and the security of employment in factories, the bulk of the villagers split their votes into seven different combinations, one of which was invalid.

Out of an electoral roll of nearly twelve hundred voters, I interviewed 120, one out of every ten. Each was interviewed twice, once before and once after the election. The number of voters interviewed by caste, was as follows: Brahmins (6), Banias and Kacchia Patels (4), Patidars (9), Kshatriyas—Chauhans, Chavdas, Solankis, Padhiars, Rajputs, and Rathods (57), Suthars, Kumbhars, and Malis (8), Vasavas and Bharwads (scheduled tribes) (20), Venkars and Harijans—scheduled castes—(8), Non-Gujaratis (5), Muslims and Christians (3). Tables 1 and 2 show the village voting pattern overall and also by caste.

These tables clearly suggest that none of the four major castes of the village voted as caste groups. Although each gave the bulk of its votes to the Congress assembly candidate, a substantial number of votes were also spread widely over other political parties.

The Patidars were divided for several reasons: their political leadership in the village was in the hands of pro-Congress men; a Patidar had stood on Swatantra ticket for the par-

Table 1. The General Election of 1967: General Pattern of Vote in the Village

Congress	Swatantra and Jan Sahgh	Split Vote (Two non aligned Parties)	One Vote	Did Not Vote	Refused to Answer	Do Not Know	Total
35 (−7 invalid) 29%	14 12%	40 33%	4 3%	14 12%	9 8%	4 3%	120 100%

Table 2. The General Election of 1967: Pattern of Vote in the Village among Four Major Castes

Caste	Congress		Jan Sangh	Swatantra	Janta Parishad	Did Not Vote	Refused To Answer	Do Not Know	One Vote
	MLA	MP	MLA	MP	MLA				
Patidars	6	4	2	4			1		
Kshatriyas	37	19	2	17		6	6	3	3
Venkars	6	1		1		1		1	
Vasavas	13	6	2	10	1	1	2		1

liamentary constituency; and finally, the Patidar youth wanted to try out the right-wing parties for a change. The Kshatriya, despite their caste association's (The Kshatriya Sabha's) electoral brief urging that they support Swatantra and Jan Sangh candidates, gave the bulk of their assembly votes and more than half of their parliamentary votes to the Congress. Their votes for the Swatantra candidate, who had given employment to some of the Kshatriyas in his tractor manufacturing firm, clearly indicated an element of economic pressure. Such a pressure was also felt by some Vasavas and Venkars. Only the Brahmins, normally neutral in village politics, strongly came out in support of rightist parties.

During the general election of 1971, the Congress approached the electorate with a division in its own ranks. The Ruling Congress headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi was popularly known as the *Indicate* and its opponents, the Organization Congress was known as the *Syndicate*. The Organization Congress had sponsored the Maharajah of Baroda as its parliamentary candidate, whereas the Ruling Congress had supported a trade-union worker from the Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) for the same seat. By 1971 there was a considerable increase in the factory employed population of the village—nearly one-fifth of its total number. While the working class supported the P.S.P. candidate because he was a champion of their interests, the agriculturists were influenced by the charismatic appeal and the pro-underdog image of Mrs. Gandhi. It was estimated that nearly eighty per cent of the village electorate, consisting of all castes, favored the P.S.P. candidate.

Social Cohesion and Political Difference in an Urban Community

My continuing intensive fieldwork in an urban community (Anand[29] in Gujarat) has revealed an increasing political differentiation in castes whose primary social cohesion remained, more or less, unchanged. Anand is a rapidly industrializing middle-sized (population approximately sixty thousand) town in western India. In 1966 a stratified sample of 500 voters was drawn from 34 social groups of castes, religious minorities, and linguistic communities. During 1966–67, the voters in the sample were interviewed three times: twice before the general election of 1967, and once after. The sample of voters[30] was interviewed twice again in 1971: before and after the general election (parliamentary). Finally, during the general election (assembly) of 1972, the voters in the sample were interviewed twice again: before and after the election. Almost every person in the sample was thus interviewed seven times over a period of six years. This extended fieldwork in Anand was undertaken with a view to understanding the electoral dynamics of an urban community in terms of time-dimension.[31]

The resulting data confirm the view that the primarily social cohesion of a caste is not easily transferrable to its nonsocial pursuits. Political homogeneity was never attained by most castes including the Kshatriyas even though Anand is one of the more vigorous centers of the caste association of the Kshatriyas (the Kshatriya Sabha) and the home of one of its splinter groups—the Kshatriya Seva Samaj. Whenever political homogeneity was achieved by a caste, my field data indicate, it was not because of its "caste association," assuming there was one. Indeed, by and large, the cohesiveness of the caste in nonsocial matters did not go beyond primary groups such as the extended family or kinship neighborhood. This contention is substantiated in findings on the six major social and religious groups of Anand which together comprise nearly three-fourths of Anand's population. They are the Brahmins (7 per cent), Banias (5 per cent), Patidars (22 per cent), Kshatriyas (25 per cent), Christians (4 per cent), Muslims (8 per cent).The two religious minorities, Christians and Muslims, are included to permit comparison of changes in political homogeneity among them as well.

---

[29] The study of Anand also includes the adjoining town of Vidyanagar which is the seat of a university. For the purposes of my research the twin towns were considered as one—Anand.

[30] In 1971 and 1972 interviews, 27 and 28 persons, respectively, had to be substituted as some of the people in the sample had either moved away, become untraceable, or had died. Wherever possible, son, daughter, brother, sister, or neighbor was substituted for the missing or dead respondent, always from the same caste and sex.

[31] See in this connection A. H. Somjee, *Anand: A Study in Electoral Dynamics,* forthcoming (tentative title).

In order to grasp the political background of the respondents, an attempt was made to ascertain the tradition of their family vote, a fairly reliable index of a voter's political background. Their response indicated the following:

Table 3. The General Election of 1952: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Extent of Electoral Participation[32]	Vote for Congress	Vote for Lok Paksh
Brahmins	A little more than half	90%	10%
Banias	Nearly two-thirds	80%	20%
Patidars	A little more than half	83%	17%
Kshatriyas	More than half	98%	2%

One of the interesting features of this observation was that proportionately more Kshatriyas were politically mobilized than Patidars, even though the rate of literacy and the need to protect private economic interests was higher among the Patidars. The castewise distribution of votes between the Congress and a regional opposition party (Lok Paksh), especially among the Patidars, was most striking, because of the influence exerted by a political party as opposed to a towering leader of the caste. The Lok Paksh had nominated Bhailalbhai Patel, possibly the greatest leader of the Patidars since Sardar Patel. In the constituency as a whole he secured a high percentage of the popular vote, but the Patidars of Anand did not give him more than 17 per cent of their votes. The Kshatriyas, like the other castes of Anand, overwhelmingly supported the Congress in India's first general election held in 1952.

The general election of 1957 especially in the Kaira District, where Anand is located, took place against the background of two vital issues: a regional movement headed by the Mahagujarat Janata Parishad which demanded that a separate state of Gujarat be carved out of the composite state of Bombay; and the Land Tenancy Act, passed by the Congress government, which proposed handing over land ownership to the tenants. These were thus the issues of regional sentiment and economic interest. The castewise performance of the parties was as follows:

Table 4. The General Election of 1957: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Extent of Electoral Participation	Congress	Mahagujarat Janta Parishad Movement
Brahmins	A little more than half	82%	18%
Banias	A little more than two-thirds	100%	0%
Patidars	More than two-thirds	61%	39%
Kshatriyas	More than two-thirds	100%	0%

The Banias, who had prospered with the growth of trade and commerce in Anand felt indebted to the Congress and therefore fully switched their support to it. With the Patidars the Land Tenancy Act was an extremely unpopular measure. Some of the medium- and large-scale landholders among them either had lost a part of their land or had felt threatened. At the other extreme, the Congress land tenure policy was very popular with the Kshatriyas, who were either petty landholders, tenants, or landless laborers. Being essentially the peasant castes of this area, the Patidars as well as the Kshatriyas were deeply affected by the changes in land tenure policy despite the fact that Anand's agriculturist population had registered a downward trend as a result of the growth of commerce and industry there. During the general election of 1957, therefore, the Patidar support for the Congress fell below two-thirds, whereas that of the Kshatriyas rose to one hundred per cent, the highest ever recorded.

---

[32] This indicates the participation of families of the respondents in previous elections.

The 1962 general election was marked in Anand by a bipartisan contest of the two regionally well-balanced parties. The political opponents of the Congress had put together a new political party with a distinct economic policy, political ideology, party organization, and leadership. This was the Swatantra party. The seat of Gujarat Swatantra was and has been Vidyanagar, which is on the outskirts of Anand. Although the party had come into existence a short time before the general election of 1962, serious differences among the regional groups within the Congress and a number of economic issues, including the Land Tenancy Act, etc., helped the new party in mobilizing political support. In Anand the distribution of party vote castewise was as follows:

The most interesting feature of the Patidar vote for the Swatantra party was in the fact that it was given to the party as such rather than to the candidate. For the Swatantra party had nominated a Kshatriya candidate, while the Congress had chosen a Patidar candidate. Yet for the Patidars of Anand, the appeal of the candidate's caste proved to be weaker than that of party ideology.

The same was true of the Kshatriya vote. Even though the Kshatriya Sabha had electorally aligned itself with the Swatantra party, and had mobilized its entire machinery and resources in the campaign, and had also backed a leading Kshatriya candidate, nevertheless the Kshatriyas of Anand overwhelmingly voted for the Congress and its Patidar candidate. The Congress policy of giving protection to the poorer section of the agriculturists and its general pro-underdog image had a special attraction for them.

The general election of 1962 in Anand, from the point of view of caste and democratic politics, was therefore most significant: It brought about a polarization of vote on ideological and programmatic lines that cut across social cleavages of castes. The Congress as well as the Swantantra party had political support among all the four major castes, and what is more, neither candidate succeeded in attracting all the votes of the caste he represented. To top it all, even the "caste association" such as the Kshatriya Sabha did not succeed in shepherding the Kshatriya voters in the direction of its candidate. Along with a differentiated vote in their ranks, the Kshatriyas were engaged in questioning the leadership and political direction given by their "caste association."

In the election of 1962, two trends clearly emerged in the politics of Anand. First, the Kshatriyas had firmly identified themselves with the Congress ideology. Henceforth they would support it in large numbers, regardless of the caste of its candidate, so long as it maintained a pro-underdog stance and policies to al-

Table 5. The General Election of 1962: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Extent of Electoral Participation	Congress	Swatantra
Brahmins	More than three-fourths	64%	36%
Banias	More than three-fourths	64%	36%
Patidars	About three-fourths	37%	63%
Kshatriyas	More than three-fourths	85%	15%

The Brahmin, and more so the Bania, support for the Congress declined considerably in 1962. The economic policies of the Swatantra party proved to be quite attractive to both these castes. Some Brahmins and a great many Banias were in the grain trade and were petty shopkeepers. To them the increasing restrictions placed on economic activity by the Congress's ideology and its policies of socialism were most irksome. The Swatantra ideology of unrestricted trade and commerce, on the other hand, was particularly attractive to them.

The caste which was most strongly drawn to the Swatantra party ideology was the Patidars. At last they had found a party which immensely suited their innovative, pragmatic, and result-oriented approach to economic life. Swatantra's economic philosophy had everything that such an industrious and economically successful caste was looking for. Moreover, Swatantra leadership was locally based (i.e., in Vidyanagar), which offered the additional possibility of influencing its organization and decision making.

leviate the suffering of the poor. Second, the Patidar voters consistently sought out a party which could act as an effective opposition and alternative to the Congress. Like the Kshatriyas, they would continue to take the ideology and program of the party more seriously than the caste of its nominee.

The general election of 1962 was also a watershed in the development of secularism in the politics of Anand. It saw the diversification of political support for both the parties not only in terms of castes but also with reference to the two religious minorities, Christians and Muslims. Both these minorities had given their en bloc support to the Congress in the general elections of 1952 and 1957. Their anxieties about the secular future of the Indian Republic had evoked, in the past, an undifferentiated support for the Congress, which is more explicitly committed to secularism than most other parties. A decade after the birth of the Indian Republic, and the two general elections, the Christians first and then the Muslims acquired sufficient confidence in India's secular future to be able to diversify their democratic choice. Not being involved in religious problems which had led to the partition of India in 1947, the Christians were the first to gain enough confidence to exercise the choice clearly. The Muslims were not far behind. The distribution of party votes in terms of minorities was as follows:

Table 6. The General Election of 1962: Religious Minorities and Vote in Anand

Religious Minorities	Extent of Electoral Participation	Congress	Swatantra
Christians	More than three-fourths	75%	25%
Muslims	Nearly three-fourths	89%	11%

The general election of 1967 witnessed continued diversification in the political base of the Congress and the Swatantra party among the castes and the religious minorities of Anand. Their share of popular vote in terms of caste and religious minorities was as follows:

Table 7. The General Election of 1967: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Congress	Swatantra
Brahmins	36%	64%
Banias	21%	79%
Patidars	23%	77%
Kshatriyas	84%	16%

Table 8. The General Election of 1967: Religious Minorities and Vote in Anand

Religious Minorities	Congress	Swatantra
Christians	74%	26%
Muslims	79%	21%

For the election of 1967, the Congress had nominated two Kshatriya leaders for the parliamentary and assembly seats, and the Swatantra party had chosen a well-known, I.C.S.-retired Patidar leader for both the seats. There was a fierce struggle for the Kshatriya vote. While the Kshatriya Sabha had come out in favor of the Swatantra party, the local Congress leaders had helped toward the establishment of a rival Kshatriya body called the Kshatriya Seva Samaj.

The period between 1962 and 1967 in India was marked by a phenomenal rise in the cost of living, increased complaints against bureaucratic slowness and excessive restrictions, and the visible new prosperity largely confined to men in industry, commerce, bureaucracy and politics. Ironically enough, the people who had prospered most during the Congress regime, Brahmins, Banias and Patidars, were looking for an alternative government. While the Kshatriyas had experienced only a trickle of prosperity, the bulk of them were not looking for a change in party rule. The Congress had lost supporters all around, including some Kshatriyas. Its greatest losses were among the Banias, then among Brahmins, and finally among the Patidars. Fall in its popularity among the Kshatriyas was very slight, nevertheless it was there. But what was significant in their case was that a well-known Kshatriya leader, namely, Narendra Singh Mahida, who had gone over to the Swatantra[33] in the 1962 election and had subsequently returned to the Congress fold before the 1967 election, could not, along with a Kshatriya running mate for the assembly seat, pull more votes for the Congress. This had occurred in spite of the fact that the local Congress leaders were instrumental in establishing a rival Kshatriya body, namely, the Kshatriya Seva Samaj.

---

[33] For the details of this see Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh Maru, "Caste and Secularism in India: Case Study of a Caste Federation," *The Journal of Asian Studies,* 25 (November, 1965), 33–50.

Inaugurated on the eve of the general election of 1967, the Kshatriya Seva Samaj was designed by and large to bring about a cleavage among the Kshatriyas along *class* lines. As opposed to the Kshatriya Sabha, whose leadership remained with the princes and feudal elements, the Kshatriya Seva Samaj brought into prominence small businessmen, school teachers, and skilled workers in the ranks of the Kshatriyas. The Samaj under the leadership of men of humbler origin proved an effective check in the area on whatever influence the Kshatriya Sabha could wield. The Kshatriya vote for the Congress, despite the work done by the Samaj and despite the caste of the two Congress-nominated candidates, had actually dwindled a little. What is important is not so much the continuing decline of Congress's popularity among the Kshatriyas but its failure to get impressive political results even when it employed caste-oriented means.

The emergence of a non-Congress vote among the Christians and the Muslims was also most significant. The decline in Congress popularity among the Muslims in the 1967 election was considerable. While the diversity in Christian and Muslim vote indicated a growing confidence in the secular character of political parties, there were certain additional local reasons for the disaffection with the Congress party: A group of the Christians in Anand had had a raw deal at the hands of the local Congress bosses in connection with the closing of the hospital they ran, thus prompting some of the Christians to try an alternative to the Congress. As far as the Muslims were concerned, the Voharas among them, a subgroup, engaged in commerce including the grain trade, had developed professional concern about the restrictive Congress policy in matters of trade in general. The economic interests of the Voharas had induced them to identify themselves with the others in the *profession*. Since the bulk of the grain traders favoured Swatantra ideology, the Voharas went along. In summary, the Christians as well as the Muslims had now started making use of political means in order to express their disapproval of the Congress policies rather than remaining solely concerned with the future of secular state in India.

In the general election (parliamentary) of 1971 the trend toward declining political homogeneity among castes and religious communities of Anand continued. As in all other previous general elections in Anand, the 1967 contest was almost completely a battle between two political groups—this time between the two factions of the old Congress, the Ruling Congress headed by Mrs. Gandhi, and the Organization Congress led in Gujarat by Morarji Desai.

Gujarat was the home state of Morarji Desai, the principal contender for power against Mrs. Gandhi, and Desai had his own men deeply entrenced in the entire infrastructure of the districts, and the bulk of the MLA's were loyal to him. Thus the well-known Kshatriya leader, Narendra Singh Mahida, the nominee of the Ruling Congress, who was a sitting M.P. and a minister for the state in the Union Defence Ministry, faced a formidable task. He began shakily and got no help from experienced political workers. The Organization Congress had pitted against him Pravinsingh Solanki, a sitting M.P. from another constituency and the son of a Kshatriya Sabha leader, Natvarsingh Solanki. To help his son in the campaign, the latter started using the machinery of the Kshatriya Sabha, but he was subsequently discouraged by the Organization Congress bosses because they feared that the Ruling Congress might bring into the fray the rival body, Kshatriya Seva Samaj. The bosses also made sure that the Samaj leadership, mostly employed in the district infrastructural bodies, was kept in good humor. In Anand, therefore, the two caste bodies were kept out of the electoral contest.

As for the other castes of Anand, they were initially inclined to view the election of 1971 as a contest between the two Kshatriyas. But their attitude subsequently changed when the regional newspapers on both the sides started playing up the theme of political stability, economic development, employment, prices, fair distribution of income, etc. On top of that came the campaign visit of Mrs. Gandhi, for which more than a hundred thousand persons turned out from within the radius of about forty miles. Her meeting was disrupted by the agents of the Organization Congress, a disruption that adversely affected the following of the Organization Congress in Anand. More and more criticism was voiced against its tactics and its electoral alliance with such three ideologically diverse parties as the Swatantra, the Jan Sangh, and the S.S.P. It would therefore not be an exaggeration to say that the election of 1971 in Anand took place in an atmosphere of a near breakdown of party machinery on both sides. The Ruling Congress had utilized the charismatic appeal and the pro-underdog image of Mrs. Gandhi. The Organization Congress, on the other hand, had relied heavily on personal influence and pressure, terror tactics, etc., to get a favorable response. In terms of caste and religious communities the performance of the two sides was as follows:

Table 9. The General Election (Parliamentary) of 1971: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Ruling Congress	Organization Congress
Brahmins	23%	77%
Banias	29%	71%
Patidars	10%	90%
Kshatriyas	76%	24%

Table 10. The General Election (Parliamentary) of 1971: Religious Minorities and Vote in Anand

Religious Minorities	Ruling Congress	Organization Congress
Christians	33%	67%
Muslims	63%	37%

The support for the Organization Congress among the Brahmins, Banias, Patidars, and Christians was most impressive. Its support among the Kshatriyas was greater than that received by the Swatantra party in the two previous general elections. Its support among the Muslim voters, too, was impressive, especially because one of its electoral allies was the extreme right-wing party (the Jan Sangh), and also because the election had taken place in an atmosphere of communal tension in the cities of Gujarat. The most impressive support for the Organization Congress had come from the Patidars, who had identified themselves with it enthusiastically.

The Organization Congress, as a matter of fact, was many things to many people. To some it was *the* Congress with its stalwarts like Morarji Desai seen as unjustly treated by Mrs. Gandhi. Others felt Mrs. Gandhi had only two types of supporters left: Muslim communalists and the Communists. They therefore preferred a right-wing combination on the Hindu side which they thought the Organization Congress represented. Finally, Mrs. Gandhi was seen as an enemy of the most progressive and well-administered state, namely, Gujarat, where she had tried to topple the ministry of a protégé of Morarji Desai.

The Ruling Congress, on the other hand, had clearly introduced into Indian electoral politics a specific economic appeal which was comprehensible to the average voter. As Mrs. Gandhi herself repeated in her various campaign speeches, her policy was not to take away people's prosperity but to generate new wealth which could reach the poor. Earlier her policy of the nationalization of banks, which had proved a great blessing to the small borrower, had established her credentials in the eyes of the lower income group. To the needy and the poor, therefore, the Ruling Congress was the party of the underdog. To the middle class and to businessmen her party held out the hope of political stability, which a motley assemblage of parties like the Organization Congress and its allies, as experience in other states showed, did not.

While the ratio of popular vote between the Ruling Congress and the Organization Congress, among our six groups was 3:4, it was not so wide among the lower strata of society, which had narrowed the margin of the Organization Congress.

Finally, we examine the general election (Assembly) of 1972. That election could not have been more opportune for the Ruling Congress, whose landslide victory in the previous election not only provided political stability to India but also restored confidence in its democratic future. The architect of that victory was Mrs. Gandhi who in the eyes of the average voter rose to great heights at the time of crisis. Her rise to prominence meant that the Indian democracy no longer needed extraordinary men like Nehru to run it. It meant that even a person like Mrs. Gandhi, whose capacity for leadership or political skill had remained untested till recently could rise to the occasion when faced with a challenge. What she gave the average voter was a touch of self-assurance. Moreover, her timing and handling of the Bangladesh crisis electrified the country. On the eve of the 1972 election, therefore, there was no doubt about which party would win in the bulk of the Indian states which had gone to the polls. Most of the guesses around election time were merely about how large the victory of Mrs. Gandhi's party would be.

Unlike the elections in the past, the 1972 election in Anand saw three political parties in the fray: The Ruling Congress; the Organization Congress; and the Jan Sangh. The two Congresses had pitted against each other two young Kshatriyas, both of humble birth, almost of equal age, both from the same village, and even distantly related. While the nominee of the Ruling Congress was the more educated, that of the Organization Congress had the advantage of having been a member of the dissolved assembly. The Jan Sangh, on the other hand, had nominated a young Patidar. The response to the three political parties in the election of 1972 was as follows:

Table 11. The General Election (Assembly) of 1972: Caste and Vote in Anand

Caste	Ruling Congress	Organization Congress	Jan Sangh
Brahmins	54%	38%	8%
Banias	45%	30%	25%
Patidars	38%	37%	25%
Kshatriyas	74%	24%	2%

Table 12. The General Election (Assembly) of 1972: Religious Minorities and Vote in Anand

Religious Minorities	Ruling Congress	Organization Congress	Jan Sangh
Christians	67%	28%	6%
Muslims	67%	30%	4%

The Ruling Congress had greatly improved its position and its support from all groups except the Kshatriyas. Among the Kshatriyas the declining trend in support for the Ruling Congress had continued, and such Kshatriya vote as it got was largely for the party rather than the candidate. The Organization Congress nominee of 1972 had also been the nominee of the undivided Congress in 1967. The same Kshatriya electorate gave 84 per cent of its votes to him in 1967, whereas in 1972 it reduced its support to 24 per cent because he had identified himself with the Organization Congress and not with the Ruling Congress. The Patidars, instead of supporting the Patidar candidate nominated by the Jan Sangh, gave three-fourths of their votes to the two Kshatriya candidates nominated by the two Congresses. All the six major groups of Anand diversified their votes. Even the two religious minorities gave some support to a traditionalist party such as the Jan Sangh. Through such electoral diversity the castes and religious minorities had asserted their right to vote wherever they pleased regardless of the attempts made by political parties to exploit their caste sentiment and the fear of losing the freedom of conscience.

Before concluding this section, it is instructive to note the extent of popular support of the Kshatriyas enjoyed by the Congress from 1952 to 1972, during the six general elections (see Figure 2). Here I am making the assumption that the Ruling Congress of 1971 and 1972 was *the* Congress.

From 1962 to 1972, the period when a diversification occurred in the Kshatriya vote, despite the presence or absence of a Kshatriya candidate or candidates, or electoral brief, for or against, from the Kshatriya Sabha or Kshatriya Seva Samaj, the bulk of the Kshatriyas continued to support the Congress. Over the years, however, their support for the Congress steadily declined. Neither the presence of a caste candidate nor a brief from a "caste association" could check it. The election of 1971 had presented them with a choice between the two ex-princely Kshatriyas and that of 1972 between two Kshatriyas of humble birth. Such a conflict merely hastened the incipient process of vote *for* the party rather than the social background of the candidate.

Fragmentation of Decision-Making Units

Political parties in search of mass support covetously look to the existence of primary social cohesion within the endogamous units of caste and hope to tap it or turn it into a "vote bank." In actual practice, however, such a complex enterprise turns out to be replete with obstacles. Since the primary cohesion of the caste exists for its *social* concerns only, political parties are forced to start at the base, with the members of the caste and caste-neighborhood influentials, and work their way horizontally so as to encompass more and more supporters.

Each caste consists of a number of endogamous units; each endogamous unit is spread over a number of villages and towns; within each village or town, fragments of an endogamous unit are dispersed over a number of caste and multicaste neighborhoods; within each such neighborhood there are a number of groups which structure the social interaction and political decision making of their members. Each of these groups, further, has its own influentials and factions. In order to mobilize mass support of a caste, a political party is required to win over as many influentials to its side as possible. Such a task is usually assigned to a caste political active. He contacts the influentials. However, the factional structure of groups and rivalry among the influentials, campaigning by political parties, perception of issues, interpretation of personal interest, attraction to certain personalities, influence of re-



Figure 2. Percentage of Kshatriya vote for Congress in six general elections

gional newspapers, exposure to different political views in the place of one's work, finally, learning from a cumulative electoral experience itself, all these together, do not make the task of a caste political active very simple. Despite the work done by caste political actives and the appeal of the caste of a contesting candidate, and also despite the work done in certain instances by "caste associations" such as the Kshatriya Sabha, the electorate in the rural as well as the urban community, as we have seen in these pages, registered a growing political diversity.

One of the greatest imponderables in any attempt to analyze the relationship between caste and politics in India is the intractable problem of the communication network of the caste. The fact that a caste is horizontally integrated and continues to hold itself together for the pursuit of its primary social concerns, despite rapid change in all other aspects of Indian life since independence, indicates an effective network of communication integrating its members toward common social goals. In the existing studies on caste not much is written on the nature of this network or about its mode of operation. To what extent and with what success such a network can be used for electoral purposes remain to be empirically determined.

In the final analysis any attempt to grasp the relationship between caste and politics in contemporary India takes us back to the problem identified by Professor M. N. Srinivas, that during the *Pax Britannica* individual castes achieved horizontal integration at the social level. So far as their politics are concerned, in my view, a reverse process is very much in evidence. Political cohesion of the castes, wherever present, is in the process of shrinking from the wider horizontal integrations to smaller and more diversified residential segments. In conclusion, I am now persuaded that what the political parties do at best is to build a patchwork of segmented political support on multicaste lines, rather than rely on a caste, however numerous it may be.

The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique

RICHARD S. KATZ
Yale University

Beyond determining which individuals will hold public office, elections provide the citizens of modern democracies with their most public opportunity to pass judgment upon public officials and public policies. Despite their public and quantitative nature, however, the meaning of electoral results in any terms beyond "won" and "lost" is by no means clear. Exactly what was the electorate voting for or against? This paper offers one tool for resolving some of this ambiguity by proposing a method by which the *changes* in the partisan distribution of votes within electoral districts may be attributed to national, subnational, or local complexes of influences. Prefacing the introduction of this new technique is a brief review of the most prominent methods of approaching this problem employed in the past. In the discussion of these methods a number of weaknesses are focused upon; these, it is argued, are largely overcome through the use of the more refined model presented here. The results of an application of the new technique to a series of congressional elections are then reported. Finally, a number of possible applications of this technique, both within and beyond the realm of electoral analysis, are briefly noted.

The voter in an American election is faced with a wide range of stimuli, some national, some statewide, some local, to which he may react and on the basis of which he must decide whether and how to vote. It would be useful to define and measure for each district three variables reflecting the relative importance of each of these three levels of influence in determining the outcome of elections. In Schattschneider's terms, what is to be measured is the "degree of nationalization of electoral forces,"[1] or what might also be called the "proportion of district-level electoral variance explained by national level forces," or the "relative magnitude of the national variance component," as well as the corresponding variables defined for the state and local levels. Since this problem has been attacked before, I begin by discussing two earlier models of aggregate electoral swings and the measurement techniques associated with them.

Previous Approaches to Electoral Nationalization

In any attempt to operationalize these variables, a fundamental ambiguity must be resolved: that is, at least two reasonable definitions may be assigned to the set of terms just introduced. "Nationalization of electoral forces," and the corresponding term at the state level, clearly imply similarity among different areas; it is necessary to specify the type of similarity intended. For example, "nationalization of electoral forces" may refer to the degree to which a shift in the distribution of the vote in one district is identical to the shift in the distribution of the vote in each other district. This is the operationalization employed by the earlier models. On the other hand, this term may refer to the degree to which different areas respond to the same electoral forces, whether or not the effects of these forces are numerically identical across space. By this second definition, "nationalization" is achieved when the issues (broadly conceived) which determine the shifts in votes among elections are identical in all districts, even if they produce numerically different results in different districts.

If what is to be measured is the degree to which districts move together in a partisan sense, the most obvious measure is the standard deviation of the difference in the partisan distribution of the vote between two elections, computed across districts. That is, if x_{jk} is the Republican proportion of the vote in district j at election k, we compute the standard deviation of the distribution $x_{jk+1} - x_{jk}$. The magnitude of this variable is partially determined by the overall volatility of the vote; thus a more interpretable measure derived from the same general model is the proportion of the variance in the local vote distributions explained by the assumption that

$$x_{jk+1} = x_{jk} + (\bar{x}_{k+1} - \bar{x}_k), \qquad (1)$$

---

[1] See Elmer E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chap. 5. Donald Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 182-202 uses the term more nearly as it is meant here.

where $\bar{x}_k$ is the average Republican proportion of the vote, computed across districts, at election *k;* restated in words, the assumption is that the Republican proportion of the vote in election $k + 1$ in district j is equal to the Republican proportion of the vote in that district in the immediately preceding election plus the difference between the *national* Republican proportions of the vote in elections $k + 1$ and k. If desired, this equation may be rewritten in equivalent form,

$$x_{jk} = n_j + (\bar{x}_k - \bar{n}), \tag{2}$$

where n_j is the "normal" vote for the Republican party in district j and $\bar{n}$ is the "normal" national Republican vote.[2] Again in words, this suggests that the vote for the Republican party in any given district may be expressed as a normal vote plus a deviation from that normal vote, where the deviation is *constant for all districts at any single election.* The standard deviation measure tells the degree to which all districts follow a common trend, while the analysis of variance technique tells how reliable an estimate may be made on the assumption that they do follow a common trend. (By "normal" vote in this context is meant the metaphysically defined distribution of votes which would occur if no temporally related influences were operating. It is, of course, unmeasurable. For the purposes of all these models, which are concerned only with shifts in votes between elections, the average distribution is an acceptable estimate for the "normal" distribution. The mean distribution is the baseline from which deviations are measured in this paper.)

This model, operationalized by computing the standard deviation of the distribution of interelection differences, has been employed with some interesting results by Butler and Stokes in comparing Britain and the United States,[3] but if suffers from a number of deficiencies, two of which apply only to the standard deviation technique and two of which apply to the model generally. First, the standard deviation technique is one that may be applied to only one pair of elections; if for any reason one or both of these elections is seriously atypical, the results will be correspondingly biased. As expressed in equation (2), however, the model may easily be applied to a series of elections. Second, so long as only one pair of elections is analyzed, it is impossible to compare areas within a nation, since only a national index is computed. Further, cross-national comparisons using the standard deviation technique must be suspect since the value of the resulting index is a function of overall volatility as well as of "nationalization." Again, as expressed in equation (2) the model may be applied to a series of elections, in which case the proportion of variance explained by the equation may be computed separately for each district. Cross-national comparison is also facilitated since the index resulting from the application of this technique is standardized with regard to overall volatility. Third, and most important, the notion that electoral choice is a purely national phenomenon, implicit in this model, is a rather severe oversimplification of reality. In the words of one group of analysts, "We can think of no good reason and only one bad reason—habit—to justify the assumption that the words 'The Democratic Party' conjure up the same image in all voters."[4] It is quite clear that support for the Democratic party in the state of Alabama does not necessarily imply support of the same policy stands, or even interest in the same policy areas, as does support for the Democratic party in the state of New York. Considering this, it is hard to imagine why the proportions of the vote received by these two parties should move in unison. It is particularly toward the removal of this deficiency that the alternative model presented below is directed. Finally, as I shall argue, the definition of "nationalization" which is implicit in both these models seems to be fundamentally deficient.

In order to take account of state and district level effects in interpreting the results of congressional elections, Donald Stokes has proposed a more elaborate "variance components model of political effects" based on the statistical model of analysis of variance.[5] Equation (2) may be rewritten by replacing the single subscript j (representing the jth district) with the pair of subscripts ij standing for the jth district within the ith state; and by replacing the second term on the right with the single expression a_k, which is the constant (through space) effect of national forces on the partisan distribution of votes specific to election k, obtaining

---

[2] See Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order* by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 9–39. For the purposes of the analysis reported here, the "normal Republican vote" has been defined to be the mean Republican share of the two party vote over the entire decade of the 1950s.

[3] Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces." See also David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 66–75.

[4] David Kovenock, Philip Beardsley, and James Prothro, "States, Party, Ideology, Issues, and Candidate Choice: A Preliminary, Theory-Relevant Analysis of the 1968 American Presidential Election," a paper prepared for the 8th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, September, 1970, p. 13. For a demonstration that "party image" and party identification can have independent effects, see Donald Matthews and James Prothro, "The Concept of Party Image and Its Importance for the Southern Electorate," in *The Electoral Process,* ed. M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 139–174.

$$x_{ijk} = n_{ij} + a_k. \qquad (3)$$

The model which Stokes has proposed starts with equation (3) and adds to it two more terms, b_{ik}, representing the deviation from the prediction of equation (3) which is specific to election k in all districts of state i (the impact of state level forces); and c_{ijk}, representing the remaining deviation, postulated to be the effect of district-level forces in district ij at election k. The final equation thus becomes:

$$x_{ijk} = n_{ij} + a_k + b_{ik} + c_{ijk}. \qquad (4)$$

From this equation, Stokes derives the expression

$$\text{Var}(x_{ij}) = \text{Var}(a) + \text{Var}(b_i) + \text{Var}(c_{ij}), \qquad (5)$$

plus three covariance terms which he finds to have negligible impact and therefore ignores. The degree of electoral nationalization is then quite obviously defined to be the ratio of Var(a) to Var(x_{ij}), that is, the proportion of the total variance in the partisan distribution of votes which is attributable to national factors. Likewise, the relative importance of statewide and local factors may also be computed.

The primary defect of the Stokes model is its implicit definition of electoral nationalization, that is, its measurement of the degree to which the trends in districts are identical not only in direction but also in magnitude. (The same objection, of course, applies at the state level.) Two obvious difficulties with this definition may be observed, both arising from the fact that different districts are, in fact, different along any number of demographic and political dimensions. First, if a national (or state or local) factor is assumed to have a constant impact on some types of voters, e.g., leading to a five per cent shift among blacks towards the Republican party, the impact of that factor on the aggregate electoral result, far from being constant across districts, should be a function of the proportions of the electorates in those districts who are of those types. In this example, the effect of the factor suggested would obviously be much greater in a district with a large proportion of blacks than it would be in a district with very few blacks. Indeed, since different groups may react in opposite ways to the same stimulus, the direction as well as the magnitude of the shift caused by a single factor may vary across districts because of varying distributions of ethnic, social, political, or economic groups.

Second, districts may vary considerably in their susceptibility to influence from whatever source, for example, because of differences in the distribution or intensity of partisanship.[6] Ignoring differences of this kind can lead to quite incongruous results—possibly a prediction that since the country swung 10 per cent Democratic, a district which in the last election was 95 per cent Democratic will in this election be 105 per cent Democratic. Looking at Stokes's own data disaggregated and examined one district at a time, one finds that in nearly 10 per cent of the cases the proportion of the overall variance explained by national factors is *negative*. (That is, the prediction of the Republican proportion of the vote based on equation (3) is, on average, less accurate than a prediction of the normal vote for each election.)

This is a difficulty worth overcoming, and the following model is proposed as a step in that direction. As Stokes observed, mathematical models, despite the disciplined and "finished" form in which they are presented, are continually evolving. This model should be seen as a step forward (I hope) from his model, but not necessarily as the final step. Because of its complexity, it will be described in some detail, at the risk of some redundancy of definition of terms whose meaning may have already become clear.

An Alternative Technique

As in Stokes's model, it is assumed that the partisan distribution of votes in a district at any given election is the result of a normal vote for that district plus deflections from that norm caused by national, state, and district level forces. By the national (or state or district) effect on the district vote is meant the impact of national (or state or district) factors on that vote. The term "factor" is broadly conceived and includes both variables that are and are not under political control. Also as in Stokes's model, it is assumed that the factors operating at each level may be aggregated to form a single index for that level. This index will be called the national (or state or district) force. In fact, the model is concerned only with these aggregate indices; their meaning may become clearer, however, if the definition of their component parts, the factors, is made more explicit.

---

[5] Donald Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, ed. John M. Claunch (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1965), pp. 61–85. An elementary discussion of analysis of variance may be found in William Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), chaps. 12 and 13. A more technical treatment of variance components analysis may be found in Shayle R. Searle, *Linear Models* (New York: John Wiley, 1971).

[6] Butler and Stokes, pp. 135–150; Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), especially chap. 5; D. Katz and S. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring, 1961), 1–24.

Under this definition of "factor," such variables as unemployment, labor unrest, candidates, crime, foreign events, or the weather might all be factors which impinge on electoral outcomes. While the existence of a factor is independent of voting, its designation as a national, state, or district factor is made solely on the basis of the geographic range of the district electorates affected by it. For example, a riot is clearly a local phenomenon; the way in which the riot is controlled, however, may make it a national factor if it affects the confidence of voters throughout the country in the ability of the government. Any factor that impinges on the choice of voters in all districts is defined as a national factor; a factor which is specific to the voters of a single state is a state factor; and any factor which is specific to a single district is a district factor.[7] It should be stressed that the range of voters influenced by a factor, and hence the level to which it is assigned, may be independent of its geographic origin or the level at which is might be controlled. It must also be emphasized that this model does not, in fact, require that individual factors be either catalogued or quantified.

Stokes assumes that the effect of each force, as just defined, is constant for all districts in which that force applies. For the reasons outlined above, this seems to be a shaky assumption at best. In its place, the present model assumes that in each district the effect of a force may be expressed as a linear function of that force, where at each level the parameters of the function are specific to the *district,* although fixed over time. The model which this describes may be expressed by the equation

$$x_{ijk} = n_{ij} + (p_{ij})(a_k) + (q_{ij})(b_{ik}) + (r_{ij})(c_{ijk}), \quad (6)$$

where p_{ij}, q_{ij}, and r_{ij} are the coefficients of the linear functions and the constant terms have been absorbed into the normal vote term, n_{ij}.

In fact, solution of equation (6), or estimation of its parameters, is impossible, since the only measurable variable is x_{ijk}. With one additional assumption, however, values of the three variables of interest—measures of the proportion of the variance in the district level distribution of the vote explained by each level of political forces—may be estimated. At the same time, it will be possible to estimate regression coefficients which are constant, linear, but unknown, functions of p_{ij}, q_{ij}, and r_{ij}. While no absolute interpretation of these coefficients is possible, they are internally comparable, and thus suitable for regression or correlation analysis.

The assumption which makes this analysis possible is that district forces are independent across districts and that state forces are independent across states. Then, since the numbers of districts and states are both large, both sides of equation (6) may be summed over the entire country with the expectation that the last two terms on the right will sum to constants over time. This being the case, it may immediately be seen that the national average distribution of votes is a linear function of the national force. Since the coefficient of determination is unaltered by linear transformations, the proportion of the district level variance explained by national forces may be estimated by squaring the correlation between the national average and the district distributions of votes over a series of elections. Further, the residuals from a regression equation predicting the district distribution of vote from the national distribution are the same as those which would have been obtained had the national force itself been used as the independent variable. (This assertion is based on the fact that the number of districts is so large that the contribution of each individual district to the national average is negligible.) Repeating this procedure on the residuals within each state in a nested two-stage regression scheme,[8] one can compute a regression coefficient ($\hat{q}_{ij}$) and the proportion of variance explained for the state level. Finally the remaining variance is attributed to the district level.

---

[7] The definition should actually be somewhat broader, since it is my intention to include those things which are caused by national factors, even if they do not themselves affect all voters.

[8] See Searle; John Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 258–260.



Figure 1. National Force (Solid Line) and Three Hypothetical Districts with High National Variance Components

The meaning of "nationalization" implied by this model may be made clearer graphically. In Figures 1 and 2, the solid line represents the national forces at each of five elections, while the broken lines represent the partisan distribution of votes in each of a number of districts. For all those districts in Figure 1, the national variance component is quite large because the district vote is clearly a linear function of the national force. This is true even for District 1A, for which p_{ij}, from equation (6), would be negative. The crucial fact is that for each of these districts, the vote distribution is a function almost entirely of national forces, even though the reactions to those forces are different in every district. The national variance components for each of the districts represented in Figure 2, however, are all quite low. Again, the concern is with the degree to which districts respond to the same forces, not with the degree to which their responses are identical.

The solid line in Figure 3 shows the deviation from the normal vote at each election between 1952 and 1960 for the Second Congressional District of Illinois, a district in which, by the estimation of this technique, 96.8 per cent of the variance in the partisan distribution of votes could be explained by national-level forces. The broken line shows the estimate of the vote for each election made on the basis of the national force. It will be noted that these lines very nearly coincide, indicating that the estimate is reasonably accurate. In Figure 4, the same type of data is displayed, this time for the Thirtieth District of California, in which only 39.5 per cent of the variance could be explained with reference to national forces. In this graph, the estimate clearly follows the actual data much less closely, illustrating that in this district factors other than those summarized in the index of national forces play a significant role in determining shifts in the partisan distribution of votes.

The principal defect of the technique just suggested applies primarily to subnational units



Figure 2. National Force (Solid Line) and Three Hypothetical Districts with Low National Variance Components



Figure 3. Actual Percentage Republican (Solid Line) and Estimated Republican Percentage (Broken Line) for the 2nd Congressional District of Illinois



Figure 4. Actual Percentage Republican (Solid Line) and Estimated Republican Percentage (Broken Line) for the 30th Congressional District of California

(e.g., states and districts). That is, this model may be generalized and applied to any number of levels of causation, but for each level of causation considered, one degree of freedom is lost in the estimation of each lower (i.e., included) level. This means that with the same number of elections, the estimates become progressively less good as more levels of effects are considered. This defect is shared by the Stokes model and indeed is inevitable in any statistical treatment of congressional election results. It means, however, that a fairly long series of electoral data may be required for any complex analysis. On the other hand, the gain is that the definitional handicaps of the previously discussed models have been overcome, for what is now measured is the degree to which the electoral trends in different districts may be considered to be the effects of common causes, rather than the degree to which the trends themselves are the same.

It may be fairly objected that this model, like the other, deals only with the behavior of those voters who shift, either between parties or into or out of the electorate. Nonetheless, two observations may be made which suggest that this is, at worst, a marginal problem. First:

> Because of the pervasive effects of party loyalties, no candidate for Congress starts from scratch in putting together an electoral majority. The Congressman is a dealer in increments and margins. He starts with a stratum of hardened party voters, and if the stratum is broad enough he may have a measurable influence on his chance of survival simply by attracting a small additional element of the electorate—or by not losing a larger one.[9]

This situation, of course, is faced by candidates for other offices as well. Although most voters vote regularly and for the same party, those who do shift may have a decisive impact on the outcome of elections. Thus, to the extent that the model is concerned with only a small segment of the electorate, it is an important segment. Second, when one considers how these voters might be influenced, it becomes clear that the attitudes of many of the regular party voters are important, and are considered indirectly by this model. On the one hand, the candidate may appeal directly to the uncommitted voters. On the other, he may appeal to them through others. From what is known of electoral behavior, it is quite clear that the appeal through others is likely to have the greater effect. Those who are most likely to shift their votes are least likely to make use of the media or to have significant levels of political information at their disposal.[10] It is unlikely that they shift on the basis of a direct appeal from the candidates. Rather, these people acquire what political information they have and those political cues which are likely to determine their votes through "opinion leaders," intermediaries who are more interested in politics, more informed, and more likely to vote regularly.[11] The level of activity of the opinion leaders, the fervor with which they campaign, the frequency with which they are sources of positive cues, may be influenced, even though their votes for the candidates of their parties are more or less assured. While the candidate is guaranteed the minimal support, the votes, of "a hardened stratum of party voters," the appeal he makes to them may determine how well he does among the uncommitted. This means that the attitudes towards national, state, and local influences of those who do not change their votes are also considered by the present model. While it does not allow separation of these two paths of influence, it does allow estimation of the relative importance of the three levels of electoral factors in determining the final deviation from the normal vote in any given district.[12]

An Illustrative Application to American Congressional Elections

Application of this technique requires that a fairly long series of electoral data be available for each district to be studied. Whatever the ultimate impact of the wave of reapportionment brought about by the Supreme Court on policy or democratic legitimacy, it has rendered the decade of the 1960s unsuited for this analysis. Consequently, the data analyzed in this section were taken from the five congressional elections which took place between 1952 and 1960. The other requirement of this technique is that there be more than one district within each state in order that the state and district level effects may be separated. The Republican percentage of the two-party vote was therefore computed for each of the 280 congressional districts, in 31 states, which met the following three requirements (these are the same requirements Stokes set in applying his technique, which has the same data requirements):

---

[9] Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Campbell et al., p. 368.

[10] Philip Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 578–99.

[11] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960); Berelson et al., pp. 109–17.

[12] This line of reasoning suggests, incidentally, that aggregate analysis of this type might be preferable to survey analysis even if the individual level data were available. Since much of the causation dealt with is postulated to be indirect, it is unlikely that individuals would give "accurate" responses if asked whether they give most weight to national, state, or district issues. Further, since the Congressman must deal with his constituency as a whole, in considering congressional behavior aggregate measures may be more appropriate. To be strictly correct, what we are measuring is the degree to which a constituency behaves *as if* each voter weighted each level of causation in a given way, and not the degree to which this is actually the case.

(1) The district boundaries were not changed during the decade. (This condition eliminated a few districts from two states which partially redistricted during the 1950s.)
(2) The district was contested in each of the five elections. (This condition eliminated virtually all of the South as well as a small number of northern districts.)
(3) At least one other district in the same state met conditions (1) and (2). (This, of course, eliminated the very small states.)

In those cases in which one of the major party candidates received the endorsement of a third party, the votes thus received were totaled with those received as the candidate of the major party, the decision having been made that third-party endorsement should be considered to be a prime example of a district-level force. If a candidate was endorsed by both of the major parties, the district was considered to have been uncontested and was thus eliminated from the analysis.

Table 1 compares the results of this analysis with those obtained by Stokes using the same data and the technique already discussed.[13] It will be immediately observed that the values obtained by this method differ radically from those which Stokes obtained. While both sets of figures suggest that the state level is the least significant, the positions of the national and district levels are reversed. Where Stokes's model attributes nearly half of the variance in the partisan distribution of votes to the district level, the new method suggests that more than half of the variance is the result of national-level forces. In light of what is known about the political thinking of even the vast majority of opinion leaders, any model which ascribes great importance to local factors must be suspect. (It should be remembered that both models assign any variance which is not explained by national- or state-level forces to the district level. In this respect, the district-level variance component is in part a measure of the "badness of fit" of the model, and it is probable that the district-level variance component which was reported for the new technique is still too large.)

Table 1. Percentage of District Level Variance Explained by National, State, and District Level Forces

	Explained Variance (%)		
	National Level	State Level	District Level
National Average (New Technique)	54.6	19.2	26.2
Stokes's Results	32.0	19.0	49.0

$N=280$

In Table 2, the average percentage of the district-level variance in electoral results explained by national-, state-, and district-level forces is set forth for a number of subsets of districts. Within each level, an analysis of variance was performed for each partition of districts, and the results of these analyses are presented in the table.

When the districts are disaggregated according to dominant party and level of competitiveness,[14] two trends emerge. First, districts in which the Democratic party averaged more than 50 per cent of the two-party vote tended to be considerably more national in their orientation than were districts which were dominated by the Republicans. Second, within each party's sphere of influence, the more competitive the district, the more variance was explained nationally. The latter finding is not at all unexpected, and is quite consistent with the finding that turnout is also related to the degree

---

[13] Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," p. 76.

[14] The definition of competitiveness used here is derived from Edward Cox, "Measurement of Party Strength," *Wesern Political Quarterly*, 13 (December, 1960), 1022–42. The mean and standard deviation of the Republican percentage of the two party vote over the decade were computed. A district was defined to be a "marginal Republican" district if the mean Republican percentage was between 50 per cent and 50 per cent plus one standard deviation, a "moderate Republican" district if the mean was between 50 per cent plus one standard deviation and 50 per cent plus two standard deviations, and a "safe Republican district if the mean was greater than 50 per cent plus two standard deviations. The Democratic districts were likewise classified. This measure has the virtue of taking into account the volatility of the vote as well as its mean. In a "marginal" district, we would estimate the probability of the dominant party's winning an election to be between .5 and .8, in a "moderate" district we would estimate this probability to be between .8 and .97 and in a "safe" district to be greater than .98.

Table 2. Analysis of Variance of National, State, and District Variance Components for Subsets of Districts

	National		State		District		
	Explained Variance	*F* Test	Explained Variance	*F* Test	Explained Variance	*F* Test	*N*
Party Competition							
Safe Democratic	60.5		14.9		24.6		57
Moderate Democratic	63.9		18.1		18.1		27
Marginal Democratic	66.8	$p \leq .01$	9.9	*NS*	23.3	*NS*	18
Marginal Republican	56.0	$F_o = 3.34$	19.1	$F_o = 1.95$	24.9	$F_o = 1.26$	41
Moderate Republican	51.7	$F_r = 2.29$	20.5	$F_r = 2.29$	27.8	$F_r = 2.29$	52
Safe Republican	46.2		23.7		30.0		85
Region							
New England	57.9		23.3		18.7		19
Mid-Atlantic	47.4		19.4		33.2		85
E. North Central	65.7		11.6		22.7		83
W. North Central	60.3	$p \leq .01$	21.0	$p \leq .01$	18.7	$p \leq .01$	38
South (N. Carolina only)	24.4	$F_o = 5.90$	44.7	$F_o = 3.96$	30.9	$F_o = 3.93$	7
Border States	56.8	$F_r = 2.09$	28.1	$F_r = 2.09$	15.1	$F_r = 2.09$	15
Mountain States	55.3		22.0		22.7		12
Pacific States	34.7		25.7		39.7		21
Number of Congressmen During Decade							
One	54.4		21.4		24.1		126
Two	52.1	*NS*	18.1	*NS*	29.8	*NS*	105
Three	61.5	$F_o = .95$	15.4	$F_o = .98$	23.2	$F_o = 1.79$	43
Four	55.0	$F_r = 2.45$	25.5	$F_r = 2.45$	19.4	$F_r = 2.45$	5
Five	32.2		3.4		64.5		1
Ballot Form							
Party Column	57.8	$p \leq .05$	16.6	*NS*	25.6	$p \leq .01$	111
Modified Party Col.	62.2	$F_o = 3.37$	22.6	$F_o = 1.46$	15.2	$F_o = 4.69$	32
Office Block	50.3	$F_r = 3.00$	20.6	$F_r = 3.00$	29.2	$F_r = 3.00$	137

NS = $p > .05$.
F_o = Observed value of *F*.
F_r = Value of *F* required for statistical significance at $p \leq .05$.

of competition within the district.[15] It suggests that in competitive districts, more attention is devoted to national politics, which is only reasonable, since it is in competitive districts that most of the national campaign is focused, and it is in competitive districts that any shift in the distribution of votes may have a nationally relevant impact. The finding that Democratic districts tend to be more national in their voting than Republican districts may be explained by remembering that the most important national trend during the decade in question was the gradual disassociation, in the minds of the voters, of President Eisenhower and the Republican party. In 1952, Eisenhower drew enough voters to Republican congressional candidates to elect the only Republican Congress of the decade. By 1956, his coat-tails were essentially nonexistent. This loss of Eisenhower's drawing power is a factor which would affect most strongly districts in which there were a large number of Democrats. (The Republicans, although perhaps reinforced in their voting intentions, did not shift and consequently did not contribute to the amount of variance to be explained or to its explanation.) The fact that one factor was of such importance suggests that even a five election series may not be long enough to give a completely unbiased picture. It should be remembered, however, that this series of elections is not a sample, but is rather the universe of elections which took place during the decade studied. Further, it is the same universe of elections upon which the political actors involved had to base their judgments. But if different issues had been salient during this period, the same districts might have scored differently.

---

[15] For evidence that turnout is related to perceived closeness of the election, see Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 54; for data suggesting that turnout is related to competitiveness in primary elections see V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 506.

Looking at the data by region, one finds that the only areas which diverge greatly from the national averages are the South and the Pacific states. With regard to the South (actually, seven North Carolina congressional districts were the only southern districts to meet the three requirements for inclusion in the analysis), it should be stressed that the observed difference is not the result of Southerners reacting differently from Northerners to the same issues; the low national variance component indicates that regardless of the direction of the reaction, factors which were salient in the North and West were not salient in the South. While it is impossible to tell with these data, it seems reasonable to suppose that at least a part of the large state variance component is actually the result of regional forces. For the Pacific states, a similar (although less pronounced) trend appears, primarily because of the influence of the state of Washington.

If the personal characteristics of the incumbent are important in determining electoral outcomes, one would expect the district variance component to be large. This expectation may be upset, however, if only one man represents the district during the time considered. In this case, what is legitimately part of the district effect may be incorrectly interpreted as part of the normal vote. For this reason, districts were disaggregated according to the number of turnovers of representative during the decade. No significant relationship was found between the number of incumbents and any of the three variance components. Indeed, the greatest deviation from the national average—the mean for districts which elected three different congressmen during the interval—was in a direction opposite to that which would have been expected. Thus, it may reasonably be argued that turnover has little impact on this measure. The overall volatility of the vote in a district also has little impact on the measure, the correlation between the standard deviation of the Republican percentage of the vote and each of the three variance components being less than .10.

Another possibility is that institutional arrangements, particularly the form of the ballot, might alter the results. Cummings finds, for example, that the correlation between presidential and congressional votes increases as it becomes institutionally easier for the voter to cast a straight party ballot.[16] On an individual level, it has also been found that the level of split-ticket voting is related to the form of the ballot.[17] This leads to the expectation that the presidential coat-tail effect will be strongest in those states which employ the party column ballot format, and might lead to the expectation that these states would also have districts with the highest national variance components. The results are difficult to interpret because the largest national variance components are observed for those districts which have a ballot format intermediate between the party column and office block types. This format requires a separate vote for president but follows the party column format for the other offices. One possible explanation is that this intermediate form of ballot requires some thought for the voter to link the presidential nominee with the rest of his party's ticket, encouraging the use of party as an identifying cue in addition to relying on the *name* of the presidential nominee. Consequently, in off-year elections, when there is no presidential nominee, voters in these states may have acquired the necessary facility to allow them to link party and president. In the straight party column states, this facility may not be developed, however, because even in presidential years, the voter need rely only on party label *or* candidate's name (not both as in the other states). In the office block states, the complexity of the task and the paucity of cues provided may make consistent voting more difficult, thus increasing the district level variance component.

Other Suggested Applications

The computation of a national average of the proportion of electoral variance explained by national, state, and local level forces represents a substantial step in itself toward reducing the ambiguity of national electoral returns. On the basis of the analysis reported here, one can reasonably infer that swings in the congressional vote are importantly influenced by forces operating nationally. The American political system looks considerably more national, and less like a loose federation of unrelated local political systems, than Stokes's analysis would lead one to expect.

The utility of this approach is not limited to the description of a single national political system. As Stokes demonstrated with his model, the decomposition of local electoral variance can lead to interesting cross-national comparisons. For example, when computed on the basis of the 1946 election of the Constituent Assembly and the 1953, 1958, and 1963 elections to the *Camera dei Deputati* in Italy, the average proportion of the variance in the Christian Democratic vote explained by national factors (in a sample of 721 from the more than 7,000 communes) was 37 per cent. This is considerably below the American figure reported in Table 1. Even without performing the computation, it may be asserted that the corresponding figure for Great Britain would be noticeably higher than for the United States. (The proportion of the variance attributed to national factors by the new method must be higher than the 47 per cent which Stokes reports.)

---

[16] Milton Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964* (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 172–97.

[17] Campbell et al., *The American Voter,* pp. 148–49.

As the regional comparisons reported in Table 2 imply, since the index of nationalization is computed for each district, this technique may also be used for intranational comparisons. The dramatic differences in the degree of electoral nationalization between the South and Pacific Coast states and the rest of the country come as no surprise to anyone familiar with American electoral politics during the decade of the 1950s. Additionally, when enough parties are actively competing so that the assumption that the proportion of the vote received by one party is independent of that received by another appears to be reasonable, comparisons between parties within a single nation may be made. Table 3 illustrates these points by comparing the national variance components for the *Democrazia Cristiana* and *Partito Socialista Italiano* in five regions of Italy. For the nation as a whole, the national variance component computed for the PSI is more than one and one-half times that computed for the DC. Further, the differences among regions for the PSI are even more dramatic than are those between the parties.[18]

Table 3. National Variance Components for Il Partito Socialista Italiano and La Democrazia Cristiana by Region

	Democrazia Cristiana	Partito Socialista Italiano
National Average	.37	.68
Northwest	.39	.82
Northeast	.43	.85
Center	.41	.74
Mezzogiorno	.30	.44
Sicily & Sardegna	.36	.47

Although no analysis of the regression coefficients produced has been carried out beyond observing that the national regression coefficients (corresponding to p_{ij} in equation [6]) were negative for the North Carolina districts upon which the southern averages were based, analyses similar to those just noted could also be performed on them.

While interesting by themselves, the national, state, and district variance components may also be profitably employed as inputs to more far-reaching analyses. These components are descriptive measures; no hypothesis is tested when they are computed. Once established, however, they may be used as either dependent or independent variables in analyses which do test hypotheses regarding many aspects of political behavior.

If democracy is a system of government in which the actions of policy makers are controlled by the people, the relationship between the behavior of the electorate and that of legislators assumes clear importance. In attempting to explain the behavior of American legislators, reference has frequently been made to their constituencies. A number of proposed theories, both normative and empirical, specify the apparent or preferred nature of the connection between constituents and the behavior of legislators. Two general classes of these models may be profitably reviewed here to illustrate how the aspect of constituency behavior described by this technique might figure in analysis: the "responsible parties" models of democracy, and the "constituency delegate" models.

The responsible parties model argues that political power ought to be vested in a cohesive political party, which by virtue of its total control of the government may be held totally accountable for its actions. That this model makes demands upon the legislator is understood; he is to follow explicitly the platform or leaders of his party. In the legislature, he is expected to vote with his party; in his contacts with his constituents, he is to be a representative of his party, adhering to its principles even at the cost of his seat. This model also makes demands upon the voter, although these are less often articulated. He is assumed to vote for a national party, either because he agrees with its platform or because he has confidence in its leaders. Orientations toward local candidates and issues, except as taken up by the national parties, are to be ignored, as are traditional loyalties. In the terms we have been using, the level of "nationalization of electoral effects" is assumed to be quite high.

---

[18] Regional definitions are from Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 332.

Opposed to this model, the constituency representative model stresses the representation of people and interests, even at the expense of clearly defined responsibility for the government as a whole. Where the responsible parties model suggests that the legislator be bound either to his national party's platform or to its leaders and argues for collective responsibility, this model favors individual responsibility and initiative on the part of independent legislators. The legislator is assumed to act independently of any supraconstituency influence, and correspondingly, the voters are assumed to be primarily oriented toward local factors.

The technique which has been proposed allows measurement of the degree to which the behavior of a constituency electorate follows the prediction of one or the other model of representation. Examination of congressmen's behavior on roll-call votes gives one indication of the model with whose predictions they are acting in accord. Table 4 reports for each party the correlation between congressmen's party unity scores on the party opposition roll calls taken during the 87th Congress (the last Congress elected during the decade from which the electoral data analyzed here were taken) and the national variance components for their districts. The expectation is that there will be a positive correlation, indicating that legislators and their constituents conform to the same model of representation. This should be the case if the problem is attacked normatively, since the legislator *should* orient himself towards politics in a way consonant with the orientation of the electorate. It should also be true if the problem is approached behaviorally, since by describing voters' decision criteria, we specify the behavior patterns required of the legislator if he is to maximize his chance of reelection; while by specifying the legislator's behavior patterns, we describe many of the stimuli affecting the voters.

The table confirms the expectation that the importance of national factors in determining local electoral results is positively correlated with party voting. For both parties this relationship is statistically significant, albeit not overwhelmingly strong. When domestic and foreign policy roll calls are considered separately, the relationship appears to be stronger for domestic issues, marginally for the Democrats but significantly for the Republicans. If domestic policy is further divided, the greatest contribution to this relationship is seen to be made by the general field of social welfare legislation, for which correlations of .21 for the Democrats and .22 for the Republicans were observed.

Table 4. Correlations Between Media Access Variables and National Variance Components for Il Partito Socialista Italiano and La Democrazia Cristiana

	Independent Variable		National Variance Component	
	2	3	DC	PSI
1. Radios per Capita	.32	−.69	.11	.41
2. Televisions per Capita		−.26	.10	.15
3. Per cent Illiterate			−.09	−.47

Alternatively, analysis may be directed toward explaining the differences in the degree of electoral nationization observed among electoral districts. Although it is not logically necessary, since intermediate structures could perform the same function, a high degree of electoral nationalization is more likely to be found in those areas where a high proportion of the voters have direct access to the national media than in those areas where information is largely filtered through local intermediaries. Looking again at Italy—where the variance in such variables as literacy (prerequisite to access to the printed media), ownership of radios, and ownership of televisions is significant—Table 5 shows that the hypothesized correlations actually exist, especially for the PSI. The greater strength of these relationships for the PSI is probably the result of its organizational weakness. While such organizations as Catholic Action and the Catholic Church itself can serve as nationalizing influences on the Christian Democratic voter in the absence of access to the national media, no similarly strong surrogate exists for the Socialist. Thus media access carries much more relative weight in determining whether or not the Socialist voter will respond to national forces.

Finally, the general approach I have suggested here is applicable beyond the realm of electoral behavior whenever variance at one level is to be attributed to a number of higher levels in a nested arrangement. For example, this approach might be applied in explaining variations over time in the budgets of bureaus that are nested within divisions, which in turn are nested within departments and finally within the nation as a whole.[19] Other examples might be arms levels within alliances or trade figures nested either geographically or by commodity type. Other applications will, no doubt, occur to those working in these and other areas of research.

---

[19] I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this possibility.

The technique for apportioning variance among several nested levels of influence which has been presented here has been shown to overcome some of the definitional handicaps of earlier methods. It must not be regarded as the final step in the gradual evolution of models in this area. It is to be hoped, however, that it will prove an aid to further progress in both substantive and methodological research.

Comment: On the Measurement of Electoral Dynamics

DONALD E. STOKES
University of Michigan

No one who seeks to capture in a formal model the realities of political or social change is likely to feel the results are free of ambiguity. I gave a good deal of thought to the point raised by Richard Katz and to several other interpretive questions that surrounded my analysis of electoral change. The point discussed by Katz is an important one. Although I do not accept his view of what ought to be done, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the work of so penetrating a critic.

There is, to begin with, no difference between us as to the nature of the national forces measured by my own model. They are indeed forces tending to produce similar shifts in the strength of the parties (or the extent of turnout) in all constituencies. I might well have used some modifying adjective such as "unidirectional" or "uniform" in describing these forces. I undertook the analysis in the first place because I wanted to learn more about the role which like swings of electoral fortune might play in the cohesion of congressional or parliamentary parties. Hence, my statistical operations were, as Katz correctly notes, intended to describe the influence of such forces.

But I was well aware, as Katz also notes, that national issues (or state or regional issues) can produce swings of different magnitude or even direction across a set of local constituencies. I said in part:

> Some forces which arise at a higher level may have opposite effects in different states or local constituencies. For example, the religious aspect of the candidacy of John Kennedy in 1960 had quite different effects in Protestant and Catholic areas.[1]

Indeed, I included within my model several covariance terms which were intended to detect the differential impact of national forces on state or local politics and of state forces on local constituencies. I noted that

> such effects will tend to produce a positive or negative covariance between movements of the vote at higher and lower political levels. In 1960, for example, the net Republican gain in the national mean due to religion would have been *positively* associated with the movement of the vote in Protestant states or districts, *negatively* associated with the movement of the vote in Catholic states or districts.[2]

The estimates of the values of these covariance terms did prove very helpful in assessing the importance of differential effects in congressional and parliamentary electoral change in the recent past. They suggested in particular that differential effects had been of much less importance than had uniform effects. Indeed, when these covariance terms were converted to their normalized form as correlation coefficients and their magnitude measured by the square of the product moment correlation coefficient, the values obtained were no larger than we would expect by chance if differential effects were completely negligible.

I should emphasize this aspect of the model and the empirical results to which it led, since it bears on a main difference between Katz's approach and my own. My reasoning was this. If differential effects of national and state forces were in fact completely absent from electoral politics and the model were applied to a finite number of elections, chance patterns of variation would tend to yield values of these squared correlations greater than zero, despite the absence of real effects. But we also know how large these chance departures from zero values would tend to be for a given number of elections. Hence, this expected departure, rather than zero, is the appropriate benchmark against which to compare the empirical values obtained from five elections. When this comparison was made for the American congressional elections of the 1950s it emerged that the squared correlations were on the average no greater than we would expect them to be if differential effects had been completely negligible. This finding encouraged me to focus on the variance components terms of the model, which were intended, as Katz notes, to measure the influence of uniform national and state forces.

The stratagem was simply a particularization to my analysis of a prudential point that needs to be kept in mind in undertaking any correlation or regression analysis. With only a few data points we will often be able to fit a regression line quite well and exhibit a high positive or negative correlation coefficient even if there is actually no correlation in the population from which a limited sample is drawn. Let us for example assume, for sake of argument, that the mean rainfall across the country on election day has no actual bearing on the Republican share of the vote for President. Yet if we confined our attention to only two elections and correlated rainfall with Republican strength at these two points in time, we would obtain a perfect correlation and be able to "explain" all of the variance of the vote since a regression line can always be exactly fitted to two data points. Even if we had data from three elections it is likely that we would obtain a very high correlation (and a high proportion of explained variance) as our line-fitting capitalized on chance. Indeed, if the joint distribution of rainfall and Republican vote were bivariate normal with no underlying relationship between the two, we could expect rainfall still to explain half of the variance of Republican strength as we fitted a regression line to data from five elections. These considerations argue the importance of designing a correlation or regression analysis to distinguish real from chance effects.[3]

---

[1] Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas, Texas: The Arnold Foundation, 1965), p. 74.

[2] Stokes, p. 75.

These considerations must be kept in view in judging the validity of the approach proposed by Katz. His technique for gauging the influence of national forces on fluctuations of the vote essentially (1) plots for each of five elections the proportion of the vote received by one of the parties in a given constituency against the proportion the party received in the country as a whole; (2) fits a regression line to these five data points; (3) calculates the proportion of the variance of the constituency vote that is "explained" by the national vote; and (4) averages these proportions of explained variance across a set of constituencies to gauge the impact of national forces in the whole country or some part of it.

The central difficulty with this approach, as my prior remarks suggest, is that it is so likely to capitalize on chance patterns. If, in the limiting case, the technique were applied to data from only two elections, the national and constituency proportions would be perfectly correlated in every constituency, and all of the variance of party strength in the constituencies between the two elections would be "explained" by national forces. With the addition of a third election, and even a fourth and fifth, the ability of the technique to capitalize on chance would still be high.

It follows from this that the technique would tend to inflate the apparent importance of national forces more if applied to a small number of elections than if applied to a larger number. In other words, if we were to start with a given number of elections and randomly remove elections from the analysis, the proportion of the variance explained by national forces would tend to rise as elections were deleted (although there would be some random upward and downward movement around the upward trend) until we finally would have explained all the variance when only two elections remained.

The same remarks can be made about Katz's treatment of state or regional forces, except that in this case the prior extraction of estimates of the importance of national forces diminishes still further the fund of information with which the analyst can work. The reduction in degrees of freedom that results from extracting estimates of national before turning to state forces amounts to diminishing the number of elections from five to four. As a result, the estimates obtained for state forces are vulnerable to a similar inflation.

There is a suggestion in Katz's piece that he dismissed such doubts by reminding himself that he was dealing with a complete population of elections and not a sample. He in particular observes that ". . . this series of elections is not a sample but is rather the universe of elections which took place during the decade studied." He hedges this position, quite properly in my view, by noting that "were different issues salient during this period, the same districts might have scored differently," a remark that admits of the possibility of seeing actual events as being drawn from a wider class of potential events. Moreover, he implicitly takes such a sampling view, as I think he should, in applying F-tests to differences between groups of constituencies.

These are questions that very quickly take us into the philosophical mists. I can well understand why some people find it strange to admit a wider class of possible events into their examination of the pattern of actual events. Whatever Katz's view of these deeper questions, however, I do not think that regarding the elections of a given period as a complete universe dispels the difficulties I have described. Once again, the case of two elections makes the point admirably. Two successive congressional elections would most certainly constitute the complete population of congressional elections in this two-year period. But this quite correct observation would not make it any less nonsensical to apply Katz's technique to these two elections and attribute all of the variance in constituency returns between the two elections to national forces. Equally, denying a sampling viewpoint does not help us over the difficulty that the importance attributed to national forces would tend to decline as more elections were brought into the analysis.

---

[3] This point is widely commented on by the literature. See, for example, S. S. Wilks, *Mathematical Statistics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 593.

In view of these considerations, I do not see in Katz's empirical results any reason to question my own for America and Britain in the recent past. His higher estimates of the importance of national forces can easily be attributed to the liability of his technique to inflate these estimates when applied to data from only a few elections. Similarly, his higher estimates of the importance of state forces in explaining the variance that remains after the apparent effects of national forces have been removed can be laid at the same door. The exceedingly nonvanishing values of the covariance terms of my own model led me to realize that there was a lot of chance to be capitalized upon in five elections—as well as to believe that uniform forces were more important than differential ones in the period I considered.

Although the comparisons Katz draws between his results and mine are, for the reasons I have given, not very helpful, the comparisons he draws between his results for different groups of constituencies seem to me more interesting. It is of course possible that the difficulties I have cited have inflated his estimates more in some groups of constituencies than in others. But if we assume that the bias is fairly uniform, there are interesting contrasts to be drawn by region, party strength, turnover of Member, and the like. I should also applaud his extending his work to comparative materials. So few serious attempts have yet been mounted to contrast electoral patterns from more than a single political system that such a venture is welcome, however much the results must be regarded as a first approximation.

Let me therefore conclude by saying that I share with Katz an interest in non-uniform electoral forces. My earlier analysis focussed primarily on uniform forces since I was interested in their role in the cohesion of legislative parties. But I also tested for the presence of non-uniform forces. The results of the test were negative for the period of my work. But the test made me aware of how important it is to distinguish real from chance effects. Katz's failure to do so almost certainly leads him to overestimate the importance of national forces. Hence, I endorse his ends but not his means and feel that his findings on recent American and British elections are easily reconciled with my own.

Rejoinder to “Comment” by Donald E. Stokes

RICHARD S. KATZ

After carefully considering Donald Stokes's comment, which was particularly useful because on every major point each of us apparently understood what the other had done, I can see two points of contention upon which I would like to comment further. The first, which is given almost exclusive attention in Stokes's comment, is his technical objection to my analysis. The second arises from the fact that our methods, being based on different models of political reality, are attempting to quantify fundamentally different things, although perhaps unfortunately calling them by the same name. With regard to the first point, the question is whether my application of the technique I proposed was methodologically permissible. With regard to the second point, the question, whose answer is not dependent on the answer to the first question, is which model is theoretically superior in the sense of being the more useful.

Stokes's technical objection to my analysis is in reality an objection to the application of the technique to a short series of data. He does not apparently object to the internal logic of the model, nor I must conclude need he object to the results of an analysis based on a longer series of data. This is an important point, to which I will return, as our techniques would not yield the same results no matter how long the series of elections. His point regarding the application of my technique to a series of five elections is important as well, however, since so long as the constitutional dictate of decennial reapportionment is in force, we can never expect to have more than five congressional elections without changes in constituency boundaries, and even where longer series are available, they are spread over so long a time as to raise serious questions of the comparability of their beginnings and ends.

There are two aspects to the question of whether five elections are adequate for analysis: the vulnerability of the measure to the nonrandom peculiarities of the five elections analyzed, and the extent to which the model is simply capitalizing on random variation in the data. Stokes's comment is addressed primarily to the latter, although his observation that my method would attribute 100 per cent of the variance to national factors with a two-election series is fundamentally gratuitous to both aspects of the question.

Certainly with limited series of data the results of any analysis are vulnerable to their idiosyncracies. As Stokes notes, I warn of this in discussing the possible impact of Eisenhower's candidacy when I observe that “were different issues salient during this period, the same districts might have scored differently.” The same vulnerability applies to Stokes's method; had no national hero been a candidate for the presidency in the 1950s, Stokes might well have found a significantly lower level of electoral nationalization. In this respect I intended to suggest that the five elections might be considered as being drawn from a wider class of events. I did not intend to suggest that either my technique or Stokes's allows us to generalize to this wider universe. Thus one is led to stress the importance of basing comparison, in so far as possible, upon comparable series of data. This point is particularly well illustrated by Stokes's analysis of turnout, in which a normalized national variance component of .86 is observed precisely because presidential elections coincide with alternate congressional elections. Stokes is wise, therefore, when he only contrasts British and American figures with regard to partisan distribution (although the comparability of these, too, is unknown), leaving turnout aside from his international comparison.

The extent to which the technique which I have proposed can be said simply to capitalize on random factors depends on the relative magnitudes of the random and nonrandom elements of variation in the data. This, in turn, is largely dependent on whether we view the elections analyzed as constituting a random sample from the universe of possible elections or rather as a highly nonrandom sample representing, aside from measurement error and the ever present “other factors,” the universe to which we may generalize. In his comment, Stokes appears to favor the sampling viewpoint. If we take this approach, random factors must be seen as important, and my technique would certainly be vulnerable to them. But is this a reasonable approach? I would suggest that it is not, for the same reasons that it would not be reasonable for a physician to generalize about the effects of all drugs after experimenting with a random sample of five medicines. Regardless of the number of individuals upon whom he experiments (or in our case regardless of the number of constituencies involved) five is an inadequate sample for generalizations to be made to an infinite universe. This is as true of Stokes's work as it is of my own. Thus, we are forced to adopt a far more restricted view of the range of our generalizations. I observe that the "series of elections is not a sample but rather the universe of elections which took place during the decade studied" because to attempt to generalize beyond the elections which took place would condemn *any* statistical analysis of election results to invalidity. But, if we take this more restrictive view, the relative importance of the random element in the data rapidly diminishes. (When I applied F-tests to differences between groups of constituencies, the view I was taking was to regard the *constituencies* as a sample.)

Indeed, the impact of a small data base on my technique need not always be in the direction which Stokes suggests. While the proportion of variance which I would attribute to national forces will be affected by random error in short series of data (as Stokes's national variance component may also be affected) because of the relatively small size of the random factor this effect may not be so large as to lead, as Stokes suggests it must, "to an entirely artificial reduction in the estimate placed on the importance of such [national] forces as additional elections [are] brought into the analysis." In the original article, I reported the national variance components for the *Democrazia Cristiana* for five regions of Italy based on a series of four elections. In Table 1, I reproduce these figures together with the corresponding data based on a series of six elections, those on which the original analysis was based augmented by the elections of 1948 and 1968.

Table 1. National Variance Components for La Democrazia Cristiana by Regions

	National Variance Components Based on:	
	6 Elections	4 Elections
National Average	.44	.37
Northwest	.47	.39
Northeast	.62	.43
Center	.50	.41
Mezzogiorno	.31	.30
Sicily and Sardegna	.36	.36

In no case was the estimate of the importance of national factors higher when based on the shorter series of elections. While this fact underlines the vulnerability of the measure to the peculiarities of each election of a short series, it does suggest that Stokes vastly overrates the liability of my technique to artifically inflate the national variance component.

My conclusion with regard to the criticism that five elections are too few would be this: to the extent that it is valid, it applies equally to Stokes's procedure and to my own, as well as to any other analysis of electoral data. That is, neither of our procedures provide a sound basis for generalization beyond the particular elections considered unless an *a priori* assumption of their representativeness of the wider universe is made. What each does is to provide a statistical summary description in the terms of the model upon which it is based of a series of elections in a particular place, at a particular time, and in particular political circumstances.

Whatever weight one eventually decides to give to Stokes's technical criticisms, they do not strike at the theoretical basis of what I have tried to do. Yet the fact remains that with any conceivable series of data, Stokes's procedure and my own will yield different estimates of the impact of national, state, and district level forces. This is because they are measuring fundamentally different things. The "nationalization" which Stokes measures is the degree to which changes in the partisan distribution of votes are numerically identical across districts. The "nationalization" I am measuring is the degree to which these changes may be treated as if they were the results of a common cause. Stokes appears to miss the importance of this difference when he attempts to defend his empirical results against mine. There is no reason for him to do this. In comparing his results with mine I did not wish to imply that there was anything technically wrong with his figures, which are the result of quite masterful analysis. In saying that "any model which ascribes great importance to local factors must be suspect," I did not mean that his figures were the result of improper analysis but that they were based on a definition of "nationalization" which did not seem to me to be very useful.

The real question is not whose numbers are right; I would contend that within their own frameworks both are correct. The question is which model of reality is the more useful for any particular theoretical or analytical purpose. My complaint about Stokes's model is that it fails to take account of differences among districts which could lead the same forces to have effects of different magnitude or even direction in different areas. To this complaint, Stokes's observation with regard to the impact of Kennedy's Catholicism is not a defense but a caveat. Kennedy's religion is a factor, in other words, which must be taken into account in interpreting his results, not one taken into account by his model. Other issues which might have different effects in different areas (race relations, restrictive trade legislation, and defense spending to name only three) come readily to mind. It was precisely because Stokes's model must mishandle this type of issue that I was led to the alternative which I have proposed.

Stokes and I have proposed different models, or theories, of the way changes in the partisan distribution of votes occur at the district level. Each has then derived a quantitative description of the congressional elections of the 1950s in the terms of his model. The descriptions differ because the underlying notions of political reality differ; no doubt each has oversimplified and distorted reality to some extent. It is my contention, simply, that the model of reality I have proposed oversimplifies less and that the measure of nationalization produced is more useful to the analysis of political behavior and more in line with what is generally meant by "explained variance" in social research.

Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces, and Divergent Partisan Majorities*

ANDREW T. COWART
University of Oslo

During the last two decades of political research, the survey studies of voting behavior have achieved perhaps an unparalleled accuracy in the specification and explanation of a dependent political variable—the vote for president. Theories have been developed and tested at the individual level concerning a host of sociological, psychological, political, and institutional factors thought to give partisan direction to voting in presidential elections. Comparable scholarly attention to individual voting in statewide contests is nowhere apparent. By and large, it is thought that the path to statistical success in the study of state politics lies in the use of aggregate election figures which, unlike national sample surveys, may be delineated by state political boundaries.

Aggregate analyses of partisan vote divisions in various statewide contests, however, leave a good deal of confusion in their wake—indeed, skepticism that the theories of individual voting behavior tested in the context of presidential elections hold much relevance for the explanation of individual voting decisions in statewide contests. In 1960, for example, sixteen of the thirty-six states which held either gubernatorial or senatorial elections gave a majority in one of those races to a party other than the party which won the state presidential vote. Kallenbach observes that only 59.7 per cent of state elections during the period 1956 to 1964 produced pluralities for presidential and gubernatorial candidates of the same party when these elections occurred simultaneously.[1] A variety of computations performed on statewide election results reveals these apparent disparities between state and national contests.

On the opposite side of the coin, however, the empirical studies of individual voting decisions for president surely place some constraints on one's willingness to assert that the issues associated with state political contests largely account for these excessive disparities in the aggregate pattern. We know that most voters in presidential contests simply cast a party vote, and also that state politics generally holds much less saliency for the voter than does national politics. These findings would not recommend the hypothesis that voter evaluations of burning statewide issue conflicts can account for divergent aggregate patterns. Indeed, we might even suggest that the relationship between basic partisan loyalties and voting is stronger in state political contests than in presidential contests, since the higher saliency levels usually accompanying presidential contests yield greater opportunities for particular issues to stimulate partisan defections.

This question of why the partisan results of various statewide contests are often so markedly different from the partisan results of presidential contests in those states has received little attention, in spite of its obvious implications for contemporary theories of voting behavior. The more fundamental observation to be made, however, is that these two dependent political phenomena—national presidential politics and state politics—find explication in two somewhat distinct bodies of literature. Indeed, the separate paths which students of state politics and those of national politics have taken is an interesting bit of intellectual history in itself. One body of research focusing clearly on state politics has been directed toward the aggregate analysis of election outcomes in the states—a field which has come to be known as comparative state politics.[2] A second body of research has taken the presidential vote at the individual level as the primary dependent variable, and these analyses have been based largely upon the national election surveys.[3] The conclusion that the divergence is "data-driven" seems inescapable: The advent of the national sample surveys led electoral theorists to test propositions at the level of the individual voter. Yet since national sample surveys do not ordinarily yield valid subsamples for each of the states, the principal emphasis has been on the presidential voting decision.

---

* This article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation, *Electoral Decision-Making in the American States: Reconciling Individual Predispositions and Aggregate Patterns* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971). Acknowledgments are due Samuel J. Eldersveld, Gudmund R. Iversen, Donald E. Stokes, and Herbert F. Weisberg for comments on the original manuscript. The data were originally collected by the Survey Research Center Political Behavior Program and were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[1] Joseph E. Kallenbach, *The American Chief Executive* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 104.

[2] Notable examples include: V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); John H. Fenton, *Midwest Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966); Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and

On the other hand, students of state politics generally have not sought statewide sample surveys of individual voters.[4] Rather, the availability of data on states as analytic units from the United States Bureau of the Census has itself shaped the kind of theory which scholars of comparative state politics have developed. Sensitive to Robinson's ecological fallacy, investigators of state politics have developed and tested theories about "state behavior" which bear little resemblance to theories developed by students of national presidential politics.

The purpose of this project is twofold: (1) to apply some of the theoretical propositions of individual voting behavior tested at the presidential level to voting in gubernatorial and senatorial elections and (2) to propose appropriate modifications of that theory in the state electoral context which will account for the observed aggregate disparities. The thesis is that one source of conflicting partisan majorities between statewide office contests and presidential contests within the state lies in an important contextual phenomenon of state elections—the prevailing candidate incumbency pattern. The patterned practice of state electorates to yield partisan majorities to different parties, depending on the office, does not necessarily serve as evidence that influential partisan loyalties at the presidential level break down as an influence at the subnational level. The partisan incumbency context of the election, however, provides an additional voter motivation either for partisan reinforcement or for defection from party. I shall also examine the role of candidate incumbency status in overriding the changing reactions to the two parties across several dimensions of attitude. The contention is that forces operating at the presidential level are similarly operative on the individual voter at the state level but that the specification of candidate incumbency context is useful for explaining individual partisan defections and aggregate partisan differences within and across the states.

Theoretical Overview, Data Base, and Operational Definitions

Federal forms of government breed federal patterns of politics, and these diversities in state and national partisanship have been noted by scholars of American politics. Thus, the Republican party of New York state is not best conceptualized as the political appendage of the national Republican party in that geographical area. Any state political party will come to possess over time a set of traditions, a group of grand old men, and a series of statewide issue positions unique to the state party; and its own leaders and its opposition leaders will remain sensitive to whatever marked departures from national party policy arise.

In a federal system, many of these distinctions will be lost upon mass publics. If the classical requirements of democratic government are difficult to meet for the citizen of a unitary state, the complexities increase multiplicatively in a federal arrangement. The voter is asked to know something of several candidates for different offices, several sets of issues associated with different levels of government, and several political parties. The fragmentary nature of the information which the typical American voter is able to assimilate about his politics is well documented, at least for presidential politics. The parallel of this in the case of state politics is not difficult to draw.

My theoretical view of voters in subnational elections is not unlike that of voters in the national elections. If the voter's psychological identification with his political party is as fundamental as it seems, then the ramifications for subnational voting should be comparable to those at the presidential level. Similarly, evaluations of party will be viewed as if no basic dis-

---

Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966).

[3] For example, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960). Notable exceptions include: Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962) 531–546; Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Fall, 1960) 397–418. These studies, however, are not concerned with state political contests.

[4] Although the selection is small, some few state sample surveys have been conducted. A four-state study is analyzed in *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, ed. William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). Also, the Comparative State Elections Project of the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, conducted a thirteen-state study during the 1968 national elections.

tinctions are being made at different levels of government. There is, in fact, good evidence for such an assumption, since almost none of our respondents ask for clarification on level of government when asked about either of the two parties. Some respondents, typically less than 3 per cent, offer remarks which suggest a state political party referent. While political sophisticates are quick to discern apparent differences between state and national parties, these distinctions are not terribly salient ones among mass electorates. By and large, a reference to one of the two major parties conjures up a set of impressions about that party as an entity which is rather unlike the scholarly view of a highly fragmented American party system.

Set in the context of current social-psychological theories of voting behavior, the condition that state electorates give partisan majorities to different parties, depending on the office contest, suggests that any of several fundamentally different processes may be operative. The marked effect of the voter's psychological identication with his political party on his vote for president is well documented. Much-attenuated effects of party loyalty in contests for state office could easily underlie the patterned practice of state electorates to select candidates of different parties for state versus presidential office. With reduced effects of party identification, the vote for various statewide office contests would be free to fluctuate as a function of the electorate's reactions to statewide issues and candidates. This view of voting for statewide office contestants would be in line with Charles Adrian's contention that partisan loyalties affect voting in state elections only slightly.[5]

While it is common for state electorates to divide their partisan majorities among different partisan contestants, the percentage differences in these majorities are only moderate. It is exceedingly rare, for example, that state A's electorate gives 80 per cent of its vote to the Democratic presidential candidate but only 20 per cent to the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Thus, with only moderate differences in percentage terms, basic party loyalties may be equally potent in statewide office and presidential office contests, but the sources producing moderate levels of partisan defection may be quite varied in the two kinds of contests. In contrast to the stability of individual party identifications, the electorate's evaluations of the Republican and Democratic parties show a good deal more change from election to election. The voter is often led to vote against his own party's presidential candidate when he is dissatisfied with the party's domestic or foreign policies, group posture, or performance in government. While these more fluid dimensions of partisan attitude have been shown to have a substantial effect on the division of the two-party vote for president, it does not necessarily follow that they influence subnational party evaluations in the same way. Other dimensions of attitude tied to the political posture and performance of the state parties may guide momentary defections from party at the state level. Thus, while party identification may be equally significant in voting for state and presidential contests, different partisan attitude sets associated with those two kinds of contests may produce such alternate patterns of partisan defection.

A third view of voting in statewide contests would converge more closely with that associated with the studies of individual-level voting in presidential elections. Both basic partisan loyalties and the evaluations of party across several dimensions of attitude, changing from time to time, may mark the vote for senators and governors in a manner similar to their presidential vote effects. Other factors associated with particular state elections may aid in specifying why the Democratic presidential candidate receives equivalent vote proportions in two states while the Senate campaigns of his partisan colleagues exhibit widely divergent results. As noted above, extensive treatment will be given here to one such contextual factor—the statewide candidate incumbency pattern—which may contribute to differential partisan majorities in gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential contests.

The theoretical meaning of a contextual variable such as the candidate incumbency pattern prevailing in a state is a good deal more elusive than it appears at first consideration. In the narrow sense, the concept will be measured perfectly by specifying whether the respondent voted in a state election pitting, for example, a Democratic incumbent against a Republican challenger. Yet, the linkage between that condition, which presumably favors the Democratic candidate, and the voter's decision is mediated by any of several components of individual reaction, some of which flow from that initial condition, others of which do not. Consider the following five items which may be thought to be among the more important elements of the incumbent's net advantage: (1) candidate familiarity, (2) campaigning advantages associated with officeholding, (3) voter's sense of approval of the *status quo,* (4) candidate personal appeal, (5) candidate issue stands. The first three fall most clearly within the commonly conceived notion of an incumbent's advantage. First, voters are more likely to know the names of the incumbent candidates and, for any election other than a high stimulus one, that familiarity will be a decided advantage. Second, through a host of structural properties associated with officeholding, the campaign apparatus of the incumbent candidate will show a clear advantage over that of the challenger (e.g., carrying out official duties, while also campaigning, at public expense; public funding of dissemination of mailed "reports" to constituents; employing administrative assistants, fortunately skilled in both administration and politics; patronage privileges; private constituent services; and occasional free radio and television time for "reports to the people"). Third, a sizable portion of the electorate, generally uninformed about political affairs and feeling a relative sense of satisfaction with "things as they are," may simply approve of that *status quo* by voting for the incumbents.

---

[5] Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 112.

These kinds of considerations fit well with what is normally thought to be the incumbent advantage. The remaining two may show up in a statistical treatment of the subject, although they are not entirely consistent with our conceptual notion of the incumbency effect. An incumbent may outdistance his opponent in electoral royalties by virtue of the same issue stands and personal appeal elements which favored him in an earlier election when he, himself, was a nonincumbent candidate. Since measures of personal reactions to the senatorial and gubernatorial candidates are unavailable, the assessment of the pure incumbency effect may be hampered. Several comments suggest that the distorting effect may be less than initially thought, although it undoubtedly remains to some extent. First, the candidate familiarity advantage is likely to overshadow the remaining components. For electorates relatively uninformed about state political contests, simple recognition of one candidate is an advantage likely to exceed the subtleties of various candidate issue stands. Stokes and Miller have shown that, in contests for the U. S. House of Representatives, the "incumbent candidate is by far the better known."[6] Second, the incumbency effect will be estimated by utilizing a data set spanning many contests and several election years. By including all respondents from a national sample voting in Democratic incumbent-Republican challenger contests, a good portion of the individual candidate effect will have subsided. For example, is there much reason to believe that the personal appeal of a Republican incumbent in one state is markedly greater than that of a Democratic challenger in another state; and is that difference likely to be systematic across contests? Especially under the various control conditions set out below, I am inclined to think that these residual effects have not much inflated the incumbency effect estimates. Yet, it should be acknowledged that the incumbency variable as a measure of prior officeholding is an imperfect measure in the broader sense in light of the fact that these alternative effects cannot be systematically removed.

Data for the analysis were taken from the national sample surveys of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, spanning a period of some fourteen years. The well-known question concerning the basic party identification of the respondent serves as the measure of party loyalty. Earlier work has shown, however, that while the elector's basic identification with his political party remains remarkably constant over time, he is likely to pick and choose from time to time among alternative party candidates as a result of momentary partisan evaluations. That is to say, a respondent who considers himself to be a strong Democrat may vote Republican after becoming dissatisfied with the Democratic incumbent president's handling of foreign policy matters. Measurement of these more fluid attitudes toward party was achieved through the use of several free-answer questions, tapping the respondent's evaluations of the Republican and Democratic parties. From the 1956, 1960, 1964, and 1968 National Survey Studies, indices of partisan attitude on domestic issues, foreign issues, group related attitudes, party performance in government attitudes, and presidential candidates were constructed for each respondent.[7]

The results of ascertaining the respondent's choice for U.S. senator and governor scarcely have appeared in earlier reports on individual voting decisions, although the senatorial vote question has been included in the Survey Research Center's questionnaire since 1956 and the gubernatorial vote question since 1964.

---

[6] Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 204.

[7] The appendix contains a technical description of the construction of these indices.

These two pieces of information, as well as the presidential vote, will be used in this paper to pinpoint the patterns of individual electoral choice which give rise to divergent partisan majorities in the states. On occasion, these national samples will be pyramided, or combined, in order to produce a more adequate sample size for various control conditions.[8]

Several decisions must be made when we attempt to isolate respondents in each of the three possible kinds of contests: (1) Democratic incumbent opposed by a Republican challenger; (2) neither candidate holding incumbency status; and (3) Republican incumbent opposed by a Democratic challenger. First, those respondents voting in contests where the winners received more than 85 per cent of the two-party vote or where both the Democratic and the Republican parties were not represented among contestants were excluded from the analysis.

Especially during the 1950s, Democratic gubernatorial and senatorial candidates in the South won election and re-election by wide margins—typically 90 to 100 per cent. The justification for excluding respondents voting in uncontested races is obvious. Less obvious is the justification for also excluding those respondents voting in contests with only token opposition for the majority party (i.e., the opposition gaining less than 15 per cent of the vote). These token opposition contests show a high concentration in the southern elections of the 1950s and early 1960s, in which the Republican party initially sought to establish a basis in the South. In order to vote against a Democratic incumbent, a southern respondent would have been required to vote not just against the Democratic party but also for a party which had only begun to surface in his state. Thus, not all southern respondents, but those respondents voting in these noncompetitive elections (85 to 100 per cent for the winner) are excluded from the analysis. The practical effect is a reduction in the number of southern respondents, the inclusion of which would have led to a probable overestimation of incumbency effects.

To be coded as an incumbent, a candidate must have held office for at least one year, either by interim appointment or election, prior to the time of the election in question. Candidates were not coded as incumbents when their appointments occurred within one year of the election; since one component of the incumbency phenomenon is undoubtedly visibility, a short stint in office coupled with reduced exposure resulting from appointment without prior campaign experience would not place that candidate on an even footing with other incumbents. Special elections, when they occurred on the same date as regularly scheduled elections, were included. On occasion, however, three states held both regular and special Senate elections on the same date: Kentucky and South Carolina in 1956; and Tennessee in 1964. Rather than deal with multiple responses, those three special elections were excluded.

Party Loyalty, Attitudes toward Party and Subnational Voting

Do the voter's attitudes toward the parties across several dimensions, which so clearly affect presidential voting,[9] have similar implications for senatorial combatants? This question seems well answered by the graphical display of Figure 1. In these graphs, the percentage voting Democratic is plotted for each level of partisan attitude, retaining the distinction between the two types of incumbency contests. The considerable monotonicity in these relationships is clear, with few departures over the four dimensions of partisan attitude.[10] It is also clear from these graphs that the incumbency status of the candidate is quite important. Thus, in spite of the respondent's negative reaction to one of the parties, he is more likely to vote for that party's candidate if that candidate is an incumbent. These differences are very nearly constant across levels of partisan attitude.

---

[8] For a discussion of the conditions under which the pyramiding of several national samples can be justified, see Andrew T. Cowart, *Electoral Decision-Making in the American States: Reconciling Individual Predispositions and Aggregate Patterns* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971), chap. 2.

[9] Campbell et al., *The American Voter;* Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (March, 1966) 19–28.

[10] The question of whether these patterns are indeed linear is an interesting one. Although there are some perturbations on the extremes, I am satisfied with some earlier work in which I utilized a linear multiple regression model to partition the departure of the aggregate vote from 0.5 (the assumed result for evenly matched contests) into two components: one indicating the net contributions of attitudes toward the parties, the other indicating the net contribution of the incumbency advantage. I have since, however, considered an alternative hypothesis which suggests an S-shaped curve for which the effects of the attitude decrease slightly as the attitude becomes more extreme in either partisan direction. A reasonably good fit is obtained with a least squares polynomial of the third degree, and the behavior of the first and second derivatives of the obtained function rule, at various points on the attitude scale, is quite consistent with certain derived consequences of the non-linear theoretical formulation. That work is in progress.



Percentage voting Democratic for U.S. Senator by four dimensions of partisan attitude and by candidate incumbency pattern
(Pyramided sample)
Figure 1

One difficulty in the interpretation of the differences in the levels of the slopes for the two types of incumbency contests lies in the varied distribution of basic party loyalties across the states. State A's electorate may return Democratic candidates to office with substantial vote margins, not because those candidates are incumbents, but rather because the distribution of basic party identifications is rather onesidedly Democratic in the state. Thus, the selection of respondents voting in Democratic incumbent races unduly increases the number of

Table 1. Percentage Voting Democratic for U. S. Senator by Party Identification, Domestic Issue Partisan Attitudes, and Candidate Incumbency Pattern[a] (Pyramided Sample)

Incumbency Pattern	Domestic Issue Partisan Attitudes								
	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
	+	0	−	+	0	−	+	0	−
Dem. Incumb./Rep. Chall.	93%	91%	74%	69%	60%	46%	40%	17%	12%
Total *N*, all voters	(308)	(189)	(88)	(77)	(100)	(97)	(40)	(82)	(165)
No. Incumb.	91	81	53	59	27	33	*	16	9
Total *N*, all voters	(173)	(94)	(36)	(29)	(48)	(49)	(19)	(69)	(126)
Rep. Incumb./Dem. Chall.	83	74	56	53	39	22	26	15	3
Total *N*, all voters	(242)	(149)	(36)	(81)	(103)	(68)	(47)	(127)	(206)

[a] "+" indicates pro-Democratic score, "0" indicates neutral score.
"−" indicates pro-Republican score on indices of partisan attitude.
* Cell size too small for specification.

Democratic party identifiers, while the selection of respondents voting in Republican incumbent races similarly increases the comparable proportion of Republicans. A major advantage of the pyramided data set is that the total number of respondents is large enough for an adequate test of the three effects—party identification, attitudes toward party, and incumbency status of the candidate.

In Tables 1 and 2 the percentage voting Democratic is given within each combination of the three independent variables. Party identification and the indices of partisan attitude have been collapsed to three levels. The two dimensions of partisan attitude chosen for this test are attitudes toward the parties on domestic issues and attitudes toward the parties as managers of government. Similarly constructed tables for the remaining two dimensions of attitude would reveal very much the same pattern, except that the lower dispersion on those two attitudes leaves more cell entries unspecified. Within each of the three categories of party identification, the tables display the percentage of respondents voting Democratic for U.S. senator by attitudes toward the two parties on each dimension and by the incumbency pattern of those state elections. Comparisons of the percentages down the columns of the tables suggest the extent of candidate incumbency

Table 2. Percentage Voting Democratic for U. S. Senator by Party Identification, Governmental Performance Partisan Attitudes, and Candidate Incumbency Pattern[a] (Pyramided Sample)

Incumbency Pattern	Governmental Performance Partisan Attitudes								
	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
	+	0	−	+	0	−	+	0	−
Dem. Incumb./Rep. Chall.	92%	91%	71%	79%	61%	37%	27%	24%	13%
Total *N*, all voters	(313)	(203)	(69)	(61)	(132)	(81)	(26)	(83)	(178)
No Incumb.	86	85	67	*	41	32	*	21	9
Total *N*, all voters	(162)	(98)	(43)	(20)	(49)	(57)	(10)	(62)	(142)
Rep. Incumb./Dem. Chall.	84	76	57	56	42	25	13	18	6
Total *N*, all voters	(230)	(130)	(67)	(48)	(120)	(84)	(32)	(107)	(241)

[a] "+" indicates pro-Democratic score, "0" indicates neutral score.
"−" indicates pro-Republican score on indices of partisan attitude.
* Cell size too small for specification.

effects, while comparisons across the tables tell us something about the effects of party identification and attitudes toward party on voting for U.S. senatorial candidates.

For example, Democratic party identifiers who favorably assessed Democratic domestic policies gave Democratic incumbent senators 93 per cent of their votes, while they gave only 83 per cent of their votes to Democratic challengers running against Republican incumbents. Similarly, Republican party identifiers who were distinctly pro-Republican in their attitudes toward partisan domestic policies cast 97 per cent of their votes for Republican incumbents; however, where Democrats held incumbency status, this vote drops to 88 per cent Republican.

The entries in these tables show a slight increase in incumbency effects when party identification and evaluations of party across these two dimensions are nonsupportive of each other. As an approximate measure of incumbency effects, one might take the difference between the percentages Democratic for respondents voting in Democratic incumbent Senate races and for those voting in Republican incumbent Senate races. For Democratic party identifiers, the difference in percentages is noticeably greater when evaluations of party domestic policies conflict with party identification than when they support party identification. For Democrats who favor their own party's domestic policies, the difference in the Democratic vote percentages for Democratic incumbents and Democratic challengers is 10 per cent, compared to an 18 per cent difference for Democrats opposed to their party's domestic policies. Similarly, the largest difference in percentages among Republicans occurs when domestic policy evaluations conflict with party identification: a 9 per cent difference in the supportive context; a 14 per cent difference in the conflicting context. Thus, when the two motivations are conflicting, there is a slightly greater tendency to resolve that conflict in favor of the incumbent.

Some Comparisons with Gubernatorial Voting

An assessment of factors affecting voting in gubernatorial elections is hampered by the scarcity of data points. Only two of the presidential election studies since 1956 have ascertained each respondent's choice for governor. A pyramiding of the 1964 and 1968 studies, in which the gubernatorial vote question was included, does not yield a sample of sufficient size to achieve control conditions similar to those of Table 1, Table 2, or Figure 1. Nonetheless, some illustrative comparisons are possible.

Incumbent governors in the states are often thought to be a breed apart. Especially in recent times, the governor as chief administrator has borne the stigma of increasing tax rates in support of expanding social services, urban needs, and so forth. In light of these unique state issues and their natural connection with the performance of incumbent governors, it is often suggested that the effects of basic party loyalties are much reduced in contests for state governorships. Tables 3 and 4 show the percentage voting Democratic in gubernatorial and senatorial elections, respectively, by party identification for the 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections. Whatever effects particular statewide issues and candidates have, they are not sufficient to reduce substantially the voter's basic ties to his party.

Nonetheless, comparisons of the two tables suggest some differences in the two kinds of contests. The estimates for off-year elections, 1966 and 1970, are most helpful here because they are free of obvious contaminating effects of presidential election years. At first glance, the ties with party appear somewhat weaker for gubernatorial voting than for senatorial voting. Note, for example, that 98 per cent of the strong Democrats actually voted Democratic for U.S. senator while only 86 per cent did so for governor. Closer inspection reveals, however, that for both 1966 and 1970, the senatorial vote is more Democratic across categories of party identification than is the gubernatorial vote. While difficulties of cell size preclude a partitioning of respondents by type of incumbency pattern, other scattered data suggest a possible explanation for the observed pattern. In 1970, eighteen Democratic incumbent senators sought re-election, but only six Democratic incumbent governors did so. The situation was the reverse for Republican incumbents: only ten Republican incumbent senators sought re-election while seventeen Republican incumbent governors did so. Thus, what we are observing here is a probable inflation of the Democratic vote for senator across categories of party identification due to the outnumbering of Republican incumbents by Democratic incumbents. Similarly, a corresponding deflation of the Democratic vote for governor occurs, probably as a result of the more numerous Republican incumbent gubernatorial candidates. It should further be noted that for strong Democrats voting in nonincumbent contests in 1970, the Democratic vote percentage for governor increases to 97 per cent (N = 41) and the

Table 3. Percentage Voting Democratic for Governor by Party Identification 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970

	Strong Democrats	Weak Democrats	Independents	Weak Republicans	Strong Republicans
1964	88% (155)[a]	70% (115)	59% (96)	22% (55)	5% (57)
1966	86 (107)	65 (130)	44 (111)	13 (88)	4 (71)
1968	83 (88)	73 (86)	37 (82)	25 (40)	*
1970	86 (133)	72 (120)	42 (149)	23 (99)	1 (77)

[a] Entries in parentheses are total *N*'s on which percentages are calculated.
* Cell size too small for specification.

Democratic vote percentage for senator decreases to 96 per cent (N = 23).

My tentative conclusion is that, in the generic sense, ballots in state elections are no less a function of the voter's identification with his political party in one kind of contest than in the other. However, a difference in the constitutional facts of life for the two kinds of contests does tend to produce two patterns at variance. Since many state governors are limited to single terms by their state constitutions, nonincumbent contests are more common in gubernatorial than in senatorial elections. Of the three kinds of contests examined here, the most frequent kind of senatorial contest during the last two decades has been that involving a Democratic incumbent and a Republican challenger. On the other hand, nonincumbent and Republican incumbent contenders are more prevalent in gubernatorial contests. The result is that senatorial voting tends to be somewhat more Democratic across categories of party identification than does gubernatorial voting. Scattered data do suggest, however, that for nonincumbent contests, both gubernatorial and senatorial voting exhibit about the same level of basic party voting.

Relative Accountings In Incumbent and Nonincumbent Contests

The importance of candidate incumbency pattern has been stressed as a source of partisan defection and as a means of overriding overt negative reactions to party, as well as reinforcing positive ones. Those who retain favorable images of the Democratic party with respect to various population groups are more likely to disregard that assessment by voting Republican if the Republican candidate happens to be the incumbent. Little has been said

Table 4. Percentage Voting Democratic for U. S. Senator by Party Identification 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970

	Strong Democrats	Weak Democrats	Independents	Weak Republicans	Strong Republicans
1964	90% (210)[a]	83% (174)	59% (173)	27% (125)	7% (111)
1966	92 (63)	68 (82)	43 (72)	9 (44)	7 (44)
1968	90 (156)	75 (162)	44 (172)	21 (122)	9 (89)
1970	98 (114)	85 (111)	62 (146)	23 (93)	8 (63)

[a] Entries in parentheses are total *N*'s on which percentages are calculated.

about the contest in which neither candidate is an incumbent. Specifically, we have not been free to examine the monotonicity in these relationships by the kind of graphical analysis of Figure 1; since the number of senatorial contests in which neither candidate is an incumbent is generally small, resulting sample sizes under control conditions become unmanageable.

Conclusions about the two kinds of incumbent races would suggest that voting in the nonincumbent contest should be more a function of attitudes toward party than it should in the incumbent races, since incumbency status itself does seem to override overt negative reactions to party. The hypothesis is that gubernatorial voting and senatorial voting are best accounted for by attitudes toward party in the nonincumbent races and less so in the two types of incumbent contests. It is in the nonincumbent contest that the vote is more free to fluctuate as a direct function of attitudes toward party, relatively unencumbered by the blocking effect of candidate incumbency status.

This formulation was prompted by some initial comparisons with presidential voting. For example, for respondents who cast both presidential and senatorial votes in 1968, the magnitudes of the multiple correlation coefficient for the regression of the vote on the four dimensions of partisan attitude is substantially greater for presidential voting (0.689) than for senatorial voting (0.527). Similar estimates for presidential and gubernatorial voting are 0.668 and 0.473, respectively. The candidate incumbency election context probably has a good deal to do with that difference. The question that naturally arises, however, is what effect incumbency has at the presidential level. This kind of effect may be somewhat attenuated for presidential voting, in comparison to statewide voting. Since information penetration throughout the electorate is likely to be more extensive for presidential candidates than for candidates at other levels, most voters will at least have heard the names of the presidential candidates. The lower salience levels associated with state politics suggest that candidate familiarity will be less extensive in these contests.[11]

The bar graph in Figure 2 displays the multiple correlation coefficients resulting from the conception of the senatorial vote and the gubernatorial vote as linear functions of the four dimensions of partisan attitude. Those coefficients were computed separately for respondents voting in each of the three types of state elections: (1) Democratic incumbent opposed by a Republican challenger; (2) neither candidate holding incumbency status; and (3) Republican incumbent opposed by a Democratic challenger.[12] In each case except the Democratic incumbent Senate races of 1968, the multiple correlation coefficients computed for respondents voting in nonincumbent contests exceed those for either type of incumbent contest.[13] Thus, voting in both gubernatorial and senatorial contests appears to be a more direct function of attitudes toward party in the relatively "pure" nonincumbent contests in which incumbency effects cannot attenuate the fundamental connection between partisan evaluations and partisan choice.

The frequency with which state electorates divide their partisan majorities between different parties for different offices is often taken as evidence that the effects of party identification are attenuated in contests for state office. The evidence presented thus far does not support such a hypothesis. After all, state electorates are but subsets of the national electorate. Given the fragmentary nature of the voter's knowledge about contests for the presidency, which typically achieve greater information penetration throughout the electorate than do contests for lower level offices, it is unlikely that the voter would discard what is for him a shorthand, judgmental device such as party identification in favor of careful assessments of statewide issues and candidates. We find no evi-

---

[11] See M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "The Salience of American State Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970) 526–535. While the findings question the usual low level of saliency attributed to state politics, the saliency advantage which national-level politics holds over state politics is clear from their presentations.

[12] The coefficients are grouped by year rather than by election type. For any particular election, the vote may not be adequately accounted for because of some unmeasured factor peculiar to that election year. Thus, rather than examining whether the magnitudes of all R's for nonincumbent contests exceed those for all incumbent contests, the question is asked whether, for each election year, the R for nonincumbent contests exceeds the R's for the incumbent contests.

[13] Correlation coefficients computed across different sample subsets of varying size may fluctuate purely as a result of changing magnitudes of the variances of the independent variables. For excessively small N's, the correlation may be quite low as a result of a reduction in variance. It should be noted that there is no correlation between the size of the subsamples and the magnitude of these multiple correlation coefficients. In fact, the lowest N's in 1960 and 1964 for senatorial voting are found in the nonincumbent races where the multiple correlation coefficients are highest. However, the exceptionally low R's for 1968 gubernatorial voting in both incumbent races may have been affected, in part, by reduced variances for the smaller subsamples in the incumbent categories.



Multiple correlation coefficients resulting when voting for U.S. Senator and for Governor are treated as linear functions of four dimensions of partisan attitude, by candidate incumbency pattern (1956, 1960, 1964, 1968)

D: Democratic incumbent
N: No incumbent
R: Republican incumbent

Figure 2

dence for the assertion that basic party loyalties hold less potency as a guide for gubernatorial voting decisions than for senatorial voting decisions.

An additional shorthand mechanism, however, does operate on voter decision making in state elections at a level not seen in presidential politics. The incumbency status of statewide candidates frequently serves both as a source of partisan defection and as a replacement for strong feelings toward party. In both senatorial and gubernatorial voting, we are able to account for the partisanship of the vote by attitudes toward party more fully in nonincumbent contests than in incumbent contests. Yet, even in incumbent contests, the effects are quite strong and markedly monotonic.

Voting for Presidents, Senators, and Governors: Ballot Splitting Among State Electorates

While the evidence in the preceding section lays some necessary empirical groundwork, it is only suggestive in explaining why election results for statewide contests often appear so different from presidential vote totals in those states. I am inclined, however, to discard the view that the elector's basic party identification does not guide the voting decision in subnational elections. Nor is it suggested that the more changing attitudes toward the Democratic or Republican parties exhibit much attenuated effects in statewide voting. Yet the test of whether a contextual phenomenon such as alternate incumbency patterns (e.g., Democratic incumbent senator and Republican incumbent governor) have the effect of propelling those vote proportions in opposite partisan directions ought to be a good deal more stringent. We begin with the view that whatever aggregate patterns prevail, their counterparts ought to be grounded somewhere in individual voter decision making. Thus, any explanation about why state electorates divide their partisan majorities between different parties should begin with the more fundamental question of why individuals divide their votes between those parties at different levels of government.

Angus Campbell's and Warren Miller's treatment of the motivational factors behind straight- and split-ticket voting is perhaps the best known work on the subject.[14] Their findings indicate that strength of partisan attachments, ballot form, presidential candidate and issue partisanship all affected the level of split-ticket voting in the 1956 presidential election. What is missing, however, is a comparable concern for the specification of the partisan direction of the split-ticket vote for other offices. From that analysis, it is evident that the presence of an extremely popular presidential candidate will induce defections from the opposite party in voting for president. Yet this is only one of several kinds of partisan defection which might occur. The presidential vote often will be a party vote with other factors at the state level producing the defection there. An understanding of the problem of split-ticket voting is equally dependent on the specification of the partisan direction of the split-ticket vote at the state contest level as it is at the presidential level.

What must accompany the restatement of the problem is a change in the form of the dependent variable used by Campbell and Miller. The categories of that dependent variable indicated merely the presence or absence of straight- or split-ticket voting for various national, state, or local contests. Once we ask the question of the partisan direction of the split-ticket vote at other levels of government, it becomes necessary to identify precisely the *offices* for which respondents split their ballots. For example, the Campbell and Miller category, "voted straight except for Senator or Congressman," becomes nearly unmanageable. Since the guiding interest of this project lies in the reconciliation of disparate partisan majorities for state and presidential contests, I shall confine my attention to the network of split-ticket patterns for president, U.S. senator, and governor for which the partisanship of the vote was ascertained.

The explanation of the partisan direction of a split-ticket vote necessarily conjures up a model of opposing forces. The voter's identification with his political party will work against propensities which might lead him to split his ballot at any level. But his evaluation of the presidential candidates may be reinforcing of that predisposition to cast a straight partisan ballot; or, it may increase the tendency to split that ballot when displeasure with the presidential candidate of his own party becomes severe.

In the previous section, the voter's tendency to approve of incumbent officeholders was shown to have a measured effect on partisan voting beyond normal partisan attachments. Thus, it is natural here to conceive of a separate force, which again may reinforce or may oppose normal partisan predispositions. The following hypotheses specify the kinds of patterns anticipated:

Hypothesis 1: When the incumbency status of the senatorial candidate and presidential candidate partisanship support partisan allegiance, the result is a straight-ticket vote for the senatorial and presidential candidates of the voter's own party.

Hypothesis 2: When presidential candidate partisanship supports partisan allegiance but senatorial incumbency status conflicts with both, the level of straight-ticket voting is reduced. The level of split-ticket voting for the presidential candidate of the voter's own party and the senatorial candidate of the opposing party increases.

Hypothesis 3: When senatorial incumbency status supports party identification but presidential candidate partisanship conflicts with both, the level of straight-ticket voting is reduced. The level of split-ticket voting for the senatorial candidate of the voter's own party and the presidential candidate of the opposing party increases.

Hypothesis 4: When the incumbency status of the senatorial candidate and presidential candidate partisanship both conflict with party identification, the tendency to vote a straight ticket against the voter's own party increases.

Hypothesis 5: The level of straight-ticket party voting increases as the strength of party identification increases.

In testing these hypotheses, I have used the combined sample of respondents—1956, 1960, 1964, 1968. Presidential candidate partisanship, of course, involves the assessment of the two presidential candidates.[15] Thus, it is natural to think, not of the level of support or opposition for one candidate, but rather of the net distance between the two candidates based upon the respondent's evaluation of each. Presidential candidate partisanship, then, reflects a net difference between the voter's evaluation of one candidate and his evaluation of the other. The seven-category party identification code was retained since the typical problem of small cell size among leaning partisans was alleviated by use of the pyramided sample.

The dependent variable was constructed by matching straight- and split-ticket voters on party identification. The relationships were first examined separately for Democratic and Republican party identifiers in order to be certain that the process was not fundamentally different for either. Then, for the dependent variable, strong Republicans and strong Democrats who, for example, voted a straight ticket for their own party are combined. The four possible combinations are listed in Table 5. The independent variables were recoded on the basis of their supportive or conflicting relationship to party identification.

---

[14] Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis for Straight and Split Ticket Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 51 (June 1957) 293–312.

[15] The procedure for constructing these indices of presidential candidate appeal is the same as that for constructing the four indices of partisan attitude, except that the search is made for free-answer content suggesting a reaction to the personal qualities of the candidates.

It is clear from the entries in Table 5 that for those respondents who favorably assessed their own party's presidential candidate and who voted in states where their own party's senatorial candidate held incumbency status, the result is largely a straight-ticket vote. Indeed, only 5 per cent of the strong partisans cast anything other than a straight party ballot. As we move down the table from the completely supportive context to various combinations of conflict and support, straight-ticket voting decreases from the completely supportive context in most cases.

The fundamental question of partisan direction of the split-ticket vote focuses on which category of the dependent variable benefits most from the decrease in the straight-ticket vote. For those respondents who favored their party's presidential candidate but were voting in state contests in which the opposite party's senatorial candidate held incumbency status, the prevailing alternative to the straight-ticket vote is a ballot split for the party presidential candidate and against the party senatorial candidate. Similarly, when the senatorial incumbent is the candidate of the respondent's own party but the respondent negatively evaluates his party's presidential candidate, the typical choice beyond the straight ticket is the partisan consistent vote for senator and the partisan defective vote for president. Finally, when both presidential candidate partisanship and senatorial candidate incumbency are conflicting with party identification, the alternative to the straight-ticket, party-oriented vote is a straight-ticket vote for the opposing party.

One cannot fail to note, however, the continuing effect of party identification. The insulation from these conflicting forces which partisan attachment provides is clearly demonstrated by the high level of straight-ticket party voting among strong partisans in each of the conflict situations. Also, straight-ticket party voting does decrease as strength of party identification decreases. As a further indication of the accuracy with which these conflict situations predict the split-ticket vote, the percentages recalculated in the two middle categories of Table 5 for split-ticket voters only reveal that fully 100 per cent (N = 37) of the strong partisans split their ballots in the predicted direction. While these results are more striking, it seems preferable to retain the straight-ticket voters, since the four-category dependent variable may represent more accurately the range of possible voter alternatives.

Hypotheses 1–4, with appropriate modifications, have been tested for gubernatorial voting

Table 5. Straight- and Split-Ticket Voting for President and U. S. Senator by Type of Conflict/Support Condition (Pyramided Sample)[a]

Presidential Candidate Partisanship	Senatorial Incumbency Status	Strength of Party Identification	Straight R's own Party	Split: R's own Party for Pres., opp for Sen.	Split: R's own Party for Sen., opp for Pres.	Straight opposite Party	(N)
supports	supports	strong	*94%*	3%	1%	1%	(361)
		weak	*91*	5	1	4	(254)
		leaning	*78*	13	2	7	(105)
supports	conflicts	strong	*86*	*10*	0	4	(249)
		weak	*76*	*14*	5	5	(200)
		leaning	*63*	*31*	0	7	(108)
conflicts	supports	strong	*61*	0	*25*	14	(55)
		weak	*31*	4	*39*	26	(122)
		leaning	*40*	5	*45*	10	(23)
conflicts	conflicts	strong	*67*	7	10	*17*	(42)
		weak	*42*	6	18	*35*	(113)
		leaning	*34*	9	25	*32*	(47)

[a] Italicized entries are those predicted by Hypotheses 1–5 to contain the largest concentration of respondents.

as well. Since only two elections—1964 and 1968—were available for analysis, the problem of cell size required that we combine strong, weak, and leaning partisans. The entries for senatorial voting were recomputed, eliminating strength of partisanship, for ease of comparison. The results are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. The increases along the diagonal are again clearly evident for gubernatorial voting. In the lower portions of Tables 6 and 7, the matrices were reduced by eliminating the first row and column for each of the two upper displays. Since party identification will naturally provide a good deal of insulation against the tendency to split one's ticket, the success or failure of these predictions can be identified more readily by first eliminating the partisan, completely consistent, straight-ticket voters. We then ask: Given that some kind of defection from party has occurred, how well can that defection pattern be identified? The heavy concentration along the diagonals of these reduced matrices is good evidence of the sources of that defection.

Split-Ticket Voting in Off-year State Elections

When the gubernatorial candidate of one party and the senatorial candidate of the opposite party are both successful in a given state election, we have reason to believe that those successes are tied to their status as incumbents. Just as candidate incumbency status tells us something about the partisan direction of the split-ticket vote in presidential-senatorial and presidential-gubernatorial voting, ballot splitting between different partisan gubernatorial and senatorial candidates in off-year elections should be a function of the supportive or conflicting juxtaposition of party identification and candidate incumbency status. Prior research suggests that ties with party will be stronger in nonpresidential elections, regardless of which incumbency pattern prevails.[16]

Both hypotheses find support from the evidence in Table 8. The data in that table are drawn from a pyramiding of the off-year election samples, 1966 and 1970, and a pyramiding of the 1964 and 1968 presidential year samples. The concentration of respondents in the first column of each table depicts the strong ties with party in spite of the various conflicting incumbency patterns which might be brought into play. Across these different supportive and conflicting election contexts, the level of straight-ticket party voting for gubernatorial and senatorial candidates is consistently greater in the off-year elections than in the presidential election years.

Also, the concentration of the second largest percentages along the diagonals of the tables indicates that conflicting incumbency patterns do give partisan direction to gubernatorial-senatorial split-ticket voting in both off-year and presidential elections. The exception, however, is found in the final row of the table, which contains respondents for whom both gubernatorial and senatorial incumbency conflict with party identification. Apparently the nuances of the split-ticket vote for senator and governor in this completely conflicting context are a good deal more subtle than can be identified here.

The specification of the incumbency context of state elections has been useful in delineating the partisan direction of the split-ticket vote in state and national elections. If we treat incumbency theoretically as a contextual factor, then we have, in effect, perfect measurement of the concept. A more satisfying theoretical treatment, however, would view the actual effect of this contextual phenomenon on split-ticket voting as a result of several distinct components of

---

[16] Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline."

Table 6. Straight- and Split-Ticket Voting for President and Governor by Type of Conflict/Support Condition (Pyramided Sample: 1964, 1968)

Presidential Candidate Partisanship	Gubernatorial Incumbency Status	Straight R's own Party	Split: R's own Party for Pres., opposite for Gov.	Split: R's own Party for Gov., opposite for Pres.	Straight opposite Party	(N)
supports	supports	82%	13%	1%	5%	(136)
supports	conflicts	73	21	1	5	(124)
conflicts	supports	35	8	43	14	(37)
conflicts	conflicts	46	3	17	34	(35)
		Reduced Matrix				
supports	conflicts		78%	4%	19%	(33)
conflicts	supports		12	66	22	(24)
conflicts	conflicts		6	31	63	(19)

Table 7. Straight- and Split-Ticket Voting for President and U. S. Senator by Type of Conflict/Support Condition (Pyramided Sample)

Presidential Candidate Partisanship	Senatorial Incumbency Status	Straight R's own Party	Split: R's own Party for Pres., opposite for Sen.	Split: R's own Party for Sen., opposite for Pres.	Straight opposite Party	(N)
supports	supports	91%	5%	1%	3%	(705)
supports	conflicts	78	16	2	5	(549)
conflicts	supports	40	3	36	21	(184)
conflicts	conflicts	45	7	18	30	(196)
			Reduced Matrix			
supports	conflicts		70%	9%	22%	(121)
conflicts	supports		5	60	35	(110)
conflicts	conflicts		13	33	55	(107)

individual reaction—candidate familiarity, approval of the status quo, and so forth. Other measurements, presently unavailable, would have allowed for a sorting out of these various components of the incumbency advantage. In one sense, however, the results are even more striking in light of the imperfection of the measure. We are able to specify with some success the partisan direction of various split-ticket voting patterns in the states without the slightest hint of individual voter response to the qualities of those candidates.

Decomposition of the Split-Ticket Vote for President and U.S. Senator

Although substantial effects of candidate partisanship and incumbency have been observed, the conflicting context which gives rise to the split-ticket vote might not be very widespread. It is necessary to consider the relative concentration of split-ticket voters in each of the supportive and conflicting situations—i.e., for turning the problem around and computing column proportions. Without this kind of reverse formulation, substantial effects of an independent variable might be observed when a given set of events occurred; yet the frequency of occurrence may have been small, leaving a rather high level of split-ticket voting unaccounted for. This kind of reverse decomposition will have obvious implications for the observed pattern.

After isolating only split-ticket voters, decomposing that split-ticket vote means forming nine categories by taking every possible combination of senatorial incumbency and presidential candidate partisanship. The coding of a respondent as consistent, neutral, or inconsistent on presidential candidate appeal and on senatorial incumbency status is governed by whether his vote for each of those two offices was (1) consistent with the partisan direction of the motivation, (2) unaffected since the motivation was neutral, (3) inconsistent with the partisan direction of the motivation.

In the first category found in Figure 3, both entries are "consistent." This means that the respondent split his ballot in such a way that (1)

Table 8. Straight- and Split-Ticket Voting for U. S. Senator and Governor by Type of Conflict/Support Condition

Senatorial Incumbency Status	Gubernatorial Incumbency Status	Straight R's own Party	Split: R's own Party for Sen., opposite for Gov.	Split: R's own Party for Gov., opposite for Sen.	Straight opposite Party	(N)
			Nonpresidential Elections (Pyramided Sample: 1966, 1970)			
supports	supports	74%	7%	12%	5%	(82)
supports	conflicts	63	33	0	5	(40)
conflicts	supports	69	5	17	9	(42)
conflicts	conflicts	65	16	7	12	(99)
			Presidential Elections (Pyramided Sample: 1964, 1968)			
supports	supports	69%	17%	11%	4%	(54)
supports	conflicts	59	32	4	6	(111)
conflicts	supports	57	6	26	12	(51)
conflicts	conflicts	87	4	4	4	(23)

in voting for president, he voted for the party whose presidential candidate he favored; and (2) in voting for senator, he voted for the other party's senatorial candidate, who happened to be the incumbent. Thus, his split-ticket vote is consistent by both criteria in the sense that he split the ballot in the partisan direction predicted. If the conflict situations identified can account for a substantial portion of the split-ticket vote, than the heaviest concentration of respondents should be found in the first category, with the remaining eight categories quite sparsely represented.

Figure 3 displays the decomposition graphically. Regardless of strength of partisan attachments, the split-ticket vote falls substantially into the first category. Thus, of the nine possible cells through which the split-ticket vote might be dispersed, the one category which simply sets senatorial incumbency status and presidential candidate appeal in conflict contains nearly half of that split-ticket voting. Actually, the second and third categories are not disconfirming of the hypothesis since, in each of those, one of the two independent variables (presidential candidate appeal or senatorial incumbency status) favors neither party, while the other remains consistent with the predictions. Note, however, that the fourth category, which contains split-ticket voters inconsistent on senatorial incumbency status, is somewhat large—a probable result of the inability to specify even to the slightest degree these respondents' reactions to the personal qualities of the candidates for senatorial office.

The implications for divergent aggregate patterns are evident. The relatively common occurrence of state electoral divisions of partisan majorities between different partisan candidates —presidential, gubernatorial, or senatorial— finds its individual level counterpart in split-ticket voting. When presidential candidate partisanship conflicts with basic party attachments, defections from party are induced in presidential voting. Similarly, the common tendency to approve of incumbent candidates brings about a higher level of partisan defection in statewide voting. The decomposition indicates that about





half of the ballot splitting in contests for the presidency and U.S. Senate seats follows just this kind of pattern.

Summary and Conclusions: Implications for Normative and Empirical Theories of Voting

That voters tend to approve of an incumbent officeholder, often in contrast to negative evaluation of the incumbent's party, has some implications for normative theories of voting. Philosophical treatises of the first half of the nineteenth century place an unparalleled stress upon the wisdom of the populace in the form of Jacksonian democratic theory. Yet all propositions of a given normative theory are never internally consistent with one another on all counts. Barriers to succession for statewide office is a case which highlights that inconsistency. The Jacksonians sought to democratize the governing process thoroughly by maximizing the number of different individual citizens actually participating in that process. A certain inconsistency resulted, however, from the standpoint of the individual voter. If voters in democratic political systems are presumed to have the necessary knowledge and judgment to arrive at informed decisions, then the presence or absence of an incumbent officeholder on the ballot ought not to sway that decision in the slightest. In effect, the range of alternatives be-



"C": Vote consistent with partisan direction of motivation;
"I": Vote inconsistent with partisan direction of motivation;
"N": Motivation neutral, no partisanship.

Decomposition of the split-ticket vote for president and U.S. senator showing per cent of all split-ticket voters who split ballot in ways either consistent, neutral, or inconsistent with presidential candidate partisanship and senatorial incumbency pattern, by strength of party identification
(Pyramided sample)
Figure 3

comes restricted, with the implication that electoral decisions will not be based upon the soundest of judgments when incumbent officeholders are allowed to seek re-election. The restrictions on gubernatorial succession, persisting in some states from the 1820s to the 1970s, imply just such a reservation about the qualifications of individual voters.

To the extent that the motivation behind restrictive succession laws was the suspicion that voters would be more inclined to vote simply on the basis of incumbency, it was not unrealistic. Neither is it a particularly happy conclusion for normative theorists. Findings of an earlier decade concerning party identification and voting brought about a revolt of the normativists who complained that the prevalence of straight party voting in a vacuum of issue awareness was not the occasion for relaxing the standards of normative democratic principles.[17]

Party voting, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the image of the informed voter, prevalent in classical normative theory. Most of our respondents do give at least one response about the two parties suggesting that they associate various good and bad conditions with the presence of those parties in government. While identification with party does not mean that the voter has much of a grasp of specific party policies, it does typically reflect more than blind identification with a party name. In this sense, widespread party voting need not be abhorrent to normative theorists.

The prevalence of incumbency effects cannot be so easily reconciled with tenets of normative voting theory. One might assert that just as party identification is a useful, shorthand device for making decisions in the absence of considerable information, so too is the predisposition to vote for the incumbent officeholder as long as the voter is moderately satisfied with things as they are. Yet these findings do not suggest exactly that. Recall that even for respondents located at the most anti-Democratic point on the scales of partisan attitude, the level of Democratic voting is much higher for Democratic incumbents than for Democratic challengers. Therefore, even the most excessive displeasure with the politics and governing of one party can be overcome partially when that party's candidate happens to be the incumbent officeholder. Candidate incumbency status is certainly a shorthand guide to political decisions, but its widespread impact upon voting in state elections runs counter to the tenets of classical democratic theory.

The implications for empirical theories of voting are best set out in the context of the seeming paradox in American federalist politics which served as the starting point of this analysis: Basic party loyalties have been shown to have pervasive effects in the arena of national presidential politics; yet election campaigns in the American states often culminate in partisan electoral decisions which are quite inconsistent with the presidential election results in those respective states. Does this mean that party loyalty gives way on a large scale to issues peculiar to each state as a guide to subnational electoral choice? The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the answer is no. The widespread occurrence of aggregate partisan disparities in state election results does not imply necessarily a fundamentally different decision-making process for the individual. The predisposition to vote for one party by virtue of the voter's identification with that party pervades decision making in contests for state governorships and U.S. Senate seats. In addition, the assessments of party, which are less stable over time, contribute measurably to the successes and failures of senatorial and gubernatorial candidates from election to election, as is the case for presidential voting.

The observation concerning disparate partisan majorities for different office contests is not without merit, however. Certainly some contextual factor operating in different partisan directions in different states is a likely source of divergent aggregate patterns between state and national contests. One such factor has been identified as the candidate incumbency pattern prevailing in each state. When the partisanship of the incumbent candidate for governor or U.S. senator runs counter to the partisanship of the individual voter, defection from party is more likely to occur.

I have attempted to specify the partisan direction which the split-ticket presidential-senatorial or presidential-gubernatorial vote would take by examining the conflicting or supportive relationship of two motivations—presidential candidate partisanship and the tendency to approve of incumbent officeholders—to party identification. The spot-welding effect of a completely consistent relationship among these three phenomena is clear in the high level of straight-ticket, party voting. As either is brought into conflict with party identification, however, split-ticket voting increases in the category anticipated. Also, nearly half of the total number of split-ticket voters are found to be concentrated in the one conflicting category in which the partisan directions of the split-ticket vote are consistent with the equivalent partisan directions of presidential candidate appeal and senatorial incumbency status.

---

[17] The arguments against the modification of normative theory on the basis of empirical findings are made by several writers in *Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism,* ed. Charles A. McCoy and John Playford (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), especially pp. 185–219.

While examinations of aggregate election results might have suggested that contemporary theories of voting behavior in presidential elections reveal little about decision making for voters in state elections, the testing of some of those theoretical propositions at the individual level does not bear out that view of state elections. However, the modification of those propositions by the introduction of one important concept—candidate incumbency status—is clearly in order for state electoral contests. The treatment of that phenomenon as a systematic force operating on voters in state elections both improves the applicability of those theoretical propositions and resolves to some extent the apparent disparities between election results in the states and prior theoretical expectations about individual voter behavior.

Appendix

In the survey studies of voting behavior over the past two decades, the Survey Research Center interview schedules have sought repeatedly the respondents' evaluations of the Republican and Democratic parties through free-answer questions:

> I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic (Republican) party?
>
> Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic (Republican) party?
>
> Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for President. Is there anything in particular about .... (Democratic presidential candidate) (Republican presidential candidate) that might make you want to vote for him?
>
> Is there anything in particular about .... (Democratic presidential candidate) (Republican presidential candidate) that might make you want to vote against him?

That much of the richness in these responses has remained through the coding process is evidenced by nearly one thousand possible code categories to which a single response might be assigned. As many as five separate responses are coded. The utility of these indices of partisan attitude has been evident in reports on several occasions.

The first step in the construction of the indices is to extract responses on the basis of content and positive or negative evaluation: (1) response reflecting the respondent's favorable attitude toward the Democratic party as it relates to various population groups; (2) response suggesting a positive reaction to Democratic domestic policies; (3) responses suggesting a positive reaction to Democratic foreign policies; and (4) response indicating a positive assessment of the Democratic party's performance as managers of government. For each respondent, the total number of positive responses to the Democratic party is obtained within each of the four subject matter areas. Comparable summed quantities are formed for negative reactions to the Democratic party, positive reactions to the Republican party, and negative reactions to the Republican party. The positive evaluations of the Democratic party and the negative evaluations of the Republican party are then summed, yielding a scale on which high values indicate a strongly pro-Democratic, anti-Republican attitude. A similar computation is performed on the pro-Republican, anti-Democratic responses, yielding a scale on which high values suggest a strong, pro-Republican, anti-Democratic attitude. The final step is simply the substraction of the latter from the former, the result being a scale for which high values indicate a net favorable Democratic attitude for each of the four content areas. The computations are performed separately for each of the four dimensions of partisan attitude:

w_{ij} = pro-Democratic response for j^{th} response of individual i
x_{ij} = pro-Republican response for j^{th} response of individual i
y_{ij} = anti-Democratic response for j^{th} response of individual i
z_{ij} = anti-Republican response for j^{th} response of individual i
v_i = index of partisan attitude for individual i

$$v_i = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{5} w_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^{5} z_{ij}\right) - \left(\sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^{5} y_{ij}\right),$$

where initial 0,1 scoring indicates presence or absence of response.

These indices have been constructed according to the criteria used by Stokes.[18] A specification of which open-ended responses are coded into each partisan attitude would require too much space for presentation here.

---

[18] Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency."

The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature*

SUSAN WELCH
University of Nebraska

ERIC H. CARLSON
University of Oregon

In partisan legislatures, party has been found to be the most important variable influencing the behavior of legislators.[1] This paper will examine a nonpartisan legislature to attempt to determine the relative impact of party and constituency as reference groups in cuing legislative behavior where the influence of party is institutionally minimized.

Earlier studies, all done in partisan legislatures, have produced a variety of hypotheses concerning the impact of party, constituency, and other reference groups on the voting behavior of the legislator. Here, we will be concerned with those hypotheses that relate to party and constituency.

Hypothesis 1: Party is the most important variable influencing legislative voting behavior. This finding has been consistent whether the analyst has used party majority votes, cluster bloc techniques, scaling techniques, or factor analysis to examine this behavior.[2] For legislators, party serves as the most important reference group in organizing their behavior, and less explicitly, as the chief device in producing relatively structured voting situations in the entire legislature much of the time.

1a: The importance of party is due to the independent effect of party leadership and party organization within the legislative body.[3] Thus, those who have found this relationship indicate that party is a manifest cue for legislative behavior. Party leaders have rewards and punishments to offer, and, especially in state legislatures, this provides a powerful incentive to go along.

1b: Party serves in a more indirect way to cue voting behavior. Legislative votes are party votes not so much because of party leaders and organizational discipline, but because party is a catch-all for sets of beliefs and attitudes, and these attitudes differentiate Democrats and Republicans. Or, even more indirectly, party influences voting behavior on a psychological level, so that self-identification as a Democrat or Republican produces distinct voting patterns, once a "Democrat" or "Republican" "right" vote is cued by some party leader or cohort.[4]

1c: Party is an important variable in explaining voting behavior because it reflects differing constituency interests. LeBlanc found in an investigation of 26 state senates that senators were more loyal to their parties in those states where constituency differences between the parties were greatest. Where parties did not have differing constituency bases, party voting was

---

* Support for this project was provided by the Research Council of the University of Nebraska. The author wishes to express thanks to University of Nebraska colleagues Peter Shocket, Philip Dyer, Michael Steinman, and Robert Sittig for their helpful suggestions concerning this paper, and to David Capek and James Bowman for their assistance in data collection. A special thanks to Eric H. Carlson for stimulating my interest in this approach to legislative politics and for suggesting some of the patterns of analysis used here. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April, 1972.

[1] See, in addition to the works cited below, the bibliography found in Duncan McRae, *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 299–309.

[2] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency,* revised edition by Edward V. Schneier, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); W. Wayne Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1968); Lewis Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); John G. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behaviour," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 7 (November, 1963), 336–56 David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).

[3] Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Frank Sorauf, *Party and Representation* (New York: Atherton, 1963); V. O. Key, *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), chap. 24.

[4] For a review of ideological and policy differences between party leaders and followers, see Herbert McClosky, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review,* 54 (June, 1960), 406–27; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960) is a standard source on the importance of party identification on voting behavior. For a review of the influences on legislative voting see Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1966), especially pp. 430–431.

less frequent.[5] Shannon, at one point, argues that the differing constituency bases of the two congressional parties would seem to account for many of their differences,[6] and Flinn notes that constituency is the basis of party cohesion.[7]

Hypothesis 2: Constituency is related to legislative behavior, independent of its relationship to party. Froman found that among members of each party those from districts that were socioeconomically "liberal" voted more "liberally" than those from "conservative" districts.[8] McRae found that Republicans from low-income districts and Democrats from high-income districts tend to vote less often with their party majority in the legislature than do legislators from "typical" party districts.[9]

Hypothesis 3: Party voting, even within legislatures where it is common, varies from issue area to issue area, as does constituency-related voting. Some issues, such as elections and reapportionment, find high degrees of party voting in most legislatures, other issues such as civil rights find little party voting in most. Issues such as local government and apportionment are highly related to constituency characteristics in many legislatures, other issues such as business regulation are not.[10]

In the nonpartisan setting, it was assumed that party would not be as important a factor in influencing voting behavior as in the partisan setting. The first question to be examined is the extent to which party influences voting behavior. If party is not influential, the second question, in light of the hypotheses, is whether any other factors, especially constituency, will assume the function that party performs in a partisan legislature. Will constituency groups serve as references for legislative voting behavior? Will any other factor or set of factors replace the influence of party in structuring legislative behavior? These questions relate then, both to individual behavior and the structure of voting as a whole.

Using a nonpartisan legislature to test some assumptions about voting in a partisan legislature is not as perverse as it may seem. We may view such an analysis of a nonpartisan legislature as a sort of control for investigations of partisan legislative behavior. It offers a unique way to test the above hypotheses, since the removal of the influence of party should have different effects on voting behavior in the legislature depending upon what is most important, i.e., whether it is the leadership and organization of party (hypothesis 1a), and psychological or ideological functions of party (hypothesis 1b), party as a reflection of constituency (hypothesis 1c), or constituency itself (hypothesis 2). If it is the first of these variables, then minimizing party influence should have an extreme effect on voting. One would expect voting that is highly disorganized in terms of stable coalitions and random in terms of issue positions, with legislators looking for cues in all sorts of different places.[11] If hypothesis 1b, 1c, or 2 is correct, then we might expect the nonpartisan voting patterns to be both structured and explainable, either by party or constituency factors.

On a secondary level, we will determine whether different issues are characterized by different patterns of voting behavior, as suggested by hypothesis 3, or whether voting in a nonpartisan legislature will be so different on the group level that all issue areas in a nonpartisan setting are characterized by similar voting patterns.

The Setting

The nonpartisan body that will be examined is the Nebraska unicameral, one of two nonpartisan state legislatures. While in the Minnesota nonpartisan legislature there appears to be some association between Liberal and Conservative caucuses and the state party structure,[12] in the Nebraska legislature few traces of party organization are evident. This has been the conclusion of past investigators of the legislature, and despite increasing pressure from the party organizations to revert to a partisan system, still seems to be true.[13] The perception of the lack of partisan conflict is also held by the legislators themselves. When asked to characterize types of conflict in the legislature, only two said that party conflict was important. This number, about 4 per cent of the membership, can be contrasted with the responses obtained by Wahlke et al. in New Jersey (85 per cent responded that party conflict was important), Ohio (59 per cent), California (26 per cent) and even Tennessee (17 per cent).[14] Thus, even though all the legislators will admit to a party preference[15] and many have held party offices, this partisanship is not perceived to carry to the floor of the legislature.

---

[5] Hugh LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency Influences," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 13 (February, 1969), 33–57; for other works dealing with influences on voting in legislatures see Samuel Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One Party State Legislature," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 26 (Summer, 1962), 185–200; Duncan McRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, 1958).

[6] Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting,* p. 131.

[7] Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," *American Political Science Review,* 58 (March, 1964), 60–71.

[8] Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies,* pp. 92–93. Clarence Stone, however, shows that the voting behavior of representatives of different parties representing the same constituency is very different. "Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Partial Dissent," *American Political Science Review,* 57 (September, 1963), 665–66.

[9] Duncan McRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in a Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review,* 46 (December, 1952), 1046–55.

[10] See Jewell and Patterson, *Legislative Process in U.S.,* "Voting in State Senates," p. 41. See also Wayne Francis, *Legislative Issues in the 50 States: A Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Charles W. Wiggins, "Party Politics in the Iowa Legislature," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 11 (February, 1967), 86–97. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes found great differences among broad issue areas in the correspondence between constituency opinion and voting of congressmen. See, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review,* 57 (March, 1963), 45–56.

[11] Patterson, "Voting Behavior in a One Party State Legislature."

Methodology

The data analysis in this paper utilizes Guttman-scaling and regression techniques. Every roll call in each of five sessions of the Nebraska legislature (1927, 1937, 1947, 1959, 1969) with at least 10 per cent dissent was examined.[16] The number of usable roll calls in each session varied from 131 in 1937 to 282 in 1969 (see Table 1). The 1927 session was a partisan session; it was examined in order to give some indication of whether the findings for the nonpartisan legislature were unique, or whether they reflected a long-standing political style in Nebraska. Longitudinal study of the 35 years since the establishment of the nonpartisan was undertaken so as to detect the development, if such exists, of some factor around which behavior in the legislature is organized.

The method used to convert the several hundred roll calls to a usable number of dimensions was Guttman scaling.[17] Some researchers divide bills a priori into sets that are seemingly scalable because of similar manifest content—tax bills, civil rights bills, local government bills, or whatever.[18] Guttman scaling, however, can provide a means to combine data in a way not dependent on the researcher's arbitrary classification of the issues. The use of the Q-matrix gives the investigator a method to compare all roll calls with all other roll calls in order to ascertain whether these roll calls will scale.[19] Thus, it is the *legislator's* issue dimensions, not the *researcher's* predetermined ones, that are measured. Taxation bills may scale with education, civil liberties with business reg-

---

[12] Theodore Mitau, *Politics in Minnesota* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960).

[13] One observer writes that "neither seniority, partisanship, nor gubernatorial influence are of major significance in the power struggle in Nebraska's unicameral structure" (Richard Marvel, "Decision Making in the Nebraska Unicarmeral Legislature," [Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 1966] pp. 76–77). Interviews with high state party officials and associates of the governor confirm the impotence of these forces in dealing with what one former governor called "an army of all generals." Power within the chamber is diffuse; as the unicameral legislature is now organized, the Speaker is elected by the full membership on a secret ballot. Some disagreement exists as to the degree of power held by the Speaker; in the past it tended to be an honorific post, but is now becoming a more important position. See Robert Sittig, "Unicameralism in Nebraska, 1936–1966," *State Government* (Winter, 1967), 38–41, and Marvel, Chapter 4. Membership on the Committee on Committees is another potential source of power; the Chairman of this committee is elected by the full house, but the other members are chosen by caucuses of members from different regions of the state. Committee chairmenships are not awarded on the basis of seniority necessarily, and the normal term of office for chairmen is two terms. For an overview of the Nebraska political system see Bernard Kolasa, "The Nebraska Political System: A Study in Apartisan Politics" (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 1968).

[14] John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 425.

[15] Interviews with legislators indicate that all are quite willing to identify themselves with one of the two major parties. These interviews are from an unpublished survey conducted by Eric H. Carlson.

[16] The selection of years was not as random as it may seem. Originally the design called for the use of ten-year intervals, beginning with 1927 and continuing until 1967. Altering the selection to the years listed, however, had the advantage of allowing an examination of two nonpartisan sessions with Republicans serving as governor, two with Democrats. While this distribution was later found to have no apparent effect, at the time the data were collected, it seemed reasonable to assume that legislative behavior might be different during the tenure of governors from the majority party of the state.

[17] For an explanation of Guttman scaling and its uses in legislative analysis see McRae, *Issues and Parties;* George Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 2 (1958), 377–412; Charles D. Farris, "A Scale Analysis of Ideological Factors in Congressional Voting," *Journal of Politics,* 20 (May, 1958), 308–38; Aage Clausen and Richard Cheney, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (March, 1970), 138–52.

[18] See Patterson, "Voting Behavior in a One Party State Legislature," and Farris, "Scale Analysis," for example.

[19] Clausen and Cheney, "Senate-House, Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy"; Duncan McRae, "A Method of Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *American Political Science Review,* 59 (December, 1965), 909–26.

Table 1. Some Attributes of Voting in each Session*

	1927 Partisan	1937	1947 Nonpartisan	1959	1969
Total *N* of bills with more than 10% dissent	217	131	145	172	282
N of bills scaling	100	64	63	61	75
Percentage of bills scaling	47%	48%	43%	35%	27%
N of scales	16	9	9	9	12
Average *N* of bills per scale	6.5†	7.6	7.9	7.6	7.3
Range in *N* of bills per scale	4–11	5–14	4–21	5–17	6–11

* There were 43 senators in 1937, 1947, and 1959, 49 in 1969, and 33 in the 1927 Senate.

† Some bills appear in more than one scale, thus, this figure does not necessarily equal $\frac{N \text{ of bills}}{N \text{ of scales}}$.

ulation, and so on in combinations that would not be predicted a priori by the investigator.

An obvious problem of this analysis is that conceivably, given the number of roll calls being analyzed, some bills will scale together simply by chance.[20] In this analysis, 59 empirical scales with a minimum of four bills each were found in the five sessions. Each of the scales had a minimum CR of .92. All but four of these scales had a reasonably consistent content, not necessarily completely homogeneous, but related in some way. These four scales of four and five roll calls each were removed from the analysis on the assumption that they were chance collections of bills.[21] The remaining 55 scales each had a CR of .94 or better, and no roll call in each had more than 15 per cent error. For the purposes of further analysis, one additional scale in the 1959 session was deleted because it essentially duplicated another scale. The remaining 54 scales, then, form the basis of the following discussion. The issue areas of the scales in each year are described in the Appendix.[22]

These scales delineate the issue areas in each session. To determine patterns of voting behavior within each issue area a further procedure was used. Each legislator received a scale score for each scale. Each of these sets of scores (54 in all) served as the dependent variable in a stepwise regression equation, with various constituency, personal, and party characteristics as independent variables. These characteristics are: party identification of the senator, his age, and his education; the proportion of his district that is urban; a measure of the industrialization of his district; and the partisan preference of his district as expressed in its vote for president in the election prior to the legislative session analyzed (1924, 1936, 1944, 1956, 1968).[23]

---

[20] McRae recognizes this problem and comments that "empiricism cannot be unbounded . . . otherwise it might lead to such absurdities as the selection of an arbitrary group of legislators simply to eliminate 'error' votes or the assemblage of a meaningless collection of roll calls for which the legislators in question had scalable votes" (McRae, "Identifying Issues and Factions," pp. 911–12). Roll calls with lopsided distributions of votes are particularly likely to scale randomly. For example, a vote with only 10 per cent dissent, even if all the dissents are "errors," would still empirically scale with any other set of votes if 10 per cent error is the only criterion for inclusion in the scale.

[21] Some arbitrariness probably entered into the decision to exclude the four scales. They had three characteristics which led to the decision: slightly lower CR's than the other scales, lopsided vote distribution in most roll calls comprising the scales, and roll calls unrelated to each other. These scales were removed from the analysis because it was assumed that they were not measuring purposive behavior, only statistical artifact.

[22] Since the scales were built from the universe of roll calls and not from predetermined "issue" areas, the content of the scales is not always as precise as one might expect or wish. Thus it was found that education and local government issues are often mixed together in one scale, regulation and taxation issues seem to scale together frequently, as do taxation and appropriation bills in some cases. In the following discussion the scales will be labeled by their primary substantive content.

[23] Other district and personal characteristics were used in preliminary analyses. These included such variables as the size of the legislator's hometown and his occupation, the income level and racial composition of senatorial districts, and the gubernatorial vote in the senatorial districts. The six variables chosen for this analysis were chosen because, on the whole, they explained the most variance in scale scores and minimized the problem of multicollinearity. Surprisingly, the gubernatorial preference of senatorial districts was even less related to the senator's party identification than was presidential vote. The statistics used in the analysis are taken from The Fifteenth Census of the United States, vol. 3, pt. 2, *Population* (Washington: U.S. Census Department, 1933); *County and City Data Book* (Washington: U.S. Census Department, 1956, 1962, 1967); Nebraska Blue Book (Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska Legislative Council, 1928, 1938,

Stepwise regression finds the variable with the strongest zero-order correlation with the dependent variable, then holds this variable constant while finding the variable with the highest first-order correlation, etc. Thus, it gives us a powerful and parsimonious means to examine the relative impact of a number of independent variables on a dependent variable.[24] In the past, researchers have been somewhat unwilling to use this kind of multivariate technique to analyze roll-call behavior. But in the case where the aim is description of a population, rather than inference from a sample to a population, the stringent limitations on the use of these techniques need not be met.[25] Zavoina and McKelvey have discovered some problems in using ordinal Guttman scales as a dependent variable in a regression model, but suggest that this procedure is conservative from a hypothesis-testing standpoint.[26] Jackson has successfully used multiple regression techniques to predict senatorial voting in the U.S. Senate.[27] Regression analysis, then, appears to be the most useful and practical tool to deal with the particular problems in examining multiple causation in legislative voting.

The methodology of the paper thus provides for two steps: first to construct from roll calls in each session Guttman scales that comprise the totality of all scalable bills meaningful in terms of issue content; and second, to attempt to explain voting on these scales in terms of the independent variables of constituency, party, and two personal characteristics.

Structure in Roll-Call Voting

One might hypothetically construct two polar kinds of roll-call behavior on the part of legislatures as wholes. On the one hand, all votes taken in the legislature could fall along a single dimension, and hence would form one scale. This sort of situation occurs where parties are tightly disciplined and the party leadership enforces this discipline on every vote. Voting in this dimension would be entirely explainable by party alone. Conceivably, however, one might find this comprehensive unidimensionality explainable by some other factor than party —if all votes were urban-rural votes, for example. This situation we might term a completely structured pattern of voting.[28]

At the opposite end of this scheme would be the situation in which *no* set of four or more votes scaled. This would indicate that no group of four or more votes formed a single dimension; almost every vote would have unique coalitions of legislators on each side. This situation presumes almost no party regularity at all, nor any regularity that might be defined by constituency, or interest group influence, or any other sort of regional, or personal, or informal pressures. This type of voting might be termed "random," or "unstructured."

Probably no state legislature or house of Congress would fall at either extreme consistently, although Carlson found that the New Jersey Senate approached the former pattern in at least one session.[29] In the Nebraska Senate, as Table 1 indicates, the proportion of scalable bills decreased over the time period examined, from almost one-half in 1927 and 1937 to slightly more than one-fourth in 1969. Thus, in 1969, almost three-quarters of non-unanimous votes displayed no consistent relationship in voting patterns to even three other votes. The smallness of this proportion of scalable bills indicates a good deal of apparent randomness in voting behavior on the part of the legislators, since consistency of voting, whether cued by party, constituency influence, interest-group pressure, committee structure or whatever, would be indicated in clusters of bills. This seeming randomness has been commented upon by Rall, who notes that the nonpartisan legislature has ". . . a tendency to fragment into small blocs, some of which contain only a single member."[30]

This pattern may be compared with that observed in other legislative bodies. Farris asserted that for the U.S. House, ". . . Representatives maintain enough consistency in voting behavior . . . so that practically all their roll call votes can be classified as part of one scale

---

1948, 1958, 1966, 1968); *Census of the the Population, 1950,* 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pt. 27, *Nebraska;* Richard Scammon, *America at the Polls* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965).

[24] See for example, William L. Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), especially chap. 15.

[25] Hays, pp. 509–10.

[26] W. J. Zavoina and R. McKelvey, "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Legislative Voting Behavior," paper presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 2–6, 1969 as quoted in John E. Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Roll Call Voting," *American Political Science Review,* 65 (June, 1971), 455.

[27] Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Voting," pp. 451–70.

[28] See also Eric H. Carlson, "Five State Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis of Roll Call Voting Patterns," paper presented at the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association Meeting, Colorado State University, May, 1971.

[29] Carlson.

[30] Frank Rall, "Nebraska: Sons of the Pioneer," in *States in Crisis,* ed. James Reichley (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 254.

or another."[31] Jackson's analysis of the 1961 and 1962 sessions of the U.S. Senate seem to indicate that more than 65 per cent of the bills scaled.[32] Carlson, in his analysis of nine houses of five legislatures (New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and California) found that the percentage of bills scaling ranged from 100 per cent in the highly partisan New Jersey Senate to 29 per cent in the California House; only three houses had less than 40 per cent scalable bills (both California houses and the Tennessee House). Patterson found in the one party Oklahoma House that about one-half the votes there were scalable (62 of 127) and that another 17 per cent formed what he called "quasi-scales."[33]

Comparing results from the Nebraska Senate to results from these other analyses, one notes that voting in the most recent sessions of the Nebraska unicameral (and these sessions are more directly comparable in terms of time) is more unstructured, in terms of scalability of roll calls, than it is in any other legislative body. This is true even in comparison with the one-party Oklahoma legislature. California provides a close rival to Nebraska's looseness of structure. The California legislature in the late 'fifties (when the analysis was done) represented a very weak partisan legislative system. The 1927 and 1937 sessions of the Nebraska Senate, on the other hand, conform more closely in degree of structure to some other legislative systems. The 1927 system was partisan, and while the 1937 system was nonpartisan, about 80 per cent of its members had served in the partisan legislature of 1935 or earlier.[34] One might hypothesize, then, that some behavior patterns from the partisan era lingered on among these members.[35] At any rate, while it is somewhat dangerous to generalize from five data points, there does seem to be a trend toward decreasing structure in legislative behavior since the establishment of the nonpartisan system in Nebraska. This trend provides some evidence for the hypothesis that it is the organization and discipline of party leadership, over a series of votes that provide voting cues for legislators' overall voting patterns. It appears that, in Nebraska at least, no other cue or reference group was as salient for legislators. Thus, in the most recent session, without party organization and leadership, most votes are unrelated to other votes.

Explaining Voting Behavior

The preceding section has described the lack of structure in voting behavior in the Nebraska unicameral legislature. This section will deal with the scalar analysis of that part of the voting behavior that was structured. It has been observed that, in general, neither party nor constituency nor any other system of reference groups has been able to serve as a cue consistently enough to present a structured voting situation. In those voting situations that *are* structured, however, what are the relative influences of party and constituency?

Consider several assumptions reflecting the applicability of the original hypotheses to the nonpartisan legislature:

(1a.) We will assume that if neither party nor constituency is related to voting (r^2 and R^2 will be used as measures of this relatedness), then this fact constitutes evidence in favor of hypothesis 1a: the importance of party is due to the independent effect of party leadership and party organization within the legislative body. That is, in the nonpartisan legislature, neither party identification nor constituency influence have been removed, but party leadership and organization have been. If the hypothesis is true, then, we would expect party to explain a small amount of the variance observed, i.e., have a small r^2.

(1b.) If party is strongly related to voting and unrelated to constituency, then this would provide evidence for the strength of hypothesis 1b: Party is an important cue because of psychological or ideological identification, not because of leadership and discipline, or because of its reflection of constituency characteristics.

(1c.) A finding that party identification is strongly related to voting and to constituency would provide some support for hypothesis 1c: Party is an important variable in explaining voting behavior because it reflects differing constituency interests. If this condition holds, however, it would not logically rule out either hypothesis 1b or 2.

(2.) If constituency is strongly related to voting, but not to party, then evidence is provided for hypothesis 2, that it is largely constituency differences, not party, that produces party divisions in legislative voting.

---

[31] Farris, "Scale Analysis," p. 314.

[32] Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Voting," p. 458.

[33] Carlson, "Five State Legislatures," Table 3; Patterson, "Voting Behavior in a One Party State Legislature."

[34] This lack of turnover may be explained by noting that the new nonpartisan legislature had 43 members, while the two houses of the 1935 partisan legislature had over 100 members.

[35] It might be noted here that another evidence of the lack of structure in the Nebraska legislature is the small size of those scales that do exist. Those bills that scale formed many small dimensions rather than one all-encompassing one as cited in the New Jersey legislature. This particular attribute of the scales is not directly comparable with most other Guttman analyses because in many cases no attempt is made to aggregate votes from different issue areas, or in some cases different bills. However, Patterson ("Voting Behavior in a One Party Legislature"), without attempting to aggregate issue areas, found his scales averaged nine votes per scale.

In sum, we will examine the relationship found among party identification of the legislator, his voting behavior, and the characteristics of his constituency in order to attempt to confirm or disconfirm the accuracy of the hypotheses stated above.

We may eliminate assumption 2 immediately. In none of the sessions examined, neither partisan nor nonpartisan, did the party identification of the legislator relate strongly to the urban character of his district or to its degree of industrialization. In only one session did the party of the legislator correlate highly with the partisan vote in his district (Table 2). Thus, in the Nebraska legislature, party is not a reflection of constituency characteristics, at least those we have measured.

Table 2. Relationship of Legislator's Party Identification to Some Characteristics of his District*

Year	Urban Character of District	Degree of Industrialization of District	Presidential Vote of District
1927	.14	.16	.15
1937	.17	.21	.10
1947	.15	.14	.47
1959	.13	.23	.07
1969	.11	.21	.26

* Measure used here is simple r.

Table 3 illustrates the relationship, expressed in r^2, between party identification and each scale for each year, as well as an average overall scale. Probably the most striking fact about the table is the lack of relationship between party and voting. In only 6 of the 38 nonpartisan scales is r^2 even equal to .09, and in only 9 more is it even a minuscule .04. While the preceding section illustrated fairly well that neither party nor any other group served as a potent organizing force in the legislature, these relationships indicate that in general party has almost no influence on the voting behavior of the legislators, even in these structured votes.

In the partisan Senate, the r^2 between party and scale scores is more than .09 in about twice as many scales proportionally (five of sixteen), and its value is between .04 and .09 in about the same proportion. Thus we can see a decline in the influence of party on voting from the partisan to the nonpartisan Senates, although even in the former the relationship was hardly overwhelming. A possible cause for this lack of influence may have been the Progressive movement: George Norris was a Nebraskan, and his influence, even at this time, may have been important. Certainly, it may logically be postulated that if Nebraska had had a strong party system in the '20s and '30s, it would have been impossible to establish the nonpartisan legislature. Thus it is not surprising to find a less than strong relationship between party and voting, even in 1927.[36]

Obviously, then, party is not strongly related to voting in even these selected roll calls, with a few exceptions. This seems to confirm hypothesis 1a, that party leadership and organization are the crucial factors producing party voting. Although the difference in this legislature between the partisan years and nonpartisan is not large, if we acknowledge that the 1927 legislature was an example of a weak party system, then the differences seem more striking.

Turning to the variance explained by the urban or industrialized character of the constituency or its voting preferences, Table 4 indicates that one or more of the constituency variables are more important explanatory variables than party in about half of the partisan scales, but in at least three-quarters of the scales in each of the nonpartisan sessions.

While these zero-order correlations between constituency and voting are, overall, higher than the correlations between party identification and voting, most of them are not extremely high. Thus, not only party is largely unrelated to most of the scales in the nonpartisan legislature, but the constituency variables are also largely unrelated. These findings do not support hypothesis 2 in any large way. We can detect a slight shift in emphasis from party to constituency as the more important set of variables between 1927 and 1937 and since then. But the impact of these constituency variables in no way substitutes for the impact of a party in a strong partisan system, nor on the whole do these variables even explain as much variance in the nonpartisan system as in the weak Nebraskan partisan system.[37]

---

[36] An example of the weakness of the 1927 party system and the possible impact of the Progressive movement is the election scale. This scale was comprised of bills relating to the establishment of a primary election system; this policy, of course, was one advocated strongly by the Progressives and other reformers of the era. The voting, as Table 3 illustrated, was little related to party, even though election issues are one of the kinds of issues most often found to be related to party.

[37] Farris found 27 scales in the House. He found correlations with party very high; only three scales had simple 4's of less than .30.

Table 3. Relationship between Party of Legislator and Scale Score on each Scale

1927	r^2	1937	r^2	1947	r^2	1959	r^2	1969	r^2
Taxation	.62	Soc. Welf.	.38	Salary II	.09	Elections	.41	Salaries	.24
Tax. & Reg.	.31	State Inst.	.23	Approp'n	.06	Regulation	.15	Bus. Regln.	.14
Judiciary	.20	Bus. Reg.	.05	Education	.04	Tax. I	.08	Civil Lib.	.07
Local Gov.	.18	Rev. & Tax.	.05	Loc. Govt.	.03	Tax. II	.01	He'th & Wel.	.04
Local Fin.	.10	Priv. Bills	.04	Taxes	.03	Salary	.01	Tax. & Reg II	.04
Elections	.08	Loc. Govt. II	.01	Lic. & Reg.	.02	Local Govt.	.01	Tax. & Reg I	.02
Regulat'n	.08	Regulation	.01	Salary I	.01	Welfare	.00	Bus. Regln.	.02
Salaries	.06	Transport'n	.00	Local Govt. II	.01	Education	.00	Civil Lib.	.01
Tax Lit.	.05	Local Govt. I	.00	Regulat'n II	.00			Lic. & Reg.	.00
Welfare	.04							Lab. & Emp.	.00
Tax. & Reg.	.03							Approprtn.	.00
Loc. Gov. II	.03							Tax & Apprtn.	.00
Hghwys & Rds.	.02								
Approprtns	.02								
State Inst.	.00								
Agriculture.	.00								
Mean r^2	.11		.08		.03		.08		.05

Table 5 is a summary table illustrating the variance explained in each session by the six independent variables. More variance was explained in the single partisan session than in any of the nonpartisan ones, except 1959. If these were correlations between voting choice and personal characteristics on a heterogeneous group of citizens, the correlations would seem moderately high and modestly impressive. Taken as a rough measure of a predictability of voting in a highly institutionalized organizational setting, they seem far less impressive. They seem, in fact, to indicate that voting behavior, even in these sets of roll calls that have displayed some structure, cannot be predicted by party and constituency taken together, along with two salient personal characteristics sometimes thought to be important in voting.[38]

Unfortunately, these findings are not directly comparable with most other roll-call studies. Most of the analyses measuring the impact of party on voting have used indices of party cohesion, rather than correlational techniques.[39]

Table 4. Scales in which one of the Constituency Variables Is More Important than the Party Identification Variable

1927	U	I	V*	1937	U	I	V	1947	U	I	V
Local Govt. I	.28	.32		Revenue & Tax	.25	.19		Salary II	.17	.14	.18
Regulation	.13			Private Bills	.12	.12		Appropriat'n.	.23	.32	.10
Salaries	.07			Local Govt. II	.07	.20		Local Govt.		.04	
Tax Lit.	.14	.08		Regulation	.05			Taxes			.12
Welfare	.10		.14	Transportation	.24	.16		Lic. & Reg.	.18	.10	.04
Loc. Govt. II	.11	.11		Local Govt. I	.04	.04	.01	Salary I	.21	.37	.09
Appropriations		.05						Loc. Govt. II	.19	.19	.08
State Institut.	.33	.12						Regulation	.28	.10	.21
Agriculture	.08	.02	.14								
1959	U	I	V	1969	U	I	V				
Taxation I	.18	.07		Health & Wel.			.09				
Taxation II	.17	.14	.04	Tax. & Reg. II		.09					
Salaries	.34	.18		Tax. & Reg. I		.46	.06				
Local Govt.	.37	.20	.10	Bus. Regulation		.09					
Welfare	.41	.22	.02	Civil Lib. II			.03				
Education	.21	.21	.02	Lic. & Regul'n	.02	.30					
				Labor & Empt.	.10	.39	.05				
				Appropriat'n	.01		.01				
				Tax & Approtn.		.01					

* U = Urbanization, I = Industrialization, V = Vote in Presidential Election.

---

[38] Breckenridge, for example, suggests that age groupings might sometimes be a factor in voting alignments. See Adam C. Breckenridge, *One House for Two* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957); the discussions about social class composition of legislators indicate implicitly that social class background affects behavior in the legislature; education is not a perfect measure of social class by any means, but does correlate with it. See Donald Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision Makers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954).

[39] See for example, Turner, *Party and Constituency;* Truman, *Congressional Party;* see also David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and

Table 5. Summary Measures of the Impact of Independent Variables in Explaining Voting Behavior

	Average R²	Average R	Low R²	High R²
1927	.36	.59	.13 Highways	.79 Taxation
1937	.30	.54	.20 Regulation	.50 Social Welfare
1947	.30	.54	.16 Taxes	.52 Spending
1959	.43	.65	.20 Regulation	.61 Welfare
1969	.29	.52	.04 Taxation & Appropriation	.55 Taxation & Regulation

McRae divided his legislators by party before constructing scales;[40] LeBlanc dealt only with roll calls on which there was party opposition;[41] and Shannon and Froman used techniques that did not really allow them to assess the cumulative impact of both party and constituency in explaining scale score.[42] However, the variance in scale scores accounted for by party alone in Shannon's analysis seems to be substantial.[43] Clausen and Chaney find that in the U.S. House the average variance explained by party alone in their economic and welfare scales is .43 and .31 respectively, and in the Senate .48 and .68. Constituency relationships were not so uniformly high, particularly in the Senate, but indices of blue-collar employment and urbanization correlated moderately with the welfare scales and minimally with the economy scales.[44]

Since what we are interested in is the relative impact of these independent variables, an attempt was made to summarize the relative impact of these variables over all scales for each session (Table 6). To arrive at a summary score measuring the importance of each variable in the scales of each session, a simple method was used: Each time a variable entered into an equation first (i.e., was the most powerful explanatory variable), it was given a score of six points; if it entered second, it was given a score of five points, etc. The scores were summed for each year and the variables ranked. In addition, Table 6 shows the number of times each variable entered into an equation first in the partisan and nonpartisan scales.

While there is a good deal of variation in the relative importance of these variables from year to year, it seems that the urbanness and degree of industrialization are the most important factors in explaining the overall voting behavior in the nonpartisan scales. They seem more important than party identification and

---

Missouri Legislative Delegations," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (December, 1958), 1051–65 for an illustration of the use of indices of cohesion on another kind of group.

[40] McRae, *Congressional Voting*.

[41] LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates."

[42] Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies;* Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting*.

[43] Shannon, chap. 4.

[44] Clausen and Chaney, p. 146.

Table 6. Importance of Each Independent Variable in Explaining Voting in the Scales of Each Session

Characteristic	1927	1937	1947	1959	1969	First*	
						Partisan	Nonpartisan
Percentage urban in district	2.5†	2	5.5	1	4	3	11
Percentage industrialized in district*	6	5	1	5	2.5	1	9
Vote of district in last pres. elect.	5	6	4	6	1	3	3
Party identification of senator	1	1	2	4	5.5	4	8
Education of senator	4	3	5.5	2.5	5.5	4	2
Age of senator	2.5	4	3	2.5	2.5	1	5

* Unfortunately, the measures of industrialization vary. In 1959 and 1969 the figure used is based upon percentage of white collar employment in the district; in 1927 and 1937, on the percentage employed in manufacturing; in 1947, on the median years of education in the district.

† The figures represent the rank order of the independent variables in each session as computed by the simple method explained in the text. The figures in the last column represent the number of times that variable was the most powerful independent variable in the regression equation. In other words, in 11 of the 38 equations, the variable of urbanization explained more of the variance than any other variable.

much more important than the personal characteristics of the legislator or his district's presidential preferences. In the partisan legislature, party seems most important, with no clear indication of next rankings. That is, age of the senator and degree of urbanization in the district are second in total points, but the education of the senator and the vote of the district in the last election enter first into more equations than does age.

It seems significant that there is little consistency from session to session in the most important explanatory variable. This finding indicates that no outstanding alignment has been consistent over a period of time. Table 5 seems to indicate that voting patterns shift radically from session to session, with no strong underlying force providing structure for the legislators.

Table 6 treats all scales equally—those in which the R^2 for the six independent variables and scale score is .70, and those in which it it only .05. Since it seems useful to separate for closer analysis the "most important" independent variables in only those scales that are highly explainable in terms of the six given variables, Table 7 sets forth those scales in which the r^2 between the "most important" variable and the scale scores is at least .20. These were considered the most important scales to examine, because, given the number of scales and the number of independent variables, small correlations are apt to be products of chance; and an independent variable that explains only 5 or 6 per cent of the variance in a scale score, even though it is the "most powerful" variable under consideration, cannot be thought to be shedding much light on voting behavior.

From Table 7 it seems clear that only urbanization and industrialization have much predictive power in explaining voting in the nonpartisan legislature. Party seems important only upon occasion, and one welfare scale in 1969 was most related to the senator's own background. On some occasions, therefore, constituency variables, and even occasionally party variables, do explain a goodly proportion of the voting behavior.[45]

Table 7. Scales in which Voting Is Relatively Predictable

Year	Scale	Most Important Variable	% Explained by MIV	Beta MIV	R^2 All Six
1927	Taxation and Regulation	Party Identification	32%	.53	.50
	State Institutions	Urbanization	33	.77	.49
	Judiciary	Party Identification	20	.42	.27
	Taxation	Party Identification	60	.71	.79
	Local Government	Industrialization	32	.35	.56
1937	Local Government II	Industrialization	20	.65	.41
	State Institutions	Party Identification	23	.55	.39
	Revenue and Taxation	Urbanization	25	.34	.41
	Social Welfare	Party Identification	38	.65	.50
1947	Licensing and Regulation	Urbanization	28	.46	.36
	Appropriations	Industrialization	33	.47	.52
	Salaries	Industrialization	37	.55	.50
1959	Local Government	Urbanization	21	.29	.45
	Salaries	Urbanization	35	.74	.50
	Education	Urbanization	37	.69	.47
	Public Welfare	Urbanization	41	.76	.61
	Elections	Party Identification	41	.66	.56
1969	Salaries	Party Identification	20	.41	.44
	Health and Welfare	Senator's Education	23	.40	.39
	Licensing and Regulation	Industrialization	30	.77	.38
	Labor & Employment	Industrialization	39	.73	.43
	Regulation and Taxation	Industrialization	46	.83	.55

---

[45] The 1959 election scale, the scale most highly related to party during the nonpartisan sessions, deals with elections in a very specific, *post hoc* way. Five of the six items in the scale deal with whether the legislature should give sanction to a recount of the 1958 gubernatorial votes. The governor of Nebraska, like all

If we examine the remaining 21 scales in the nonpartisan sessions, and the 11 in the partisan sessions, the distribution of the most important explanatory variables is rather random:[46] It would not be unfair to speculate, given these random distributions and the small correlations, that the relatedness of the variables is almost a chance artifact of the probability that given enough variables and enough equations, something is bound to correlate with something else.

This perhaps excessively cynical view seems to suggest that in the case of this nonpartisan legislature, the structured voting is either related to differences in the urban-rural nature of the legislator's constituency (urbanization and industrialization measures), or it is not related to any of the variables under consideration.[47] In the partisan legislature, party identification seems more important, with these constituency variables related to some scales.

One might object to this whole analysis of the impact of constituency on voting in legislatures by noting that the kinds and number of independent variables are limited. We can agree that the kinds of measures concerning the nature of the constituency are crude, yet they do reflect some of the most salient factors about the constituency. While the congressman or legislator is not likely to perceive the constituency in exactly the terms used here, he is equally unlikely to ignore the large groupings of blue-collar workers, low-educated people, farmers, or whatever; these measures do give some indication of the importance of these groups in each district.[48] A conceivably important factor not considered in this analysis is the legislators' attitudes and sympathies toward interest groups. These attitudes may partially reflect gross constituency characteristics (a person representing a heavily blue-collar district is not likely to be unsympathetic with labor groups), but may contain dimensions unrelated to these characteristics. Further, the data presented here did not take into account personal attitudes of the legislators toward various economic, political, and social issues. Individual attitudes, of course, may or may not reflect constituency opinion.[49] However, data on attitudes toward interest groups and toward some economic, social, and political issues were collected for about half of the legislators in the 1969 session. Adding these variables into the regression equations did not significantly improve predictability in voting for even this small group. This is only a small and perhaps misleading bit of evidence, however, since the measures of social and economic liberalism used were rather crude ones.

In terms of individual voting behavior (as contrasted with overall voting structure), if we return to our original hypotheses and assumptions concerning their validity, we find that the data seem to rule out 1b and 1c, because clearly party is not strongly related to voting in any consistent way. The verdict on hypothesis 2 is less clearcut, because in some scales constituency does explain a large amount of the variance, while in others it explains very little. If we remember, however, that a large proportion of the roll calls did not scale at all, then hypothesis 2 does not appear to be strongly supported. In sum, when the nonpartisan legislature is used as a control, the observed lack of both structure and explainability in voting behavior must lead one to conclude that it is the organization and discipline of party leadership that produce strong party voting in legislative bodies.[50]

---

his gubernatorial counterparts, is elected on a partisan ballot. Thus, there was a grand opportunity in the legislature for Democrats and Republicans to take sides on an issue of immediate and great partisan concern. While party identification did show more correlation with this set of issues than any other, still only 41 per cent of the variance was accounted for by party.

[46] Distribution of Most Important Variable in Other Scales:

	Age	Urbanization	Party Identification	Industrialization	Partisan Vote	Education	Total
Partisan	1	2	1	0	3	4	11
Nonpartisan	5	5	4	3	3	1	21

[47] Francis's more impressionistic conclusion was that in Nebraska the major source of conflict was the urban-rural difference (Francis, *Legislative Issues in 50 States*).

[48] For a good discussion of this point see Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies.*

[49] See Miller and Stokes, "Constituency influence in Congress."

[50] The causal factors relating to a strong party leadership within the legislature are another question. And, in fact, party leadership may be forthcoming from outside the legislative body. Van der Slik et al. found that voting in one kind of nonpartisan setting, without party leadership organized formally within the legislative body, could be strongly influenced by partisan preference (Jack Van der Slik, David Kenney, and

Issues and Voting in a Nonpartisan Legislature

One of the consistent findings of those who have examined partisan legislatures, even highly partisan bodies, is that some issues are more highly partisan than others. Less consistent have been the findings about exactly which issues are more partisan. Regional conflict was found in apportionment and local government issues, as well as in issues of constitutional revision, civil rights, and sometimes in social welfare.[51] Jewell found party conflict high in the areas of labor, elections, constitutional amendments, legislative organization, and natural resources; intermediate party conflict was found on appropriations, welfare, state offices, and schools.[52] Wiggins in Iowa discovered high party conflict on labor, legislative organization, elections, constitutional amendments, and national issues, intermediate conflict on appropriations, welfare, state offices, and schools.[53] In the Oklahoma one-party legislature, Patterson found taxation a product of conflict with urban-rural coalitions, elections related to political competitiveness, education to socio-economic constituency variables, and public morals to rural-urban differences.[54] LeBlanc, in his analyses of state senates, observed that business regulation and health and welfare issues tended to be less partisan than revenue, appropriations, labor, legislative organization, and elections.[55]

We will hypothesize that in a nonpartisan legislature, only those issues that are directly related to the fortunes of the parties and those tied most directly to national issues will be characterized by a high degree of partisan conflict: particularly election issues and certain kinds of social welfare legislation that are the subject of national controversy. We will further hypothesize that issues relating to local government, agriculture, spending, and taxation will be related to rural-urban differences in constituency.

Table 8 indicates that our hypotheses are only partially confirmed. The social welfare issues in the 1937 scale were related quite directly to Roosevelt's New Deal proposals, and the election scale of 1959 was related quite directly to the fortunes of the two parties (see footnote 45); therefore, the finding that these issues are related to party is expected. The state institutions scale of 1937 is less related to any national issue, although since it dealt with court and prison reform largely, it may be capturing a liberal-conservative or Roosevelt-anti-Roosevelt alignment. The salary scale of 1969 may be viewed as a gubernatorial support series of votes.[56]

Most of the spending and taxation scales that showed any relationships (and this includes the salary scales, and the social welfare scale of 1959 which contained several bills relating to increasing unemployment compensation) were related to constituency. More than half of these bills, however, were not strongly correlated with any variable, nor were most of the local government scales and agriculture related to any variable under consideration.

In sum, the hypotheses about party and constituency conflict are moderately substantiated. Different patterns of conflict occur with different kinds of bills. On the whole, however, party conflict was found only rarely (and two of the four scales on which there was party conflict were found in 1937).

Conclusions and Implications

The above findings indicate that there is relatively little structure in voting in the Nebraska legislature. This suggests not only that party is the most important reference group in structuring legislative behavior but also that in the absence of party, no other kind of reference group serves a similar purpose.[57] Even though

---

Samuel J. Pernacciaro, "Roll Call Voting Patterns in the Illinois Constitutional Convention: A Regression Analysis," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, April, 1972). This nonpartisan constitutional convention was, of course, operating within the very highly partisan political setting in Illinois; many of the members, although nominally nonpartisan, were responsible to the Democratic organization of Cook County; others had strong party ties to downstate Republican and Democratic organizations. See also Caleb and Janet Clark, "The Impact of Electoral and Party Systems upon Political Conflict in State Constitutional Conventions," paper presented at the 1972 Southwestern Social Science Convention, San Antonio, Texas, March, 1972.

[51] Francis, p. 21.

[52] Malcolm Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (September, 1955), 779–80.

[53] Wiggins, "Party Politics in the Iowa Legislature," p. 87.

[54] Patterson, "Voting Behavior in a One Party Legislature," pp. 199–200.

[55] LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates," p. 41.

[56] The Governor, labeled a "progressive" Republican, had in his tenure from 1966 to 1970, embarked upon an effort to modernize both the fiscal structure and the organization of state government of Nebraska. Increasing the salaries of high state officials to make them more competitive with business and other states was one among many examples of what his opponents viewed as wasteful spending. Thus, many of these measures were opposed by the Democrats and were capitalized upon in the successful Democratic gubernatorial campaign in 1970.

[57] This finding is supported by the relative lack of structure found by Carlson, "Five State Legislatures," in the weakly partisan California legislature of the late

Table 8. Scales: Party and Constituency Conflict

Issue	Number of Scales in Nonpartisan	Scales highly Related to Party, $r^2 \geq .20$	Scales highly Related to Constituency, $r^2 \geq .20$
Social Welfare	4	1 (1937)	1 (1959)
Elections	1	1 (1959)	0
State Institutions	1	1 (1937)	0
Salaries	4	1 (1969)	2 (1959, 1947)
Revenue and Taxation	7	0	3 (1937, 1947, 1969)
Regulation	9	0	2 (1947, 1969)
Local Government	5	0	1 (1959)
Education	2	0	1 (1959)
Highways and trans.	1	0	1 (1937)
Labor and employment	1	0	1 (1969)
Civil Liberties	2	0	0
Agriculture	1	0	0
Private Bills	1	0	0

strong constituency differences exist, and in Nebraska the urban-rural nature of constituency is superimposed on regional differences, constituency is not a strong factor around which voting can be consistently organized.

If we examine those votes that do display structure (that is, those that scale), we find that the majority are not explainable to any large extent by party, constituency, or personal variables. Voting is simply not predictable from the kinds of measures utilized here. Obviously other variables than party identification, rural nature of the constituency, or age enter into a voting decision. Such influences as one's attitude toward an issue, susceptibility to interest group pressure, the legislator's personal desire to do a favor for a colleague—these sorts of influences are not being measured directly by the data at hand, yet they might be real influences on behavior.[58] Still, these influences are probably not entirely divorced from the constituency and party characteristics we have examined.

What implications does this lack of apparent predictability and order in voting have? One that is immediately apparent concerns the responsibility of elected officials to their constituents. While citizens do not generally think of parties in terms of ideology or policy, most Americans know even less about the policies and platforms of their legislators.[59] Thus, removing this most salient cue of party identification for most voters would seem to be taking away one means of a rational voting choice, just as removing party organization seems to take away the most salient cues for the legislator.

One of the original motives behind political nonpartisanship was, in Norris's words, to give the people more power in their government by eliminating corruption caused by "crass" political deals and putting government on a businesslike basis. It is difficult to see how constructing a setting in which there is no consistency in behavior on the part of representatives and little knowledge on the part of electors can give the people more power. While there are undoubtedly virtues in a nonpartisan system unrelated to the question of responsibility, to that question at least, a nonpartisan legislature seem to be a less than satisfactory answer.

1950s and the Tennessee legislature, where again, strong parties did not exist at that time in the legislature.

[58] Again, for a discussion on the use of constituency data as an indicator of real constituency preferences, see Froman.

[59] See Donald Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–46. It seems probable that Nebraska voters are neither more nor less informed about politics than their counterparts elsewhere. A survey taken in Lincoln, Nebraska, during the election campaign of 1970 found 56 per cent of the population unable to name their congressman, 32 per cent unable to name their congressman's party (and one can assume that some of the remaining 68 per cent were guessing). Of course, for the segment of the population that is much more aware and informed, even about policy issues, the nonpartisanship of the legislature would be less of a hindrance to some sort of rational voting behavior than for the public at large. For information on this public, see G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Missing Links in Legislative Politics: Attentive Constituents," *Journal of Politics,* 31 (August, 1969), 700–21; and Robert S. Erikson, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll-Call Voting," in *American Political Science Review,* 65 (December, 1971), 1018–32.

Appendix

The following table categorizes scales according to their predominant issue area by year:

Issue Areas of the Scales	1927	1937	1947	1959	1969	Total
Revenue, Taxation, or Appropriations	5*	1	2	2	2	12
Regulation	1	1	2	1	5	10
Local Government	3	2	2	1	0	8
Social Welfare	1	1	0	2	1	5
Salaries	1	0	2	1	1	5
Education	0	0	1	1	0	2
Civil Liberties	0	0	0	0	2	2
State Institutions	1	1	0	0	0	2
Highways and Transportation	1	1	0	0	0	2
Agriculture	1	1	0	0	0	2
Elections	1	0	0	1	0	2
Judiciary	1	0	0	0	0	1
Private Bills	0	1	0	0	0	1
Labor and Employment	0	0	0	0	1	1

* The numbers indicate the number of scales in this area.

Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study*

EUGENE R. WITTKOPF
University of Florida

Introduction

Reaction in the United States to the decision of the United Nations General Assembly on the China issue has raised anew the question of whether foreign aid has or has not been, indeed, should or should not be, used as a political instrument by the United States in seeking compliance by other states with its foreign policy positions. According to *The New York Times*, Senator Hugh Scott was "expressing a common resentment" when he observed that "a good many nations we have helped generously with foreign aid over many years have shown a classic lack of appreciation." Similarly, the *Times* reports that Senator J. W. Fulbright "suggested that rather than cutting back on United States contributions to the United Nations, Congress might reduce foreign aid to countries that had voted against the United States position on China."[1]

The purpose of this essay is to apply empirical evidence to the "has or has not" portion of the debate. Specifically, its purpose is to examine in a comparative foreign policy framework the relationship between political outcomes in the General Assembly, as represented by roll-call voting agreements across an entire set of roll calls, and foreign aid allocations, one of a myriad of extraorganizational links between UN members. In principle, the inquiry will be concerned with the extent to which foreign aid is an instrument of influence in the General Assembly. In propositional form, we will be concerned with the hypothesis that *the larger the agreement in General Assembly voting exhibited by a developing state with a foreign aid donor, the greater will be the amount of aid it receives from that donor.* At the same time, however, we will also be concerned with the reverse formulation of the proposition, i.e., whether the allocation of donors' aid dollars can be used to describe and explain the voting preferences of developing nations. We will examine the covariation between pairwise voting patterns in the 1963 (Eighteenth) and 1966 (Twenty-first) General Assemblies and the allocation of foreign economic assistance in two three-year periods, 1962–1964 and 1965–1967. Initially attention will be focused on the United States. The results for the U.S. will then be compared with those for other aid donors to ascertain their similarity or dissimilarity. The donors that will be compared with the U.S. are the Soviet "bloc"[2] and the twelve UN members (other than the U.S.) of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[3]

---

* Support for the research reported in this article was made available by the Department of Political Science, University of Florida, and the International Relations Program, Syracuse University, assistance that is gratefully acknowledged. I wish also to acknowledge with appreciation the advice and encouragement of Michael K. O'Leary, Steven J. Brams, James E. Price, William D. Coplin, and Patrick J. McGowan. The research reported here is a revised and expanded version of my "The Concentration and Concordance of Foreign Aid Allocations: A Transaction-Flow Analysis," in *Locational Approaches to Power and Conflict*, ed. Kevin R. Cox and David R. Reynolds (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), in which the covariance between aid allocations and voting agreements in 1963 is examined. Also examined in that study is the relationship between aid allocations and trade flows and diplomatic exchanges between developed and developing nations.

[1] *The New York Times*, October 27, 1971, p. 16.

[2] Lack of aid data on a dyadic basis has required the aggregation of the Soviet Union and other Communist nations into a single actor, referred to somewhat unhappily as a "bloc." For purposes of the 1962–1964 aid data, the Soviet "bloc" comprises the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Mainland China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. With the exception of Mainland China, the same states comprise the Soviet "bloc" for purposes of the 1965–1967 aid data.

[3] Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Australia, though not a DAC member until 1966, is included in the 1965–1967 analyses.

Although the DAC donors and the Soviet "bloc" nations together contribute the vast bulk of bilateral economic aid flows in the international system, several other states do maintain modestly sized bilateral programs, many of them in the area of technical assistance. Finland and New Zealand are among the developed nations maintaining such programs. Spain, Kuwait, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic, Nationalist China, Israel, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela are among the developing nations that reportedly maintain some such program, often in conjunction with a multilateral effort. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-Developed Countries 1961-1965* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1967), pp. 59–61; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Resources for the Developing World* (Paris:

The Aid and Voting Nexus

Foreign aid has often been used in studies concerned with general patterns of state behavior in and toward the United Nations.[4] Little empirical or comparative work, however, has attempted to isolate what role foreign aid may play in the political processes of the organization, or how these processes and their outcomes may influence other types of foreign policy behavior, such as aid allocations.[5] Yet the implication that aid influences voting behavior, or vice versa, is frequently suggested in the literature on both the United Nations and foreign aid, particularly as it relates to the United States. A brief, suggestive discussion of some of this literature will provide a background for the subsequent empirical analysis.

The suggestion that foreign aid is used as a bargaining tool in securing UN votes is spelled out clearly by Robert O. Keohane in his study, "Political Influence in the General Assembly."[6] "Certain states in the Assembly are very susceptible to bilateral pressure," he writes, "no matter how subtle its application may be. The more dependent a state is on a greater power for trade, aid, or protection, the more responsive it is likely to be to pressure."[7] Similarly, he notes, "Threats of retaliation of one sort or another—reducing foreign aid, for example—usually need not be made explicit. Often it is sufficient that the smaller state is aware that 'Big Brother' is watching."[8] Keohane also points out, however, that foreign aid is unlikely to be used as a bargaining tool by all foreign aid donors.

> Despite the United Nations' commitment to the use of rational and deliberative procedures, states attempt to coerce one another to support their positions. Yet even the most "realistic" observer of the General Assembly will quickly realize that attempts to achieve results by using extra-parliamentary threats—for instance, the threat to reduce foreign aid—are almost entirely limited to the two great powers. Nowhere is bipolarity more marked.[9]

The use of aid by the United States to influence voting behavior is suggested by Edward S. Mason, who writes that "diplomats are frequently worried by voting records in the United Nations and suggest that an increase in aid to their particular country would improve this record."[10] Lloyd D. Black has been more direct.

O.E.C.D., 1970), pp. 289–91; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1969 Review* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1969), pp. 60–63. Unfortunately, the data necessary for a systematic analysis of the aid programs of these donor countries comparable to that undertaken for the donors included in the study are not available. In fact, even in the case of the Soviet bloc, as will be noted below, the data are not comparable to those available for the DAC donors, thus leading to the presentation of two separate sets of results. However, the interest usually attached to Soviet aid programs seems to warrant its (their) inclusion.

[4] See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 226–27; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," in *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations*, ed. John E. Mueller (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 163–65; and John F. Clark, Michael K. O'Leary, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "National Attributes Associated with Dimensions of Support for the United Nations," *International Organization*, 25 (Winter, 1971), 1–25.

[5] Two examples of studies that use UN votes to examine aid allocations are Masakatsu Kato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme," in Mueller, *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations*, pp. 204–10; and Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 140–43.

[6] Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (March, 1966).

[7] Keohane, p. 19.

[8] Keohane, p. 19.

[9] Keohane, pp. 17–18. See also David A. Kay, "Instruments of Influence in the United Nations Political Process," in *The United Nations Political System*, ed. David A. Kay (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 105.

Keohane also suggests that "most decisions of the General Assembly . . . are not important enough to United States interests for it to threaten convincingly to alter the level of aid or support that it is giving, or to exercise other forms of pressure . . . for the sake of gaining a few more votes in the United Nations" (Keohane, p. 20). And he argues that the changing composition of the United Nations has probably made bilateral pressure less important that it was, say, in the 1950s (pp. 19–20).

Still, this caveat does not obviate the likelihood that foreign aid is a significant factor conditioning states' voting behavior, particularly where aid represents part of a general dependency relationship between a developing nation and an aid donor. In discussing the "appeal for good relations" as a form of bilateral pressure, for example, Keohane observes that the threat implicit in this appeal ". . . may become a painfully acute form of pressure if it is exercised by greater powers and directed toward states that depend on them for aid or support" (p. 18).

Jack C. Plano and Robert E. Riggs also observe that most UN votes are not sufficiently important to warrant a threat to alter aid levels. See *Forging World Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 154. In an earlier work, however, Riggs discusses the difficulty of separating specific uses of aid to secure compliance in the UN from the general relationship likely to hold between these two variables; see Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations: A Study of United States Influence in the General Assembly* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), pp. 38–39. The important point, of course, is that whether aid is or is not related to votes remains an empirical question.

[10] Edward S. Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 33.

He observes that "the State Department . . . places high value on the employment of foreign aid to . . . swing critical votes in international bodies. . . . While UN votes may not, and should not, be the primary determinant in aid decisions, it is reasonable to assert that they cannot be ignored—nor are they."[11]

On the other hand, Francis O. Wilcox, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, has argued that as a matter of *policy*, the United States eschews the use of foreign aid or similar devices to influence the behavior of UN members.[12] Interestingly, however, the section of Wilcox's article in which he makes this argument is entitled "U.N. Votes and Foreign Aid," carrying a subtle implication, quite apart from the argument itself, that there is something more than a random relationship between these two variables. Similarly, Black's normative view that UN votes should not be the "primary determinant in aid decisions" is echoed by other writers, again implying that foreign aid and UN votes are in fact nonrandomly associated. Mason, for example, has expressed the opinion that foreign aid is "frequently not a very useful instrument" for purposes of "influencing behavior in the United Nations."[13] Similarly, Charles Wolf, Jr. has asserted that "winning votes in the UN" is an "unreasonable" objective of foreign aid,[14] and Jacob J. Kaplan has expressed the view that ". . . the United States should not seek to starve a poor country into support of its foreign policy. An incentive system cannot operate in the case of every vote in the United Nations or every meeting of developing nations."[15]

But at least one writer has argued that policy makers should give more, not less, attention to how foreign aid might be used to influence political outcomes in the United Nations. In the concluding section of his study of *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework*, Andrew F. Westwood argues that the "alignment of underdeveloped countries in the Cold War" has been of concern to the United States for two reasons: first, because of the felt need for general ideological support in the competitive struggle with the Soviet Union; and second, because of ". . . the need for cooperation, and the give and take which produces it, on a wide variety of issues and problems, notably in the United Nations,"[16]

Westwood concludes that "the efforts to press aid into service [for purposes of general ideological support] probably can be summed up as unnecessary and ill-suited indeed to this realm of ideas and emotions."[17] On the other hand, he argues that the need to apply foreign aid to promote "cooperation" on a "wide variety of issues and problems" has not waned but in fact has become more important.

> This [need] has not faded but grown as more underdeveloped countries have entered the United Nations and the necessary majorities there increasingly have depended on their votes. The idea that no *quid pro quo* should be asked in return for aid has governed here as well [as in the area of general ideological support], although practice has diverged from it on occasion. But here the idea has a different character—not that ideological support is too gross a return for aid, but any return, even support on an issue in which the underdeveloped country may have little interest, is inappropriate. It seems likely that one of the major questions for the future is whether aid should not be included within the broad process of give and take on concrete issues which produces cooperation among mature, independent, and equal nations.[18]

Data and Methodology

Scope of the analysis. The UN votes analyzed are all committee and plenary roll calls taken in the Eighteenth and Twenty-first General Assemblies, a total of 78 in 1963 and of 163 in 1966. Attention is focused on the relationship between aid and voting preferences of developing states identifiable on the basis of all of these votes; no attempt will be made to identify "critical" votes or specific issues of particular significance to either aid donors or recipients.[19] It is important to emphasize, therefore, that the purpose here is to ascertain whether a relationship between donors' aid allocations and recipients' voting behavior exists as a general phenomenon.

---

[11] Lloyd D. Black, *The Strategy of Foreign Aid* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1968), p. 19.

[12] Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations," in *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 147–48.

[13] Mason, p. 42.

[14] Charles Wolf, Jr., "Economic Aid Reconsidered," in *The United States and the Developing Economies*, ed. Gustav Ranis (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 52.

[15] Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 248. See also Kaplan, p. 73.

[16] Andrew F. Westwood, *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 105.

[17] Westwood, p. 105.

[18] Westwood, p. 105.

[19] Cf. Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in General Assembly," pp. 163–64. Much additional work has been undertaken to determine whether a "critical vote" or "issue-area" approach might be a preferable way to address the question examined in this essay. Generally speaking, the results of these analyses suggest that neither of these alternatives is preferable to the generalized approach that has been chosen. For example, a contingency table analysis of developing nations' voting behavior on the China issue and their U.S. aid receipts during 1961–1967 indicated that aid allocations and voting behavior are quite probably independent of one another. See Eugene R. Wittkopf and James Green, "Empirical Perspectives on the

The aid recipients used in the statistical analyses were selected from a population of developing nations defined as independent nations that received foreign economic assistance from one or more of the sixteen members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee[20] or from the Soviet bloc during one or more of the six years spanned by the study. So defined, the possible number of observations used in the study varies from 85 in 1962 to 96 in 1967.[21] A list of these recipient nations is given in Table 1.

Although by 1967 there were, according to the criteria set forth above, as many as 96 foreign aid recipients, no one donor actually extended aid to all of these potential recipients in any one of the six years analyzed. In fact, the number of recipients for each donor varies greatly; in 1964, for example, the United States extended some form of economic assistance to 77 developing nations, while in the same year France aided only 26 independent nations. Throughout the analysis, attention for each donor country is confined to that subset of developing states to which the donor actually distributed foreign aid.

Three additional criteria are used to delimit the actual number of aid recipients included in the subsequent analyses. First, for reasons discussed below, attention is restricted to those aid recipients that received some *positive* amount of aid from each donor analyzed. Second, only those UN members that missed 40 per cent or fewer of the roll calls in each General Assembly are included in the roll-call analyses. Although this is an arbitrary figure, some minimum number of recorded votes seems necessary since much of the subsequent analysis is based on the behavior of all or major subsets of UN members. Finally, attention is restricted to those aid donors that distributed foreign aid to eight or more developing nations beyond those excluded according to the aforementioned criteria.[22]

Confining attention to the actual recipients of aid for each donor is especially important. In effect, it amends the proposition being examined to read *given that a nation recieves aid from a particular donor country,* the larger its voting agreement with that donor, the greater will be the amount of aid it receives from that donor. Because of this restriction, it might be argued that the empirical results presented later are in fact not addressed to a critical factor, namely, that the level of agreements between a foreign aid donor and its aid recipients may be

---

China Vote and U.S. Foreign Aid, 1961–1967" (paper, University of Florida, January, 1972). Similarly, work has been done using only those votes on which the United States and the Soviet Union did not agree. The results obtained differ only marginally from those displayed later, which employ all Assembly roll calls. Finally, an effort was made to replicate Bruce Russett's factor analysis of UN votes in 1963 in which he found five "super issues" in the General Assembly; see Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 63–67. *VRA* scores (discussed later) were calculated for those votes that loaded at .5 or greater on each of the three most important dimensions in the 1963 Assembly (cold war, 20 votes; intervention in Africa, 17 votes; supranationalism, 18 votes). The *VRA*'s were then correlated with the 1962–1964 U.S. aid *RA*'s (also discussed later). The results are given below (Table A). Although some interesting differences across the various dimensions are apparent, the important point is that the conclusions that can be drawn about the association between aid and votes (or lack of association) do not differ dramatically from those that can be drawn on the basis of looking at all roll-call votes. (See Table 3.)

Table A. U. S. Aid Allocations and U. N. Voting Agreements: Correlations Between 1962–1964 Relative Allocation Indices and 1963 Relative Agreement Indices Calculated by Issue-Area[a]

	Cold War	Intervention in Africa	Supranationalism
1962	.26* (67)	.15 (67)	−.04 (67)
1963	.21* (68)	.18 (68)	−.009 (68)
1964	.32* (63)	.45* (63)	−.07 (63)

[a] Correlations statistically significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk.

[20] West Germany, Portugal, and Switzerland are members of DAC in addition to those nations cited earlier. Aid flows from Germany and Switzerland have been included in the aid matrices analyzed using the transaction-flow model. Portugal is excluded since it extended aid only to its overseas territories.

[21] These numbers as well as the nations listed in Table 1, include such non-UN members as South Korea, Muscat and Oman, South Vietnam, and Western Samoa. Although these nations are, by definition, excluded from the correlation analyses, they are included here since their aid receipts from the DAC donors have been included in the aid matrices analyzed using the transaction-flow model.

[22] Again, there is nothing magic in the number eight; it is simply the minimum number of developing nations included for which data on Soviet bloc assistance are available. But with an N less than eight, the technique of fitting a line to data points is either inappropriate, or the number of observations is so small as to severely restrict the generalizability of the empirical findings.

Table 1. Names and Abbreviations of the Ninety-Six Independent Foreign Aid Recipient Nations Included in the Study[a]

Abbreviation	Nation	Abbreviation	Nation
1 AFGH	Afghanistan	49 LIBE	Liberia
2 ALGE	Algeria	50 LIBY	Libya
3 ARGE	Argentina	51 MADA	Madagascar
4 BOLI	Bolivia	52 MLWI	Malawi
5 BOTS	Botswana	53 MALA	Malaysia
6 BRAZ	Brazil	54 MALD	Maldive Islands
7 BURM	Burma	55 MALI	Mali
8 BURU	Burundi	56 MALT	Malta
9 CAMB	Cambodia	57 MAUR	Mauritania
10 CAME	Cameroon	58 MEXI	Mexico
11 CENT	Central African Republic	59 MORO	Morocco
12 CEYL	Ceylon	60 MUSC	Muscat and Oman
13 CHAD	Chad	61 NEPA	Nepal
14 CHIL	Chile	62 NICA	Nicaragua
15 COLO	Colombia	63 NIGE	Niger
16 CONB	Congo (Brazzaville)	64 NGRA	Nigeria
17 CONK	Congo (Kinshasa)[b]	65 PAKI	Pakistan
18 COST	Costa Rica	66 PANA	Panama
19 CUBA	Cuba	67 PARA	Paraguay
20 CYPR	Cyprus	68 PERU	Peru
21 DAHO	Dahomey	69 PHIL	Philippines
22 DOMI	Dominican Republic	70 RWAN	Rwanda
23 ECUA	Ecuador	71 SAUD	Saudi Arabia
24 EL S	El Salvador	72 SENE	Senegal
25 ETHI	Ethiopia	73 SIER	Sierra Leone
26 GABO	Gabon	74 SING	Singapore
27 GAMB	Gambia	75 SOMA	Somalia
28 GHAN	Ghana	76 SOAF	South Arabia Federation[c]
29 GREE	Greece	77 SPAI	Spain
30 GUAT	Guatemala	78 SUDA	Sudan
31 GUIN	Guinea	79 SYRI	Syria
32 GUYA	Guyana	80 TAIW	Taiwan (China)
33 HAIT	Haiti	81 TANZ	Tanzania
34 HOND	Honduras	82 THAI	Thailand
35 INDI	India	83 TOGO	Togo
36 INDO	Indonesia	84 TRIN	Trinidad and Tobago
37 IRAN	Iran	85 TUNI	Tunisia
38 IRAQ	Iraq	86 TURK	Turkey
39 ISRA	Israel	87 UGAN	Uganda
40 IVOR	Ivory Coast	88 UAR	United Arab Republic
41 JAMA	Jamaica	89 UPPE	Upper Volta
42 JORD	Jordan	90 URUG	Uruguay
43 KENY	Kenya	91 VENE	Venezuela
44 KORS	Korea (South)	92 VITS	Vietnam (South)
45 KUWA	Kuwait	93 WSAM	Western Samoa
46 LAOS	Laos	94 YEME	Yemen
47 LEBA	Lebanon	95 YUGO	Yugoslavia
48 LESO	Lesotho	96 ZAMB	Zambia

---

[a] All nations shown were independent by the end of 1967. Those not independent throughout the 1962–1967 time period are listed below, followed by the year in which they achieved independence.

ALGE—1962
BOTS—1966
BURU—1962
GAMB—1965
GUYA—1966
JAMA—1962
KENY—1963
LESO—1966
MLWI—1964
MALD—1965
MALT—1964
RWAN—1962
SING—1965
SOAF—1967
TRIN—1962
UGAN—1962
WSAM—1962
ZAMB—1964

Source for determination of the year of independence is Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (September, 1968), 935–950.

[b] Zaire.

[c] Including Aden.

significantly different from (presumably greater than) the level of agreements between a donor and its nonrecipients. Put differently, "between-group" differences may be more significant than "within-group" differences. Accordingly, some empirical evidence to be presented later specifically addresses the question of between-group differences. It will be shown that, on the basis of this analysis, there is little evidence to support the proposition that restricting the analysis to those developing nations that actually receive aid from each donor country analyzed restricts the generalizability of the empirical findings.

To examine the dual notion that aid allocations may be either a cause or a consequence of voting behavior—that is, that aid may be either an inducement to future behavior or a reward (or punishment) for past behavior—the 1963 voting data were correlated with both 1962 and 1964 foreign aid data, and the 1966 voting data were correlated with both 1965 and 1967 aid data. Further, because the General Assembly meets in the Fall of each calendar year, while foreign aid is presumably distributed throughout the year (probably most of it prior to that point in the annual Assembly meeting at which most roll-call votes are taken), correlations between the 1963 aid and 1963 voting data and between the 1966 aid and 1966 voting data have also been included.

Based on the assumption of a one-year lag between the variables, if foreign aid is more consistently used as an *inducement* to future behavior within the Assembly than as a reward for past behavior, then we would expect that the aid and voting correlations would be higher when the aid data refer to the year either prior to or during the Assembly year than when the aid data refer to the year following the Assembly. Conversely, if aid is used as a *reward* (or punishment) for past behavior, then we would expect the correlations lagging behind the aid data by one year to be the greater.[23]

Despite the conceptual distinction between the use of aid as an inducement or as a reward, it would be surprising if the analyses were to unearth this distinction. The considerable stability in the distributional patterns of donors' foreign aid can easily be demonstrated.[24] Similarly, other writers have documented that over time the basic issues and alignments in the General Assembly have remained largely unchanged.[25] Consequently, significantly different patterns in the relationship between aid and voting during any two- or three-year period are most unlikely to occur—and in fact they do not occur. Therefore, the net result of this analysis (i.e., using the concept of a variable lag structure in exploring the relationship between foreign aid and UN voting) will be to document further the stability of these two basic measures of relations among nations.

Foreign aid data and indices. Foreign aid data for the DAC donors were drawn from three publications of the OECD on the geographical distribution of financial flows to developing nations.[26] All data for the DAC donors refer to net *disbursements* of foreign economic assistance;[27] neither commitments nor military aid data are included. Data on 1962–1964 Soviet bloc aid were drawn from two United Nations publications,[28] while those for 1965–1967 were drawn from three publications of the U.S. Department of State.[29] Data on Soviet bloc aid refer to *commitments* of economic assistance (grants and credits), not to disbursements. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that the DAC and Soviet bloc data differ in kind; moreover, the fact that the Soviet bloc data are commitments rather than disbursements may help explain the relatively small number of cases displayed later for the Soviet bloc. Because of the definitional distinction between DAC and Soviet bloc data, two separate sets of analyses of the relationship between aid and votes will be included, one excluding Soviet bloc aid, the other including the data in the analyses.

---

[23] It is because of the absence of an a priori rationale for assuming which temporal sequence is more likely to hold that correlation rather than regression analysis has been chosen as the analytical technique.

[24] See Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Distribution of Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective: An Empirical Study of the Flow of Foreign Economic Assistance, 1961–1967" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, July, 1971), pp. 38–41.

[25] See, e.g., Russett, *International Regions,* pp. 59–93.

[26] *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries 1960–1964* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1966); *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries 1965* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1967); and *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries 1966–1967* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1969).

[27] The OECD uses the term "net total official financial flows" to describe these data. The flows are defined as the sum of grants, including grants for technical cooperation; intergovernmental reparation and indemnification payments, a type of disbursement remitted only by Italy and Japan throughout the 1962–1967 time period, and by West Germany until 1965; net official loans; loans repayable in recipients' currencies (net); and transfers of resources through sales for recipients' currencies (principally food aid distributed under the aegis of U.S. Public Law 480). O.E.C.D., *Geographical Distribution 1960–1964,* p. XII.

It will be noted that the aid data do not distinguish between various budgetary categories and administrative agencies in donor countries. In effect, therefore, it is assumed that the aid data comprise the foreign policy output of an aggregate decisional unit in each donor country. This is admittedly a very powerful assumption (as Graham T. Allison has clearly demonstrated in his *Essence of Decision* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1971]) that should perhaps be subjected to additional research. But use of the OECD-DAC data does allow one to move beyond what Baldwin has identified as the tendency to define foreign aid in terms of American institutions. See David A. Baldwin, "Analytical Notes on Foreign Aid and Politics," *Background,* 10 (Winter, 1966), 75–76.

[28] *International Flow of Long-term Capital and Official Donations, 1961–1965* (New York: U.N., 1966), pp. 22–23; and *The External Financing of Economic Development* (New York: U.N., 1969), pp. 44–45.

Given the definition of foreign aid employed for the DAC donors, it is possible that recipients may make net repayments of aid to donors in excess of their gross aid receipts. In effect, these developing nations are "recipients" of "negative total aid." Since the total aid definition across the entire range of recipients is a net definition, it would seem most reasonable to retain all recipient states for a particular donor in the subsequent analyses, even when their total aid receipts fall below zero. Negative aid flows, however, can markedly affect the relative allocation indices used as one of the empirical measures of aid allocations. Hence, all negative aid values were excluded from the aid matrices prior to computing the relative allocation indices using the transaction-flow model. To retain comparability across the various analyses, negative aid flows have also been excluded from the correlation analyses based on the absolute volume of aid allocated by aid donors among developing nations.

The first foreign aid variable used in the correlation analyses is the absolute amount of foreign aid allocated by an aid donor among its aid recipients. The second measure used is based on a transaction-flow analysis of the aid data. The transaction-flow model used is a version of the original model devised by I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch,[30] as revised by Leo A. Goodman[31] and programmed by Steven J. Brams.[32] This model's principal merit in studying aid allocations is that it provides a common denominator for data on the aid programs of donors otherwise vastly disparate in terms both of their magnitude and geographical scope of activity. Further, it allows one to tie all donors together into a single "system" so that the aid activities of donors relative to one another can easily be described.

The transaction-flow measure used is the *RA* index, referred to as a "relative allocation" index.[33] The measure is defined as

$$RA_{ij} = \frac{A_{ij} - E_{ij}}{E_{ij}},$$

where

RA_{ij} = the relative allocation of foreign aid from the i^{th} donor to the j^{th} recipient,

E_{ij} = the expected allocation of foreign aid from i to j, and

A_{ij} = the actual allocation of foreign aid from i to j.[34]

---

[29] Director of Intelligence and Research, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1965* (Research Memorandum RSB-50, June 17, 1966), p. 2; Director of Intelligence and Research, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967* (Research Memorandum RSE-120, August 14, 1968), pp. 2–3; and Director of Intelligence and Research, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968* (Research Memorandum RSE-65, September 5, 1969), pp. 2–3. UN data have been used for the first three years since State Department estimates of Soviet bloc data are not available on an annual basis for all of the years 1962–1964. State Department estimates have been used for the later three-year period rather than UN estimates on the assumption that the former are more accurate than the latter. UN data apparently were collected from unofficial sources such as press releases as well as official Soviet and East European publications. The State Department, on the other hand, presumably received its information directly from recipient nations. It is assumed, therefore, that the margin of error is less in the State Department than in the UN data. See also Vassil Vassilev, *Policy in the Soviet Bloc on Aid to Developing Countries* (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969), pp. 61–66.

[30] I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 28 (July, 1960), 551–72.

[31] Leo A. Goodman, "Statistical Methods for the Preliminary Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 31 (January-April, 1963), 197–208; and Leo A. Goodman, "A Short Computer for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science*, 9 (April, 1964), 176–86.

[32] Steven J. Brams, "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (October, 1965), 487–88.

[33] The more commonly accepted term for transaction-flow *RA*'s is "relative acceptance" indices. "Relative allocation" has been chosen for the aid *RA*'s, however, since this seems a more accurate reflection of the nature of foreign aid monies treated as transaction flows given the absence of a two-way flow of funds.

[34] The reason for excluding negative aid flows from the analysis should now be apparent. If both A_{ij} and E_{ij} are negative, and the former is greater than the latter, RA_{ij} can be a positive number, indicating aid flows greater than an indifferent amount, despite the fact that it is based on a negative A_{ij}. Intuitively, this is, of course, an unreasonable result. More importantly, the *RA* for a second donor, *k*, assuming *k* also allocates aid to recipient *j*, can be markedly inflated due to the negative flow from *i* to *j*, thereby causing RA_{kj} to have an extreme effect on the correlation coefficient used to assess the association between donor *k*'s aid allocations and developing nations' voting agreements with *k*.

The expected value, E_{ij}, is calculated on the basis of the allocation of *each* donor's total aid volume as distributed proportionally among all of the recipients included in the "system" analyzed. The model assumes that donor i will send to recipient j approximately the same percentage of its total foreign aid as the percentage of the total aid which j receives from all donor countries combined. If, for example, Argentina receives 10 per cent of the total aid disbursed by the DAC members, the model predicts that Argentina will receive 10 per cent of whatever percentage each donor contributes to the total volume of aid disbursed by all of the DAC members. Because the model is indifferent to all other factors or variables, it is sometimes referred to as an indifference, or null, model.[35]

We know, of course, that foreign aid donors are *not* indifferent to all factors other than the total magnitude of aid distributed among developing nations. By making this assumption, however, we can establish a benchmark against which to assess the actual distribution of aid by each donor. In effect, the transaction-flow model serves only to highlight greater than (or less than) expected aid flows.[36] Explaining deviations from the expected values is a separate task. For this purpose, a measure of voting agreements in the UN directly analogous to the aid *RA* indices is used.

Voting agreement indices. The first measure of the roll-call agreements between each donor and its aid recipients utilized is the percentage of all roll-call votes taken in each of the Assemblies, with both the aid donor and recipient present and voting, on which both donor i and recipient j vote identically.[37] Abstentions as well as yeas and nays are included in the calculation. For each donor this variable is correlated with the absolute amount of foreign aid the donor allocates among its aid recipients.

The second measure of voting agreements employs a model developed by Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary for the comparative analysis of voting bodies.[38] Specifically, we will employ the Brams-O'Leary relative agreement index, defined as[39]

$$VRA_{ij} = \frac{AG_{ij} - E(AG_{ij})}{E(AG_{ij})},$$

where

VRA_{ij} = the relative agreement between UN members i and j,

AG_{ij} = the actual number of times members i and j agree across a set of roll calls, and

$E(AG_{ij})$ = the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected pair of Assembly members, for all roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting, agree.

The expected agreement between i and j, $E(AG_{ij})$, is defined as the sum of the probabilities of agreement between i and j, on each of the roll calls with both i and j present and voting, included in the set of roll calls analyzed. These probabilities are based on the actual distribution of yeas, nays, and abstentions in the General Assembly on each roll-call vote.[40]

What the Brams-O'Leary model does is establish a statistical norm, based on the behavior of all members in the General Assembly, against which to measure the actual number of voting agreements between specified pairs of members. Like the pairwise measure discussed earlier, the *VRA* index also expresses agreement between two actors in percentage terms. The VRA_{ij} percentages, however, measure deviations from zero, the point at which *i* and *j* agree exactly as often as would be expected on the basis of the behavior of all members in the Assembly.[41]

---

[35] For a more complete discussion of the transaction-flow model, see Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (December, 1966), 882–86; Steven J. Brams, "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society Papers*, VI, Vienna Conference (1966), pp. 144–48; and E. Wittkopf, "The Concentration and Concordance of Foreign Aid Allocations." My thanks to Professor Brams for the considerable guidance and encouragement he lent to the application of the transaction-flow model and his computer program INDIFF to the data on foreign aid flows.

[36] The principal difference between the original Savage-Deutsch model and the Goodman-Brams modification is that the former excludes from the calculation of E_{ij}'s only a country's transactions with itself, while the latter excludes all pairs not actually linked by known transaction flows. In the case of the foreign aid data, three of the four logical portions of the square foreign aid matrix are, by definition, blank—recipient to recipient, recipient to donor, and donor to donor aid flows. With so many zero entries, it was necessary to assign an arbitrarily small value (equal to $.01) to one cell within each row and column that would otherwise have been entirely blank in order to ensure calculation of E_{ij}'s for the actual non-blank cells.

[37] Todd uses this measure of voting agreements in his study of voting in the Security Council. James E. Todd, "An Analysis of Security Council Voting Behavior," *Western Political Quarterly*, 22 (March, 1969), 61–78.

[38] Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 449–70.

[39] Brams and O'Leary, p. 463.

[40] Brams and O'Leary, pp. 452–53. The Brams-O'Leary model assumes that the voting behavior of legislative members is independent from one roll call to the next. It can be demonstrated, however, that the value of the expected term in the calculation of *VRA* is not dependent on the assumption of independence. See Lawrence S. Mayer, "A Note on 'An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies'," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September, 1971), 764–65, and the response in Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "Comment on Mayer's 'A Note on "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies" '," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September, 1971), 766–67.

In fact, for each donor country in both General Assemblies analyzed there is almost 100 per cent covariation between the percentage of pairwise agreements measure and the *VRA* index. Operationally, this means it makes virtually no difference which agreement variable is used in the correlation analyses.[42] However, because the *VRA* index is conceptually analogous to the foreign aid relative allocation indices used as one of the foreign aid variables, the *VRA* index will be retained as the agreement measure when the aid *RA* indices are also used.

In addition, the Brams-O'Leary relative agreement index also provides a technique for assessing the difference in the level of agreements between each aid donor and its aid recipients and nonrecipients—the "between group" differences discussed earlier. Group relative agreement scores are defined as[43]

$$VRA_{IJ} = \frac{\sum_{I,J} A_{ij} - \sum_{I,J} E_{ij}}{\sum_{I,J} E_{ij}},$$

where

VRA_{IJ} = the relative agreement of member subsets *I* and *J*,

A_{ij} = the actual number of agreements between members *i* and *j*, with the summations ranging over all individual members *i* and *j* belonging to the (disjoint) subsets *I* and *J*, and

E_{ij} = the expected number of agreements between members *i* and *j*, with the summations ranging over all individual members *i* and *j* belonging to the (disjoint) subsets *I* and *J*.

For the purpose of this analysis, subset *I* always refers, with the exception of the analysis for the Soviet bloc, to an individual UN member, namely, foreign aid donor *i*. For each *I* subset, two *J* subsets are defined, one which includes all UN members that receive foreign aid from the i^{th} donor, the other which includes all UN members that are *potential candidates* for foreign aid but do not receive aid from the i^{th} donor. For the Soviet bloc, subset *I* refers to the Soviet Union and all Eastern European nations previously identified as aid donors.[44]

The concept *potential candidates* for foreign aid was operationalized as follows. It seems intuitively unreasonable to include such countries as the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and other similar states in the calculation of group *VRA* scores for nonrecipients of aid. Similarly, in none of the data collected for purposes of the present study, including data on Soviet bloc commitments, were receipts of foreign aid by Eastern European or Asian Communist nations reported. Therefore, in calculating group *VRA* scores for each donor country *i*, nonrecipients of foreign aid were defined as those UN members that received foreign aid in one or more forms from one or more of the *other* donors, whether a DAC donor or the Soviet bloc.

Given the stability over time in the relationship between aid and voting demonstrated in the correlation analyses presented below, group *VRA* scores were calculated only for the years 1963 and 1966. According to the definition elaborated in the preceding paragraph, 80 of the 113 members of the United Nations in 1963 were defined as potential recipients of foreign aid in that year; of the 122 members of the United Nations in 1966, 90 were defined as potential recipients of foreign aid in that year.[45]

Findings

Percentage of pairwise agreements and absolute amounts of foreign aid. The results of the analyses of each donor's aid measured in absolute terms and the percentage of pairwise agreements in the 1963 and 1966 General Assemblies, displayed in Table 2, are indeed striking. Although in certain cases, such as the results for the United States based on the 1963 Assembly, there is a positive association between the

---

[41] Conceptually, the *VRA*'s are virtually identical with the aid *RA*'s. The two indices differ only in the calculation of the expected term; as indicated, the expected values for the aid *RA*'s depend on the row and column marginal totals in the aid matrix, while the expected values for the *VRA*'s depend upon the probabilities of agreement between a randomly-selected pair of Assembly members across a set of roll-call votes.

[42] Substantively, this means that the patterns of agreements between particular pairs of states are not affected by the overall divisions in the Assembly. See Brams and O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," p. 463.

[43] Brams and O'Leary, p. 464.

[44] As a practical matter it would make virtually no difference if subset *I* were defined to include only the Soviet Union, since the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European allies exhibit almost identical behavior in their UN voting patterns.

[45] Developing nations making net repayments of aid (i.e., negative aid recipients) to a particular donor, as well as those that missed more than 40 per cent of the UN roll calls, were subtracted from these numbers for purposes of calculating group *VRA*'s for that donor.

Table 2. Correlations Between 1963 and 1966 General Assembly Pairwise Voting Agreements (Per cent) and 1962–1964 and 1965–1967 Foreign Aid Disbursements[a]

(Number of foreign aid recipients [*N*] shown in parentheses)

Donor Country	Total foreign aid			Total foreign aid		
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Australia	—	—	—	−.01 (19)	−.004 (20)	−.16 (21)
Austria	—	.41 (16)	−.04 (26)	.09 (35)	−.18 (32)	.03 (41)
Belgium	—	—	—	−.06 (9)	−.11 (26)	−.04 (53)
Canada	.35 (22)	.27 (27)	.16 (33)	−.09 (41)	−.17 (45)	−.17 (45)
Denmark	—	—	—	.13 (17)	−.18 (25)	−.08 (26)
France	−.19 (21)	−.15 (20)	−.24 (23)	−.28 (20)	−.28 (26)	−.20 (26)
Italy	.02 (21)	−.31 (20)	−.16 (42)	−.11 (44)	−.12 (44)	−.21 (44)
Japan	−.25 (29)	−.12 (35)	−.03 (34)	−.10 (38)	−.18 (41)	−.07 (46)
Netherlands	—	—	—	−.25 (11)	−.38 (13)	−.37 (14)
Norway	—	—	.10 (17)	−.22 (16)	−.28 (23)	−.43* (24)
Sweden	−.28 (14)	−.004 (23)	.39 (15)	−.08 (19)	−.27 (23)	−.24 (19)
United Kingdom	−.18 (27)	−.03 (29)	.02 (56)	−.17 (56)	−.21 (60)	−.22* (64)
United States	.08 (67)	.04 (68)	.03 (63)	−.07 (73)	−.06 (71)	−.06 (69)
Soviet bloc[b]	−.24 (9)	.28 (8)	.06 (16)	−.08 (16)	−.18 (12)	−.32 (11)

[a] Aid data for the Soviet bloc are commitments, not disbursements. Recipients of negative foreign aid and recipients that missed more than 40 per cent of the Assembly roll calls are excluded. A dash indicates that *N* is less than eight. Data on Australian disbursements prior to 1965 are not available. Correlation coefficients significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk (*).

[b] Correlations between the per cent of agreements of each aid recipient with the Soviet Union and commitments of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc.

variables, the magnitudes of the correlations are virtually negligible. In fact, if we use statistical significance as a decision-rule to assess the strength of the associations,[46] none of the cor-

---

[46] The appropriateness of significance tests in cases where the sample and the universe are the same, typically the case in cross-national research, remains an unresolved debate among political science and international relations scholars. The use of such tests here is a conservative one and follows the suggestions of Winch and Campbell, who argue that in the case of nonsampled data, tests of significance are appropriate to an analysis of the (null) hypothesis that the magni-

Table 3. U. S. Aid Allocations and U. N. Voting Agreements: Correlations Between 1963 and 1966 Relative Agreement Indices and 1962–1964 and 1965–1967 Relative Allocation Indices[a]

(Number of foreign aid recipients [*N*] shown in parentheses)

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Total foreign aid: excluding Soviet bloc commitments	.29* (67)	.31* (68)	.45* (63)	.38* (73)	.37* (71)	.42* (69)
Total foreign aid: including Soviet bloc commitments	.31* (67)	.29* (68)	.51* (63)	.30* (73)	.33* (71)	.36* (69)

[a] Recipients of negative foreign aid and recipients that missed more than 40 per cent of the Assembly roll calls are excluded. Correlation coefficients significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk (*).

relations indicates a significant relationship between the variables in the hypothesized positive direction. Indeed, the only significant associations are the inverse ones for Norway and the United Kingdom in 1967. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the correlations, including those for the United States based on the 1966 Assembly, point toward an inverse relationship between foreign aid and UN votes for virtually all aid donors. The number of statistically significant negative correlations is admittedly small. But substantively, the overall pattern of the results, far from being consistent with the hypothesized relationship between aid and votes, suggests that most foreign aid donors are prone to reward their enemies rather than their friends. We will return to this inference in the discussion of the correlations between the voting and foreign aid *RA*'s.

Voting relative agreement and foreign aid relative allocation indices. The results of the analyses using the *VRA* and aid *RA* indices are displayed in Tables 3–5. Looking first at the correlations for the United States (Table 3), we can see that there is a dramatic change from the patterns summarized in Table 2.[47] All of the correlations for both Assembly sessions now indicate a positive association between aid and votes. Further, when statistical significance is used to assess the strength of the associations, all of the correlations fit the hypothesis that the larger the (relative) number of voting agreements exhibited by a developing nation with the United States, the greater will be the (relative) amount of aid received by that state from the U.S.

At the same time, however, it is also true that in terms of shared variance none of the correlations is overwhelming in magnitude. In the case of the 1962 aid *RA*'s and the 1963 *VRA*'s, for example, less than 10 per cent of the variation in one variable is explained by the other, while in the case of the largest correlations in the table, those for 1964, only between 20 and 26 per cent of the variation is thus explained.[48] In addition, the results provide little

---

tude of the relationship between two variables is due to chance. (Robert F. Winch and Donald T. Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance," *The American Sociologist,* 4 [May, 1969], 143). Cf. Bruce M. Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 263; and J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1964: Some Bivariate Relationships," *International Organization,* 24 (Summer, 1970), 533. Significance tests are also particularly useful in situations where there are large variations in the number of observations, as is the case here, which otherwise would make comparisons across foreign policy actors very difficult.

[47] Because the percentage of pairwise voting agreements and the *VRA*'s are very highly correlated, as noted earlier, the change in the results for the U.S. from those shown in Table 2 can be attributed largely to the transaction-flow model, which, in effect, "transforms" the aid data by adjusting for the size of aid recipients assumed to be reflected in the relative magnitudes of foreign aid transactions between donors and recipients. The magnitude of foreign aid transactions may also indicate the importance of recipients to donors, but this will be reflected in the aid *RA*'s only if the foreign aid transactions for a particular donor are greater than what would be expected on the basis of the proportionate distribution of transactions of all aid donors included in the system analyzed. Essentially, then, the indifference model is an alternative to the more usual ways of "normalizing" foreign aid data, such as by the population size, GNP, or imports of developing nations. Interestingly, in the analysis of U.S. aid and developing nations' voting behavior on the China issue cited earlier (footnote 19), an aid/imports ratio was used as one of the foreign aid variables, but the results were virtually identical to those obtained when only the absolute amounts of aid dollars were used.

[48] These generally low levels of shared variance are perhaps not surprising given the large number of both political and development considerations presumed to undergrid U.S. aid allocations. For a discussion and empirical analysis of some of these additional con-



Figure 1. Relationship Between United States Total Aid Relative Allocation Indices, 1964, and General Assembly Roll-Call Relative Agreement Scores with the United States, 1963

basis for drawing an inferential distinction between the use of aid as an inducement to future behavior and its use as a reward (or punishment) for past behavior in the UN. True, in both Assemblies the relationship between aid in year $t+1$ and voting agreements in year t is moderately stronger than in those cases in which the aid data precede the voting data. But the differences are not striking in either Assembly. All we can safely say at this point is that there is a moderately strong, statistically significant association between the relative allocation of U.S. foreign aid and the relative number of voting agreements between the U.S. and its aid recipients in the General Assembly.

Are these results for the United States simply due to a small number of extreme cases? In general, the answer appears to be no. Scatter diagrams for two of the strongest associations in Table 3, those for 1964 and 1967 (excluding Soviet bloc commitments), are displayed in Figures 1 and 2.[49] The diagram for 1964 (Figure 1) does suggest that the extreme cases of Chile, Brazil, Turkey, and Greece make a substantial contribution to the moderately strong, positive association between aid and votes. At the same time, however, the relatively large concentration of Latin American states, plus Taiwan, Liberia, Thailand, and the Philippines in the upper right-hand quadrant of the diagram, and in addition, the large number of Af-

---

siderations, see E. Wittkopf, "The Concentration and Concordance of Foreign Aid Allocations," and E. Wittkopf, *Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972).

[49] Nations are identified according to their abbreviated names given in Table 1. The reader is cautioned to note that the axes in the two scattergrams are not identical. This is also true for Figure 3 shown on p. 884.



Figure 2. Relationship Between United States Total Aid Relative Allocation Indices, 1967, and General Assembly Roll-Call Relative Agreement Scores with the United States, 1966

rican states (those which derive the bulk of their aid from Britain and France) in the lower left-hand portion of the diagram together point toward a positive association between aid and votes across a large range of developing nations. Similarly, in 1967 (Figure 2) the pattern of a large number of Latin American nations in the upper right-hand portion of the graph and a large number of African nations in the lower left-hand portion again accounts for the positive association between aid and votes. An interesting feature of both diagrams, one most apparent in 1967, is the large number of Asian and Arab nations in the upper left-hand portion of the diagram. *If* the hypothesis were correct that aid motivates voting behavior, or vice versa, then we would expect either: (1) that these states would agree more often with the United States than they in fact did, or (2) that the U.S. would not allocate as much relative aid to these nations as it actually did. Because neither of these outcomes is reflected in the diagram, U.S. behavior in these instances was probably motivated by other factors, such as political or security considerations in the case of the Asian nations, and perhaps the desire to maintain some semblance of political influence in the region in the case of the Middle Eastern nations. Similarly, the results suggest that factors other than U.S. aid, such as anti-Israeli or anticolonial sentiments, are more important explanations of the recipients' political behavior in the UN.

How do these findings for the United States compare with those for other aid donors? The results shown in Tables 4 and 5 clearly indicate that, in contrast to the United States, for most donors use of the aid *RA* and *VRA* indices does not yield results dramatically different from those displayed in Table 2. Judging by the signs of the coefficients, a somewhat smaller proportion of the correlations is consistent with

Table 4. Correlations Between 1963 General Assembly Roll-Call Relative Agreement Indices and 1962–1964 Foreign Aid Relative Allocation Indices[a]

(Number of foreign aid recipients [*N*] shown in parentheses)

Donor Country	Total foreign aid: excluding Soviet bloc commitments			Total foreign aid: including Soviet bloc commitments		
	1962	1963	1964	1962	1963	1964
Austria	—	.06 (16)	.36* (26)	—	.28 (16)	.37* (26)
Canada	.24 (22)	.34* (27)	.12 (33)	.27 (22)	.34* (27)	.14 (33)
France	−.52* (21)	−.38 (20)	−.61* (23)	−.51* (21)	−.37 (20)	−.55* (23)
Italy	.0003 (21)	−.38* (20)	−.12 (42)	−.003 (21)	−.39* (20)	−.10 (42)
Japan	−.24 (29)	−.11 (35)	−.18 (34)	−.25 (29)	−.14 (35)	−.17 (34)
Norway	—	—	−.14 (17)	—	—	−.11 (17)
Sweden	−.17 (14)	−.22 (23)	−.05 (15)	−.18 (14)	−.25 (23)	−.03 (15)
United Kingdom	−.22 (27)	−.21 (29)	−.08 (56)	−.22 (27)	−.22 (29)	−.04 (56)
Soviet bloc[b]	NA	NA	NA	−.02 (9)	−.002 (8)	56* (16)

[a] Recipients of negative foreign aid and recipients that missed more than 40 per cent of the Assembly roll calls are excluded. A dash indicates that *N* is less than eight. Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands are thus excluded entirely. Data on Australian disbursements prior to 1965 are not available. NA indicates not applicable. Correlation coefficients significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk (*).

[b] Correlations between the relative agreement scores of each aid recipient with the Soviet Union and foreign aid relative allocation indices for commitments of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc.

the hypothesized positive association between aid and votes in the 1963 Assembly, and a somewhat greater proportion is consistent with the hypothesis in the 1966 Assembly. Of the 51 correlations calculated on the basis of the 1963 voting data (including those for the U.S.), 35 per cent are in the predicted positive direction (compared with 48 per cent in Table 2); of the 81 correlations based on the 1966 voting data, 36 per cent are in the predicted direction (compared with 7 per cent in Table 2). The positive correlations, however, are statistically significant for only four donors—Austria (1964), Canada (1963), Australia (1966, including Soviet bloc aid commitments), and the Soviet bloc (1964). And for none of these donors is the relationship consistently strong over time, as it is for the United States. Thus the overall pattern of either a negative or a weak positive association between aid and votes remains.

Turning to the question of the use of aid as an inducement or as a reward, we can note that like the results for the United States, the results for most other donors fail to support any inferences about these two conceptually distinct uses of foreign aid. The case that appears to be an exception is the Soviet bloc, for which the correlations based on the 1963 voting data might be interpreted as indicating the use of aid as a reward. However, this pattern is not repeated in the 1966 Assembly, and the small number of cases for each correlation would in any event make such an inference suspect. Further, given the generally small number of cases, the correlations can be especially sensitive to extreme data points, a fact which appears to account for

Table 5. Correlations Between 1966 General Assembly Roll-Call Relative Agreement Indices and 1965–1967 Foreign Aid Relative Allocation Indices[a]

(Number of foreign aid recipients [*N*] shown in parentheses)

Donor Country	Total foreign aid: excluding Soviet bloc commitments			Total foreign aid: including Soviet bloc commitments		
	1965	1966	1967	1965	1966	1967
Australia	.31 (19)	.37 (20)	.15 (21)	.30 (19)	.41* (20)	.14 (21)
Austria	−.19 (35)	.05 (32)	.02 (41)	−.12 (35)	.12 (32)	.02 (41)
Belgium	−.44 (9)	−.31 (26)	−.12 (53)	−.44 (9)	−.31 (26)	−.13 (53)
Canada	.09 (41)	.11 (45)	.20 (45)	.17 (41)	.11 (45)	.19 (45)
Denmark	−.17 (17)	−.31 (25)	.01 (26)	−.05 (17)	−.15 (25)	−.03 (26)
France	−.33 (20)	−.14 (26)	−.08 (26)	−.33 (20)	−.17 (26)	−.08 (26)
Italy	−.02 (44)	−.28* (44)	−.27* (44)	−.07 (44)	−.25* (44)	−.28* (44)
Japan	−.04 (38)	−.13 (41)	.01 (46)	−.09 (38)	−.10 (41)	.01 (46)
Netherlands	.01 (11)	.08 (13)	−.44 (14)	.02 (11)	.08 (13)	−.41 (14)
Norway	−.31 (16)	−.40* (23)	−.39* (24)	−.36 (16)	−.41* (23)	−.38* (24)
Sweden	−.07 (19)	−.17 (23)	−.29 (19)	−.11 (19)	−.17 (23)	−.30 (19)
United Kingdom	−.16 (56)	−.17 (60)	−.17 (64)	−.17 (56)	−.17 (60)	−.18 (64)
Soviet bloc[b]	NA	NA	NA	−.20 (16)	−.31 (12)	−.42 (11)

[a] Recipients of negative foreign aid and recipients that missed more than 40 per cent of the Assembly roll calls are excluded. NA indicates not applicable. Correlation coefficients significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk (*).

[b] Correlations between the relative agreement scores of each aid recipient with the Soviet Union and foreign aid relative allocation indices for commitments of economic assistance from the Soviet bloc.

the unusually high correlation for 1964. Finally, it bears repeating that since the Soviet data are commitments rather than disbursements, the Soviet bloc aid *RA*'s are considerably more disparate than would probably be the case if the Soviet data measured the actual amount of resources flowing from the Soviet bloc to developing nations (as do the data for the DAC donors).

It is interesting that a shift in the geographic location of Soviet aid recipients beginning in 1965 appears to account for the negative (but not significant) correlations for the Soviet bloc based on the 1966 voting data. Prior to 1965 Soviet commitments were extended only to Asian and African developing nations, but beginning in that year Soviet aid commitments to European and Latin American nations are reported as well.[50] The magnitudes of the Soviet aid commitments to these nations have usually yielded relatively high aid *RA*'s. Moreover, these nations have traditionally been more pro-Western in their UN voting behavior than have most Asian and African developing nations. Therefore, the resulting upward pull on the correlation coefficients suggests that, in simple linear terms, the Soviet bloc too tends to reward its Assembly enemies more than its friends. This is particularly apparent in 1967, for which a scattergram indicates that the generally high positive aid *RA*'s of Turkey, Uruguay, and Chile coupled with their negative *VRA*'s with the Soviet bloc make a substantial contribution to the r of −.42.

These results for the Soviet bloc raise the question of whether similar patterns in the aid allocations of other donors can be used to explain the large number of negative correlations shown in Tables 4–5. Scatter diagrams of the statistically significant negative correlations for Italy and Norway based on the 1966 voting data do suggest that a relatively small number of cases (particularly for Norway) contribute heavily to the negative associations. Again the substantive interpretation would seem to be that enemies are rewarded more than friends. Put differently, the relative amount of aid these nations have received from the respective donors has had little impact on their propensity to vote with the donor in the UN, or, conversely, the position these nations have taken on the range of issues before the UN vis-à-vis each donor has had relatively little impact on the allocation of aid by the donor. Particularly important in this respect seems to be the position on decolonialization and related issues taken in the UN by a number of developing nations, notably in Asia and Africa.[51] This is especially apparent for France, for which the correlations based on the 1963 Assembly indicate a strong inverse association between aid and votes.

The position France's former African colonies have taken on many UN issues in opposition to France is reflected in their high negative *VRA*'s with their former ruler. At the same time, however, these nations receive the largest proportion of their aid from France and therefore have correspondingly high aid *RA*'s. In contrast to these African states, some recipients of French foreign aid, notably those in Europe and Latin America, are among those developing nations least prone to disagree with Western states on decolonialization and related UN issues.[52] Given the proportionately larger share of aid received by these states from the United States, however, the aid *RA*'s of France's European and Latin American aid recipients tend to be much lower than the *RA*'s of the African states. Consequently, a line fitted through these data points shows that aid and voting agreements are inversely rather than positively associated.

The interaction of these factors is illustrated in the scatter diagrams of the relationship between the 1964 aid *RA*'s (excluding Soviet bloc commitments) and the 1963 *VRA*'s for France and the United States displayed in Figures 3 and 1, respectively. It is readily apparent from the diagram for France (Figure 3) that the inclusion of Chile, Brazil, Greece, and Turkey accounts for the high negative correlation between the two variables (r = − .61). With the exception of Madagascar, none of France's former African colonies agreed more often with France (in relative terms) than did these four non-African aid recipients. At the same time, none of these four nations received as much foreign aid from France (in relative terms) as did France's former African colonies. In fact, the aid *RA*'s are less than an indifferent amount (i.e., less than zero), partly because these nations received a relatively large proportion of the foreign aid disbursed by the United States. This fact is vividly illustrated in the scatter diagram for the U.S. (Figure 1).

Again, then, we are faced with the temptation to argue that France (like other donors) is prone to reward its enemies more than its friends.[53] There are alternatives, however. On

---

[50] Estimates of Soviet bloc aid commitments in millions in U.S. dollars to European and Latin American developing nations are as follows:

	1965	*1966*	*1967*		*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
ARGE	15			ECUA			5
BRAZ		128		GREE	84		
CHIL			55	TURK	200		200
				URUG			10

[51] For a discussion of decolonization issues, with special reference to African states, see David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 80–85.

[52] Kay, p. 84.

[53] In a separate analysis of the two basic component categories of foreign aid, grants and gross official loans, it was found that there is a positive (but not significant) relationship between France's *VRA*'s and aid *RA*'s when the latter are calculated only on the basis of grants, and a negative relationship similar to those shown in Tables 4 and 5 when the aid *RA*'s are calculated on the basis of gross loans. The reason lies in the fact that France chose not to allocate grants to its European and Latin American aid recipients, thus excluding those nations most prone to agree with her in the UN as the above results indicate. For details, see E. Wittkopf, "The Distribution of Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective," pp. 124–33.



Figure 3. Relationship Between French Total Aid Relative Allocation Indices, 1964, and General Assembly Roll-Call Relative Agreement Scores with France, 1963

the one hand, it could be argued that "matters could be worse." This is very close to the notion suggested by Mason when he observes that "[d]iplomats are frequently worried by voting records in the United Nations and suggest that an increase in aid to their particular country would improve this record."[54] The implication of this argument is that aid does serve, at least minimally, as a form of influence by moderating the positions of developing nations in the UN; that without this aid, frequently high in relative terms, the positions of aid recipients would be even more antidonor (meaning in most cases anti-Western) than they already are.[55] The corollary of this notion is that those states that appear generally more prodonor in terms of their voting preferences can be considered "safe."

On the other hand, it could also be argued that a large number of considerations and motivations undergird the aid programs of developed nations, of which the international political behavior of aid recipients in the UN is only one. Similarly, the UN voting behavior of developing nations is also conditioned by domestic as well as international political considerations other than those concerning foreign aid. Therefore we should not be surprised by the generally weak, albeit inverse, association between voting agreements and aid allocations observed for most donors. What this argument implies, of course, is the need for multivariate analysis of both voting preferences and aid allocations. But it also suggests that insofar as we can generalize from the present data and methodology, the preferable substantive interpretation of the findings seems to be that in terms of their allocation of foreign aid most donor countries are indifferent to the roll-call voting behavior of developing nations in the United Nations.[56] The reason for this may well be quite simple—the types of foreign policy positions and behavior represented by UN roll calls may be largely irrelevant to the central concerns of decision-making elites dealing with foreign aid allocations.

---

[54] Mason, p. 33.

[55] As Benjamin J. Cohen has put it in discussing the rationale for a U.S. development aid program, "In at least one fundamental respect . . . the promotion of the growth of poor countries is in our national interest: economic concessions on our part serve as a kind of insurance against belligerency on the part of the less developed countries" ("The Third World: The Issues," in *American Foreign Economic Policy*, ed. Benjamin C. Cohen [New York: Harper and Row, 1968], p. 339).

The exception to this generalization is the United States. Even here, however, care must be used. The fact that the results for the United States were found to be statistically significant might lead one to conclude that foreign aid is indeed used as an instrument of influence in the UN. But this is far from conclusive. It may be that the results reflect little more than the co-occurrence of two indicators of states' general foreign policy orientations, which means the question of a causal link between the indicators remains largely unanswered. Even in the case of the United States, then, additional and alternative lines of inquiry are in order.

Between-group differences. The final question to be addressed is whether the exclusion of nonrecipients of aid for each donor is in part responsible for the results discussed above. For this purpose, group *VRA* scores have been calculated for each donor's set of recipients and nonrecipients of aid in 1963 and 1966. The results of the analyses are displayed in Table 6.

Looking first at the United States, we see that in 1963, the 68 recipients of U.S. aid as a group agreed with the United States 34 per cent less often than would be expected on the basis of the behavior of all members of the General Assembly. In comparison, the three nonrecipients agreed, as a group, 38 per cent less often than would be expected. In 1966, the corresponding group *VRA*'s indicate that the 71 recipients of U.S. aid agreed with the United States 34 per cent less often than would be expected, while the four nonrecipients agreed 59 per cent less often than would be expected.

If the hypothesis is correct that the exclusion of nonrecipients of aid results in a stronger relationship between aid allocations and voting agreements than would otherwise be the case, then we would expect the group *VRA* scores of the aid recipients to be substantially higher than the group *VRA*'s of the nonrecipients. In general, however, this is not the case. The difference of twenty-five percentage points between the recipients and nonrecipients of U.S. aid in 1966 is the largest difference (in the predicted direction) between the two percentages for any donor. But the number of nonrecipients is so small as to make this difference between the groups of questionable substantive interest. Other than the United States, the only differences approximating the same magnitude are those for Belgium and the Soviet bloc in 1966. In the case of the Soviet bloc the number of nations comprising the recipient group is so small as again to cast doubt upon the substantive meaning of the differences between the two groups.[57]

For many of the remaining donors the difference between the two group *VRA*'s is slight; in fact, in ten of the remaining twenty cases the difference is less than six percentage points. Moreover, in half of all the cases based on the 1966 data, and in just under half of the cases based on 1963, the relative agreement scores of the group receiving aid from the donor are in fact less than the *VRA*'s for the nonrecipients. In general, then, exclusion of the nonrecipients of aid for each donor does not appear to qualify significantly the findings regarding the association—or lack of it—between the allocation of foreign aid and patterns of agreement in General Assembly voting. "Between-group" differences, in other words, do not appear to be more important than "within-group" differ-

---

[56] This conclusion must, of course, be used advisedly. From the perspective of aid donors, what is being said is *if* foreign aid donors are motivated to allocate their aid on the basis of how developing nations vote in the UN, then we would expect to find patterns of association different from those found for most donors. The United Kingdom is an illustrative case similar to France. In 1964, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda had among the highest aid *RA*'s of any British aid recipient. These states were also among those least prone to agree with Britain in the 1963 General Assembly. The result is an inverse association. If, however, a primary consideration was how these nations voted in the UN vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, then we would expect that Britain would not have allocated as much of its aid proportionately to these nations as it in fact did. Although it is generally the case that developing nations agree with most aid donors (notably DAC donors) relatively infrequently (i.e., virtually all DAC donors' *VRA*'s are negative), clearly some developing nations among those that Britain chose to aid in 1964 agreed relatively more often with the United Kingdom than either Kenya, Tanzania, or Uganda. Accordingly, our hypothesized relationship between aid and votes suggests that these other states should have received a relatively greater amount of British aid than they did.

[57] Because the Soviet bloc data are commitments rather than disbursements, this is the one donor for which group *VRA*'s could show more than minimal fluctuations from one year to the next if they were calculated for all six years included in the study.

Table 6. General Assembly Group Relative Agreement Scores of Developing Nations Receiving and Not Receiving Foreign Aid, 1963 and 1966[a]

(Number of nations in each group shown in parentheses)

Donor Country	1963		1966	
	Group receiving total aid from donor	Group not receiving total aid from donor	Group receiving total aid from donor	Group not receiving total aid from donor
Australia	NA	NA	−35 (20)	−25 (58)
Austria	03 (16)	−06 (43)	−15 (32)	−21 (32)
Belgium	—	—	−21 (26)	−35 (52)
Canada	−17 (27)	−16 (47)	−26 (45)	−15 (29)
Denmark	—	—	−16 (25)	−14 (53)
France	−58 (20)	−50 (53)	−41 (26)	−42 (49)
Italy	−06 (20)	−16 (45)	−25 (44)	−21 (21)
Japan	00 (35)	−05 (38)	−04 (41)	−11 (37)
Netherlands	—	—	−22 (13)	−23 (65)
Norway	—	—	−15 (23)	−14 (55)
Sweden	−07 (23)	−05 (51)	−21 (23)	−14 (54)
United Kingdom	−42 (29)	−41 (42)	−45 (60)	−42 (15)
United States	−34 (68)	−38 (3)	−34 (71)	−59 (4)
Soviet bloc[b]	−02 (8)	−17 (66)	21 (12)	00 (66)

[a] Recipients of negative foreign aid and recipients that missed more than 40 per cent of the Assembly roll calls are excluded. A dash indicates that the group receiving aid comprises less than eight Assembly members. NA indicates that foreign aid data are not available.

[b] Soviet bloc members are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union in 1963; and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union in 1966.

ences in terms of roll-call agreements between developing nations and foreign aid donors.

Summary and Conclusion

A striking feature of the analysis is that the hypothesized association between aid and votes was found to hold only for the United States, and only in that portion of the analysis using deviations from idealized norms as the operational measures of aid allocations and voting agreements. Although positive associations were discerned for other donors as well, such as the Soviet bloc in 1964, for no aid donor other than the U.S. was the association found to be consistently strong over time. In some respects, then, the results support Keohane's observation that the use of extra-parliamentary instruments of influence in the United Nations is confined almost exclusively to the United States and the Soviet Union.[58] This appears to be the case even though for other donor countries (notably Britain and France vis-à-vis their former colonies) foreign aid is clearly part of a general dependency relationship between developed and developing nations. Apparently, then, the voting behavior of developing nations is largely irrelevant to the concerns of most foreign aid donors.

Even in the relationship between aid allocations and voting behavior observed for the United States, it is unclear which of the two variables should be considered a cause and which a consequence. With the possible exception of the analyses of Soviet bloc aid commitments, most of the results based on a lagged relationship between the variables examined have failed to point toward significantly different relationships between aid and votes within either of the two three-year periods analyzed.

Certainly the association between aid and votes is sufficiently strong in the case of the United States to warrant further research into the exact nature of the causal nexus—if, indeed, it exists at all. As suggested above, multivariate analysis would be a logical next step. Alternatively, longitudinal rather than cross-national analysis of some selected subset of developing nations might be pursued. Or one might attempt to measure the perceptions that UN participants have of the use of aid as influence. Whatever the particular strategy pursued, from the viewpoint of the student of international organization the results for the United States do suggest that continued examination of the extraorganizational links between UN members may prove useful in describing and explaining the outcomes of the political processes in the United Nations.

A word of caution is in order, however. Although the results do show a statistically significant positive association, neither 10 per cent nor even 25 per cent covariation is sufficiently large to lead one to believe that extraorganizational links alone will suffice to explain organizational politics. Indeed, another researcher viewing these results may find here a case for directing greater attention to intraorganizational processes and influence patterns in an effort to explain political outcomes.[59] There is merit in this position.

Similarly, the foreign policy analyst could interpret the results for the United States as suggesting the need for continued examination of the impact of external variables on foreign policy outputs, for both developed and developing nations. When we move beyond the United States, however, the results also suggest that external variables—at least insofar as they are tapped in this study—may well be insufficient explanations of foreign policy behavior; that we may have to examine role, governmental, and societal variables[60] as well in order to explain foreign policy outcomes.

Should there be a relationship between foreign aid and United Nations votes? A dual interpretation of the findings can also be made by those interested in this normative question. Those who prefer that "appreciation" for foreign aid be reflected in the United Nations will find little solace in the generally moderate levels of association between aid and votes. Conversely, those who subscribe to the opposite view may well find discomfort in the fact that there is *any* association whatsoever between the variables, particularly considering that the association appears to be confined almost exclusively to the United States. Which perspective is adopted probably depends on one's view of the role of foreign aid as an instrument of influence and the role of the United Nations as an instrument of conflict management and resolution. One perspective is represented by Kaplan's normative position that ". . . the United States should not seek to starve a poor country into support for its foreign policy. An incentive system cannot operate in the case of every vote in the United Nations or every meeting of developing nations."[61] The other perspective is represented by Westwood: "It seems likely that one of the major questions for the future is whether aid should not be included within the broad process of give and take on concrete issues which produces cooperation among mature, independent, and equal nations."[62]

---

[58] Because the Soviet bloc and DAC data do differ in kind, it seems reasonable to tentatively regard the absence of comparable results for the United States and the Soviet bloc (a surrogate for the Soviet Union) as at least partially attributable to the absence of comparable data.

[59] The utility of examining intraorganizational processes is demonstrated in Chadwick F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly," in *Quantitative International Politics,* ed. J. David Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 51–84; and Kathleen Maas Weigert and Robert E. Riggs, "Africa and United Nations Elections: An Aggregate Data Analysis," *International Organization,* 23 (Winter, 1969), 1–19.

[60] The potential impact of these factors on foreign policy is discussed in James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics,* ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–92.

---

[61] Kaplan, p. 248.

[62] Westwood, p. 105.

Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process*

DAVID W. ROHDE
Michigan State University

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
Washington University, St. Louis

Since Woodrow Wilson wrote *Congressional Government,* the dominance of the standing committees in the House of Representatives in determining legislative outcomes has been accepted by students of Congress. In light of recent studies of groups of House committees[1] and in-depth studies of individual committees,[2] the generalization about the central role of committees in the legislative process remains intact. These studies, however, indicate that there are major differences among these "little legislatures" in regard to their organization and behavior, and that these differences are in part a function of differences in their memberships. Furthermore, as Charles Clapp has said,

> Not only is the fate of most legislative proposals determined in committee: to an important degree the fate of individual congressmen may be decided there too. A person's congressional career may rest largely on the kind of committee post he is given.[3]

Therefore, given the importance of committee membership, both in policy making and in determining the success of individual congressmen's careers, the process by which members are assigned to committees is of the greatest importance.

A good deal of research has been devoted to the committee assignment process in the House.[4] Most of this research, however, has been based on the *results* of the process, i.e., the committee assignments that were actually made. For example, the desirability of committees has been measured in terms of the proportion of the freshmen on each committee, or the number of transfers from a committee versus the number of transfers to it. The variable missing from such treatments has been the desires of the members. Also, success in achieving committee assignments has been treated in only the most general terms, again because of the absence of data on what committees members requested.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze committee assignments by focusing on this "missing link." Our subject will be the committee assignments of Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Committee assignments, as Clapp's observation above suggests, are valued, are in limited supply, and are allocated by

---

* We would like to express our gratitude to Richard Fenno of the University of Rochester and John Manley of Stanford University for making available to us the request data for the 87th, 88th, and 90th Congresses, and to Robert Salisbury of Washington University, St. Louis, for the request data from the 86th Congress. We also wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Robert Delgrosso of Michigan State University. We finally want to thank Richard Fenno, Morris Fiorina of the California Institute of Technology, and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions of this study. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971.

[1] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "Congressional Committees: A Comparative View," a paper presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 8–11, 1970; George Goodwin, Jr., *The Little Legislatures* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).

[2] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966); John Manley, *The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970).

[3] *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 207.

[4] The classic treatment of the process is Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review,* 55 (June, 1961), 345–357. Assignments are discussed at length in Clapp, *The Congressman,* pp. 207–240, and Goodwin, *The Little Legislatures,* pp. 64–79. Some recent studies include Louis C. Gawthrop, "Changing Membership Patterns in House Committees," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (June, 1966), 366–373; Charles Bullock and John Sprague, "A Research Note on the Committee Reassignments of Southern Democratic Congressmen," *Journal of Politics,* 31 (May, 1969), 493–512; Charles Bullock, "Correlates of Committee Transfers in the United States House of Representatives," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 29-May 1, 1971; Charles Bullock, "The Influence of State Party Delegations on House Committee Assignments," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 15 (August, 1971), 525–546; and Charles Bullock, "Freshman Committee Assignments and Re-election in the United States House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review,* 66 (September, 1972), 996–1007.

rather well-defined mechanisms and procedures. By viewing committee assignments as the culmination of a special sort of allocation process, we shall be in a position to *explain* the results of this process, the *descriptions* of which have constituted the bulk of research on this topic to date. It is explanations we seek, and we find more general theories of social choice particularly well-suited for this purpose. More specifically, we examine the data of committee assignments in terms of actors in pursuit of personal goals, constrained only by scarcity and institutional procedures. We will consider the process from the point of view of the members requesting assignment and the members who make the assignments: who wants what committees, and whose requests are satisfied. The basic data which will be employed are the requests for committee assignments, by all House Democrats, made to the Democratic Committee on Committees in the 86th-88th and 90th Congresses.

Democratic Committee Assignments[5]

In the House, the Democratic Committee on Committees is made up of the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee.[6] At the beginning of each Congress they are faced with the task of filling vacancies on the other standing committees of the House. Each member of the Committee is assigned a geographic zone, containing his own state and perhaps others, and he is responsible for handling requests for assignments from members in his zone.[7]

Some time after the November election, new Democratic congressmen submit to the Committee on Committees their requests, in order of preference, for committee assignments. At the same time, returning congressmen may submit requests for second assignments or for transfers from committees they held in the previous Congress.

After members submit requests, lobbying for assignments begins. Many representatives seeking assignments write letters to some or all members of the Committee on Committees, setting forth arguments on their own behalf. Many also pay personal visits to the members of the Committee (especially their zone representative), to the Democratic leaders, and to the chairmen of the committees they are requesting. Often letters are written to members of the Committee on Committees to support the cause of some requesters. Typically these letters came from the deans of state delegations (either from themselves alone or on behalf of the whole delegation), from party leaders or office-holders outside the House, from committee chairmen and from leaders of interest groups relevant to the work of the committees requested.

At the beginning of the Congress, the size of committees as well as party ratios are set by negotiation between the leaders of both parties.[8] Thus the members of the Committee on Committees are faced with the task of filling the vacancies on the standing committees which have resulted either from the failure of some Democratic members to return or from the creation of new positions. The Committee meets in executive session, and each of the committees is called up (usually alphabetically). For each committee the members proceed in order of seniority to nominate candidates from their zone.[9] The names of nominees are written on a blackboard, and they are discussed by the members. After nominations are completed, the members vote by secret ballot.

Finally, after the Committee on Committees has filled all the vacancies, their decisions are placed before the Democratic Caucus for ratification. This is, however, almost always a *pro forma* action.

For our purposes, then, the time sequence of the committee assignment process, which culminates in the creation of a committee structure for a new Congress, may be characterized by the following stages:

---

[5] In addition to our own data, this description relies heavily on Masters, "Committee Assignments," and on Clapp, *The Congressman*, Chapter 5.

[6] The Democratic delegation on Ways and Means is made up almost entirely of members drawn from the South and Border States and from the large industrial states. They are elected to membership by a vote of the full Democratic caucus. During the period covered by this study the committee was dominated by the Southern and Border State group, who were greatly overrepresented compared to their proportion of the Democratic delegation in the House. In the 86th-88th Congresses, they had 8 members out of the total of 15, and in the 90th Congress they had 7 of 15. For a discussion of assignments to Ways and Means, see Manley, *Politics of Finance*, pp. 22–38.

[7] Zone assignments in the 86th Congress are listed in Masters, "Committee Assignments," p. 347. The number of states represented varies greatly, with Keogh of New York, for example, representing only his own state, while Metcalf of Montana represents seven small Western and Midwestern states.

[8] While party ratios usually reflect the partisan division in the House, it is not unlikely that the decisions on both these questions are influenced by the leadership's knowledge of the requests of the members of their party.

[9] It is important to note that the only way a requester can be nominated for a committee post is to be nominated by his zone representative.

(1) the committee configuration in the previous Congress;

(2) an election;

(3) requests for assignments by newly elected members and by returning members who held assignments in the committee configuration of the previous Congress;

(4) the establishment of size and party ratios for committees in the new Congress;

(5) committee assignments by the Democratic Committee on Committees for the new Congress.

Stage 1 provides initial conditions which are "disturbed" by an election (stage 2). The election disturbs the initial committee structure in several obvious ways. First aggregate party proportions in the chamber are altered, requiring the renegotiation of the committee structure by party leaders: committee sizes and party ratios are fixed at this stage (stage 4). Second, individual and aggregate election results effect a change in the opportunity structure in the chamber. Individual defeats of party members in the election create party committee vacancies (which may or may not be lost to the party depending on the aggregate election results and its effect on stage 4). At the outset of the new Congress, then, there are unfilled committee vacancies and demand for those slots by newly elected and returning members (as expressed at stage 3).

Our concern in this paper is with the process of committee assignments for the Democrats. We take the first, second and fourth stages of the process as exogenous to our concerns (though, as we suggested earlier, stage 4 may well be conceived as as endogenous, since it is probable that deviations from the aggregate party ratio on any given committee are partly a result of the configurtion of requests at stage 3). Before getting into the details of our analysis, we should first outline the general theoretical context within which we view the requests of the members and the decisions of the Committee on Committees.

Member Goals and Committee Assignments

As the title of this paper implies, we view the committee assignment process as an instance of "social choice" (or "collective decision making"). That is, a group (the Committee on Committees) is charged with allocating the valuable resources (places on committees) of the collectivity (the Democratic members of the House). We view the participants in the process as rational actors, that is, actors who have goals that they want to achieve, and who, when confronted with a decision-making situation, examine the available alternatives and choose the alternative which seems most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals.

On the question of goals, Richard Fenno has argued that "of all the goals espoused by members of the House, three are most basic. They are re-election, influence within the House and good public policy. There are others; but research on the House acknowledges these to be the most consequential."[10] If this view is accepted, we may now consider each of the participants in the assignment process and show how the outcomes of that process affect their goals.

(1) *Requesters.* The impact of committee assignments on the members requesting those assignments is so obvious that it hardly needs to be discussed. If a congressman holds any or all of the goals mentioned above, his committee assignment will have a substantial impact on the probability of achieving them.

> A "good" assignment may greatly enhance his value to his constituents and provide unusual opportunities to publicize his activities in Congress; here he can develop the expertise and the reputation as a "specialist" that will enable him to influence his colleagues and important national policies.[11]

(2) *The Committee on Committees.* The interest of members of the Committee on Committees in what assignments are made is less direct than that of the requesters, but important nonetheless. If a member has a general interest in the policy area of a particular committee, he may support the assignments of congressmen whose views are most congruent with his own. Furthermore, when a piece of legislation important to a member of the Committee on Committees comes before the House, he may call in debts owed to him by congressmen he has sponsored for committee assignments in order to influence such legislation.[12]

(3) *The Leadership.* The filling of committee vacancies is also important to the Democratic leadership, for much the same reasons as it is to the members of the Committee on Committees.

---

[10] Fenno, "Congressional Committees," p. 3.

[11] Clapp, *The Congressman,* p. 207.

[12] It is clear that such debts are recognized, and that they are called in. One member, commenting on the influence another member had within the House, said, "Much of his power rests with the fact he is on Ways and Means. Since that Committee determines committee assignments, he is in a very important and strategic spot. He makes his deals with various groups as to which people he will support for certain spots. Naturally when the time comes that he wants something, he can make a request and people reciprocate." Quoted in Clapp, *The Congressman,* pp. 29–30.

Committee assignments are vital to the leadership in two ways. First, to the degree that the leadership affects assignments it has an important resource for doing favors for members, for rewarding members for past favors, and for establishing bonds with members that may provide some leverage in future legislative situations. Second, committee assignments are vital to the policy for which the leadership is responsible.[13]

(4) *State Delegations*. Members of a state delegation have an interest in other delegation members serving on committees which affect the interests of their state. Such members serve as a source of information about the committee's business and a resource for influencing the course of legislation on that committee.[14]

This discussion could be extended to include the committee chairmen and persons outside the House (e.g., interest groups), but the essence of our point is established. How committee slots are assigned is of vital interest to many individuals and groups, because those assignments will have an impact on the achievement of their goals within the House.

Data and Analysis

The empirical analysis, which constitutes the bulk of this current study, employs *request* data from four Congresses. In all, we have data on the committee requests, in order of preference, of 106 freshmen and 89 nonfreshmen Democratic representatives. It is important to reiterate the distinctiveness of these data. Ordinarily, analyses of committee assignments are based on the *results* of the process, from which inferences about the process are drawn.[15] By using request data, however, we are in a position to assess the extent to which the process links requests on the one hand with final assignments on the other. Moreover, we may now determine who benefits and who is harmed by the assignment process, not in terms of so-called objective standards of "good" and "bad" assignments, but rather in terms of the subjective preferences of the actors affected. All these possibilities permit somewhat keener insights into the characteristics of this important internal process.

The first aspect of the assignment process we will consider is the requests themselves: what committees are requested most often, and how many requests are made. For this part of the analysis we will consider only the requests of freshman Congressmen. Nonfreshmen already hold committee assignments and, because of service restrictions,[16] are prevented from applying for certain committees (unless they are trying to transfer from the committee they hold).[17]

Table 1 presents these data on freshman requests. The first column gives the total number of requests for each of the standing committees. The second column gives the percentage of all requesters who applied for a slot on each of the committees. The last column indicates the percentage (and number) of all requests that were the requesters' first choices. Thus, 15 congressmen (nearly 14 per cent of all freshmen) requested Agriculture Committee slots. It may be further noted, however, that of these 15 requests, 7 were first preference requests.[18]

Although this table does indicate the distribution of preferences for the various standing committees, consideration of aggregate demand to determine committee desirability is potentially misleading. First, the distribution of pref-

---

[13] Manley, *Politics of Finance*, p. 24.

[14] See Bullock, "The Influence of State Party Delegations."

[15] Most of the individual committee studies (e.g., Fenno, Manley) also draw on interviews with committee members to generalize about what led them to seek assignment to the committee and why they were successful.

[16] The standing committees of the House are divided into three classes: exclusive, semi-exclusive, and nonexclusive, and there are rules which govern assignments to each class. Members of exclusive committees may serve on no other committee. Members of semi-exclusive committees may be given a second assignment only on a nonexclusive committee; and members of nonexclusive committees may be given second assignments on any semi- or nonexclusive committee. During the period covered by this study the committees in these classes were: *exclusive:* Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means; *semi-exclusive:* Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Public Works, and Science and Astronautics; *nonexclusive:* District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Un-American Activities, and Veterans Affairs. In addition, Post Office and Civil Service was changed from semi-exclusive to nonexclusive status at the beginning of the 88th Congress. Finally, the twenty-first standing committee, Standards of Official Conduct (established in 1967) seems to occupy a special status since it is a third assignment for a number of members.

[17] We do, however, include the requests of two nonfreshmen who were first elected in special elections near the end of a Congress. They were not assigned to any committees then, and thus they are in the same position as freshmen.

[18] The reader will note that only 18 committees are listed in Table 1. Ways and Means is excluded here, and throughout the rest of the analysis, because its vacancies are filled by the caucus. Rules and Standards of Official Conduct are excluded because they were never requested, by either freshmen or nonfreshmen. In regard to Rules, this absence of requests probably reflects the special importance this committee has to the leadership, since almost never is a vacancy on Rules filled by a member not first sponsored by the leadership. See Clapp, *The Congressman*, p. 218; and Manley, *Politics of Finance*, p. 77.

Table 1. House Committee Requests and First-Choice Preferences of Freshmen[a]

Committee	Total Requests	Percentage Requesting[b]	Percentage of Requests First Choice (*N*)[c]
Agriculture	15	14	47 (7)
Appropriations	12	11	42 (5)
Armed Services	26	24	26 (12)
Banking and Currency	34	32	41 (14)
District of Columbia	3	3	0 (0)
Education and Labor	17	16	29 (5)
Foreign Affairs	23	21	61 (14)
Government Operations	8	7	13 (1)
House Administration	1	1	0 (0)
Interior and Insular Affairs	20	19	50 (10)
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	34	32	38 (13)
Judiciary	25	23	36 (9)
Merchant Marine and Fisheries	5	5	20 (1)
Post Office and Civil Service	13	12	23 (3)
Public Works	29	27	31 (9)
Science and Astronautics	15	14	33 (5)
Un-American Activities	2	2	0 (0)
Veterans Affairs	8	7	13 (1)

[a] Number making requests = 108.

[b] *Since requesters submitted multiple requests, this column sums to more than 100%.*

[c] The number totals to 109 because one requester asked for "Foreign Affairs or Agriculture," and so both *requests were considered first choices.*

erences reflects the *opportunity structure* as well as the preference structure, so that observations about committee popularity on this basis are necessarily ambiguous.[19] Second, even if we discount the effects of opportunity, the aggregate demand for a committee vacancy may not accurately reflect the intensity of preference for that vacancy. To take one example, although aggregate demand for Agriculture and Post Office-Civil Service is approximately the same (14 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively), there is a great difference in the proportion of those requests that are first choices (47 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively).

More important than the two previous points, however, is that attempts to provide an aggregate measure of committee desirability are inconsistent with the conception of the legislator's behavior as goal-directed. All congressmen are not the same. Their goals differ, and the kinds of constituencies they represent vary. Thus, we would expect committees to have *differential* appeal to different types of congressmen.

The next two tables lend credence to this expectation. While it is difficult to measure the personal goals of legislators, it is probably safe to assume that most freshmen are initially concerned with firming up relationships with their constituencies. This is probably a minimal requirement for the pursuit of policy goals and internal House influence, and is, of course, directly relevant to the goal of reelection. Thus, we can classify members according to the kinds of districts they represent in order to demonstrate the extent to which "committee popularity" varies with constituency types.

In Table 2 we have classified districts according to region and population per square mile. Although the classification is crude and the choice of variables somewhat arbitrary,[20] this

---

[19] Thus a problem with using requests or appointments as a measure of committee desirability results from anticipated reactions. A freshman will probably refrain from requesting the committee he most wants if he believes there is no chance of getting it. Table 1 seems to support this view in regard to requests for Appropriations, which (along with the other two exclusive committees) is generally recognized to be the most sought-after committee. It is, however, also recognized that freshmen have little chance to be appointed. (Indeed, in the four Congresses analyzed here, no freshman was appointed.) There does not, however, seem to be any evidence of anticipated reaction in regard to requests for other committees.

[20] Differences among districts on a regional basis are well known, hence the selection of that variable. Regions are defined as follows: *Northeast:* Conn., Del., Me., Mass, N.H., N.J., N.Y., Penn., R.I., Vt.; *Border:* Kent., Md., Mo., Okla., W.Va.; *South:* Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Va.; *Midwest:* Ill., Ind., Ia., Kan., Mich., Minn., Neb., N.D., Ohio, S.D., Wisc.; *West:* Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Colo., Haw., Ida., Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., Utah, Wash., Wyo.

Population per square mile was selected to tap the relatively urban or rural nature of districts. While per-

Table 2. House Committees Most Requested by Freshmen
(Controlling for Region and Population Density)

Region	Density[a]	Committee	Percentage Requesting
South (*N*=18)	Sparse	Interstate Comm. Banking and Curr. Public Works	45 39 33
Midwest (*N*=7)	Sparse	Interior Interstate Comm. Public Works	57 57 43
West (*N*=16)	Sparse	Interior Public Works	75 38
East (*N*=8)	Medium	Armed Services	50
South (*N*=9)	Medium	Interstate Comm. Foreign Affairs	44 33
Midwest (*N*=9)	Medium	Judiciary Public Works Ed. and Labor Interstate Comm.	44 44 33 33
East (*N*=15)	Concentrated	Banking and Curr. Interstate Comm. Judiciary	40 40 33
West (*N*=7)	Concentrated	Banking and Curr. Interstate Comm. Ed. and Labor Foreign Affairs	71 71 57 43

[a] See footnote 20 for definitions.

scheme suffices to exhibit the very real differences in committee appeal. We have listed those committees requested (at any preference level) by 30 per cent or more of the members in each category containing at least seven requesters.[21] Immediately one notes that committees differ greatly in their relative attractiveness to the various groups of representatives. Interior is one striking example. That committee was the most requested for both Midwestern and Western congressmen from sparsely populated districts. These members, moreover, accounted for 80 per cent of the total requests for that committee (16 of 20). The reason is clear: Congressmen from these constituencies can probably serve the interests of their districts better on that committee than on any other. In the words of one Western representative on the committee:

> I was attracted to it, very frankly, because it's a bread and butter committee for my state. I guess about the only thing about it that is not of great interest to my state is insular affairs. I was able to get two or three bills of great importance to my state through last year. I had vested interests I wanted to protect, to be frank.[22]

---

centage urban would have been a preferable measure in this regard, such data were available on a district basis only for the 88th and 90th Congress. To operationalize this variable the districts were divided into three categories: sparse (less than 100 persons per sq. mi.), medium (100–999 persons per sq. mi.), and concentrated (1,000 or more persons per sq. mi.). Population data were obtained from *Congressional District Data Book: Districts of the 87th Congress* (for the 86th and 87th Congresses) and from *Congressional District Data Book: Districts of the 88th Congress* and its supplements (for the 88th and 90th Congresses). Both books and the supplements are published by the Bureau of the Census.

[21] The excluded categories and the number of members in each were: East, sparse (3); Border, sparse (4); Border, medium (5); West, medium (3); Border, concentrated (0); South, concentrated (0); Midwest, concentrated (4).

[22] Quoted in Fenno, "Congressional Committees," p. 6.

Table 3. Requests by Freshmen for Selected House Committees
(Controlling for Interesteds and Indifferents)[a]

	Requested		Not Requested		Total		Percentage of Requests by Interesteds
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	
Banking and Currency							
Interesteds	17	47	19	53	36	100	
Indifferents	9	20	36	80	45	100	65
Total	26	32	55	68	81	100	
Education and Labor							
Interesteds	11	30	25	70	36	100	
Indifferents	3	7	42	93	45	100	79
Total	14	17	67	83	81	100	
Interior and Ins. Aff.							
Interesteds	11	65	6	35	17	100	
Indifferents	5	8	59	92	64	100	69
Total	16	20	65	80	81	100	
Armed Services							
Interesteds	9	30	21	70	30	100	
Indifferents	9	18	42	82	51	100	50
Total	18	22	63	78	81	100	
Agriculture							
Interesteds	11	33	22	67	33	100	
Indifferents	1	2	47	98	48	100	92
Total	12	15	69	85	81	100	

[a] See footnote 23 for definitions.

Other specific examples may be cited. Public Works is requested by 17 of the 41 representatives from sparsely populated districts in the South, Midwest, and West, and they account for 59 per cent of the requests for that committee. Banking and Currency, part of whose jurisdiction includes housing legislation, was the most requested committee by members from districts with concentrated populations in both the East and West.

Thus, as these data demonstrate, there is indeed a difference in the attractiveness of committees to various groups of representatives, and in most instances there is a clear relationship between the type of district represented and the committees most requested.

Table 3 provides even more direct evidence on this score. For five selected committees, we partitioned members into two groups—interesteds and indifferents—depending on constituency characteristics.[23] Although the relation-

---

[23] These committees were selected because of the availability of constituency data which seemed reasonably related to representatives' probable interest in the committee. We borrowed the terms "interested" and "indifferent," and the basic ideas on measuring interest, from Charles Bullock (see "Correlates of Committee Transfers," pp. 22–23), although our specific measures are somewhat different. Bullock, in turn, adopted the terms from David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

Data on constituency characteristics were obtained from the *Congressional District Data Book: Districts of the 88th Congress* and its supplements. In this source data were available on freshmen representatives in the 86th and 87th Congress only if they came from states which were not redistricted after the 1960 census. Therefore the number of members considered in Table 3 is 81 instead of 108.

For each committee a constituency measure was selected, and each representative's district was ranked as either above or below the national average on that measure. If the district was above the national average, the congressman was classed as an interested; if the district was below the national average, the congressman was classed as an indifferent. The measures of the committees are as follows (national averages are in parentheses); Banking and Currency and Education and Labor, percentage of population residing in urban areas ship between ascribed interest and request behavior varies from committee to committee, it is always in the predicted direction and quite strong. The ratio of the proportion of interesteds applying for a committee to the proportion of indifferents applying varies from a low of nearly 2 to 1 (Armed Services) to a high of more than 16 to 1 (Agriculture). Moreover, a high proportion of requests for each committee is accounted for by interested requesters.[24]

These findings lead us to the following conclusions: Since the attractiveness of a committee does vary from member to member, a broad-gauged, systemic property like "committee desirability" may not be appropriate for an understanding of congressional behavior. A few committees (e.g., Appropriations, Ways and Means) may be almost universally desired, but beyond these few, the attractiveness of a committee, and the value of an assignment to it, may depend solely on the interests and preferences of the member under consideration. While to an urban congressman an assignment to Agriculture might be viewed as disastrous, a farm-belt member might prefer it second only to an appointment to Appropriations.

To this point we have been characterizing the empirical request configuration. Before we turn to the data on assignments proper, we should report several additional features of this configuration as it relates to the opportunity structure of the House.

Clearly the decision about *which* committees to request is a complex strategic one for a member to resolve. Additionally, however, he must decide the strategic question of *how many* committees to include in his preference ordering. In many instances (at least with regard to freshmen) the final preference ordering submitted comprises the entire "information environment" of the Committee on Committees. In any event, it does provide one of the few pieces of hard data on members' desires. The extent to which a goal-directed member chooses to vary that information environment, then, becomes an important strategic consideration. (Shortly we examine the relationships among length of preference ordering, assignment success, and other features of the opportunity structure.)

Table 4. Number of Requests by Freshmen and Nonfreshmen[a]

Number of Requests	Freshmen		Nonfreshmen	
	N	%	*N*	%
1	24	22	71	82
2	15	14	9	10
3	49	45	3	3
4 or more	20	19	4	5
Total	108	100	87	100

[a] Here also the two unassigned nonfreshmen are included with the freshmen (see note 17).

Initially we consider this decision as faced by freshmen and nonfreshmen. The strategic problems facing these two groups are very different. The freshman has no committee assignment at all. He desires a good committee, but he knows for certain that he will be assigned to *some* committee. That is, any committee assignment is possible, the range of alternatives open to the Committee on Committees is maximal, and the member is entirely at the Committee's mercy. The nonfreshman, on the other hand, already has a committee, one which he may keep as long as he wishes. Thus, he need not worry about being given a committee less desirable than the one he holds.

Therefore, if the member assumes that, circumstances permitting, the Committee on Committees will attempt to satisfy his request (obviously he must assume this, or else it would be irrational to bother making any requests at all), the two groups are likely to follow different strategies regarding the number of requests they make. Freshmen are likely to offer the Committee on Committees a wider range of alternatives (i.e., make more requests), while nonfreshmen will probably be much more specific in their requests. As Table 4 shows, the data are in accord with these expectations. Only 22 per cent of the freshmen make only one request, while 82 per cent of the nonfreshmen do so.

Within the freshman category in Table 4, there is considerable variation in the number of requests.[25] Some of this variation in request behavior reflects variations in opportunities con-

---

(69.9 per cent); Interior and Insular Affairs, land area of district (8,159 sq. mi.); Armed Services, percentage of the total labor force who are members of the armed forces (2.5 per cent); and Agriculture, percentage of the employed civilian labor force employed in agriculture (6.6 per cent).

[24] The proportion of Armed Services requests made by interesteds is by far the lowest. This is probably because interest in this committee is determined by other things besides a relatively large number of servicemen in a district (e.g., large defense plants or a hope of attracting defense bases or plants to a district in the future).

[25] We restrict the following discussion to freshmen because the argument about a nonfreshman's ability to be more specific in his requests applies as well here as it did above.

Table 5. Number of House Committee Requests by Freshmen[a]
(Controlling for State Vacancy and State Competition on First-Choice Committee)

Number of Requests	State Vacancy				No State Vacancy			
	State Compet.		No State Compet.		State Compet.		No State Compet.	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	0	0	5	42	1	9	18	26
2	0	0	4	33	3	27	7	10
3	8	67	1	8	4	36	32	47
4 or more	4	33	2	17	3	27	11	16
Total	12	100	12	100	11	99[b]	68	99[b]

[a] Five members whose most-preferred committee had no vacancies are omitted here.
[b] Error is due to rounding.

fronting members.[26] The data of Table 5 are wholly consistent with this hypothesis. In this table we look at two features of the opportunity structure (unfortunately, our total N is too small to permit the meaningful introduction of other relevant features). The first is whether a member is confronted by competition for his first-choice committee by another member of his state delegation. Since the only way a member can get assigned to a committee is to be nominated by his zone representative, a member's *probability* of getting a particular assignment is substantially reduced if the zone representative or the Committee on Committees must choose among two or more members from the same state. Therefore, we would expect a member to "hedge his bets"—that is, make a greater number of requests—if another member from his state is requesting his most-preferred committee.

The second feature of the opportunity structure that may influence the decision concerning the number of requests a congressman makes is the source of vacancies. It is apparent that at least the large states regard themselves as entitled to one or more seats on important committees, and that members, when requesting assignments, feel that a claim made on "their state's" vacancy is a persuasive argument in their favor.[27] Thus a member whose most preferred committee (as revealed by him in his preference ordering) contains a state vacancy may be more likely to list few options, *ceteris paribus*, than other members.

As Table 5 reveals, when a state vacancy exists, the presence of state competition makes a great deal of difference in the number of committees requested. With state competition, no member makes fewer than three requests, but without state competition, 75 per cent do so. When no state vacancy exists, state competition has no effect; 36 per cent make fewer than three requests with state competition, and 36 per cent make fewer than three requests without it. (There is a large difference, in the predicted direction, in the number that make a *single* request.) Furthermore, in the absence of state competition, a member is much more likely to submit fewer than three requests if there is a state vacancy than if there is not (75 per cent versus 36 per cent). Thus, as we expected, both the existence of state competition and the presence of a state vacancy exert an independent impact on the number of committees requested by freshmen.

So far, we have examined the committee assignment process from the point of view of the requester. We now consider who is successful in getting the assignments he requests, viewing the process in terms of the goals of the members of the Committee on Committees and the leadership.

Above we stated that the member must assume that, if circumstances permit, the Committee on Committees will try to satisfy his request. We also argued that the number of requests a member makes depends on certain strategic considerations, and thus we implicitly argued that a member would think that his probability of getting *some* requested committee depends (at least in part) on the number of requests made. In Table 6 we present data re-

---

[26] Here we consider opportunities to depend upon certain objective conditions, such as number of vacancies for a given committee (supply), number of requests (demand), and service restrictions regarding dual requests (formal rules), and upon informal norms which may guide the allocation of committee vacancies, such as "same-state" norms for appointment.

[27] See Bullock, "The Influence of State Party Delegations," and Clapp, *The Congressman*, pp. 220, 238.

Table 6. Number of House Committee Requests and Assignment Success
(Freshmen and Nonfreshmen)

A. Freshmen

Number of Requests	Member Received							
	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	18	75	—	—	6	25	24	100
2	6	40	5	33	4	27	15	100
3	16	34	15	32	16	34	47	100
4 or more	9	45	8	40	3	15	20	100
Total	49	46	28	26	29	27	106	99[a]

B. Nonfreshmen

Number of Requests	Member Received							
	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1	32	45	—	—	39	55	71	100
2	1	11	5	56	3	33	9	100
3 or more	2	22	5	56	2	22	9	100
Total	35	39	10	11	44	49	89	99[a]

[a] Error is due to rounding.

lating to these points. Freshmen and nonfreshmen are treated separately to prevent seniority from contaminating the results.

When the data are examined we find that in regard to freshmen our first statement is more correct than our second. That is, almost three-fourths of the freshmen do get *some* committee that they requested, and the probability of getting *no* choice is affected little by the number of requests. For nonfreshmen, on the other hand, more requests do increase chances of some success.

The most striking finding in Table 6, however, results from our treating freshmen and nonfreshmen separately. Contrary to what one might expect in a body in which seniority is often important, freshmen are much more successful in getting requested assignments than are nonfreshmen. This finding is reinforced by the data in Table 7, which shows assignment success by amount of seniority. We find that the probability of receiving *no* request monotonically *increases* as seniority increases.

This result should not be entirely unexpected, for many references in the literature on committee assignments claim that seniority is

Table 7. Seniority and Success in Assignment to House Committees

Number of Previous Terms	Member Received							
	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
0	49	46	28	26	29	27	106	99[a]
1	19	41	8	17	19	41	46	99[a]
2	9	43	1	5	11	52	21	100
3 or more	7	32	1	5	14	64	22	100[a]
Total	84	43	38	20	73	37	195	100

[a] Error is due to rounding.

Table 8. State Competition, Seniority, and Success in House Committee Assignments
(All Committees with Vacancies)

	Member Assigned		Member Not Assigned		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
No Same State Competition	103	36	187	64	290	100
Same State Competition; Competitor Not More Senior	20	26	56	74	76	100
Same State Competition; Competitor More Senior	1	7	13	93	14	100
Total	124	33	256	67	380	100

often ignored when circumstances dictate. For example, Clapp claims that

> given a contest for an important committee assignment, in which returning members of Congress may wish to transfer from another committee and find themselves competing with each other and with freshmen congressmen, seniority is not infrequently brushed aside, if it will not bring about the outcome desired by those making the decision.[28]

Another observer of the process stated:

> Seniority may control if all other things are equal. But other things usually are not equal. Sometimes you begin to think seniority is little more than a device to fall back on when it is convenient to do so.[29]

To assess the accuracy of this last statement, we examined a situation where it is more likely for "other things" to be "equal": the case when two members from the same state are competing for the same committee. We looked at all committees that had vacancies, and determined for each requester whether another member from the same state was applying for that committee, and if so, whether the other member was more senior. The relevant data are presented in Table 8. It is clear that a request for which there is no same state competition has a likelihood of about one chance in three of being granted. When there is competition, however, a member has about one chance in four of success if his competitor is not more senior, while he has only one chance in fourteen if the competitor *is* more senior. Thus in this instance, where "other things" are more likely to be "equal," seniority may become very advantageous, although it is generally not.

What then are the things that in other situations are *not* "equal"? That is, in terms of the goals of members who determine committee assignments, what factors cause them to ignore seniority? Clearly, many kinds of interacting and even conflicting motivations may influence the members of the Committee on Committees. Thus it is dangerous to posit either a single motive for all members of the Committee on Committees or even for any one member. Still, it is not unreasonable to assess the extent to which the data support any of these motives.

The first motive or goal for Committee on Committees members we have posited might be termed the *management goal.* The Committee on Committees, in this view, is concerned solely with satisfying requester demands. Thus, it acts as an "impersonal" preference aggregation device in an effort to keep requesters happy. In reporting on this motive, we find it useful to contrast it with another, the *constituency interest goal.* According to this goal, committee makers ignore request data, concerning themselves instead with matching individual members to committee vacancies on the basis of constituency characteristics and interests.

The data relevant to this comparison are presented in Table 9. For the committees investigated in Table 3 we partitioned freshmen[30]

---

[28] Clapp, *The Congressman,* pp. 226–227.

[29] Quoted in Clapp, *The Congressman,* p. 226. We should note here that the data in Tables 6 and 7 indicate only overall success and not success in those instances where the requests of freshmen and nonfreshmen are in direct competition. Masters states that "when two or more members stake a claim to the same assignment, on the ground that it is essential to their electoral success, both party committees usually, if not invariably, will give preference to the member with longer service" (Masters, "Committee Assignments," p. 354). We do not know what arguments were made about electoral success, but in our data 50 nonfreshmen were in competition with one or more freshmen for assignments to semi- or nonexclusive committees which had insufficient vacancies to satisfy all requests. Of these 50 members, 23 were passed over in favor of freshmen. This does not include instances where the passed-over member received another, more preferred, assignment.

[30] We restrict our attention here to freshmen not only because of the effects of seniority on both request behavior and success, but also because the situation is much more complex in regard to nonfreshmen. Mini-

Table 9. Interesteds, Requests, and Success in House Committee Assignments[a]
(Freshmen)

Interested[b] Requested	Yes Yes	Yes No	No Yes	No No	Total
Committee					
Banking and Currency	47 (17)	0 (19)	33 (9)	3 (36)	15 (81)
Education and Labor	64 (11)	4 (25)	67 (3)	2 (42)	14 (81)
Interior and Ins. Aff.	64 (11)	17 (6)	20 (5)	3 (59)	14 (81)
Armed Services	33 (9)	0 (21)	11 (9)	2 (42)	6 (81)
Agriculture	27 (11)	14 (22)	100 (1)	4 (47)	11 (81)

[a] Each cell gives percentage of *N* assigned to that committee (*N* in parentheses).
[b] See footnote 23 for definition of interesteds.

members according to two criteria: whether they qualify as interested and whether they requested the committee. The results suggest that the management goal dominates the constituency interest goal. In most instances (the small Ns make firm conclusions difficult), interested-requesters get the nod. Moreover, for *every* committee, requesting-indifferents are more successful than nonrequesting-interesteds. Minimally, we conclude that committee makers do not take member requests lightly—that, in requesting a committee, a member is not waltzing before a blind audience.

A third obvious candidate as a motivational hypothesis for members of the Committee on Committee in *party maintenance*. Whether a member is interested in influencing policy outcomes or in influence for its own sake, one thing that in part determines the amount of such influence is the majority or minority status of his party. A member has more influence if he is Speaker than if he is Minority Leader, more influence if he is chairman of a committee than if he is ranking minority member, and probably more influence if he is on the majority side of the committee than if he is in the minority. Therefore it is in the interest of most Committee members to help insure the reelection of party colleagues. Thus the question arises, who needs the most help? Clearly, the members most in need of help are those who were elected by the smallest margin. *Ceteris paribus,* a member elected with 51 per cent of the vote is more likely to be defeated than one elected with 61 per cent. Thus, we would expect members from marginal districts to be more successful than members from safe districts. (We have termed a district marginal if the member was elected with less than 55 per cent of the vote.)

As the data in Table 10 show, our expectations are correct. Marginal freshmen are slighly less likely to fail to receive a requested committee and are much more likely to receive their first choice than are safe freshmen.

Marginal nonfreshmen are *much* less likely to receive no choice than are safe nonfreshmen, but they are about equally likely to receive their first choice as are safe nonfreshmen. We also find that some of the difference in success between freshmen and nonfreshmen disappears here—that is, safe freshmen are treated about the same as marginal nonfreshmen. When one recalls that these nonfreshmen, even though they are marginal, have demonstrated (at least once) their ability to get re-elected, it does not seem surprising that these two groups are about equally successful.

The perceived stand of the individual member on specific issues is yet another basis on which committee makers may determine as-

---

mally we would have to control for whether a representative is already a member of a committee for which he would be classified as an interested. Further, we would probably want to control for whether the requests made are for transfers or dual service assignments. Also we would want to exclude prestige committee requests. These controls would make the Ns so small and would break them into so many categories that a meaningful test would be impossible.

Table 10. Margin of Election and Success in House Committee Assignments
(Freshmen and Nonfreshmen)

A. Freshmen

	Member Received							
District is	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Marginal	31	56	10	18	14	25	55	99[a]
Safe	18	35	18	35	15	29	51	99[a]
Total	49	46	28	26	29	27	106	99[a]

B. Nonfreshmen

	Member Received							
District is	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Marginal	7	39	5	28	6	33	18	100
Safe	28	39	5	7	38	54	71	100
Total	35	39	10	11	44	49	89	99[a]

[a] Error is due to rounding.

signments.[31] Their prime concern here is the degree to which members will support the party position on issues which come before the standing committees (*party support goal*). While detailed considerations of individual committees are beyond the scope of an initial study such as ours, two pieces of evidence may shed some light on this question. Generally speaking, southern Democrats are less likely to support their party's position than are northern Democrats. Therefore, whether we consider the granting of a specific request a reward for past behavior or an attempt to gain influence over future behavior, the leadership should be less likely to intervene with the Committee on Committees on behalf of a southerner than a northerner. Moreover, since the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee are more liberal and more supportive of their party than is the average House Democrat,[32] those members, even when acting on their own, are likely to be more favorably disposed toward the requests of northern Democrats than toward those of southerners. Therefore, we would expect southerners to be less successful than northerners in obtaining requested committees.

As Table 11 shows, the data support this hypothesis. For both freshmen and nonfreshmen, southerners are more likely than nonsoutherners to receive *no* request. They are less successful than their colleagues from other regions in getting their first choices as well. One might wonder, however, whether this finding of lesser success among southerners does not simply repeat our finding concerning marginal versus safe districts. That is, since southerners are more likely to come from safe districts,[33] they may be less successful than nonsoutherners simply because they are elected by larger margins. To examine the possibility we present in Tables 12 and 13 data on region, margin of election, and assignment success for freshmen and nonfreshmen, respectively.

Since there are few marginal freshmen southerners and no marginal nonfreshmen southerners, we will focus our discussion on members from safe districts. As the data demonstrate, even when marginal members are removed, southerners are less successful than are nonsoutherners. Among both freshmen and

---

[31] In addition to our discussion of member goals above, see Masters, "Committee Assignments," pp. 354–355, and Clapp, *The Congressman*, pp. 228–230.

[32] See Fenno, "Congressional Committees," pp. 33–34, and Manley, *Politics of Finance*, pp. 29–32.

[33] Using a different definition of safe seats, Wolfinger and Hollinger found that while southerners held only 38 per cent of the Democratic seats in the 88th Congress, they held 63 per cent of the safe seats. See Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan H. Hollinger, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 60–61.

Table 11. Region and Success in House Committee Assignments

(Freshmen and Nonfreshmen)

A. Freshmen

Member Recieved

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	8	31	7	27	11	42	26	100
Non-South	41	51	21	26	18	23	80	100
Total	49	46	28	26	29	27	106	99[b]

B. Nonfreshmen

Member Received

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	7	27	2	8	17	65	26	100
Non-South	28	44	8	13	27	43	63	100
Total	35	39	10	11	44	49	89	99[b]

[a] The South includes the eleven states of the Confederacy.
[b] Error is due to rounding.

nonfreshmen, safe southerners are more likely to receive no request than are safe nonsoutherners, and are less likely to receive a first request. The evidence is unequivocal: Region has a strong, independent impact on committee assignment success, even when election margin is controlled.[34]

The second piece of evidence bearing on the

---

[34] This finding is all the more striking in light of the southern Democrats' dominance of the Committee on Committees during this period (see footnote 6). It is, admittedly, dangerous to treat a variable like region as a surrogate for, in this case, expected policy behavior. Support for party policies clearly varies within regions. Moreover, other informal, nonpolicy, behavioral norms are likely to cloud the relationship between region and appointment success. A clear indication of this intraregional variation is the rather startling differential in success between members from the South and those from outside the South when we control for the state of their zone representative. As the data in Table A show, the southern member who is from the same state as his zone representative is much more likely to secure a requested assignment than are his southern colleagues who are not from the same state as their zone representatives. Whereas 60 per cent of the freshmen who are *not* from the same state as their zone representative fail to receive any committee request, only 18 per cent of those from the zone representative's state delegation are in the same unenviable position. The differential is somewhat smaller for nonfreshmen (75 per cent versus 50 per cent receive no request), but the pattern is the same. For members from outside the South, however, this differential does not appear. There is virtually no difference between the success of members who are from the same state as their zone representative and that of members who are not.

Table A. Assignment Success, Region, and Zone Representative's State Delegation

Member Received

	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
A. Freshmen, Non-South								
Same State[a]	16	52	8	26	7	23	31	101[b]
Not	25	51	13	27	11	22	49	100
Total	41	51	21	26	18	23	80	100
B. Freshmen, South								
Same State	5	46	4	36	2	18	11	100
Not	3	20	3	20	9	60	15	100
Total	8	31	7	27	11	42	26	100
C. Non-Freshmen, Non-South								
Same State	13	46	3	11	12	43	28	100
Not	15	43	5	14	15	43	35	100
Total	28	44	8	13	27	43	63	100
D. Non-Freshmen, South								
Same State	3	30	2	20	5	50	10	100
Not	4	25	0	0	12	75	16	100
Total	7	27	2	8	17	65	26	100

[a] Same State means that the member making the request and his zone representative are from same state.
[b] Error due to rounding.

Table 12. Region, Margin of Election, and Success in House Committee Assignments

(Freshmen)

A. Marginal Districts

Member Received

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	1	25	0	0	3	75	4	100
Non-South	30	59	10	20	11	22	51	101[b]
Total	31	56	10	18	14	26	55	100

B. Safe Districts

Member Received

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	7	32	7	32	8	36	22	100
Non-South	11	38	11	38	7	24	29	100
Total	18	35	18	35	15	29	51	99[b]

[a] The South includes the eleven states of the Confederacy.
[b] Error is due to rounding.

Table 13. Region, Margin of Election, and Assignment Success in House Committee Assignments

(Nonfreshmen)

A. Marginal Districts

Member Received

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	0	—	0	—	0	—	0	—
Non-South	7	39	5	28	6	33	18	100
Total	7	39	5	28	6	33	18	100

B. Safe Districts

Member Received

Region[a]	First Choice		Other Choice		No Choice		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
South	7	27	2	8	17	65	26	100
Non-South	21	47	3	7	21	47	45	101[b]
Total	28	39	5	7	38	54	71	100

[a] The South includes the eleven states of the Confederacy.
[b] Error is due to rounding.

Table 14. Party Support and Success in House Committee Assignments

(Nonfreshmen)

A. 86th Congress

	Assigned	Not Assigned	Total
Supporter[a]	62	38	100
	(8)	(5)	(13)
Nonsupporter	40	60	100
	(2)	(3)	(5)
Total	56	44	100
	(10)	(8)	(18)

B. 87th Congress

	Assigned	Not Assigned	Total
Supporter	50	50	100
	(8)	(8)	(16)
Nonsupporter	45	55	100
	(5)	(6)	(11)
Total	48	52	100
	(13)	(14)	(27)

C. 88th Congress

	Assigned	Not Assigned	Total
Supporter	62	38	100
	(8)	(5)	(13)
Nonsupporter	40	60	100
	(4)	(6)	(10)
Total	52	48	100
	(12)	(11)	(23)

D. 90th Congress

	Assigned	Not Assigned	Total
Supporter	60	40	100
	(9)	(6)	(15)
Nonsupporter	0	100	100
	(0)	(4)	(4)
Total	47	53	100
	(9)	(10)	(19)

E. All Congresses

	Assigned	Not Assigned	Total
Supporter	58	42	100
	(33)	(24)	(57)
Nonsupporter	37	63	100
	(11)	(19)	(30)
Total	51	49	100
	(44)	(43)	(87)

[a] Supporters are members whose party support scores were above or equal to the mean for the party for the previous Congress. Cell entries are percentages; *N*s are in parentheses.

party support goal is presented in Table 14. To construct this table we examined the party support scores of nonfreshmen requesters[35] for each of the Congresses in the sample, and compared the assignment success of those whose support surpasses the mean for the party in the previous Congress with those who gave the party less than the mean support. In each of the four Congresses, high party supporters were more successful in securing assignments (i.e., being granted any one of their requests) than low party supporters. Part E of this table gives the aggregate totals: 58 per cent of the high party supporters, as opposed to 37 per cent of the low party supporters, secured a requested committee.

Summary and Conclusions

In this paper we have viewed the Democratic assignment process as an instance of social choice. We have examined the process from the point of view of the members requesting assignments and of the members making assignments. We have assumed that both groups are goal-directed and that an understanding of their behavior derives from an analysis of alternative goals and alternative means (behaviors) of achieving them.

---

[35] We exclude the two nonfreshmen elected in special elections near the close of the preceding Congress, for whom there was no party support score data. For each Congress, a member's party support score is tabulated from his voting behavior in the previous Congress. Party support data is found in the appropriate volumes of the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac:* vol. XIV (1958), pp. 124–125; vol. XVI (1960), pp. 140–141; vol. XVIII (1962), pp. 764–765; vol. XXII (1966), pp. 1030–1031.

In regard to those members requesting assignments, we have shown that their choice of committees is related to the type of district they represent. Also, the data indicate that the decision concerning the number of requests to make appears to be affected by certain strategic considerations such as whether the requester is a freshman, whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee, and whether another member from his state is competing with him for his most preferred committee.

We next considered the making of assignments. Here we found that about three-fourths of the freshmen are granted some committee they requested. The data showed, however, that nonfreshmen are much less successful. Indeed, the probability of success decreased as seniority increased; therefore other factors were sought in order to explain assignment success. We considered several alternative goals for committee makers—the management goal, the constituency interest goal, the party maintenance goal, and the party support goal—and found strong support in the data for most of them. However, the interaction (and collinearity) among goals precludes any unqualified conclusions.

The assignment process in the House of Representatives is obviously complex, and it is affected by a host of factors, some of them detailed in the body of this paper. Our purposes here have been severalfold. First, we believe it is useful to view the assignment process as an institutionalized allocation process involving goal-seeking actors, scarce but valued commodities, and behavioral constraints. Second, given this view, we have sought to supply a "missing link" in the literature on committee assignments, namely the preferences of committee requests. Not only does this link provide some interesting insights about one group of actors in the process (requesters); additionally, it provides empirical knowledge about the constraints and information confronting the other significant group in the process—the committee makers. Third, the heuristic use of a social choice construct and the new data on the preferences of committee requesters have brought into focus and provided some order to the complex of strategic factors involved in this process.

The questions for future empirical analysis appear to be almost limitless. For example, future research should consider, instead of surrogate variables like region, the position of members on specific issues before and after the assignment decision. Another aspect to be examined is the behavior of individual members of the Committee on Committees. What requesters from which zones are most successful? Do zone representatives appear to nominate members whose views are like their own? A third aspect of the process which deserves further consideration is the opportunity structure: Are members who are granted their first choice more likely to make further requests in the future, and if so are they very successful? Are members who receive no request initially granted a good assignment at some later time, or are they perpetually unsuccessful?

The research reported here is not distinctive in one respect: It raises as many questions as it answers. Nevertheless, we feel this study has provided some initial direction for a more comprehensive, formal understanding of the committee assignment process, and thus of internal relationships in the House as a whole. In this fashion, we believe, students of the public sector will begin to ascertain some of the operating characteristics of its institutions and thus be in a better position to make sound evaluations and prescriptions.

Candidates' Perception of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates*

CHONG LIM KIM
DONALD P. RACHETER
University of Iowa

The purpose of the research reported in this article is to test the "congratulation-rationalization effect," a highly provocative hypothesis that John Kingdon has formulated in regard to politicians' beliefs about voters.[1] Comparing the beliefs that winning and losing candidates held about voters, Kingdon discovered that the winners manifested significantly more favorable beliefs than the losers.[2] Drawing upon a theory of cognitive dissonance of the Festinger variety, he offered an interesting interpretation of the findings.[3] Both winners and losers, argued Kingdon, are likely to confront a dissonance-producing situation after an election and therefore are likely to alter their beliefs about voters. This reasoning led him to hypothesize that winners tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losers tend to rationalize their defeats by downgrading voters' competence. The essence of the "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis in Kingdon's original formulation is this: As a result of the election outcomes, winners tend to change their beliefs about voters in a favorable direction, whereas losers tend to alter such beliefs in an unfavorable direction.

The hypothesis is important, for it has theoretical implications for the role of elections in the democratic process. This hypothesis implies, in the first place, that elections produce a favorable change in the beliefs that an elected official holds about voters' competence. Because of his victory, the politician believes even more than he did previously that the voters are well informed, genuinely interested, and capable of making intelligent choices. Consequently, the elected official may pay closer attention to the voters' opinions and be more responsive to them than if he were not elected. The manifest function of elections in this case is the inducement of responsible behavior on the part of the representative through a rearrangement of the candidates' cognitions.[4]

The hypothesis also has implications for constituency influence on the representative. The "congratulation-rationalization effect" may magnify such influence. The politician often acts according to his conception of the voters' reactions to alternative courses of action he might choose.[5] The extent to which the representative anticipates the reactions of his constituency is likely to be related to his beliefs about the voters' competence. Hence, the tendency for a winning politician to develop beliefs complimentary to the voters implies that his anticipation of the voters' reactions will weigh heavily on his action. Constituency influence on a representative may therefore increase as a result of the "congratulation-rationalization effect."[6]

Although Kingdon demonstrated a significant difference between winners and losers in

---

* Research for this project was supported by two grants from the Graduate College of the University of Iowa to one of the authors and we acknowledge our gratitude. We also wish to thank John W. Kingdon of the University of Michigan for his helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this article.

[1] John W. Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March, 1967), 137–45. See also his book, *Candidates For Office: Beliefs and Strategies* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[2] Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs," 139–42.

[3] See, for example, Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Row, Peterson, 1957); Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 58 (March, 1959), 203–10; Robert B. Zajonc, "The Concepts of Balance, Congruity, and Dissonance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Summer, 1960), 380–96; Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: John Wiley, 1962); and Florence L. Denmark and Brunhilde Ritter, "Differential Cognitive Dissonance and Decision Latency," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 86 (February, 1972), 69–74.

[4] Political theorists have attributed various functions to elections. Elections have been considered as devices for selecting leaders and legitimizing the regime, means of giving the citizens direct and indirect control over government policies, channels for the expression of public choices, and links between officials and the voting public through which influence is exchanged. However, cognitive effects of elections such as the one stated in this hypothesis have not been explicitly formulated as part of the functions of elections. See, for example, Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies*, 15 (June, 1967), 173–201; and Gerald Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968), pp. 16–40.

[5] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 49.

[6] Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs," pp. 144–45.

their beliefs about voters, he was unable to test the hypothesis. Since his study was based on interview data collected after an election, it was not possible for him to compare candidates' beliefs about voters before and after the election, a comparison essential to test such a hypothesis.[7] Therefore, whether winners really change their beliefs in a favorable direction and whether losers alter their beliefs in an unfavorable direction still remains an open question.

The Iowa Election Study provides an excellent opportunity to test the "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis. Candidates for office were asked to indicate their beliefs about voters both before and after an election. All contested candidates who ran in the 1970 Iowa general election were included in the study. The data were collected by means of mail questionnaires.[8] The pre-election survey, conducted in October and November 1970, included 262 candidates.[9] Of these, 202 candidates returned usable replies, which represents a 77 per cent response rate. Given our before-and-after design, we sent out questionnaires after the general election only to those who had responded to the pre-election survey. One hundred seventy-three of the winning and losing candidates responded to the follow-up questionnaire, an impressive 86 per cent of all those who responded to the first questionnaire. In addition to various standard information on the candidates' social and career background characteristics, we also solicited information regarding their beliefs about voters, their pre-election anticipations of the election outcomes, their political ambition, their support for the institution of elections, and the 23 paired-item *Rotter Internal Versus External Control Scale.*

Measurements of Key Variables

Candidates' beliefs about voters consist of their theories, implicit or explicit, about the manner in which voters make their electoral choices.[10] An important part of such beliefs relates to candidates' perceptions of voters' competence, that is, the extent to which they believe the voters are deeply interested in campaigns, the extent to which they believe the voters are informed of key issues, and the extent to which they believe the voters make intelligent choices on the basis of the issues rather than on the basis of party labels or candidate characteristics. When elected, the candidates who believe that the voters are politically interested, informed, and capable of making intelligent choices are probably more likely to be constrained by the voters' opinions than are other candidates who have less favorable perceptions of voters' competence.[11]

Another part of candidates' beliefs is their conception of what factors influence voters' choices. The voting studies have identified three major factors of this sort: party identification, issues, and candidate orientation.[12] The candidates were asked both to rate and to rank the relative importance of each of these three factors, before and after the election. If the "congratulation-rationalization effect" is indeed operative, one would expect that winners change in their rankings of the three factors in the direction complimentary to voters, whereas losers change in the direction deprecating to voters. More specifically, one might expect that the winners who ranked party or issues as first in importance before an election, would subsequently rank the personal characteristics of candidates as first.[13] Conversely, the losers who

---

[7] The "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis involves changes in candidates' beliefs and the direction of such changes. To test the hypothesis, one needs data on attitude changes. Interview data collected at a single point in time, the kind of data used in Kingdon's study, do not provide an adequate basis to test the hypothesis.

[8] Certain typical problems are associated with the use of mail surveys. Briefly, these problems relate to the type of data which can be gathered, the type of respondents who can be reached, and the response rate. In the present study, these problems were recognized and dealt with as fully as possible. First, the questionnaire used was brief, and the questions asked were simple and straightforward. Moreover, many of our questions had been used in several previous studies and their reliability had been tested. Second, our respondents were an ideal sample for a mail survey. They were candidates for public office, a relatively well-educated and articulate group. We found almost no "nonresponses" in the returned questionnaires. Finally, the response rate for the pre- and postelection surveys were impressive. For a good discussion of the problems associated with the use of mail surveys, see William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp. 170–83.

[9] This figure represents all contested candidates who ran in the 1970 general election in Iowa. There were also 32 candidates who were unopposed in the election. We did not include these unopposed candidates in our survey.

[10] Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs," 137–38.

[11] Lewis A. Dexter, *The Sociology and Politics of Congress* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 151–75; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review,* 57 (March, 1963), 45–56.

[12] See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954); and David E. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review,* 65 (June, 1971), 389–400.

[13] We are making a number of assumptions here. Stated explicitly, (1) we assume that when a candidate rates candidate characteristics as the most important factor, he is congratulating himself and the voters, and

Table 1. Change in the Candidates' Perception of Voters' Competence (Frequency)

Before Election \ After Election		Scale Scores							
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Scale Scores	0	2	0	5	0	3	0	0	10
	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	1	6
	2	3	1	6	0	5	1	3	19
	3	1	0	0	1	3	1	2	8
	4	1	2	3	2	10	3	8	29
	5	0	0	0	5	6	10	13	34
	6	2	0	5	2	10	10	24	53
Total		11	3	22	10	37	25	51	159

Increase in perception

Decrease in perception

initially ranked issues or candidate characteristics as first, would rank party labels as the most important factor after an election.

The operational measurement of candidates' perceptions of voters' competence is a summated scale, constructed on the basis of the candidates' responses to three questions.[14] These questions have to do with the candidates' beliefs concerning voters' political interests, their political knowledge, and their capacity to make intelligent electoral choices.[15] Each candidate who responded was assigned a score based on the arithmetic sum of his coded responses. The scale scores range between 0 (least favorable) and 6 (most favorable).[16] Table 1 displays data concerning the candidates' perceptions of voters' competence before and after the election. Of 159 candidates who re-

---

(2) we assume that when a candidate rates party labels as first in importance, he is rationalizing his defeat by blaming voters for blindly voting for party. These are the assumptions which Kingdon has made in his study. We recognize at this point that another plausible assumption which contradicts our first assumption can be made: when a candidate rates candidate characteristics as the most important factor, he might be downgrading the voters. To believe that the voters make their choices on the basis of candidates' personal characteristics could mean that a candidate is disparaging their political sophistication. However, our objective is to test the validity of Kingdon's hypothesis and therefore we adopted his assumptions. See his "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," pp. 139–40.

[14] When responses to several questions are aggregated to form a single measure as was the case in our summated scale, we might be in effect losing some information. Therefore we have also scrutinized responses to individual questions. The results of the item-by-item analysis did not change our basic arguments. See Donald P. Racheter, "Representation and the Congratulation-Rationalization Effect" (M.A. thesis The University of Iowa, 1972).

[15] The questions used were: (1) Would you indicate how important you think the candidates' issue positions are to the voters in determining their choices? (2) Generally speaking, how interested in the campaign do you think the voters in your district are? (3) How well informed do you think the voters in your district are about the candidates' issue positions? The same set of questions was repeated in the postelection survey with only the tense changed.

[16] Responses to the three voter competence items were coded: (0) Not important (or informed), (1) Somewhat important (or informed), and (2) Very important (or informed). These coded responses were summed to form a simple index.

Table 2. Change in Candidates' Perception of Voters' Competence by Election Outcomes

(Percentages)

Election Outcomes	Change in Perception													
	+6	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	−1	−2	−3	−4	−5	−6	Total (*N*)
Winner	0.0	0.0	2.7	1.3	13.5	12.2	36.5	17.6	10.8	1.3	4.1	0.0	0.0	100% (74)
Loser	0.0	1.2	4.7	2.3	10.6	15.3	30.6	9.4	15.3	4.7	3.6	0.0	2.3	100% (85)

turned usable questionnaires before and after the election, 51 (or 32 per cent) reported an increase in their favorable perceptions of voters, while 55 (or 35 per cent) reported a decrease. Almost one-third of the candidates indicated "no change" in their perceptions. From these results, a measure of the direction and the magnitude of changes in candidates' perceptions was constructed. This measure, which ranges between scale scores of +6 and −6, is designed to indicate the degree of increase or decrease in favorability of a candidate's perception of voters' competence.[17]

Findings

1. Changes in Candidates' Beliefs About Voters. The hypothesis that winners tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losers tend to develop deprecating beliefs may be tested in two ways: (1) a comparison of winners and losers in terms of the direction and the magnitude of changes in their perceptions regarding the competence of voters, and (2) an analysis of changes that take place in candidates' rankings of the relative importance of three factors which influence voters' choices: party labels, issues, and candidate characteristics.

The data presented in Table 2 show little difference between winners and losers in terms of the direction and the magnitude of changes in their perceptions regarding the competence of voters. Among the winners, roughly 37 per cent did not change in their perceptions. Among the losers 31 per cent did not change, indicating a slight, but statistically insignificant, tendency for winners to have more stable perceptions than losers ($t = 0.53$, df $= 157$, n.s.). While some 30 per cent of the winners showed an increase in their complimentary beliefs, 34 per cent of the losers also did. Similar proportions of the winners and losers indicated a decrease in such beliefs: 33.8 per cent and 35.3 per cent respectively. Thus, the evidence makes it quite clear that winners do not necessarily develop complimentary beliefs more than do losers. Conversely, losers do not necessarily develop more deprecating beliefs than winners.[18]

A supplementary analysis was performed to test the hypothesis. Instead of relying upon the candidates' perceptions of voters' competence, we focused on changes that took place in the candidates' rankings of the relative importance of the three factors influencing voters' choices. By comparing their pre- and postelection rankings, we were able to determine shifts that occurred in their relative rankings of party labels, issues, and candidate characteristics.

According to the "congratulation effect," one might predict that the winners who initially ranked party or issues first in importance are likely to rate their own characteristics as first after an election. Conversely, the losers who ranked issues or candidates as first in importance are likely to rank party as the most im-

---

[17] The measure for the direction and the magnitude of changes in candidates' perceptions regarding the competence of voters was constructed from the two summated scales of voters' competence: the pre- and postelection scales. To obtain scores for changes in candidates' perceptions, the postelection scores were subtracted from the pre-election scores.

[18] Additional evidence is available. When we compared the winners and losers in terms of their pre- and postelection perceptions, we discovered as shown in Table A that the winners manifested much more favorable perceptions than the losers after the election, and that the subsequent winners also manifested significantly more favorable perceptions than the subsequent losers before the election. This means that the winners had more favorable perceptions than the losers from the outset.

Table A. Candidates' Perception of Voters' Competence Before and After General Election

(Percentages)

Scale Scores		Before Election		After Election	
		Winner	Loser	Winner	Loser
	0	3.4%	7.2%	2.7%	10.6%
Least Favorable	1	0.0	6.2	0.0	3.5
	2	9.1	13.4	9.5	17.6
	3	3.4	7.2	6.8	5.9
	4	19.3	20.6	21.6	24.8
Most Favorable	5	28.4	15.5	29.7	3.5
	6	36.4	29.9	29.7	34.1
	Total (*N*)	100% (88)	100% (97)	100% (74)	100% (85)
		$t=2.04$,	$p<.025$	$t=2.72$	$p<.005$

Table 3. Change in the Relative Ranking of Three Factors

(Percentages)

Change in Ranking	Most Important Factor		Least Important Factor	
	Winner	Loser	Winner	Loser
From Issues or Candidate to Party Label	25%	78%	28%	66%
From Party Label or Issues to Candidate	75	22	72	34
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(20)	(27)	(40)	(29)
	$X^2 = 12.95$,	$P < .001$	$X^2 = 12.10$,	$P < .001$

Note: The total in the table does not add up to 173 candidates, because many did not fit the four types of change reported above. Of all candidates, 39 per cent did not change in their rankings; 19 per cent changed from party to issues; and 10 per cent changed from candidates to issues.

portant factor after an election, due to the "rationalization effect." With respect to the shifts that occur in the least important factors, one might expect that the winners who initially ranked issues or candidates as last in importance are likely to rank party labels as the least important after an election. In a similar vein, the losers who ranked party or issues as last in importance at the outset, are likely to rank candidate characteristics as the least important after the election.

There are six logically possible types of change in the candidates' rankings of the relative importance of party, issues, and candidates.[19] Table 3 reports only that portion of the data most relevant to testing the hypothesis.[20] Focusing upon factors ranked as the most important, one finds that the winners more than the losers tended to alter their ranking from party or issues to their own characteristics, suggesting that the winners tend to congratulate voters for "making the right choices." By comparison, the losers more than the winners tended to change their ranking from issues or candidates to party label, which indicates that the losers tended to downgrade voters for "blindly voting for party labels." Looking at the shifts which occurred in the least important factors, however, one is struck by a finding contradictory to the prediction. The winners who ranked party or issues as least important at the outset tended to rank candidate characteristics as least important after the election. Among the losers, those who ranked issues or candidate characteristics as least important tended to rank party labels "least important" after the election. Thus, the evidence about ranking shifts is also inconclusive, and does not offer confirmation of the hypothesis that winners develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losing candidates develop deprecating beliefs.

2. Effect of Candidates' Anticipation of Election Outcome. It is quite possible that candidates anticipate the election outcome long before election day. Because of such anticipations, the "congratulation-rationalization effect" might take place even before the actual outcome is known. The candidates were asked to rate their chances of winning in the first questionnaire.[21] Fifty-seven per cent rated their chances favorably, while some 30 per cent gave pessimistic assessments. If the "congratulation-rationalization effect" does take place before the election as a result of candidates' anticipations of the outcome, one might expect that among the subsequent winners, those who anticipated an election victory at the outset as compared to those who anticipated a defeat, would manifest more favorable beliefs about voters. Again, among the subsequent losers, those who anticipated a victory as compared to those who anticipated a defeat at the outset, should have more favorable beliefs.

The data presented in Table 4 show no evidence to confirm such an effect of candidates' anticipations upon their beliefs about voters.

---

[19] The six types of change in the candidates' rankings include: (1) from party to issues, (2) from party to candidates, (3) from issues to party, (4) from issues to candidates, (5) from candidates to party, and (6) from candidates to issues.

[20] Of the six types of change, only four are directly relevant to testing predictions derived from the hypothesis. Since we assume that changes from issues or candidates to party reflect the rationalization effect and that changes from party or issues to candidates reflect the congratulation effect, we report data on these four types of change. Nevertheless, we have also examined all six types of change separately, and have found no evidence to contradict the conclusion suggested in the text.

[21] The question was: "How do you rate your chances in the upcoming election?" Responses were coded: (1) Excellent chance to win, (2) Good chance to win, (3) Some chance to win, (4) It's a toss-up, (5) Probably will lose, and (6) Almost sure to lose.

Table 4. Effect of Anticipation on Candidates' Pre-Election Beliefs

(Percentages)

Pre-election Perceptions of Voters' Competence		Winner		Loser	
		Anticipated Victory	Anticipated Defeat	Anticipated Victory	Anticipated Defeat
	6	35.5%	42.9%	32.1%	31.2%
Most Favorable	5	32.9	14.3	20.8	10.4
	4	15.8	28.6	20.8	16.7
	3	2.6	7.1	13.2	2.1
	2	9.3	7.1	9.4	16.7
Least Favorable	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5
	0	3.9	0.0	3.7	10.4
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N)	(76)	(14)	(53)	(48)
		$X^2=3.96$, n.s.		$X^2=11.12$, n.s.	

Among the subsequent winners, no significant difference was discovered between those who anticipated a victory and those who anticipated a defeat in terms of their perceptions of voters' competence ($X^2 = 3.96$, n.s.). Similarly, among the subsequent losers, there was no significant difference between those who anticipated a victory and those who anticipated a defeat ($X^2 = 11.12$, n.s.). A supplementary analysis in which we compared candidates' anticipations and the direction of changes in their beliefs also revealed a negative result: the anticipations of the election outcome did not effect changes in candidates' beliefs about voters.[22] Thus, one can conclude that neither the actual election outcome nor the anticipations of the outcome have significant effect upon candidates' beliefs about voters.

3. Dissonance States and Changes in Candidates' Perceptions of Voters' Competence. Thus far, our analysis has concentrated on the difference between winners and losers in their beliefs about voters, and changes in such beliefs. The overall evidence lends no clear support for the "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis. Nevertheless, it seems yet possible to confirm the hypothesis if it is cast in somewhat different terms, terms more consonant with the theory of cognitive dissonance as originally outlined by Festinger. Although Kingdon acknowledged his debt to Festinger's theory, his formulation actually departed from the theory by placing a heavy emphasis upon the independent impact of election outcomes.[23] When Kingdon stated that winners tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losers tend to develop rationalizations for their defeats by downgrading voters' competence, he was evidently assuming that dissonance is a direct consequence of the election outcome. Although a state of cognitive dissonance may result from the election outcome, it depends also upon the candidates' pre-election beliefs about

---

[22] The results of this analysis are reported in Table B. It is clear that no significant difference obtains between those who expected to win and those who expected to lose within each group of the winners and losers. This indicates that differences in pre-election anticipations of the election outcomes have no visible impact upon the direction and magnitude of changes in candidates' perceptions regarding the competence of voters.

[23] Kingdon stated that: "winners develop complimentary beliefs about voters and losers develop rationalizations for the losses *simply by virtue of the outcome of the election*" [our emphasis]. See his "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," p. 142.

Table B. Anticipation of the Outcomes and Change in Perceptions

(Percentages)

Change in Perception	Winner		Loser	
	Anticipated Victory	Anticipated Defeat	Anticipated Victory	Anticipated Defeat
Favorable Change (Increase)	26.6%	33.3%	34.3%	35.0%
No Change	36.7	33.4	15.8	40.0
Unfavorable Change (Decrease)	36.7	33.3	49.9	25.0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(60)	(12)	(38)	(40)

voters. What precipitates the "congratulation-rationalization effect" may be a state of dissonance induced by the incongruence between a candidate's beliefs and the election outcome, rather than the winning or losing in itself.

Restated in direct dissonance terms, the hypothesis asserts that within each group of winners and losers it is only those experiencing a high degree of dissonance who will change in their beliefs about voters. The dissonance, rather than the election outcome, is the critical variable in this formulation. High and low dissonance states were established on the basis of (1) the pre-election scale scores for candidates' perceptions of voters' competence, and (2) the election outcomes.[24] A candidate who entered the campaign with favorable beliefs about voters and subsequently emerged as a winner may experience less dissonance than other successful candidates who had unfavorable beliefs from the outset. Similarly, a candidate who initially had favorable beliefs but was later defeated may feel greater dissonance than other losers who had unfavorable beliefs from the outset.

In Table 5, the direction and the magnitude of changes in candidates' perceptions of voters' competence are compared by different dissonance states within each group of winners and losers. Looking at the winners first, one finds that as compared to the "low dissonance" group, the "high dissonance" group—the candidates who had unfavorable beliefs about voters at the outset—tended to change their beliefs in a more favorable direction. The rank-order correlation between dissonance states and changes in candidates' perceptions was quite high (*tau* c = .48). This suggests that winners whose initial beliefs about voters were incongruent with the election outcomes tended to upgrade their beliefs. Thus, there is evidence to conclude that the "congratulation effect," a part of Kingdon's hypothesis, is operative, insofar as winners' initial beliefs about voters and the subsequent election outcomes are not congruent.

With respect to the "rationalization effect," another part of the hypothesis, a strong correlation was found between dissonance states and negative changes in candidates' perceptions (*tau* c = −.41). Among the losers, the "high dissonance" group consists of the candidates who entered the election campaign with highly favorable beliefs about voters. These candidates believed at the outset that the voters were well informed on key issues, were deeply interested in the campaign, and were capable enough to make their choices on the basis of issues rather than on the basis of a candidate's party label or his personal characteristics. Despite the highly complimentary beliefs that these candidates held, the voters did not reciprocate with electoral support: they were subsequently defeated. Thus, these candidates were likely to perceive a dissonance between the election outcome and their beliefs about voters. The data indicate that the "high dissonance" group of the losers more than the "low dissonance" group tended to change their beliefs in the direction deprecating to voters. Evidently, the "rationalization effect" is also operative among the losers, insofar as the losers' initial beliefs about voters and the subsequent election outcome are not congruent.[25]

What emerges in this analysis is this: The "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis can be confirmed, but only if cast in terms of "dissonance states" rather than "election outcomes." In his original formulation, probably because he lacked pre-election data, Kingdon emphasized the independent effect of the election outcomes—winning and losing. Consequently, he hypothesized that winners tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losers tend to relinquish such beliefs. Clearly, this formulation obfuscates the critical importance of dissonance states by implicitly assuming that changes in candidates' beliefs are direct effects of the election outcomes. Our analysis has shown, however, that the election outcomes do not in themselves effect changes in candidates' beliefs. What causes change in such beliefs is dissonance induced by the *discrep-*

---

[24] The "high" and "low" dissonance groups among the winners and losers were established in the following manner:

Election	Scale Scores for the Pre-Election Perceptions						
Outcomes	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Won	High Dissonance Group (*N*=26)				Low Dissonance Group (*N*=48)		
Lost	Low Dissonance Group (*N*=56)				High Dissonance Group (*N*=29)		

[25] The data reported in Table 5 also show considerable cognitive changes for the low dissonance groups. For instance, 54 per cent of the low dissonance winners changed their perceptions in both favorable and unfavorable directions. Among the low dissonance losers, almost 72 per cent either increased or decreased in their evaluations of voters. Thus, it seems evident that factors other than dissonance states also act upon changes in the candidates' perceptions. These unidentified factors notwithstanding, the overall evidence clearly indicates that cognitive dissonance explains a large part of the variation in changes of candidates' perceptions. The problems of validating dissonance theory are succinctly discussed in Natalia P. Chapanis and Alphonse Chapanis, "Cognitive Dissonance: Five Years Later," *Psychological Bulletin*, 61 (January, 1964), 1–22.

Table 5. Relation Between Candidates' Dissonance States and Perceptions of Voters' Competence

(Percentages)

Change in Perception*	Winner		Loser	
	High Dissonance	Low Dissonance	High Dissonance	Low Dissonance
Large increase	—	—	—	3.5
Medium increase	11.6	—	—	20.7
Small increase	53.8	10.4	25.1	27.6
No change	19.2	45.8	32.1	27.6
Small decrease	11.6	37.5	28.5	17.1
Medium decrease	3.8	6.3	10.8	3.5
Large decrease	—	—	3.5	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(26)	(48)	(56)	(29)
	Kendall's *tau c* = .48		*tau c* = −.41	

* These seven categories were established from the scale scores for the direction and the magnitude of changes in perceptions of voters' competence: Large increase (+6, +5), Medium increase (+4, +3), Small increase (+2, +1), No change (0), Small decrease (−1, −2), Medium decrease (−3, −4), and Large decrease (−5, −6)

ancy between a candidate's beliefs and the election outcome. Therefore, whether or not winners will develop complimentary beliefs and whether or not losers will develop deprecating beliefs depends upon the states of dissonance that such candidates confront after an election, rather than on the election *per se*.

Conclusions

The analysis has disclosed no clear evidence to support the hypothesis that winners tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losers develop deprecating beliefs. Although nearly two-thirds of the candidates were found to have changed in their perceptions of the competence of voters, no significant difference in direction and magnitude of such changes was discovered between the winners and losers. The evidence was again inconclusive when we focused on the shifts that took place in the candidates' rankings of the relative importance of three factors influencing voters' choices: party labels, issues, and candidate characteristics. The winners did not change their rankings of the three factors in a direction visibly more complimentary to voters than the losers, nor did the losers change their rankings in a direction more deprecating to voters than the winners. Therefore, it seems evident that winners do not necessarily develop more complimentary beliefs than losers. Conversely, losers do not necessarily develop more deprecating beliefs.

The "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis, however, was strongly supported in the analysis when it was refined. In this new formulation, the state of dissonance rather than the election outcome was made the major independent variable. The results of analysis show that among the winners, the "high dissonance" group more than the "low dissonance" group tended to upgrade their beliefs concerning the competence of voters. By contrast, among the losers, the "high dissonance" group more than the "low dissonance" group tended to downgrade their beliefs about voters. Thus, the evidence suggests that the "congratulation-rationalization effect" is operative to the extent that candidates' beliefs about voters and the election outcomes are incongruent.

Finally, one may ask whether the congratulation-rationalization hypothesis formulated by Kingdon offers a sound explanation of the divergent beliefs held by winning and losing candidates. The findings reported in this article suggest that the hypothesis does not provide an efficient explanation for the phenomenon that winners manifest markedly more favorable beliefs than losers do. It seems clear that winners more than losers have favorable beliefs, but not because winners change their beliefs in a favorable direction as a result of their election victories nor because losers alter their beliefs in an unfavorable direction. Alternative explanations must be sought for the divergent beliefs that winning and losing candidates manifest.[26] Possibly such explanations might be found in such factors as the incumbent status of candidates, the degree of competitiveness in their districts, their career socialization, and the level of their political ambition.

[26] Kingdon suggested alternative explanations based on the incumbent status of candidates and the marginality of the district. We plan to test some of these explanations in future research. See Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," pp. 142–43.

Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict*

TIMOTHY A. ALMY
University of Georgia

Urban scholars, whatever their discipline, have shared a concern for identifying the structural and environmental factors which shape local politics. The literature has become too extensive for a thorough discussion of the many variables which influence local politics, but one possibly important aspect that has largely been ignored by political scientists is the ecological structure of cities.[1]

In an effort, therefore, to remedy an apparent oversight in urban analysis, this paper will focus upon the theoretical and empirical relationships between the residential location of social-class groups in selected American cities and the electoral cohesion displayed by such population groups. Attention will also be directed at studying the consequences of this intragroup cohesion upon intergroup conflict as it is manifested in electoral competition. This analysis of residential location and electoral cohesion may provide an opportunity to examine existing propositions concerning the effects of location upon urban political conflict.

Residential location reflects a variety of class-based considerations. Studies have indicated that occupational and educational groups tend to cluster spatially in their selection of residential areas.[2] Even with low rates of interaction in most neighborhoods, neighbors in homogeneous areas are not only of similar status, but also tend to share the same values and lifestyles.[3] Residential location may also be a strategy for minimizing the social and spatial distance between the individual and the population he desires to emulate. Conversely, location also serves to maximize the distance from groups with which the individual does not wish to interact.[4] Additionally, the creation and erection of homogeneous and exclusive residential areas may also serve to increase the cohesiveness and solidarity of the inhabitants and lead to the development of distinctive group standards.

Several urban scholars have been concerned with the social implications of such group cohesion.[5] Apparent disagreement about the effect of residential segregation upon group cohesion exists, however, which suggests that we need further empirical study of the relationship between intragroup cohesion and intergroup disagreement. The disagreement centers on whether residential segregation increases or decreases the frictions between social-class groups. The solidarity of segregated classes may also be influenced by the intensity of the electoral disputes between these same groups. The more intense the disputes between class groups, the more may be their intragroup cohesion.[6]

One method that may prove useful in the examination of intragroup cohesion and intergroup disagreement is the analysis of the voting choices of urban residents. The policy choices of various social-class groups reflected in referenda voting on such local concerns as education, civic improvements, taxation, and similar items, can provide an index of both the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of community groups. The analysis of social-class support and opposition to local ballot issues facilitates the identification of segments of the urban popula-

---

* This article follows from the author's doctoral dissertation, "Ecological and Structural Determinants of Urban Electoral Conflict" (University of California, Riverside, 1971). Acknowledgments are due Charles R. Adrian and Ronald O. Loveridge for comments on the dissertation. I owe special thanks to Harlan Hahn who made these data available for analysis and who read and evaluated both the dissertation and manuscript.

[1] For one discussion of some ecological factors and intercity cooperation, read Oliver P. Williams, Harold Herman, Charles S. Liebman, and Thomas R. Dye, *Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies, A Philadelphia Story* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

[2] Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology,* 60 (March, 1965), 493–503; Suzanne I. Keller, *The Urban Neighborhood* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 90–92.

[3] William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 310–344.

[4] Oliver P. Williams, *Metropolitan Political Analysis, A Social Access Approach* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 28.

[5] Among the major works in this area are James Beshers, *Urban Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, 1962); William H. Michelson, *Man and His Urban Environment* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970); John Sirjamaki, *The Sociology of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1964).

[6] James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957); Lewis A Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956).

tion that are politically opposed to one another. By focusing upon local referenda voting, we can identify the nature and intensity of political conflicts that exist between electoral groups within many communities.

In summary, this paper is concerned with a pattern of urban conflict. This theme suggests that conflict is spatially patterned and thereby associated with residential location. The following hypotheses will be examined:

(1) Residential location will significantly influence the development of electoral cohesion *within* social-class groups. Social-class groups that are spatially segregated (located in socially homogeneous sectors) in a city will exhibit greater intragroup electoral cohesion in local referenda than spatially integregated social-class groups (located in socially heterogeneous sectors).

(2) Residential location will significantly influence the amount of electoral disagreement *between* different social-class groups. The residential segregation of class groups will promote the development of interclass disagreements, while spatial integration will hinder the development of these disagreements.

(3) The degree of interclass electoral disagreement will influence the degree of intraclass electoral cohesion. This relationship will be influenced, however, by the spatial distribution of class groups within each city. Cities with segregated classes will display high intraclass electoral cohesiveness, irrespective of the degree of interclass disagreement. On the other hand, cities with integrated classes will manifest low electoral cohesion independent of the degree of class disagreements.

Sources of Data and Methods of Measurement

Eighteen cities from a U.S. Public Health Service study of local voting behavior were selected for this study. The two criteria used for the selection of cities were size of city and number of referenda issues for which voting records and precinct maps were complete.[7] Despite the small base, these eighteen cities represent nearly all regions of the U.S. and offer a good basis for comparision. The two sources of information for this paper are city block demographic characteristics from the 1960 United States Census of Housing, and precinct-voting results from five types of referenda.[8]

The examination of the distribution and cohesion of population groups is not intended to be a study of the properties of the individuals within the city, instead, it is an examination of the aggregate properties of population groups residing within specified geographical sections of each community. Census statistics give valuable information about the environmental characteristics of an area, while precinct returns provide information about the political texture of an area. Aggregate data, therefore, appropriately provide the basis for the operationalization of the key concepts discussed in this paper. The next task is to elaborate on the methods used in defining these concepts operationally.

A social-class group is comprised of all of the precincts within a city that manifest similar social characteristics. A useful measure of social class presented in the Census of Housing is mean house value, and since housing values appear to be valid indicators of the social status of homeowners, they may be employed as surrogates for such typically used variables as education, occupation, and income. To determine the social-class rank of an individual precinct, the mean house value of each city block within each precinct is aggregated, and the mean house value of the precinct is computed.[9]

Social-class electoral cohesion is the amount of variance between precincts of the *same* social-class group in voting on referenda.[10] A group with low electoral cohesion manifests higher intensity of conflict than a class that is electorally cohesive. If precincts within a social class exhibit a relatively high amount of variance in their voting behavior, there is an electoral division within that class. This division of support for the referenda issues is a demonstration of intragroup electoral conflict.

---

[7] Peoria: 125, 736; St. Joseph: 71, 996; Medford: 29, 750; Rockford: 144, 707; Greensboro: 140, 672; Dayton: 239, 591; Fremont: 100, 739; Yakima: 45, 060; Flint: 193, 371; Lima: 53, 373; Berkeley: 113, 165; Allentown: 108, 926; Knoxville: 169, 766; Trenton: 102, 211; Lincoln: 148, 092; Eugene: 77, 284; Beaumont: 115, 716; Sioux Falls: 72, 557.

[8] A good discussion on the use of these specific data is provided by Harlan Hahn, "Ecological Data and Structural Characteristics: Some Notes on the Homogeneity of Precincts and Census Tracts (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Albuquerque, N.M., April 8–10, 1971).

[9] Social-class groups, computed on the basis of mean house values, were the following: Rank 1: mean values less than $7,320; Rank 2: mean values from $7,321 to $11,880; Rank 3: mean values from $11,881 to $18,120; Rank 4: mean values from $18,121 to $22,680; Rank 5: mean values above $22,681.

[10] Each city was ranked according to its mean social-class variance in voting for each referendum. The ranks were split at the median into two groups. Two-way analysis of variance statistics also indicated that splitting the ranks at the median resulted in the best homogeneous groupings possible. For fluoridation referenda the cutting-point was 73.6; for education, 70.6; for parks, 70.4; for civic improvements, 76.8; for public works, 82.2.

Interclass electoral disagreement is the degree of variation in voting on referenda *between* different social-class groups within a city. High variation in voting indicates high disagreement between classes. High disagreement is indicative of electoral conflict within the community.[11]

It is possible to specify the amount of spatial segregation or integration that a social-class group displays by examining the social dissimilarity scores of each of the precincts within a class group. This dissimilarity score is the amount of class difference between a precinct and all spatially contiguous precincts. Differences are translated into ordinal values varying between zero and one. Precincts with index scores near zero are in areas of very few class differences (socially homogeneous), whereas precincts with index scores approximating one are located in areas of great class distinctions (socially heterogeneous). The aggregation of the dissimilarity scores for all precincts within each class of precincts allows the comparison of the classes in a city on the basis of residential location, i.e., segregated or integrated.[12]

The empirical determination of the spatial contiguity of precincts is made by calculating the geographical distance between all possible pairs of precincts within each city. The calculation of the distance between all pairs of precincts is based upon the designation of the exact geographic location of each precinct. In this manner, the distance between any specific precinct and all other precincts can be examined, and those precincts that are nearest to the precinct in question can be identified according to social-class characteristics.

In addition, each precinct is given a value which reflects the average geographical distance between that precinct and all other precincts of the same class. Another statistic that has been calculated for each precinct is a measure of electoral disparity—the mean difference (percentage of the vote in favor of the referendum) between the precinct and all others within the same social class. Social dissimilarity and electoral disparity are similar to the measures of residential location and electoral cohesion except that dissimilarity and disparity are calculated on a precinct level rather than a social-class level.

The referenda under study include voting on the addition of fluorides into local water supplies, school bond and tax override elections, parks and recreation bonds and tax levies, bonds for the construction and improvement of civic buildings, and bonds for the construction of public works projects, such as streets, sewers, and city water works. This analysis encompasses 58 municipal elections held in these 18 U.S. cities since 1955. Fluoridation referenda account for 12 of the elections, education for 14, parks and recreation for 8, civic improvements for 12, and public works for 12 elections. This rich variety of ballot issues allows cross-community comparison of the pattern of political conflict.

In brief, this paper will test three major hypotheses: (1) An increase in the spatial segregation of social-class groups will be associated with an increase in the electoral cohesion displayed within each group; (2) an increase in the spatial segregation of social-class groups will be associated with an increase in the electoral disagreements between class groups; (3) an increase in interclass electoral disagreements will be associated with an increase in the electoral cohesion within each group but this relationship will be modified by the spatial distribution of social classes within each city.

Residential Location and Electoral Conflict

This investigation is principally concerned with examining the empirical associations between specified ecological variables and patterns of electoral behavior. Previous studies have indicated the need for research identifying the linkages between contextual factors and political processes. To clarify these linkages,

---

[11] Essentially the same technique was used to determine high and low disagreement among classes. For fluoridation referenda, the dichotomy was 136.8; for education, 49.2; for parks, 44.2; for civic improvements, 68.8; for public works, 121.4.

[12] Social class dissimilarity is computed in this way:

$$D_i = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\frac{X_{i1} - X_i}{d_{i1}}\right)^2}{\sum_{j=1}^{M} \left(\frac{M}{d_{ij}2}\right)^2},$$

where D is the amount of dissimilarity between precincts in the ith case, and all surrounding precincts, X_i is the social class of the ith precinct, and X_{il} is the rank of the lth precinct which surrounds the ith precinct. N_i is the number of precincts with data that are spatially proximate to the ith precinct. M equals maximum $(N_i - X_i, X_i - 1)$, where N_i is the number of class groups $(N_c = 5)$.

The numerator of the above ratio sums the rank dissimilarities between a precinct and its nearest surrounding precincts. This sum is weighted by the inverse of the square of the geographical distances (d_{il}^2). (My thanks to W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, for his assistance in developing this formula.) Social-class dissimilarity scores ranged from 5.497 to 22.730. For example, cities above 8.918 were categorized as high in dissimilarity, i.e., residentially integrated.

this paper suggests a model in which electoral cohesion within social-class groups and electoral disagreements between these groups are associated with the residential location of class groups in cities. In addition, the model implies that the association between interclass electoral disagreement and intraclass electoral cohesion is mutual in that each variable affects the other. The following indicates the direction of the hypothesized associations. As the model suggests, the associations between location and cohesion, and location and disagreement, are hypothesized to be direct and statistically significant, and the relationship between disagreement and cohesion is also assumed to be direct and significant.



Associations between the residential location of social-class groups and social-class electoral cohesion, between residential location and electoral disagreement, and between electoral disagreement and electoral cohesion were tested for statistical significance utilizing Fisher's Exact Test. This statistic is useful in the instance of bivariate tables where N is small and the data are not amenable to χ^2 tests of significance.[13] The relationships were examined for each category of referendum to determine how much patterns of municipal conflict vary according to the policy content of local ballot issues. The associations between residential location and social-class electoral cohesion are presented in this first table.

Perhaps the most striking finding in Table 1 is the consistency in the association between location and cohesion. In each referendum the direction and strength of the statistical associations remain essentially unchanged. Those cities with a high degree of spatial segregation (whose class groups are ecologically isolated) tend to have classes with high electoral cohesion. Conversely, the spatial integration of class groups is significantly associated with the development of low electoral cohesion within classes. Although examination of Table 1 reveals variation by referendum type in the pro-

Table 1. Residential Location of Social-Class Groups and Electoral Cohesiveness

(Percentages)

Local Referendum Issue	Residential Location of Social-Class Groups	*N***	Electoral Cohesion Within Class Groups	
			Low	High
*Fluoridation**	Spatially Segregated	7	14	86
	Spatially Integrated	7	80	20
*Education**	Spatially Segregated	10	10	90
	Spatially Integrated	4	75	25
*Parks**	Spatially Segregated	5	—	100
	Spatially Integrated	3	100	—
*Civic Improvements**	Spatially Segregated	7	—	100
	Spatially Integrated	5	60	40
*Public Works**	Spatially Segregated	5	20	80
	Spatially Integrated	7	86	14

* Significant at 5 per cent level, Fisher's Exact Test.
** Number of cities.

---

[13] Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 96–104.

portion of cities that display high electoral cohesion, this cohesion may be explained primarily by the spatial segregation of the class groups within those communities.

The findings in this table appear to be consistent with previous appraisals of the effects of residential segregation upon group cohesion. In general, segregated residential areas are thought to provide the physical contiguity for group cohesion and loyalty.[14] Studies indicate that if citizens move into neighborhoods inhabited by people of similar class, this demographic homogeneity is influential in the development of psychosocial homogeneity.[15] Similarly, other studies suggest that the class groups that are residentially located in homogeneous and segregated neighborhoods display distinctive group standards.[16] Distinctive group standards may also affect the electoral cohesion of classes in voting in local referenda. The distributions in this first table confirm that residential segregation is associated with the presence of electoral cohesiveness and solidarity.

Since residential location may also affect the development of intergroup disagreements and friction, the residential location of class groups was statistically related to the degree of electoral disagreement between class groups. The associations are presented in Table 2.

The patterns evident in Table 2 confirm that residential location significantly influences the amount of electoral disagreement between classes. Communities with segregated class groups display more electoral friction between classes than do integrated communities. Interestingly, the significant association was not found to fluctuate by referendum—a finding that is consistent with the analysis in the first table. The strong positive association between segregation and intergroup disagreement supports the inferences of the model, and in addition, may provide evidence to resolve some of the apparent contradictions of previous studies.

Several scholars have argued that intergroup conflict is a product of the spatial integration of incompatible groups. Physical proximity, they claim, may increase the probability of interaction which normally results in hostility and conflict between groups with distinctive standards.[17] Additional studies have noted that spatial integration brings about increased accessibility between unlike groups, which produces intergroup frictions.[18] Others speculate, however, that conflict between groups is influenced by residential segregation, leading to a decrease in interaction and communication, which further isolates groups.[19] The speculation linking spatial integration to conflict and intergroup

Table 2. Residential Location of Social-Class Groups and Electoral Disagreement

(Percentages)

	Residential Location of Social-Class Groups	N**	Electoral Disagreement Between Social-Class Groups	
			Low	High
*Fluoridation**	Spatially Segregated	7	—	100
	Spatially Integrated	5	80	20
*Education**	Spatially Segregated	10	20	80
	Spatially Integrated	4	100	—
*Parks**	Spatially Segregated	5	—	100
	Spatially Integrated	3	100	—
*Civic Improvements**	Spatially Segregated	7	28	72
	Spatially Integrated	5	100	—
*Public Works**	Spatially Segregated	5	20	80
	Spatially Integrated	7	86	14

* Significant at 5 per cent level, Fisher's Exact Test.
** Number of Cities

---

[14] Beshers, *Urban Social Structure*, p. 122.

[15] Robert C. Tryon, *The Identification of Social Areas By Cluster Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 8.

[16] Beshers, p. 111.

[17] D. W. G. Timms, *The Urban Mosaic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 2.

[18] Michelson, *Man and His Urban Environment*, pp. 119–125.

[19] Sirjamaki, *Sociology of Cities*, p. 270.

friction does not seem to be supported by the findings in this table, and therefore, may need qualification. Residential segregation appears to actually increase interclass disagreement rather than lower disagreement. Apparently, the association posited in the model between residential location and interclass electoral disagreement is confirmed by the data in Table 2.

The association between disagreement across class groups and electoral cohesion within them is imputed to be mutual and symmetrical. Analysis reveals that for all referenda, most of the cities that manifest high electoral disagreement between classes also display high electoral cohesion within class groups. This disagreement is not posited to cause cohesion because each variable is presumed to occur simultaneously. The more interclass disagreement exhibited in a city, the higher is the electoral cohesiveness, but if cohesion is taken as the independent variable, the higher the cohesion, the higher the disagreement becomes.

Although disagreement and cohesion are symmetrically related, it is easier to focus upon the influence of disagreement upon cohesion. The association has been found to be moderately, but not statistically, significant. To ascertain whether or not the relationship may be real and not spurious, Table 3 presents the associations between disagreement and cohesion controlling for residential location. If the association is indeed spurious, i.e., if the two variables depend upon residential location for their value, rather than upon each other, then the moderate positive relationship between high interclass disagreement and high social-class electoral cohesion will be invalidated.

Analysis of Table 3 indicates that the association may, in fact, be spurious, because whatever the level of class disagreement, the residential location of class groups exerts strong influence upon cohesiveness. In each referendum, cities with spatially segregated class groups display high electoral cohesiveness irrespective of the degree of interclass electoral disagreement. It is also evident that spatially integrated communities generally possess low electoral cohesiveness uninfluenced by amount of electoral disagreement.

These conclusions suggest that the original model needs reformulation. Reliance upon Fisher's Exact Test indicates that the associa-

Table 3. Electoral Disagreement Between Classes and Cohesion Within Classes Controlling for Residential Location

(Percentages)

	Residential Location of Social-Class Groups Within Cities					
Electoral Disagreement	N	Spatially Segregated Electoral Cohesiveness		N	Spatially Integrated Electoral Cohesiveness	
		Low	High		Low	High
FLUORIDATION REFERENDA						
Low	2	—	100	2	100	—
High	5	20	80	3	67	33
EDUCATION REFERENDA						
Low	3	—	100	3	67	33
High	7	14	86	1	100	—
PARKS REFERENDA						
Low	0	—	—	3	67	33
High	5	20	80	0	—	—
CIVIC IMPROVEMENT REFERENDA						
Low	4	25	75	3	67	33
High	3	—	100	2	50	50
PUBLIC WORKS REFERENDA						
Low	3	—	100	4	100	—
High	2	—	100	3	100	—

tions between location and cohesion, and location and disagreement are direct and statistically significant. As Table 3 reveals, the relationship between disagreement and cohesion may be spurious. Since residential segregation has been shown to affect cohesion and electoral disagreement, any association between cohesion and disagreement is significantly affected by the residential distribution of class groups.

These conclusions have been drawn from an analysis of social-class groupings within cities. Social-class segments constitute a useful and appropriate unit of analysis when attempting to draw inferences about the distribution and cohesion of class groups. The utilization of class groups within cities as the unit of analysis, however, limits the number of observations under investigation and may increase the probability of error. A more specific level of analysis may provide the opportunity to examine additional hypotheses related to location and urban electoral behavior.

The study of precinct voting patterns furnishes the occasion for investigating spatial location and electoral cohesion on a more precise scale, and with an increased number of observations. It is the purpose of this inquiry to determine if the patterns evident in the prior model are supported by investigation at a different level.

Two hypotheses are presented for scrutiny: (1) Precincts displaying high social-class dissimilarity will tend to display high electoral disparity. Dissimilarity is a measure of the amount of class difference between a given precinct and all of its contiguous precincts. Disparity refers to the degree of electoral difference (defined as the percentage of the vote in favor of the referendum) between precincts of the same class rank, irrespective of their location within a city. (2) Precincts revealing high distance scores will tend to exhibit high electoral disparity. A distance score is a measure of the average geographical distance between a precinct and all other precincts of the same class. It is an indicator of the geographical dispersion of similarly ranked precincts.

The logic of these hypotheses is that precincts of the same class arranged in segregated areas of a city will display fewer electoral differences between themselves than do precincts of the same class when they are located in integrated areas. Precincts in these highly dissimilar, or integrated, areas will manifest a high degree of electoral disparity because the electoral cohesiveness associated with segregated areas is not developed. As the spatial distance increases between similar classranked precincts, the likelihood that these precincts will be located in residentially segregated sectors of a city will also tend to decrease, thereby raising the level of electoral disparity. The following relationship may be inferred from these hypotheses.


GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRECINCTS
SOCIAL-CLASS DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN PRECINCTS
ELECTORAL DISPARITY BETWEEN PRECINCTS

Social class dissimilarity and geographical distance occur simultaneously, but there is no theoretical ground for assuming any causal relationship, even though a weak relationship is evident upon examination of correlation matrices. Class differences (dissimilarity) do not logically produce a situation of increased geographical distance between precincts of the same rank, nor does the reverse pattern occur. This model posits that both dissimilarity and distance independently produce disparity. Table 4 presents the Kendall coefficients of correlation (tau) between these variables. Kendall coefficients are used because dissimilarity is an ordinal measure, and assumptions of normality cannot be inferred.[20]

The finding most evident in Table 4 is that the coefficients between social-class dissimilarity and electoral disparity are generally of a high magnitude. As precincts increase in the amount of social-class dissimilarity they possess, they also display more electoral disparity between themselves and other precincts of the same class-rank. Interestingly, the coefficients between distance and disparity are also significant, but of a slightly lower magnitude than the associations between dissimilarity and disparity. Precincts revealing high distances between themselves and other similarly class-ranked precincts tend to manifest high levels of electoral disparity (voting difference between similar precincts). The data seem to indicate that the hypothesized relationships do exist, but that the strengths of relationships vary.

[20] Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics*, pp. 213–223.

Table 4. Kendall Rank-Order Coefficients of Correlation (tau) Between Dissimilarity and Electoral Disparity on Local Referenda

	N*	Fluoridation	Education	Parks	Civic Improvements	Public Works
Knoxville, Tenn	25	.69**	.41**	.32***		
St. Joseph, Mo.	69	.73**		.49**	.53**	.69**
Greensboro, N.C.	24	.75**				.57**
Lincoln, Neb.	97	.59**	.55**		.51**	.64**
Rockford, Ill.	148		.56**		.56**	.47**
Fremont, Cal.	65		.25**	.20**		
Lima, Ohio	67		.29**		.40**	.54**
Eugene, Ore.	75	.39**			.45**	.28**
Dayton, Ohio	180	.28**	.24**	.21**	.26**	.25**
Peoria, Ill.	113		.16**		.36**	
Yakima, Wash.	53	.41**	.33**	.53**	.24**	.33**
Berkeley, Cal.	124		.53**	.38**		
Trenton, N.J.	88	.28**	.49**			
Beaumont, Tex.	25		.27***	.19	.36**	.28***
Medford, Ore.	38	.88**	.65**		.42**	
Flint, Mich.	121	.75**	.64**			.52**
Allentown, Pa.	55	.58**	.52**	.38**	.52**	.59**
Sioux Falls, S.D.	29	.75**			.70**	.67**

Kendall Rank-Order Coefficients of Correlation (tau) Between Distance and Electoral Disparity

	N*	Fluoridation	Education	Parks	Civic Improvements	Public Works
Knoxville, Tenn.	25	.47**	.21	.26***		
St. Joseph, Mo.	69	.51**		.31**	.46**	.48**
Greensboro, N.C.	24	.55**				.48**
Lincoln, Neb.	97	.38**	.34**		.46**	.50**
Rockford, Ill.	148		.32**		.48**	.39**
Fremont, Cal.	65		.18***	.11		
Lima, Ohio	67		.16***		.22**	.28**
Eugene, Ore.	75	.27**			.34**	.19**
Dayton, Ohio	180	.22**	.11***	.13**	.10***	.08
Peoria, Ill.	113		.14***		.18**	
Yakima, Wash.	53	.34**	.28**	.40**	.13	.17***
Berkeley, Cal.	124		.41**	.31**		
Trenton, N.J.	88	.20**	.36**			
Beaumont, Tex.	25		.13	.09	.21	.19
Medford, Ore.	38	.61**	.49**		.24***	
Flint, Mich.	121	.50**	.43**			.43**
Allentown, Pa.	55	.39**	.39**	.23**	.44**	.48**
Sioux Falls, S.D.	29	.48**			.42**	.36**

* No. of Precincts.
** Significant at .01 per cent.
*** Significant at .05 per cent.

To determine if the relationship between dissimilarity and disparity is spurious, and if it is largely through the geographical distance between precincts that dissimilarity influences high disparity, partial rank-order coefficients of correlation (tau) between dissimilarity and disparity are calculated controlling for distance. The results of this partialling are presented in Table 5. When dissimilarity and disparity are correlated controlling for distance, the strong association is somewhat reduced and modified but not eliminated. The conclusion drawn from this finding is that the relationship is not spurious.

Table 5. Kendall Rank-Order Partial Coefficients of Correlation (tau) Between Dissimilarity and Electoral Disparity*

	N	Fluoridation	Education	Parks	Civic Improvements	Public Works
Knoxville, Tenn.	25	.26	.36	.18		
St. Joseph, Mo.	69	.40		.37	.33	.25
Greensboro, N.C.	24	.51				.23
Lincoln, Neb.	97	.45	.41		.31	.47
Rockford, Ill.	148		.48		.28	.21
Fremont, Cal.	65		.19			
Lima, Ohio	67		.21	.10	.33	.38
Eugene, Ore.	75	.21			.37	.10
Dayton, Ohio	180	.13	.18	.14	.08	.19
Peoria, Ill.	113		.05		.17	
Yakima, Wash.	53	.11	.17	.35	.14	.07
Berkeley, Cal.	124		.41	.19		
Trenton, N.J.	88	.12	.21			
Beaumont, Tex.	25		.18	.16	.20	.24
Medford, Ore.	38	.60	.32		.19	
Flint, Mich.	121	.49	.36			.22
Allentown, Pa.	55	.36	.46	.44	.49	.29
Sioux Falls, S.D.	29	.42			.67	.59

* Controlling for Distance.

Kendall Rank-Order Partial Coefficients of Correlation (tau) Between Distance and Electoral Disparity*

	N	Fluoridation	Education	Parks	Civic Improvements	Public Works
Knoxville, Tenn.	25	.08	.13	.11		
St. Joseph, Mo.	69	.23		.14	.09	.00
Greensboro, N.C.	24	.10				.13
Lincoln, Neb.	97	.05	.04		.00	.09
Rockford, Ill.	148		.14		.17	.13
Fremont, Cal.	65		.02	.07		
Lima, Ohio	67		.00		.04	.01
Eugene, Ore.	75	.13			.07	.05
Dayton, Ohio	180	.01	.03	.00	.09	.01
Peoria, Ill.	113		.10		.08	
Yakima, Wash.	53	.17	.12	.14	.02	.01
Berkeley, Cal.	124		.18	.15		
Trenton, N.J.	88	.06	.11			
Beaumont, Tex.	25		.02	.00	.12	.06
Medford, Ore.	38	.32	.25		.16	
Flint, Mich.	121	.26	.21			.18
Allentown, Pa.	55	.18	.19	.10	.23	.21
Sioux Falls, S.D.	29	.18			.15	.13

* Controlling for Dissimilarity.

The association of distance and disparity is also tested for spuriousness in Table 5 to ascertain the effect of dissimilarity upon the relationship. Examination of Table 5 indicates that the partial coefficient of correlation between distance and disparity is significantly reduced and almost eliminated. Usually, if the introduction of a third variable into a partial correlation eliminates or reduces the original correlation, it may be inferred that the original relationship was spurious if the third variable, i.e., dissimilarity, occurred prior in time to either of the other variables. In this instance, however, distance and dissimilarity occur simultaneously;

therefore, the conclusion may be that the manner in which distance modifies disparity has been traced.[21]

In summary, distance alone does not cause disparity to vary, but rather, high dissimilarity provides the conditions under which the increasing distance between precincts produces high disparity. These findings generally support the conclusions previously developed that social-class electoral cohesion is associated with the residential location of social-class groups. The strength of the association between the social-class dissimilarity of precincts and the electoral disparity between precincts confirms the previous findings. Moreover, the hypothesized association between residential arrangements of class groups and class electoral cohesion has been supported by two levels of empirical investigation.

Summary and Conclusions

Ecologists have theorized that there is a geographical basis upon which human behavior depends and some have studied how the spatial relationships of humans have been affected by a variety of forces in the urban environment.[22] To determine if the geographical distribution of social-class groups in a city has influenced the intensity of political conflict between classes, this paper has examined class voting responses to five types of referenda.

Those communities in this study that contained spatially segregated social-class groups also exhibited high social-class electoral cohesion and solidarity. Those groups located in areas of the city with few class differences appeared to have a commonality of voting behavior. Class groups not located in homogeneous areas did not exhibit this solidarity. In those cities, however, that had geographically fragmented classes with few segregated areas, the electoral cohesion of each class was low. A social-class group located in an area of wide class dissimilarity was likely not to vote in concert with other groups of the same social class located elsewhere in the city. The geographical separation of precincts of the same class would appear to produce voting behavior that is not uniform or consistent within that class group.

The segregation of population groups may tend to fuse neighborhood sentiment together. The adherence to common values and attitudes within each group is mirrored in the cohesiveness in voting by the groups within the area. Apparently certain areas in a city attract groups that come to possess similar political viewpoints. That this process of mutual attraction occurs seems to be indicated by the low variation in voting within residentially segregated areas of cities.

Interestingly, the cohesiveness of class groups was not affected by the type of issue voted upon by the residents of the city. Presumably distinct referendum issues, which appear to exhibit different policy contents, would elicit varying responses from the electorate. The analysis indicated, however, that each referendum type was associated with similar patterns of class cohesion.

Although location influenced intraclass cohesion, the spatial patterning of classes in each city also affected the level of disagreement between class groups. Communities with segregated classes exhibited a high degree of social-class cohesion and solidarity. Conflict theorists have contended that such a situation may create intense intergroup conflict. The findings of this paper, however, did not fully confirm those assertions. Instead, interclass disagreements appeared to be associated more with the geographical distribution of class groups than with class solidarity. Those cities that displayed segregated social-class groups also manifested higher levels of interclass disagreements than those social class groups in spatially integrated communities.

In summary, ecologists have contended that location is important in determining the behavior of population groups; the conclusions of this paper seem to support these contentions. Although this study is somewhat limited in scope, the findings indicate that the theoretical contributions of human ecology may be helpful in explaining certain patterns of local politics and the conflicts that shape them.

---

[21] Claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), p. 429.

[22] For a thorough discussion of these concepts, see Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925).

The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation*

BERNARD H. BOOMS
The Pennsylvania State University

AND

JAMES R. HALLDORSON
F. W. Woolworth Company, Tax Department

Fry and Winters introduced a new dimension of public policy output analysis in a recent article published in this *Review*.[1] In many ways their effort is a truly groundbreaking endeavor. It is imaginative, innovative and raises several important questions. As we shall suggest in the following analysis, however, the techniques Fry and Winters employed, while appropriate, were misused in several ways. After reformulating their analysis, we have found that the calculated values of their redistribution index as well as the nature of their findings, change substantially.

Fry and Winters's study is concerned with two broad questions: 1) Does politics make a difference in public policy outcomes, and 2) How are certain factors (socioeconomic and political variables) specifically related to policy outcomes?

Fry and Winters contend that previous studies addressed to these questions were formulated to bias the results against political variables. They suggest that:

> . . . prior findings have been the result of the examination of a measure of public policy in which the influence of the politcal system is likely to be negligible, that is *levels* of public revenues and expenditures. To examine this proposition empirically, our study shifts attention to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state revenue and expenditure policies across income classes. In redirecting analysis to allocations rather than levels of state revenues and expenditures, we focus on a province we believe to be more predictably political.[2]

Their alternative is to derive a new measure of public policy output:

> We have taken as our dependent variable the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures as represented by the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the three lowest income classes in each state. The major hypothesis of our study is that, in regard to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state government revenues and expenditures, political variables will have a stronger influence on policy outcomes than will socioeconomic variables.[3]

They raised the question of the impact of politics on public policy outcomes because most recent expenditure studies have suggested that political variables have little or no impact on policy outcomes.[4] In particular, the results have shown that socioeconomic variables seem to be more strongly related to state revenue and expenditure levels than are political variables, although the results have varied by function.[5] Given these findings, Fry and Winters state:

> . . . The political analyst may have to look beyond levels of taxes and expenditures to find politics having an independent or dominant influence on policy outcomes in the states. . . . As Key originally

---

* While this paper was being written, Mr. Halldorson was a Masters Degree candidate in the Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University. Michael R. King and Robert S. Friedman of the Political Science Department offered their valuable comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge their help. Special thanks are also due Joan B. Booms, and our colleagues in the Economics Department, Teh-wei Hu, D. Lynne Kaltreider, and James D. Smith for their interest and help. Stuart Scantlebury provided essential computation assistance. Special mention needs to be made of Richard F. Winters's open willingness to discuss the techniques he and Brian R. Fry used in their study and to provide the authors with some of the data used in their study.

[1] Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 508–522.

[2] Fry and Winters, p. 508.

[3] Fry and Winters, p. 508.

[4] This literature starts with Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *The Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–289. Fry and Winters provide a concise review of the literature. For a critique of the literature in this field see, Joan B. Booms and Bernard H. Booms, "A Critique of Recent Public Policy Output Studies," unpublished paper, The Pennsylvania State University, 1972.

[5] Fry and Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," p. 510. Others have also pointed to the interesting fact that public welfare is the one function for which outcomes are least well accounted. See, for example, Peter S. Albin and Bruno Stein, "The Determinants of Relief Policy at the Sub-Federal Level," *Southern Economic Journal*, 37 (April, 1971), 446. Since public welfare is mainly a redistributive program, this finding suggests that redistributive elements of public policy are not well accounted for in previous studies.

hypothesized, a fruitful area of search for such influence may be the redistributive policies of state governments.[6]

Public policy studies to date have been concerned with the allocation dimension of public policy, i.e., *how much* is provided for what program or function. In other words, research has emphasized the *levels* of resources allocated for alternative functions, implying that most public programs can be considered primarily allocative in nature. This view seems somewhat unrealistic. Obviously, public assistance is aimed purposely at redistribution within society, but most other public functions are not specifically designed for redistribution, but rather for the provision (allocation) of services that either would not be produced by the private sector because of total market breakdown, or would be underproduced because of partial market failure.[7]

Few, if any, of these allocation programs, however, are neutral in distribution impact. "Even programs that apparently benefit most of the population—such as education and highway construction—have a variable incidence of benefits."[8] So virtually all government programs contain an element of redistribution. Fry and Winters suggest that a look at the redistributive aspects of allocation should constitute a new focus for research because it is here that politics may play a central role.

We add that it is important to study redistribution effects because they are an important determinant of the quality of life for many people in our society. The allocation of public burdens and benefits is a major point of conflict in our society. It is obviously advantageous to know something about the factors influencing the distribution of public outcomes.

Incidental to this concern of knowledge for policy purposes is the question of whether political, socioeconomic, historical, or geographical variables are more helpful in studying this question. *A priori* Fry and Winters's contention that political variables should be most important in determining the distribution of output seems reasonable. While the *level of funds* spent seems more likely to be a function of ability-to-pay factors such as income, *who pays* and *who benefits* from a *given* level of operation may lie more in the realm of politics. It might be hypothesized that political forces design the program and influence its administration.[9]

Fry and Winters's Method

Fry and Winters sought to measure the "net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures" in each state expressed as a ratio of expenditure benefits to tax burdens for the lowest three income classes.[10] The process by which these ratios were derived was adapted from a Tax Foundation Study (1967).[11] The purpose of that study was

> to provide broad estimates of (1) the total tax burden—Federal and state-local—on families and unattached individuals by income class and major type of tax, and (2) the benefits of government expenditures by major groups of programs.[12]

Bases of allocation were assumed for each major tax and expenditure category in order to explain the incidence of burdens and benefits to families in each income class. The statistical bases of allocation used by Fry and Winters were taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), *Survey of Consumer Expenditures 1960–1961*[13] which reported families' average dollar expenditures and average dollar income receipts for specific expenditure and income categories by income class. In this study (BLS) expenditures and income were reported for the entire nation for both urban and rural families. Fry and Winters adapted these data to determine the percentage distribution of tax burdens and expenditure benefits for each income class by state.[14]

---

[6] Fry and Winters, p. 510.

[7] See Richard A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), for a discussion of the distinction between the allocative and distributive functions of government, and a definition of public outcomes based on the performance of the market.

[8] Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics* (May, 1968), 515, cited in Fry and Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," p. 510.

[9] John P. Crecine presents some evidence which tends to support these statements. His results seem to indicate that level of expenditures and revenues is, in the short run, relatively immune to political pressure. He concludes that political pressure and influence are more likely to affect whose street gets repaired, and how much is spent per pupil at a school, rather than the level of the total street repair or school district expenditures. See John P. Crecine, *Government Problem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

[10] Fry and Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," p. 513.

[11] Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures By Income Class,* 1961 and 1965 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).

[12] Tax Foundation, p. 7.

[13] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Survey of Consumer Expenditures, 1960–1961,* Report No. 237–93, February 1965, and supplements.

[14] For example, it was assumed that expenditures for automobile operations served as the basis of allocation

The Tax Foundation considered each revenue and expenditure category for the federal and state-local levels of government. The bases of allocation were then applied to the aggregate total amounts collected and expended by each level of government to determine the expenditure benefits and tax burdens for each income class for the entire nation. It is important to note that the statistical bases of allocation were adapted from national averages for expenditures and income, and referred to a *national distribution of families by income classes.*

Fry and Winters adapted directly the method used in the Tax Foundation study to determine the distribution of benefits and burdens for states' expenditures and revenues by income class for each state. To do this Fry and Winters assumed those bases of allocation from the Tax Foundation study that were applicable to state government expenditures and revenues (see Tables 1 and 2). They also adapted the same statistical bases of allocation used by the Tax Foundation and converted them into percentage amounts to explain the percentage distribution of burdens to benefits by income class for each expenditure and revenue category. Because they assumed the statistical bases of allocation from the Tax Foundation study, they used one set of percentages for the distribution of revenue burdens and one set for expenditure benefits. These two sets of percentages were then applied to each state's expenditures and revenues to determine the actual amount of tax burdens and expenditure benefits by each income class for each state. They then summed the amount received as expenditure benefits, and the amounts spent as tax burdens for each state for the lowest three income classes, i.e. those with an income under $4,000. Finally, they expressed these amounts as a ratio of expenditures to revenues in each state.

Critique of Fry and Winters's Methods

This technique, which should yield a meaningful approximation of the distribution and benefits from the public sector, is not problem-free. Fry and Winters acknowledge this, citing some of the "problems"—the necessity of selecting somewhat arbitrarily the allocation bases from which they constructed their indices, and the assumption that the consumption pattern of a given income group does not vary from state to state.[15] This latter assumption results from the lack of Bureau of Labor Statistics data on a state-by-state basis. Fry and Winters thus necessarily assume that people in the $3,000 to $3,999 group (regardless of the state in which they reside) spend the same percentage of their income on the allocation bases commodities (e.g., cigarettes, automobile operation). While this is clearly not true for all goods, the items used here for assigning benefits and burdens to an income class are universal American consumption items. Thus this assumption seems realistic.

The above-cited problems do not invalidate their calculations and results; however, Fry and Winters make some errors in using the technique which *do* seem to destroy much of the value of their work and cast doubt on their results. We will discuss these errors, describe our reformulation and then compare the Fry and Winters findings with our own.

The *major* error committed by Fry and Winters in deriving their redistribution index is their application of the Tax Foundation's calculated distributions of expenditures and revenues (which refers to the U.S. as a whole) to each state. The Tax Foundation used expenditures by each income class as a percentage of the total; in doing this, they validly based their work on national figures for the number of families in each income class as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. *But* this procedure should not be followed when developing separate state-by-state estimates of redistribution, since the number of families in each income class varies widely across the states.

Fry and Winters adapt the bases of allocation used by the Tax Foundation in order to explain the distribution of tax burdens and expenditure benefits by income class. The Tax

---

for motor vehicle taxes. The average amount spent for automobile operations in each income class was multiplied by the number of families in that income class to determine the total amount spent by each income class for automobile operations. This amount was summed across income classes to determine the amount spent by all families in all income classes. The amount spent by each specific income class was then taken as a percentage of that total. If the families in the income class of $15,000 and over accounted for 10 per cent of all automobile operation expenditures, they were allocated 10 per cent of the burden for Motor Vehicle taxes. Similarly, on the expenditure side, it was assumed that benefits of government highway expenditures were allocated to each income class according to one-half its expenditures for automobile operation and one-half its expenditures for total current consumption. The same process was repeated to determine the percentage of the total amount spent for automobile operation and total current consumption by each income class. If the income class of $15,000 and over accounted for 12 per cent of expenditures for total current consumption and 8 per cent of expenditures for automobile operation, they would then be allocated 10 per cent of the benefits for government highway expenditures.

[15] Fry and Winters, pp. 514–515.

Table 1. Bases of Allocation for State Government Expenditures

Expenditure Category	Basis of Allocation
Direct Expenditures	
Education	
Elementary and Secondary	Number of children under 18.
Higher and Other	Higher education expenditures.
Highways	Half automobile operation and half total current consumption.
Public Welfare	Income from public social assistance and private relief.
Agriculture	Farm money income before taxes.
Insurance Trust	Public unemployment and social security benefits.
Interest	Interest income.
Other—General	Half money income before taxes and half number of families and unrelated individuals.
Intergovernmental	
Education	Half number of children under 18 years of age and half higher education expenditures.
Highways	Same as Direct Highway Expenditures.
Welfare	Same as Direct Welfare Expenditures.
General	Same as Direct General Expenditures.

Foundation took the average amount spent or received in each category as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and multiplied it by the number of families in each income class and summed these amounts across classes to determine the amount spent or received by all income classes for each category for the country as a whole. Fry and Winters took this amount spent by each income class, and expressed it as a percentage of the total amount spent by all income classes. These figures were assumed to express the proportion of burdens and benefits allocated to each class. The single set of percentages, derived as it was from national distributions, was then applied by Fry and Winters to each state's revenues and expenditures to determine the amounts spent and received by the income classes in each state.

This method of index construction is inappropriate because it is derived from percentages based on a *national* distribution of families by income class (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' study). The proportion of families in each income class obviously varies from state to state.[16] Consequently, the application of these percentages to each state's revenues and expenditures erroneously assigns burdens and benefits to income classes. For example, if on the na-

Table 2. Bases of Allocation for State Government Revenues

Revenue Category	Basis of Allocation
Taxes	
Sales and Gross Receipts	
Alcoholic Beverage	Alcoholic beverage expenditures.
Tobacco	Tobacco expenditures.
Motor Vehicle	Automobile operation expenditures.
All Other	Total current consumption.
Individual Income	Personal taxes.
Corporation	Half total current consumption and half dividend income.
Property Tax	Half total current consumption and half housing expenditures.
Death and Gift	Completely to the $15,000 and over income class.
All Other	Total current consumption.
Social Insurance Contributions	Combination of social security, railroad, and government retirement contributions and total current consumption.
Charges and Miscellaneous	Total current consumption.
Intergovernmental	Distribution of federal taxes.

---

[16] An examination of 1960 Census data proves that the distribution of families by income class does vary significantly from state to state. As an illustration, the national percentage of families and unattached individuals in the income class of $3,000 to $3,999 is 11.0 per cent as reported by the BLS. According to 1960 Census data, the percentage of families who earn from $3,000 to $3,999 varies from 6.2 per cent in Connecticut to 14.3 per cent in Maine.

tional level, the income class of $15,000 or over spends 10 per cent of the total spent for automobile operation, Fry and Winters assign 10 per cent of the burden for Motor Vehicle taxes to this income class in each state. But in some states, the proportion of families who make $15,000 or more is, for example, less than the national average, and thus in those states this income group accounts for less than 10 per cent of the total spent on automobile operation expenditures. By Fry and Winters's method this income class would be allocated 10 per cent of the burden of motor vehicle taxes in each state no matter what the distribution of families who earn $15,000 or more is in that state.

A less serious error is Fry and Winters's inclusion, as part of revenues to be allocated, of those connected with the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. In 16 states liquor retailing is limited by law to state owned monopoly liquor stores. The revenue from these stores is correctly included by Fry and Winters as an item of burden to be allocated. However, Fry and Winters also include purchases by state liquor stores for resale as an item of benefit to allocate and thus as a factor in calculating their output measure. There seems to be no clear rationale for doing this. Not since prohibition have federal or state governments decreed the amount of liquor *purchases*. Purchase amounts are not the subject of public policy. Also, since the official figures on liquor store expenditures reflect total price, i.e., both price of item and tax, and since only figures for states with government monopoly on sales are collected, an unknown bias is introduced into the calculation of the redistributive index. The extent of this bias must be investigated, or the calculations corrected, before the redistribution measure can be accepted as actually measuring what it is purported to measure. In reformulating a redistribution index, we correct for Fry and Winters' handling of revenues and benefits allocated on the basis of the sales of alcoholic beverages, by excluding liquor store expenditures from consideration.

The Method of Reformulation

To provide a measurement of distribution of the tax burdens and expenditure benefits on a state-by-state basis, it would be ideal to have data on consumer expenditures and income by income class for each state. Unfortunately, the extensive study done by the BLS is the only one that provides sufficient figures of families' expenditures and income by income-class. As mentioned above, due to the sampling method that study does not provide data on a state-by-state basis.

It is the purpose of the reformulation to adapt the national figures provided by the BLS for a state-by-state analysis. Instead of using one set of national averages for the number of families and single consumers in each income class, as Fry and Winters did, the reformulation accounts for the distribution of families and single consumers by income class in each state.

The reformulation employs seven equations that determine the distribution of burdens (benefits) for each category of revenues (expenditures) to each income class, as well as the redistribution of income. The reformulation determines burdens and benefits, along with the redistribution ratios, for each category of revenues and expenditures, for each income class, in each state. (See Appendix 1 for equations.)

The first equation considers the BLS categories of expenditures and income that serve as the bases of allocation for the corresponding categories of state expenditures and revenue. (See Tables 1 and 2 for bases of allocation.) The average amount spent (received) by each income class for each BLS category is divided by the average money income before taxes for each income class. The average amount spent (received) for each BLS category is presented as a percentage of the average money income before taxes for all nine income classes.

The second equation derives the aggregate total money income before taxes for all families and unattached individuals in each income class for each state. The *distribution* of families and unattached individuals, by income class in each state is accounted for here, thus overcoming the major error of the Fry and Winters study.

The third equation derives the average dollar amounts of expenditures and income for each category that serves as a basis of allocation to the corresponding categories of state revenues and expenditures.

The fourth equation sums the average dollar amounts of expenditures (income) across all nine income classes. Each individual income class is then taken as a percentage of this total.

The fifth equation derives the actual dollar amount of burdens for state government revenues and benefits of state government expenditures for each income class in each state.

The sixth equation sums the dollar amount of benefits for all twelve categories of expenditures, for each income class, as well as the burdens for all twelve categories of revenues for each income class in each state.

The final equation derives the ratio of redistribution for the lowest four income classes, i.e., those earning less than $4,000 by dividing total expenditure benefits received for the lowest four income classes by the revenue burdens paid out for the same income classes.

A Comparison of Results

We now turn to the relationship among our index of redistribution, that of Fry and Winters, and facets of the social, economic, and political structure of the states. Our results are presented in the same manner as Fry and Winters's in order to facilitate comparisons.[17]

Table 3 gives the redistribution ratios for the subject states. A rank ordering of the states according to each version of the index is also provided. It is obvious the absolute values of the two versions of the index differ greatly, and the rank ordering shifts significantly. (The simple correlation between the two indices is .63.) These discrepancies seem to indicate that our revision is an important change. The errors we discussed above appear to have more than just academic import.

To check for further differences between the two approaches, a state-by-state comparison would be ideal. Unfortunately, such a direct comparison is not possible since Fry and Winters do not list the figures on the amount of burdens and benefits for each state. One possible means of comparison, however is to examine the single set of percentage distributions presented by Fry and Winters and the percentage distributions for *each* state obtained in the reformulation, but not presented here because of space limitations. Such a comparison bears out the thesis of the reformulation. For example, the percentage allocation for the burden of motor vehicle taxes for the income class of $3,000 to $3,999 is 8.2 per cent according to Fry and Winters's methods, while the percentages yielded by the reformulation ranged from 1.7 per cent in Idaho to 12.6 per cent in Arkansas for the same category and the same income class. Similar striking differences were found for most categories and income classes.

After constructing their index of redistribution, Fry and Winters proceeded to test several basic hypotheses regarding the factors associated with redistribution. The results of these tests are found in Table 6, Summary of Findings, in their article. For purposes of comparison and illustration only, we carried out identical tests using the reformulated version of the dependent variable.

Table 3. A Comparison of Ratios

Reformulation		State	Fry & Winters*	
Rank	Ratio		Rank	Ratio
1	6.004	Massachusetts	1	3.320
2	5.904	Illinois	10	2.376
3	5.804	California	12	2.322
4	5.385	Colorado	7	2.464
5	4.700	Connecticut	5	2.486
6	4.680	Washington	25	2.093
7	4.348	New York	3	2.644
8	4.342	Ohio	16	2.242
9	3.900	New Jersey	21	2.135
10	3.694	Missouri	2	2.712
11	3.679	Idaho	18	2.205
12	3.549	Michigan	34	1.920
13	3.501	Kansas	30	1.998
14	3.375	Rhode Island	6	2.482
15	3.372	Maryland	33	1.923
16	3.348	Indiana	42	1.793
17	2.995	Pennsylvania	23	2.107
18	2.958	Oregon	8	2.446
19	2.785	Minnesota	24	2.098
20	2.774	Nevada	39	1.826
21	2.653	Oklahoma	4	2.567
22	2.590	West Virginia	28	2.011
23	2.559	Utah	32	1.954
24	2.522	Wisconsin	11	2.340
25	2.522	Georgia	22	2.127
26	2.482	Iowa	29	2.001
27	2.435	Arizona	46	1.694
28	2.398	Kentucky	9	2.428
29	2.304	Alabama	14	2.267
30	2.216	Tennessee	27	2.031
31	2.211	Maine	26	2.060
32	2.198	Mississippi	13	2.274
33	2.184	Wyoming	47	1.660
34	2.166	Delaware	20	2.190
35	2.128	Nebraska	40	1.813
36	2.126	North Carolina	35	1.900
37	2.126	Florida	36	1.850
38	2.123	Louisiana	15	2.252
39	2.036	Arkansas	17	2.212
40	1.971	New Mexico	44	1.720
41	1.910	Montana	31	1.962
42	1.908	Vermont	19	2.199
43	1.845	New Hampshire	38	1.830
44	1.740	South Carolina	43	1.775
45	1.728	North Dakota	37	1.845
46	1.661	Virginia	48	1.620
47	1.574	Texas	41	1.800
48	1.537	South Dakota	45	1.715

* Source: Fry and Winters, p. 515.

It should be pointed out there are some statistical problems with the method Fry and Winters used to test their hypotheses. The most obvious problem is one of multicollinearity.[18] The existence of heavy multicollinearity still yields unbiased estimates for the regression coefficients but inflates their standard errors. This, in effect, lowers the chance of a variable's being statistically significant and thus may lead to improper assumptions concerning the absence of correlation between the dependent variable and specific independent variables. In essence, the danger is not of erring in favor of finding a statistically significant correlation when one does not exist, but, rather, of missing true correlation linkages.

---

[17] The error of assuming a uniform income distribution among states made it possible to use only two tables, one for burdens, the other for benefits. Our technique yields two such summary tables for *each* state so it is impossible to include these summary tables.

Noell states without specific evidence that multicollinearity exists in the Fry and Winters regressions. Our efforts provide evidence to prove this allegation. A test of orthogonality on the determinate of the correlation matrix of in-

Table 4. Summary of Findings

48 States

	Hypothesized Relation	Zero-Order	Partial	Regression Coefficient	Beta Coefficient
I. Variables					
Socioeconomic Variables					
Ability to Pay					
Median Income	+	.65 (.18)	.42 (−.27)	13.33**	1.11
Industrialization	+	.43 (.29)	.06 (−.02)	7.66	.05
Urbanization	+	.67 (.34)	.30 (.15)	26.21*	.33
Education	+	.39 (−.01)	.45 (.17)	510.33**	.48
Need (Demand)					
Gini Index	+	−.43 (.00)	−.18 (.22)	−82.68	−.21
% under $3,000	+	−.56 (−.14)	.60 (−.07)	243.58**	2.07
Political Variables					
Mass Political Behavior					
Political Partic.	+	.34 (.14)	.40 (.37)	25.79**	.41
Democratic Vote	+	−.30 (−.06)	.06 (.11)	5.10	.06
Interparty Comp.	+	.24 (−.21)	.14 (−.14)	18.92	.08
Leg. Inducements	+	.37 (.03)	−.10 (.07)	−38.95	−.07
Government Insts.					
Apportionment	−	.07 (.04)	−.17 (.01)	−4.65	−.09
Leg. Party Cohesion	+	.50 (.24)	.20 (−.05)	1240.88	.11
Governor Power	+	.52 (.26)	−.10 (.12)	−259.89	−.07
Governor Tenure	+	.47 (.17)	.36 (.12)	2343.20**	.24
Elite Behavior					
I. G. Strength	−	−.23 (−.04)	−.25 (−.17)	−2408.95	−.19
Civ. Ser. Coverage	+	.44 (.33)	.20 (.34)	5.46	.14
Leg. Professionalism	+	.56 (.51)	.20 (.28)	2.34	.20
Innovation Index	+	.70 (.46)	.41 (.07)	60.96	.44
Constant				−182305.72	
II. Multiple Coefficients of Determination					
			R^2		
All Variables			.64 (.55)		
Socioeconomic Variables			.56 (.17)		
Political Variables			.72 (.38)		
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination[a]					
Political Variables Controlled for Socioeconomic Variables			.64 (.46)		
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled for Political Variables			.42 (.27)		

* Indicates significant at 10% level for a two-tailed *t* test.

** Indicates significant at 5% level for a two-tailed *t* test. Two tailed tests were used in order to test both the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients.

Numbers in parentheses are from Fry and Winters, p. 520.

[a] For a discussion of this statistic see Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 350–351.

---

[18] See comment by James J. Noell and reply by Fry and Winters. *American Political Science Review,* 64 (December, 1970), 1249–1251. An unknown referee pointed out a problem that neither Noell nor we mention, viz., that caution should be used in choosing which income variables to include as independent variables, since the dependent variable is in part income-defined. Obviously it would be meaningless to regress a variable on its own constituent parts.

Table 5. Summary of Findings

36 Non-South States

	Hypothesized Relation	Zero-Order	Partial	Regression Coefficient	Beta Coefficient
I. Variables					
Socioeconomic Variables					
Ability to Pay					
Median Income	+	.64 (.23)	.45 (−.40)	13.71*	.79
Industrialization	+	.49 (.33)	.04 (−.05)	4.97	.03
Urbanization	+	.69 (.42)	.47 (.23)	44.35**	.52
Education	+	.20 (−.08)	.54 (.19)	644.08**	.43
Need (Demand)					
Gini Index	+	−.20 (.13)	−.23 (.47)	−107.70	−.18
% under $3,000	+	−.54 (−.21)	.63 (−.23)	294.08**	1.44
Political Variables					
Mass Political Behavior					
Political Partic.	+	−.007 (.06)	.51 (.36)	39.05**	.31
Democratic Vote	+	.15 (.11)	−.08 (.17)	−13.90	−.05
Interparty Comp.	+	.16 (−.16)	.25 (−.19)	30.12	.14
Leg. Inducements	+	.21 (.11)	−.24 (.33)	−105.98	−.13
Government Insts.					
Apportionment	−	.001 (.10)	−.20 (.09)	−5.64	−.11
Leg. Party Cohesion	+	.41 (.25)	.18 (.00)	1141.11	.09
Governor Power	+	.53 (.24)	−.24 (−.04)	−734.74	−.18
Governor Tenure	+	.45 (.12)	.45 (.17)	2958.10*	.33
Elite Behavior					
I.G. Strength	−	−.08 (−.01)	−.17 (−.07)	−1630.16	−.13
Civ. Ser. Coverage	+	.47 (.35)	.40 (.48)	10.90*	.27
Leg. Professionalism	+	.64 (.56)	.21 (.14)	2.83	.26
Innovation Index	+	.68 (.50)	.34 (.17)	54.06	.39
Constant				−196966.05	
II. Multiple Coefficients of Determination					
			R^2		
All Variables			.87 (.67)		
Socioeconomic Variables			.53 (.28)		
Political Variables			.72 (.46)		
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination[a]					
Political Variables Controlled for Socioeconomic Variables			.72 (.54)		
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled for Political Variables			.53 (.39)		

* Indicates significant at 10% level for a two-tailed *t* test.

** Indicates significant at 5% level for a two-tailed *t* test. Two tailed tests were used in order to test both the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients.

Numbers in parentheses are from Fry and Winters, p. 520.

[a] For a discussion of this statistic see, Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 350–351.

dependent variables showed values of .0000000069 and .0000001525.[19] Since a value of unity means no multicollinearity, and a value of zero indicates the matrix is singular, or perfect multicollinearity exists, problems of multicollinearity are obviously present.

There are also some difficulties in interpreting Fry and Winters's presentation of their findings. No measure is provided of the impact that a change in each variable has on the dependent variable (other things constant). Regression coefficients, which provide a quantitative measure of these impacts, are useful for judging the potential impact of alternative policy changes or outcomes. Regression coefficient values as well as beta coefficient values are presented in Table 4. Beta coefficients can be used to measure the importance of individual explanatory variables for the calculated value of the dependent variable, just as partial correlation coefficients are used for this purpose.[20] This measure provides an alternative method for comparing the relative importance of variables in "explaining" the dependent variable. Note that the regression coefficient is inappropriate for this purpose, since the size of the coefficient can be changed by changing the units of measurement for the variable. Regression coefficients show the degree of impact, not degree of correlation. For these reasons, we have computed regression and beta coefficients in addition to the various correlation techniques used by Fry and Winters. The results are presented in Table 4. In interpreting the table, one should bear in mind that while the zero-order and partial correlation coefficients allow one to make statements about the degree of association among variables, the regression coefficient gives a quantitative measure of the impact of changes in the independent variable on the dependent variable. As was indicated above, this statistic allows for judgements regarding proposed policy changes. It also points to what might be altered if significant changes in redistribution are desired.[21]

---

[19] For a description of this test, see Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 49 (February, 1967), 92–107.

Table 4 shows major differences between our results and those of Fry and Winters. Several are particularly interesting. Note that by reformulating the redistribution index, we have raised considerably the relative explanatory power of the socioeconomic variables (from .17 to .56 for the multiple coefficient of determination, and from .39 to .53 for the multiple-partial coefficient of determination). More significantly, we find that the amount of explained variance between all 48 states and the non-South states (Table 5) is very nearly identical (.84 and .87), contrary to Fry and Winters's results (.55 and .67). This finding tends to make Fry and Winters's lengthy explanation of South vs. Non-South differences less meaningful.

Also interesting is that the relationship between interparty competition and redistribution changes direction. Contrary to Fry and Winters's own findings, when our index is related to competition, the data support the original Fry and Winters hypothesis; namely, that competition leads to greater redistribution.

The primary purpose of this paper was to reformulate a redistribution index for the impact of state government activities on the incomes of individuals and to show how such a reformulation was important because it yielded results significantly different from those originally obtained by Fry and Winters. The above regression analysis was carried out for comparison purposes only. In addition to the few specific comparisons made here, others could be made and important hypotheses tested; this work however awaits more appropriate analytical techniques.

APPENDIX I

Methodological Appendix

Presented below are the seven equations that were used to determine the distribution of burden (benefits) for each category of revenues (expenditures) to each income class as well as the redistribution of income. (See pp. 928 and 929 in text for a discussion of these equations.)

Equation 1:

$$P_{ih} = \frac{(\overline{C}_{ih})}{\overline{Y}_i}$$

P_{ih} = Percentage of money income before taxes spent (received) for BLS categories of expenditures and income that serve as bases of allocation

h = Bases of allocation that correspond to state expenditure and revenue categories. h from 1 to 24

i = Income classes. i from 1 to 9

$\overline{C}_{ih}$ = Average dollar amounts of expenditures and income for bases of allocation

$\overline{Y}_i$ = Average money income before taxes

In some cases the BLS categories had to be combined. Therefore,

$$(\overline{C}_h), \left[\overline{C}_h = \sum_{i=1}^{9} \overline{C}_{ih}\right]$$

represents the BLS categories or combination of categories that serve as the bases of allocation for the corresponding categories of state revenues and expenditures. The values of both $(\overline{C}_h)$ and $(\overline{Y}_i)$ were taken from the same BLS study used by the Tax Foundation and Fry and Winters.[22]

---

[20] See Arthur S. Goldberger, *Econometric Theory*, John Wiley, New York, 1964, pp. 197–198. A note of caution is in order here. The fact that beta coefficients are themselves statistics is often overlooked by researchers. Before any meaning can be attributed to a beta coefficient, one must test whether it is significantly different from zero. Likewise, in comparing the magnitudes of beta coefficients, one should test for a statistical significance difference between the two beta coefficients. See Teh-wei Hu, "Beta Coefficients Used in Statistical Inference," unpublished paper (The Pennsylvania State University, 1971).

[21] Note also that indications of statistical significances are given for the regression coefficients, making possible an evaluation of the reliability of these estimates.

[22] The values of (C_h) for the category of elementary and secondary education were not included in this formula. The basis of allocation for this category is the

Equation 2:

$$T_{ij}=(M_{ij})(\overline{Y}_{ij})$$

T_{ij} = Total aggregate money income before taxes for all families and unattached individuals

j = State, j from 1 to 48

M_{ij} = Number of families and unattached individuals

$\overline{Y}_{ij}$ = Average money income before taxes

The values of (M_{ij}) were taken from the 1960 census.[23]

Equation 3:

$$A_{ijh}=(P_{ih})(T_{ij})$$

A_{ijh} = Average dollar amount of expenditures (income)

P_{ih} = Percentage of money income before taxes spent (received)

T_{ij} = Total aggregate money income before taxes for all families and unattached individuals

This step recalculates the values of (C_{ih}) for each individual state. The values of (A_{ijh}) take into account the difference in the distribution of families and unattached individuals, by income class, from state to state.

Equation 4:

$$a_{ijh}=\frac{A_{ijh}}{\sum_{i=1}^{9} A_{ijh}}$$

a_{ijh} = Percentage of expenditures (income) spent (received) by each income class in relation to the total amount spent by all nine income classes

A_{ijh} = Average dollar amount of expenditures (income)

The values of (a_{ijh}) represent the percentage burden (benefit) of state government revenues (expenditures) allocated to each income class.

Equation 5:

$$BE_{ijk}=(a_{ijh})(SE_{jk})$$
$$BU_{ijl}=(a_{ijh})(SR_{jl})$$

BE_{ijk} = Dollar amount of benefits from state expenditure program

BU_{ijl} = Dollar amount of burden from state revenue program

k = Category of state government expenditure program

l = Category of state government revenue program

SE_{jk} = Dollar amount of state government expenditures

SR_{jl} = Dollar amount of state government revenues

The dollar amounts of state expenditures (BE_{jk}) and state revenues (BU_{jl}) were taken from the *Compendium of State Government Finances in 1961*.[24]

Equation 6:

$$be_{ij}=\sum_{k=1}^{12} BE_{ijk}$$

$$bu_{ij}=\sum_{l=1}^{12} BU_{ijl}$$

be_{ij} = Total dollar amount of benefits for all categories of state expenditures

bu_{ij} = Total dollar amount of burdens for all categories of state revenues

BE_{ijk} = Dollar amount of benefits from state expenditure program

BU_{ijl} = Dollar amount of burden from state revenue program

Equation 7:

$$r_j=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{4} be_{ij}}{\sum_{i=1}^{4} bu_{ij}}$$

r_j = The ratio of redistribution for the lowest four income classes

be_{ij} = Total dollar amount of benefits for all categories of state expenditures

bu_{ij} = Total dollar amount of burdens for all categories of state revenues

---

number of children under 18 years of age for each family. The values of (P_{ih}) for this category were taken directly from the BLS study.

[23] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of the Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pts. 2–9, 11–52. A problem arises here since the income classes used by the BLS and those used by the Bureau of the Census do not coincide in all cases. To solve this problem, those income classes between \$6,000 and \$9,999 were lumped into one class. To combine the BLS data, weighted averages were taken (according to the number of families and single consumers in the income class to be combined) to determine the average amounts of income and expenditures for the income class of \$6,000 to \$9,999. For the Census data the classes were simply added together.

[24] U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality*

RICHARD ZECKHAUSER
Harvard University

"In a capitalist democracy there are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used to make 'political' decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make 'economic' decisions."[1] To economists, the freely functioning competitive market mechanism has alluring structural properties.[2] If each individual follows his own self-interest in making his market decisions, an efficient outcome is achieved.

What of the possibility of constructing a voting mechanism that would achieve a collective political outcome that would have desirable properties that parallel those of the competitive market outcome? Can a voting system be impersonal and decentralized, allow each individual to act on his own behalf, and guarantee that a Pareto-optimal outcome will be achieved?[3]

A Desirable Voting Scheme

In the market, an individual indicates his preferences through his purchases and sales. In general, these tracings are insufficient to define an individual's complete preference mapping, but from the standpoint of efficiency this creates no difficulties. With merely the limited amounts of information fed to it, the market leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome. (It should be noted that no individual has an incentive to disguise his preferences.)

A voting system in theory could operate in the same decentralized fashion. Each individual would feed in some indication of his preferences, and the processing mechanism would employ this information to yield an outcome. To see whether such a procedure should be established as an ideal, we must determine how it can perform along a number of significant dimensions.

Major Characteristics of Social Decision Procedures

The flow diagram below provides the context for the major topics discussed in this paper. (At a later juncture, it will serve to summarize its principal results.) These topics are indexed A through F.

Social decision problems are first classed as economic or political. Economic decisions are handled by the market mechanism. Under the appropriate competitive conditions, the market outcome will meet some preassigned standards of acceptability. The principal standard to be met is efficiency. The measuring rod for this standard is Pareto optimality.

There are myriad situations in which the very restrictive competitive assumptions are not met. For these situations, much the subject of current economics debate, the unhindered play of the market will not lead to an attractive outcome. Perhaps the establishment of new areas of property rights, or innovative additions to present market mechanisms will set things right. Whatever, this is not material to the present discussion.

These situations would be of import for this paper if they were treated as political decisions. They then would be carried down the lower branch of the flow diagram, where they could serve as further exemplars for the analysis of that branch.

Political Decisions and the Individualist Approach

In evaluating outcomes in the economic arena,

---

* Kenneth Arrow, Robert Klitgaard, Pamela Memishian, Howard Raiffa, Thomas Schelling, Michael Spence, Milton Weinstein, and a referee for the *American Political Science Review* provided me with helpful comments. This research was supported by NSF grants GS-28626x and Gr-58.

[1] Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 1.

[2] It is with some discomfort that I leave aside the problem of distribution in this paper. The issue is attacked directly in a later effort, "Risk Spreading and Distribution," Kennedy School of Government, Discussion Paper No. 10 (August, 1972). There I argue that a profound belief in the efficacy of the outcome of a perfect market gives one insights into distributional questions. One can consider the problem of drawing the social contract equivalent to that of a group of future citizens starting in some initial position of equal potential (they face the same lottery on future possibilities). They draw up a contingent claims agreement, the magnitudes of payment to depend on their future fortune in securing endowments of goods and capabilities (that is the states of the world). In retrospect, we may decide that it is our duty to redistribute in the manner that would be prescribed by the hypothetical agreement that antedated our present position. For a philosophically compatible, but perhaps policy inconsistent view, see John Rawls, *The Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971).

[3] Thomas Schelling has commented at great length, interpreting and questioning the significance of Pareto optimality as a criterion for social choices. He states, "the significance of failure to achieve Pareto-optimality merely means that the situation is improvable . . . it is the degree of improvability that determines how important the nonoptimality is. Pareto optimality is not like virginity or justice. . . . Small departures are of small interest, large departures are of large interest." Personal communication, July 12, 1972.

Economists have long recognized that Pareto optimality by itself is a hopelessly incomplete guide to normative and descriptive considerations of social choice. An indication of this author's response is given by the conclusion to this paper.


Social decisions
economic decisions
political decisions
Market mechanism
decentralized, ordinal, unique.
Non-market mechanism
centralized
decentralized
ordinal
cardinal
Arrow results (A)
Rank-order methods and extensions (B)
ordinal
cardinal
unique
non-unique
unique
non-unique
Random dictator (C)
Majority, rule-type procedures (D)
Lottery outcome (E)
Non-unique voting scheme (F)
Dictatorial outcomes
Inefficient outcomes
Democratic and efficient outcomes
Dictatorial outcomes
Inefficient outcomes
Democratic and efficient outcomes

Context and Summary Diagram

we rely on consumer sovereignty. Each individual is entitled to judge what is best for himself, and these individual judgments form the basis for assessments of social welfare. This paper carries over this individualist ethic to the evaluation of all social choices, including those that are conventionally considered to be of a political nature. Thus individuals' preferences form the basis for the social decisions considered here. In social decisions more than one individual is involved. Together, social decision and consumer sovereignty exclude from consideration any form of paternalistic rule.

The ground rules then are set. We are searching for a procedure that enables us to proceed from information on individuals' preferences to a social outcome that meets some conditions of acceptability. The ultimate objective is to discover a decentralized procedure, one which consciously or automatically takes the (perhaps incomplete) information provided by individuals' ballots and yields an acceptable social outcome.

Centralized Decision Procedures

For purposes of comparison, I shall begin with a look at the success or nonsuccess of centralized procedures. With centralized decision, a single decision authority with accurate knowledge of individuals' preferences selects an outcome.

Centralized Decision, Ordinal Preferences (A)

At first glance it would seem that centralized decision procedures hold out promise of great success. Yet Kenneth Arrow, in a much celebrated work, has demonstrated that there is no general procedure to pass from individuals' preferences to social orderings that meets certain standards of attractiveness.[4] The power of the Arrow result derives from the fact that the standards he imposed were both innocuous in appearance and intuitively appealing.

Arrow sets forth four standards. In unrigorous language, they are: (1) The procedure must include all logically possible combinations of individuals' orderings. (2) It must lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes. (3) The choice between any two alternatives cannot be influenced by the presence or nonpresence of a third alternative. (4) No individual can always secure his choice regardless of the preferences of others. A later expositor has provided a mnemonic for these properties:[5] unrestricted domain, U; Pareto principle, P; independence of irrelevant alternatives, I; nondictatorship, D. Dealing with the simplest case of interest (at least two individuals and at least three alternatives), the famous Arrow result is that there is no social welfare function that satisfies U, P, I, and D.

Let us stop for a moment to get our bearings in the flow chart. We should like all of our social decisions to apply over an unrestricted domain. Condition U is imposed at all nodes in the flow diagram and throughout this paper. Next observe that the "Arrow result" box lies on the ordinal branch. The independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, I, requires that the centralized decision procedure rely on no more than individuals' ordinal preferences. The impossibility of simultaneously satisfying all four Arrow conditions is indicated by the paths of the arrows emanating from the box. They are stopped either by inefficiency (nonsatisfaction of P) or dictatorship (nonsatisfaction of D).

---

[4] For the conditions, see K. Arrow, *Social Choice*, pp. 22–33.

[5] Amartya K. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (Holden-Day, Inc., San Francisco), pp. 41–42.

Centralized Decision, Cardinal Preferences (B)

Somewhat different formulations of the centralized social choice problem will lead to success stories. A number of analysts, some of whom substantially predate Arrow, have proposed that acceptable centralized decision procedures can relax one or another of the conditions he imposed. Perhaps the most frequently cited suggestion is that the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, I, be softened or eliminated. The objective underlying this relaxation is to secure some cardinal measurement on individuals' intensities of preferences.

By way of example, more than two centuries ago, Borda proposed the rank-order method of election, a method now frequently employed to establish national rankings of college athletic teams. Under this system, preassigned weights are given to voters' first, second, third choices, etc. Sum each candidate's scores over all voters: highest aggregate score wins. The procedure is neither dictatorial nor inefficient.[6] Reference to the flow diagram shows that its emanating arrow penetrates to the rightmost rectangle.

Are rank-order systems ethically appealing? Neither economic theory nor any other axiomatic system can give us any insight into this question. Each analyst of social choice must decide for himself whether in making the choice between A and B, it is of concern how each fares with the voters not only with respect to the other, but also with respect to C.

We need dwell no further on the appropriate constraints for centralized procedures; decentralized procedures represent the principal focus of this paper. Thus far we have been merely setting the stage and filling in the complementary boxes.

Decentralized Decision Procedures

The remainder of this paper will follow out the implications of and possible standards of performance for a variety of decentralized decision procedures. It will index them, as it did the centralized procedures, by the capital letters in the flow diagram.

The analysis that follows is largely nonmathematical and thus almost by necessity, unrigorous. Other theorists, no doubt, will be able to reconstitute these results in more formal, perhaps stronger contexts. The purpose of this paper is to sketch some new methods and results, and the framework in which they apply.

With centralized decision, each voter's preferences are assumed to be known by the social choice mechanism. With decentralized decision, knowledge of preferences is gained only indirectly. Under decentralized procedures each voter fills out a ballot; he is assumed to follow as best he can his own self-interest. These ballots are processed by some mechanism to produce a social choice. Depending upon the particular choice mechanism that is in operation, and the situation in question, a voter's ballot may or may not be a complete and truthful indicator of his preferences. This observation provides a hint about where we are going. A whole new class of problems arises when we move from centralized to decentralized decision procedures. Essentially they revolve around getting individuals to reveal their preferences. The unfortunate result, as we shall see later, is that the very structure of social choice schemes that elicit true preferences on ballots leads to inefficiencies in outcomes.

An abstract representation of a decentralized choice procedure will facilitate discussion. There are

m voting individuals indexed over i, and
n alternatives indexed over j.

An individual, i, fills out x_i as the ballot indicating his preferences. The voting system processes the received ballots, $X=(x_1, \cdots, x_i, \cdots, x_m)$ to arrive at a social choice. A social choice is represented by the probability vector $P(X)=(p_1(X), \cdots, p_j(X), \cdots, p_n(X))$ whose elements indicate the probability that an alternative is selected. In the language of mathematics, a voting mechanism maps X into P.

Most of the familiar voting procedures are deterministic. Given X, a single alternative is selected with certainty; one element of P is unity, the rest zero.

Later sections of this paper discuss voting procedures that may lead to randomized outcomes. These outcomes are analyzed and evaluated before the final results are known, before the lottery is conducted. Randomized outcomes may lead to gains in efficiency. More important for the purposes of this paper, they may help insure that individuals mark their ballots with their true preferences.

---

[6] Following Pareto optimality, efficiency requires that a switch away from the selected candidate would lower the welfare of at least one voting individual. If the selected candidate had the highest total score, then there could be no other candidate who received an equally high individual score from each voter. A switch from the man with the highest total would therefore involve a loss for at least one voter.

[7] Special difficulties arise if lotteries on alternatives are permitted; and rank-order schemes need not lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes. See Richard Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 83 (November, 1969), 696–703.

To evaluate probabilistic outcomes, a voter must be able to evaluate outcomes in a nondeterministic world. Even if the world is deterministic, there may not be full information, in which case the voter may be making a decision under uncertainty. Fortunately, there is a well-developed body of literature on prescriptive decision making under uncertainty. We shall follow the major track of that literature.[7]

A rational decision maker under uncertainty is assumed to assign a utility value to each possible outcome. The paradigm decision problem requires that he select one among alternative lotteries where each lottery is described by the probability vector it offers for the different outcomes. In choosing among lotteries, the rational decision maker selects the one that offers him the highest expected utility value.

Notice that judgments of welfare are made here on an ex ante basis, before lotteries are resolved. Thus certain social choices will be ruled non-Pareto optimal, even though they will eventually lead to situations that considered in isolation are Pareto optimal. An example displays the properties of this before-the-fact evaluation procedure. Two risk-averse individuals each have $10,000 in the bank. They are given the opportunity to gamble their total savings on the flip of a coin. Both would decline as they both prefer their present situation to participation in the lottery. If they were forced to participate in the lottery, it would be a non-Pareto-optimal situation. This despite the fact that if the lottery were conducted and one man ended up with $20,000 and the other with nothing the outcome would be Pareto-optimal.[8]

To conduct an analysis of situations of this sort requires that individuals define what are called von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for each possible outcome.[9] The utility values for individual i are indicated by the v_j^i's; they are normalized with a value of 1 assigned to the most preferred outcome, and 0 to the least.

The voting mechanism, however, may seek to elicit something much less than the individual's full cardinal preference structure. Majority rule procedures, for example, merely ask the individual which is his most preferred alternative.

It is useful to classify decentralized decision procedures on a couple of dimensions. Decentralized procedures, like those that are centralized, can rely on cardinal or merely ordinal indications of individual's preferences. The two alternatives are indicated in the first branching in the flow diagram.

Unique Voting Schemes

The second branching reflects a consideration that does not arise with centralized procedures; for with them, individuals' preferences are assumed to be known. With decentralized procedures, however, each individual ballots in his own self-interest. This raises the possibility that with some of these procedures and some situations an individual working in his own behalf will find it desirable to disguise his preferences. This may be unfortunate. It may be important for the apparatus that is processing the votes to be able to determine the exact preferences of an individual from his markings on the ballot.

If an individual will mark his ballot the same way for two or more preference structures, then the ballot is not unique.

> Definition: A voting system is called *unique* if a voting individual will mark his ballot in a different manner for every possible configuration of his preferences.

Decentralized Decision, Ordinal Preferences, Unique (C)

If merely ordinal preferences are required, it would seem the task of constructing a unique scheme would be somewhat simpler. In many real world situations things are simpler still. Individuals are asked to indicate only a small portion of their ordinal preference structure, their first-place choice. This is the customary procedure in the United States when we are selecting a single individual for an office: the presidency, a mayorship, the local dog catcher.

---

[7] For a good introduction to this subject, see Howard Raiffa, *Decision Analysis* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

[8] The ex-ante expected utility approach can be employed to make evaluations of social welfare. See Richard Zeckhauser, "Determining the Qualities of a Public Good—A Paradigm on Town Park Location," *Western Economic Journal,* 11 (March, 1973), 39–60. For an application of this principle in the social decision context, see Richard Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule With Lotteries on Alternatives." Peter Fishburn formalizes this argument in "Lotteries and Social Choices," *Journal of Economic Theory,* 5 (October, 1972), 189–207. Peter C. Ordeshook employs the principle to define candidates' mixed strategies as lotteries on social states should they get elected. See "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition," *The American Political Science Review,* 65 (December, 1971), 1141–1145.

[9] Appropriate historical attribution would give much of the credit for this utility concept to Frank P. Ramsey.

A traditional majority-rule decision procedure will lead to honest revelation of preferences if there are but two alternatives. But when the competitors number three or more such honesty can no longer be assured. For example, if in a three-man race your preferred candidate *A* is likely to receive little support, you may choose to vote for your second choice rather than waste your vote on a lost cause. If your ordering is *A-B-C*, you will vote for *B*. You would vote the same way if your ordering were *B-A-C* or *B-C-A*. The voting procedure is not unique, but this should have been expected. There are six possible orderings and only three possible ballot markings. There is no way to have a unique marking for each ordering. What is disturbing is that the system is not unique with respect to the first-place preference, and it is information on that preference that the system was attempting to solicit. Considerations such as these lead us to a modified concept of uniqueness, one that applies in a more restricted context.

> Definition: A voting system is called *unique with respect to a property of a preference ordering* if a voting individual will mark his ballot in a different manner for every possible configuration of that property.

For example, a voting system is unique with respect to first-place preferences if a voting individual will mark his ballot differently depending upon which candidate he likes best.[10] Majority rule does not qualify.

Does a voting system exist that is unique with respect to first-place preferences? Yes, there is a type of system that meets this requirement. It is most easily understood with the aid of a mechanical example that has the required intrinsic properties.

The Random Dictator System: A Voting System That is Unique with Respect to First-Place Preferences

Each individual writes the name of a candidate on a ballot. The voters' ballots are collected and placed in a revolving drum. After shuffling, a ballot is chosen at random. The name on the chosen ballot is the elected candidate. In effect, the voter whose ballot is chosen dictates the outcome, hence the name of the system. (Matters would be just the same if a voter were first selected at random, and then the selected voter were asked to choose the elected candidate.)

The random dictator system is not deterministic. If an alternative *j* is marked as first choice on *k* ballots, p_j will equal k/m. That is, a candidate will have a probability of election that is proportional to the number of first place votes he receives. The p_j's will take on fractional values (except in the special case where there is a unanimous first choice); the system will not be deterministic.

We shall see here, and again later with cardinal preferences, that the consideration of probabilistic outcomes is essential if a voting scheme is to be unique. Consider the voter's behavior in the random dictator model. He assigns utility values v_A, v_B, and v_C to the three candidates. Why should he vote for his favorite, *A*? Assume that instead he had voted for *B*. This would reduce the probability that *A* gets elected by $1/m$; it would increase the probability that *B* got elected by $1/m$. The net change in the expected utility to the voter would be $(1/m)(v_B - v_A)$. By assumption, $v_B < v_A$; the voter would lose by switching; he also would lose if he decided to choose *C*. The key element here is that when the individual switches his vote the probability gain for the switched-up candidate is just equal to the probability loss for the switched-down candidate. This implies that the probability of election of the third candidate remains constant when a vote is switched between the other two. This absence of third-candidate effect is essential. Otherwise, the decision on whether to vote for *A* or *B* might depend on how the vote affects the probability that *C* gets elected.[11] A formal generalization of this argument requires a new concept.

> Definition: A voting system will be said to be *probabilistically linear* if it is of the following form. Let *S* be the matrix of votes, where element $s_{ij}=1$ if voter *i* submitted his ballot for *j*, and 0 otherwise. The vector *P* that gives the probability that each candidate is elected is calculated $P = wS + e$. Here *e* is a row vector giving exogenous contributions to the election probabilities, and *w* is a row vector of non-negative weights summing to $1 - \sum_j e_j$.

> Theorem I: If a decision procedure that solicits individuals' first place preferences is to be unique, it must be probabilistically linear.

Note that probabilistic linearity is equivalent to the following property: For any voter *i* and for any pair of candidates *D* and *E*, switching his vote from *D* to *E* must increase the probability that candidate *E* gets elected by the amount w_i, decrease the probability that D gets elected by the amount w_i, and leave all other election probabilities unchanged.

---

[10] If we extend this concept to the market setting, we discover that market procedures are unique with respect to the information required for efficiency: individuals' marginal rates of substitution and producers' marginal rates of transformation among valued goods.

[11] Say v_A is only slightly greater than v_B, but much greater than v_C. If *C* had less probability of being elected if the individual voted for *B* rather than *A*, it might be reasonable for him to vote contrary to his true preferences.

The proof of the theorem can be demonstrated with a three-man example. For notation, let $\Delta^{F}_{D\text{ to }E}$ represent the change in the probability that F is elected if voter i switches his vote from D to E. Consider the previous example where the present vote is for A. Necessary conditions for probabilistic linearity are that

$$\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }B} = -\Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }B} = \Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }C} = -\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }C}$$

and that

$$\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B} = \Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }C} = 0.$$

Given that the sum of the mutually exclusive probabilities of election must add to 1 as they did when the vote went to A, there are the conservation equations

$$\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }B} + \Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }B} + \Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B} = 0$$

and

$$\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }C} + \Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }C} + \Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }C} = 0.$$

To see that $\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B}$ must equal 0, assume it were negative. The voting system must handle any set of preferences. Thus, let the voter strongly dislike C, say $v_A - v_C = k$, where k is a large number, and let him slightly prefer A to B, $v_A - v_B = \epsilon$. Despite this preference, the voter will switch his ballot to B, as his net utility gain will be $-\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B}(k-\epsilon)$, a positive number. Keep the same ordinal preferences, but let the gap between v_A and v_B be k, with the gap between B and C being the minimal ϵ. Then the individual will choose A over B, the utility gain once again being $-\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B}(k-\epsilon)$. Thus, unless $\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B}=0$, the voter may ballot in two different ways, despite the fact that his ordinal preferences are the same in both instances. This contradicts the assumption that the voting system is unique. Therefore $\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }B}=0$ as claimed.

An identical argument shows that $\Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }C}=0$. These results together with the conservation equations show that $\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }B} = -\Delta^{B}_{A\text{ to }B}$ and $\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }C} = -\Delta^{C}_{A\text{ to }C}$. To show that $\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }B}$ must equal $\Delta^{A}_{A\text{ to }C}$, merely apply the argument above to show that whether you ballot for B or C cannot influence the probability of election for A if a voting system is to be unique with respect to ordinal preferences. The conditions of the theorem are thus demonstrated.

This theorem and the random dictator system can be extended to deal with further places in voters' ordinal rankings. Provide each voter q ballots for his first choice, r for his second, s for his third, etc., with $q>r>s$. The selection procedure is random as before.

Thus we find that only variants of the random dictator system will elicit ballots unique with respect to individuals' (portions of individuals') ordinal preferences. How well does the random dictator system perform? An example tells the sad news.

With the values shown in the box, Voter 1 will mark his ballot with A and Voter 2 will inscribe a C.

Utility Valuations in Two Voter World

	v_A	v_B	v_C
Voter 1	1	.90	0
Voter 2	0	.90	1

The resulting social choice when the random dictator system is employed will have the probability vector $P=(.5, 0, .5)$. The expected utility values for each of the voters will be .50. But this outcome is not Pareto optimal. Both voters would have preferred the social choice $P=(0, 1, 0)$.

The difficulty is apparent. The random dictator system does not take into account intensities of preference. (Indeed, no information is gathered on second and further preferences, but even if it were, this would not cover the intensities problem. With the same ordinal patterns, both voters could have assigned a value of .10 to v_B. In that case the social choice of the random dictator device would be Pareto-optimal, as would be any lottery on A and C.)[12]

To sum up, it is interesting to observe that there exists a class of unique ordinal voting schemes.[13]

---

[12] For further discussion of this matter, see R. Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives."

[13] This paper is addressed to situations where a single outcome is selected, and all individuals vote to help determine that outcome. The model does not apply, for example, to the selection of a legislature. (With a stretch of the imagination, we might construe voters to be choosing among all possible legislatures, but usually an individual voter ballots to help determine only a small part of that body.) Strict proportional representation is the closest (but still imperfect) legislative equivalent to the random dictator system. The number of seats secured is proportional to the number of votes received.

Proportional representation will guarantee honest balloting if two conditions are satisfied. (1) Each voter's utility for the legislature must be an additive separable function of his utilities for each elected representative. (Otherwise, his preferred vote might depend on the candidates others were voting for.) (2) All ballots cast in the first round must count in the determination of the final legislature. This requires that representation be broken down into arbitrarily small units, and that there be no elimination of candidates. (Condition (2) can be violated if there are strict party interests, and if each voter is indifferent among the candidates of his party.) See Mark Thompson and Richard Zeckhauser, "Proportional Representation," mimeo (1971). A referee suggests that Kramer also has unpublished work on this subject.

We now know that such schemes perform terribly inefficiently. Leave aside the adverb, and this lesson could have been derived directly from the Arrow results.

Decentralized Decision, Ordinal Preferences, Nonunique (D)

This next class of social choice procedures merits discussion primarily because it is the one most frequently in use in the United States. Majority and plurality rule both fall under this category. The Arrow results tell us that these schemes cannot meet his four standards either.

One difficulty with these procedures, as is well known, is that they lead to intransitive choice patterns for certain combinations of individuals' preference orderings. Transitivity is required if we are to have a social ordering. The only way around the problem is to rule out patterns of individuals' preferences that do not satisfy the single-peakedness condition.[14] To exclude in this way would be to violate Arrow's condition *U*.

Now that we are working on a decentralized basis, further problems may arise. The vote processing mechanism may not even be able to divine individuals' true preference orderings. It turns out, fortuitously, that single-peakedness is also sufficient to eliminate any incentive for a voter to disguise his preferences. Getting rid of one problem automatically eliminates the other. Whenever the structure of voters' preferences is such that majority rule can be guaranteed to work on a centralized basis, it can be guaranteed to work in a decentralized format as well.

Standards for Decentralized Schemes

One lesson we have learned thus far is that ordinal preferences do not provide sufficient information to enable social choices to meet Arrow's standards. For centralized procedures, we saw that information on cardinal preferences is sufficient to guarantee an efficient, nondictatorial outcome. The key question for the remainder of this paper is whether we can find decentralized procedures that perform satisfactorily when the balloting system elicits cardinal indications of the voters' preferences.

Satisfactoriness, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. My criteria, consistent with the earlier analysis, are Pareto optimality and nondictatorship. The first concept is unambiguous; the latter is subject to a variety of interpretations. I shall provide one definition of dictatorial outcomes that enables me to achieve my other results. The reader may come up with other definitions that serve equally well.

Dictatorial Outcomes—What They Are and Why They Should Bother Us

Most discussions of social choice are concerned with the selection of a candidate in a single election, or an outcome in a particular set of circumstances. Given the restricted domain of such a social decision, it might be perfectly acceptable to reach an outcome that catered heavily to one individual's or group's preferences and little or not at all to those of others. (Surely, this provides the normative justification for such practices as logrolling.)

Other social decisions can be of much greater consequence. Indeed at the most general level, we can conceive of a grand social decision as selecting a single point from the entire space of social states. It is with reference to momentous social decisions of this sort that we impose distributional requirements on the outcomes of social choice processes. We should like to observe outcomes that demonstrate that the preferences of more than one individual have been taken into account.

Even if a series of social choices is made sequentially or in a variety of separate arenas, we might conceive of the combination of the voters' expressed preferences on all issues and the social choice mechanism as selecting one point in the space of social states. Thus even if a great number of social choices is to be made on a one by one basis, we should like to see the total social outcome reflect the fact that all individuals have participated in the selection process.

One indication that a group had been excluded from positive consideration in the social choice procedure would be that it selected an outcome that was most unattractive for that group. A more precise understanding of what is meant by unattractive is given by the term Pareto-terrible.

> Definition: An outcome is called *Pareto-terrible* for a group of individuals if it is a strictly constrained minimum: if there exists an outcome that is preferred by all members of the group, and if there is no outcome that is worse for some member without being better for some other member.

An outcome is Pareto-terrible for a one-man group, an individual, if it is his least preferred outcome. With lotteries permitted there will always be outcomes that are not Pareto-terrible for any reference group.

I shall employ the Pareto-terrible concept as a cornerstone of my definition of dictatorial outcomes.

---

[14] See A. Sen, *Collective Choice,* pp. 166–168 for a discussion of single-peakedness where individuals' preferences are defined over a single dimension. There is no equivalent to the single-peakedness criterion if two or more dimensions enter individuals' preferences; cyclical majorities will be the rule.

Definition: A voting scheme is *dictatorial* for a set of voting individuals preferences if it selects an outcome that is Pareto-optimal for one nonempty subset of individuals and is Pareto-terrible for the complementary nonempty subset of individuals.[15]

With this definition in tow, we can proceed on our search. Exposition is simplest if we step slightly out of order to the bottom of the Context and Summary Diagram and address first the question of honest balloting.

Decentralized Decision, Cardinal, Nonunique (F)

Nondictatorial, Pareto-optimal social choices cannot be made unless, in general, the voting scheme is unique with respect to individuals' cardinal preferences. In particular instances nonuniqueness may not matter. For every nonunique ballot marking for individual 1, however, there will be a set of preferences for individual 2 such that Pareto optimality cannot be assured.

A three-candidate example will reveal the difficulties. Assume that individual 1 marks his ballot x' whether his preferences are (1, .60, 0) or (1, .70, 0) for candidates *A*, *B*, and *C* respectively. Individual 2 has preferences (0, .35, 1). If individual 1's FIRST set of preferences hold, candidate *B* will have zero probability for all Pareto-optimal choices. With individual 1's SECOND preferences, all Pareto-optimal probability vectors have either *A* or *C* receiving zero probability.

Pareto Optimality of Different Probability Vectors

Configuration of Individual 1's	Probability Vectors (*A*+ indicates positive probability)						
Preferences	1, 0, 0	0, 1, 0	0, 0, 1	+, +, +	+, +, 0	+, 0, +	0, +, +
FIRST	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
SECOND	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Except for the first and third listed vectors, no probability vectors are Pareto-optimal for both of individual 1's possible preference configurations. The problem is simple. The mechanism that processes the votes is unable to distinguish between two situations which require different outcomes to be Pareto-optimal.

The 1, 0, 0 and 0, 0, 1 vectors are ruled out because they are dictatorial. They allow one voter to get his first choice at the expense of the other who receives the outcome that for him is worst. This would be particularly objectionable if, as is quite possible, the voting scheme were selecting a single point from the space of social states, i.e., if all social decisions were being simultaneously resolved.[16]

To achieve Pareto optimality, any voting scheme that is nondictatorial for this set of preferences must be able to distinguish between FIRST and SECOND configurations of individual 1's preferences. An equivalent "counterexample" demonstration can be arranged for any indistinguishable pair of individual 1's preferences. The three-alternative case covers all essential complexities.

First consider the case where individual 1's indistinguishable configurations have different alternatives as the most preferred. Let individual 2 be indifferent between the two sometimes-most-preferred-by-1 alternatives, with the third alternative less attractive. Which of two alternatives is Pareto-optimal depends on which of individual 1's preference configurations applies; there is no way to tell.

Matters are a bit more complicated if individual 1's indistinguishable orderings rearrange his second and third candidates or merely change their relative scores. To construct the counterexample first normalize the two individuals' utilities to 1 and 0. Add together 1's and 2's utilities for each of the three candidates. The candidate with the lowest total must receive zero probability in any nondictatorial Pareto-optimal outcome. (If the two voters have opposite orderings, then the extreme candidates may tie for lowest total. Then, at least one of these candidates will be excluded from any Pareto-optimal outcome.) Given the two different utility vectors for 1, select a utility vector for 2 so that (a) his first place choice is not the same as that of 1, and (b) the candidate receiving the lowest total will differ depending on which of 1's vectors applies. Such a selection will always be possible.[17]

---

[15] The concluding theorem of the paper employs the dictatorship concept negatively. It states that no system can simultaneously be nondictatorial and at the same time guarantee that other desirable standards are met. The more restricted the definition of dictatorship, then, the stronger my final result. This result would still be achievable if the term "Pareto-optimal" in the above definition were replaced with "unanimously most preferred." The argument for the definition in the text is that it captures more of what we may mean by dictatorship in a general context.

It should be noted that Pareto-terrible is not a perfect counterpart to Pareto-optimal. There are situations where all outcomes are Pareto-optimal and none Pareto-terrible. The converse is not true.

[16] On a less grandiose level, there are a number of ways that single social-choice decisions can be formulated to deal with a large number of issues. Issues can be compounded. The issues at hand might be whether Smith or Jones should be mayor and whether or not the new high school should be built. This can be viewed as a single decision with four possible outcomes. Alternatively, we might amalgamate issues by employing a lottery. A coin will be flipped to see whether a voting mechanism will select a mayor or decide on a high school. Here too there are four possible outcomes, each composed of two contingent decisions.

It is true, of course, that for certain patterns of preference for 2, particular instances of nonuniqueness for 1 will not matter. This raises the question whether a voting individual can monitor other individuals' preferences or ballot markings to help select his own ballot marking. Such monitoring raises no problems so long as each individual's markings are unique, conditional on the ballot markings of others. For with this information, all individuals' accurate cardinal preferences can be deduced.

A definitional problem arises with the concept of uniqueness if voters monitor each others' ballots and only employ the same marking for two different preference orderings if they discover that it will not affect the set of Pareto-optimal outcomes. Notice that this monitoring would have to be most accurate, for as long as there is any positive probability that the other individual(s) have a "counterexample" set of preferences, Pareto optimality cannot be assured. In discussing uniqueness for the remainder of this paper, I shall assume either (a) that the required accurate monitoring is not possible, or (b) if it is possible, an individual who has an incentive to mark his ballot nonuniquely will sometimes do so in cases where other individuals have counterexample-relevant sets of preferences.[18]

This slightly tortuous argument leads to a general result that can serve as a building block for later arguments.

Theorem II: For nondictatorial voting schemes, if the ballot processing mechanism is always to lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes, the voting individuals' ballots must be unique with respect to their cardinal preferences.

Decentralized Decision, Cardinal, Unique (E)

To continue the thrust of our major investigation, we should like to know the properties of voting schemes that are unique with respect to cardinal preferences. In essence, we are asking: What voting schemes will get individuals to mark their true cardinal preferences? Unique schemes require one-to-one correspondences between ballot markings and preferences. If the mapping process is understood, we can say that in effect individuals are marking their true preferences.[19]

The required structural characteristics can be easily delineated in our three-candidate example. Before marking his ballot, the individual voter will consider his possible effects on the probability outcome vector. Matters are simplest if we start with the case of one individual.

What are the structural characteristics of a decision process that gets a single individual to reveal his true cardinal preferences? The individual is assumed to understand how the scheme works. The scheme is an announced function, s, that transforms the individual's ballot into a probability vector outcome. This process can be represented as

$$P = s(x).$$

The individual, knowing the form of s, will select x to maximize his expected utility. Representing his utility vector as V, and his optimal ballot as x^*, this can be expressed

$$\max_x s(x)V^T \qquad \text{is achieved at } x^*.$$

We wish to discover the properties of the function s that will lead

$$x^* \equiv V.$$

That is, we wish to construct a function s such that it is in the individual's best interest to vote his true cardinal preference.

First, the function must obviously assign probabilities in the same rank order as the utilities that are provided through the x vector. (For simplicity, we consider the case without ties.) Otherwise, the individual would have an incentive to misreport which alternative he liked best and which least.

---

[17] Another numerical example may be helpful. Assume that 1 marks his ballot the same way whether his cardinal utility values are 1,.5,0 or 1,0,.2. Then if individual 2 has preferences 0,1,.9, for example, a nondictatorial Pareto-optimal outcome cannot be assured. The third candidate can never be included for individual 1's first set of preferences and must always be included for his second set of preferences.

[18] I strongly believe that it is possible to substantiate the arguments in the remainder of this paper without these assumptions. But the whole area is most elusive, and I have not been able to discover a convincing proof for this assertion.

[19] It may be possible to construct voting schemes that are not unique for each individual taken alone, but are unique for all individuals taken together. This would require that individuals have some capability to monitor each others' preferences and ballot markings. For example, individual 1 might mark his ballot the same way when he has preferences V_1' and individual 2 marks X_2' as he does when he has preferences V_1'' and individual 2 marks X_2''. The processing system can take 2's markings into account in deciphering individual 1's preferences.

If each individual's cardinal preferences are to be revealed, it is sufficient that *given other individuals' markings* there be a one-to-one correspondence between an individual's markings and his preferences.

With no loss of generality, we can normalize and assign a utility value of 1 to the most preferred alternative and 0 to the least. Assign the value y to the intermediate alternative; thus $V=(1, y, 0)$.

The key question then is, what additional properties must $s(x)$ have so that

$$\max_z s(1, z, 0)\begin{pmatrix}1\\ y\\ 0\end{pmatrix} \quad \text{is achieved at } z = y$$

for all y, $0<y<1$.

The sum of the probabilities of the outcomes must equal 1. Thus, the function $s(x)$ is fully described by detailing the effect of the choice of z on p_1 and p_2. Represent these relationships

$$p_1 = f(z), \quad \text{and}$$
$$p_2 = g(z).$$

The individual's expected utility is

$$1p_1 + yp_2 + 0(1 - p_1 - p_2).$$

He will select z to maximize

$$f(z) + yg(z);$$

the third term vanishes because of the zero multiplicand.

I will deal with the situation in which the f and g functions are continuous and differentiable; my results can easily be extended to noncontinuous cases. First-order maximization procedures applied to the preceding expression reveal that

$$f'(z) = -yg'(z).$$

If it is to be in the individual's self-interest to select $z=y$, a significant property of f and g is dictated.[20] For all z

$$f'/g' = -z. \qquad \text{[A]}$$

Additional required properties are that for all z,

$$f''(z) + zg''(z) < 0,$$
$$g(z) < f(z),$$

and

$$g(z) > 1 - f(z) - g(z). \qquad \text{[B]}$$

The first requirement tumbles out of the second-order conditions that guarantee that the individual is at a maximum, not a minimum. The second and third requirements insure that the probability assigned to the highest value outcome is greatest, the second is second, and the lowest is lowest.

We should also like to have

$$f(1) = g(1),$$
$$g(0) = 1 - f(0) - g(0).$$

If alternatives are ranked the same, they should receive the same probability assessment.[21]

There is an infinite number of schemes that meet these requirements. One satisfactory scheme has the functions

$$p_1 = f(z) = .6 - .1z^2/2,$$
$$p_2 = g(z) = .25 + .1z,$$

and

$$p_3 = 1 - p_1 - p_2 = .15 + .1(z^2/2 - z).$$

Here $g'(z)=.1$; and to satisfy requirements

$$f'(z) = -zg'(z) = -.1z$$

for $z=y$. For all values of z, there must be the ordering $p_1>p_2>p_3$. This three-alternative scheme is illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 1. A scheme that leads an individual to express his true cardinal preferences.

	Value of z					
	0	.2	.4	.6	.8	1
p_1	.6	.598	.592	.582	.568	.55
p_2	.25	.27	.29	.31	.33	.35
p_3	.15	.132	.118	.107	.102	.10

[20] The uniqueness requirement is equally well satisfied so long as there is a one-to-one mapping between z and y. Any scheme that induces such a mapping has the key structural aspects that are discussed below in relation to this scheme.

[21] I am indebted to Kenneth Arrow for this point among others.

The procedure just employed to construct a unique voting scheme for cardinal preferences can be readily extended to the many-alternative case. The computations get somewhat messy as the number of alternatives increases, but no new conceptual problems arise.[22]

Pareto Optimality of the Unique with Respect to Cardinal Preferences Scheme

The scheme presented is unique with respect to the individual's cardinal preferences. Unfortunately, it is not Pareto-optimal. Pareto optimality would require that $p_1 = 1$. This misfortune, alas, is representative. With rare exceptions, schemes that are unique with respect to information required to make an efficient decision are by their very construction not Pareto-optimal.

The general difficulties that are encountered can be understood in the context of the simplest case where the difficulties matter, the case of two voters and three alternatives. (The one-voter case is not disturbing; Theorem II applies only to nondictatorial voting procedures. With one individual, dictatorship is acceptable; the cardinal preferences required by Theorem II are not needed to achieve a desirable outcome. Merely ask the individual which alternative he prefers and give it to him.)

Voting Schemes with Two Voters and Three Alternatives

With two or more individuals, as Theorem II tells us, efficient voting procedures that are democratic require cardinal preferences as inputs. The procedure must be unique with respect to individuals' cardinal preferences.

The insights we have derived from consideration of the one individual situation are readily extended. Look at the matter from the standpoint of voter 1. Assume that the vector giving voter 2's true cardinal preferences, γ, has been fed to the decision mechanism, and that voter 1 knows this γ.

The social outcome now is a function of both γ and x. Represent this relationship as

$$P = r(x, \gamma).$$

If honesty is to be insured, whenever

$$x^* \text{ is maximizer of } r(x, \gamma)V^T, \text{ then}$$
$$x^* \equiv V.$$

Paralleling our procedure from before, with z being the utility value of the in-between alternative, represent the function r fully by

$$p_1 = j(z, \gamma),$$

and

$$p_2 = k(z, \gamma).$$

The efficiency condition that parallels [A] is for all z,

$$j_1(z, \gamma) = -zk_1(z, \gamma).\text{[23]} \qquad [C]$$

There are no simply-stated conditions that insure the individual will write down his preferences in their true order. What is needed boils down to the tautological requirement that for all γ, the x that is the maximizer of

$$p_1 + \lambda p_2, \quad 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$$

is of the form (1, z, 0), where z too is a value between 0 and 1.[24]

Consider a scheme that meets all requirements and is unique with respect to the individual's cardinal preferences. For such a scheme an individual with preferences (1, y, 0) will select $z = y$ for all possible values of y. From condition [C], given that z is less than 1, the increase in p_2 as z increases is greater than the corresponding decrease in p_1. The slack can only be taken up in p_3, $(p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1)$, which therefore must be decreasing over the whole range of z. This implies that p_3 must have positive probability (except in the case when the individual is indifferent between his first and second alternatives).[25] This observation suggests another general result.

> Theorem III: A voting scheme that is unique with respect to individuals' cardinal preferences must lead to probability vector outcomes all of whose elements are positive.

---

[22] To deal with discontinuous cases, merely replace $(f[x + \Delta x] - f[x])/\Delta x$ wherever $f'(x)$ appears, and similarly for $g'(x)$. Second derivatives can be handled in parallel fashion.

[23] This analysis could be carried out equally well for a world where other individuals' ballot markings were uncertain parameters. A subjective probability distribution $f(\gamma)$ would be placed over that parameter. Thus, efficiency condition [C] would become

$$\int j_1(z, \gamma)f(\gamma)d\gamma = -z \int k_1(z, \gamma)f(\gamma)d\gamma.$$

Other conditions would be modified equivalently; the basic results would be the same. Where there is perfect information on other individuals' preferences and ballot markings, the case considered in the text,

$$f(\gamma) = 1 \quad \text{for } \gamma = \gamma^*, \quad \text{otherwise } 0.$$

[24] One scheme that elicits true preferences for this two-individual case allows either individual to allocate 50 per cent of the outcome probability. Each individual takes half his probability as given and deals with the rest as he would in Figure 1, with the vertical scale relabeled with .5 placed where there is now a 1.

[25] If $y = z = 1$, then p_3 can be 0. As z can no longer increase, p_3 need not further decrease in value.

Shortcomings of Schemes That Are Unique with Respect to Cardinal Preferences

Theorem III has a very unfortunate implication. No democratic voting schemes that are unique with respect to individuals' cardinal preferences will guarantee Pareto-optimal outcomes. (We saw this previously when there was but one individual.) With two individuals and three alternatives, say, all three alternatives will have positive entries in the probability outcome vector. The diagram below illustrates why, in general, such a probability vector cannot represent a Pareto-optimal outcome. In the diagram, each alternative is represented by its vector of individuals' utilities.



Figure 2. Pareto optimality and vectors of individuals' utilities for alternatives.

The northeast frontier represents all Pareto-optimal points. These points can be achieved through linear weighting of alternatives *A* and *B* or a linear weighting of alternatives *B* and *C*. If all three alternatives are given positive weight, a point strictly interior to the triangle *ABC* will be the outcome. Every such interior point is dominated by a point on the northeast frontier; therefore it cannot be Pareto-optimal. Only in the case where all three alternatives lie on the same straight line will it be possible for a Pareto-optimal scheme to give positive probability to all three alternatives. (In such a case, the concept of efficient choice loses much of its meaning. All possible probability outcome vectors are Pareto-optimal.)

The conclusion, therefore, is that in general when there are but two individuals, only two alternatives will be involved in Pareto-optimal outcomes. Converting the geometry to n dimensions, we find that with n individuals a maximum of n alternatives will need to be given positive probability weight in order to achieve all Pareto-optimal outcomes. Furthermore, assigning positive probability to more than n alternatives will lead to non-Pareto-optimal outcomes unless the utility vectors of the excess alternatives are linearly dependent (lie on the same straight line in the two-individual case) on those in some set of n.

> Theorem IV: In an n-individual world, assigning positive probability to more than n alternatives whose vectors of individuals' utilities are linearly independent will result in a non-Pareto-optimal outcome.

Major Theorem

The motivation at the start of this paper was to discover a voting system that leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes. Individuals were assumed to vote in their own self-interests. It was recognized that depending on the situation and the voting system, they might or might not vote honestly. The vote-processing system would then lead to an outcome. For at least some situations we should like to require that the outcome be democratic. It was hoped that the outcome would be Pareto-optimal as well. The objective was to find systems that could guarantee these properties. Unfortunately, no such system exists.

> Theorem V: No voting system that relies on individuals' self-interested balloting can guarantee a nondictatorial outcome that is Pareto-optimal.

Proof

Consider the case of two individuals with strict preferences among three alternatives whose vectors of individuals' utilities are linearly independent. By Theorem II, "if the ballot processing mechanism is to lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes, the voting individuals' ballots must be unique with respect to their cardinal preferences." By Theorem III, this voting scheme "must lead to probability vector outcomes all of whose elements are positive." But by Theorem IV, assigning positive probability to all three alternatives in this two-individual world will lead to a non-Pareto-optimal outcome. The three theorems together prove that no satisfactory voting system can be found for this case. An equivalent demonstration can be provided for any number of voters.

Summary

The recent literature of social choice has provided rather pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of passing from individuals' ordinal preferences to socially desirable outcomes. Most voting mechanisms, the most common social choice procedure where political outcomes are involved, elicit no more extensive information than individuals' ordinal preferences, and those preferences may not be honestly revealed.

This paper has confronted these problems.

First, it showed that procedures are available that will elicit individuals' honest ordinal and cardinal preferences. With honest cardinal preferences as possible inputs to a decentralized voting procedure, there was a flicker of hope for finding an efficient social choice mechanism. The flicker was extinguished when it was discovered that any social choice mechanism that elicits honest preferences automatically leads to non-Pareto-optimal outcomes. Theorem V presents the disheartening conclusion.[26] No voting system that relies on individuals' self-interested balloting can guarantee a nondictatorial Pareto-optimal outcome.

Conclusion

No decentralized mechanism can guarantee a satisfactory social choice. This result is particularly unsettling to us economists, for we are accustomed to the paradigm of the efficient market mechanism functioning in a world of perfect competition.[27]

Perhaps we should not ask despairingly, Where do we go from here?, but rather inquire, Have we been employing the appropriate mind-set all along?

We economists, to the extent that we are scientists, have fallen prey to the natural tendency to concentrate our attentions on those phenomena for which our theories have the greatest power. The land of perfect competition has been our homeground, and most times when we have ventured out, it has been to consider areas that differ in but one or two aspects from the place we know best. Our prescriptive theories for situations with externalities and public goods with rare exceptions have been developed as if the "aberrant" case we are considering is the sole deviation from the norm of the competitive model. By following this track we have achieved some useful results. But this success has only been achieved at a cost. We have constricted ourselves to view and evaluate new lands in the same terms that we have been able to apply profitably to familiar territory.

The results of this paper contribute to a muffled but growing plea: Let us not rely on market-based standards of behavior and performance when examining those important areas of the world that in no way resemble the model of perfect competition. Rather, we should describe and evaluate those areas employing terms and theories developed to meet their specific needs.

Where might this lead us? It might force us to undertake some study of the role of preference revelation. With the competitive market outcome, it is each man for himself. No one cares about anyone else's preferences, and that is the reason that no one has an incentive to disguise or distort information about his own. In all other situations, we care very much about the structure of everyone else's preferences. Self-interested people become appropriately self-conscious about revealing their preferences, and find that they have an incentive to distort them. For example, the essence of a voting problem is a common or shared decision. I shall try to influence your vote. Not only that, the way I shall vote myself will depend very much on my assessment of the voting patterns of others. I cannot be relied upon to provide the information that any vote-aggregating mechanism will wish to elicit. Decentralized decision procedures cannot be expected to function effectively. Recognizing this, we might ask, Is a fully decentralized decision procedure what we should really seek? (Indeed, to the extent that consumer sovereignty relies on individuals' expressed preferences, we might even question its universal desirability.) In political contexts, this would come down to asking, Is voting the appropriate way to make social decisions?[28]

This brings us full circle from the quote that opens this paper. That observation suggests invoking a geometric analogy for a concluding theme. Geometers may find that they can derive their most powerful results if they analyze and deal with circles, for circles are representations of perfect closed curves. But the more general category is the class of closed curves. It deserves attention too. Reference to the exceptional perfect case, the full circle in this instance, may be a type of analogy that is regularly overdrawn.

---

[26] New variants of Theorem IV could be developed by altering the strength of different definitions, and interchanging existential and universal modifiers. I suspect that Pareto improvements may be possible: stronger results with the same definitions, or stronger definitions leading to the same results.

[27] I am indebted to Thomas Schelling, who suggested that I emphasize this theme in my conclusion and provided me with helpful insights. This theme reiterates the central message of my volume, *Studies in Interdependence.*

[28] Many observers of the political scene would argue that our present social choice procedures are very far from aggregative processes that rely on individuals' preferences. See Edward Banfield, "'Economic' Analysis of 'Political' Phenomena; A Political Scientist's Critique" (mimeo.), 1967, and a forthcoming joint piece by Banfield and Zeckhauser on the same subject.

A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns

PETER J. TAYLOR

University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England

The year 1812 is famous for the birth of that favorite political monster, the gerrymander. Many facets of this creature's subsequent behavior have been studied although most scholars have overlooked its most powerful trait—the ability to hypnotize both friend and foe alike. Politicians, political commentators, and political scientists have become fascinated by the shapes of electoral districts. Politicians have proposed and sometimes enacted legislation to ensure contiguity and compactness;[1] political commentators have been using their imaginations to conjure up more political monsters;[2] and political scientists have recently been trying to measure some elusive shape ideas.[3] In this short note I want to shake off the hypnotic influence of the gerrymander to consider briefly how the concept of shape has been approached in other disciplines, notably geography, so that we may return to the electoral districting problem with what seems to be a new shape measure that is particularly suited to this problem.

Shape is in many ways a rather peculiar empirical concept. In its most general form it can only be a classificatory concept.[4] Thus areal shapes are often compared to the shapes of familiar objects—Italy is like a boot, etc. This nominal level of measurement is equivalent to that of the political commentators referred to above. But if we compare areal shapes to geometric shapes[5] whose basic properties are known, we can produce shape measures at a ratio level. This is one of the basic approaches of political scientists who compare electoral district properties with an ideal circle.[6] When we do this we are in fact making our shape concept more specific, and we usually call these measurements measures of *compactness*. However, this is not necessarily the final stage in making the shape concept more specific. We can in fact envisage several types of divergence from compactness.[7] Thus, while we would all recognize a thin rectangle as being "less compact" than a square or circle, we would also have to make a similar statement concerning a five-pointed star. Clearly we have two further concepts here, namely, *elongation* and *indentation*. Furthermore, we can add two topological divergences from compactness to our list, namely, *separation* (noncontiguity) and *puncturedness* (shapes with holes in them).[8] The advantages of this abstract consideration of shape are that given these four divergences from compactness, we can (1) look at the shape measures we have and see what divergence(s) they measure, and we can (2) make a judgment about which concept is particularly relevant to a given problem and then concentrate on its particular measurement without incorporating less relevant aspects of the shape.

---

[1] Emanuel Celler, "Congressional Apportionment—Past, Present and Future" in Symposium of 12 articles on "Legislative Reapportionment," ed. R. Kramer, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 17 (Spring, 1952). Andrew Hacker, *Congressional Districting* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964).

[2] Charles Roberts, "The Donkey, the Elephant and the Gerrymander," *The Reporter* (September 12th. 1952) 30–4. Robert J. Sickels, "Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumb-bells—Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?" *Yale Law Journal*, 75 (July, 1966), 1300–8. Gus Tyler and David Wells "Camel Bites Dachshund," *New Republic*, 145 (November 11th, 1961), 9–10.

[3] Ernest C. Reock, Jr., "Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (Feb. 1961), 70–74. Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness," *Minnesota Law Review*, 50 (January, 1966), 443–52.

[4] See Carl C. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

[5] See David R. Lee and T. Thomas Sallee, "A Method of Measuring Shape," *Geographical Review*, 60 (Oct., 1970), 555–63.

[6] Reock, p. 73. Schwartzberg, p. 448. In other subjects this approach has been used by: V. C. Miller, "A Quantitative Geomorphic Study of Drainage Basin Characteristics in the Clinch Mountain Area, Virginia and Tennessee," Office of Naval Research, Geography Branch, Project NR 389-042, Technical Report, 3 (1953); Stanley A. Schumm, "The Evolution of Drainage Basins and Slopes in Badlands at Perth Amboy, New Jersey," *Bulletin of the Geological Society of America*, 67 (May 1956), 597–646; Jack P. Gibbs, ed., *Urban Research Methods* (New York, 1961), pp. 99–106, and Lee and Sallee, p. 557. A short review can be found in Peter Haggett and Richard J. Chorley, *Network Analysis in Geography* (London: Arnold, 1969), pp. 70–78.

[7] Peter J. Taylor, "Distances within Shapes: an Introduction to a New Family of Finite Frequency Distributions," *Geografiska Annaler*, 53B (July, 1971), 40–53.

[8] Taylor, Figure 3.

With regard to the first point, shape measures that relate a shape's area to a specified circle would seem to be most sensitive to elongation,[9] while measures relating a shape's perimeter to a specified circle's circumference are particularly suited to measuring the degree of indentation.[10] Clearly, neither of these approaches is suitable for measuring separateness or puncturedness, although these concepts can be picked up by more general measures of shape based on aggregate divergences from a center of gravity.[11] Since difference indices seem to measure different aspects of the general concept of shape, it becomes imperative to consider exactly what one wants to measure in a given problem. Let us consider what we want to measure in the context of political districting problems.

The introduction of shape criteria in any districting problem has traditionally sprung from both positive and negative motives. On the positive side the purpose of considering shape has not been explicit, but very often the shape of districts has been associated with attempts to produce areas within which contact is relatively easy.[12] This contact in turn may foster a sense of community and identity within the district by both party organizations and voters. Clearly noncontiguity is unacceptable on these grounds, since it means areas of a single district are separated by zones of other districts. Indentation is related to contact less directly. Although "indented" shape districts are topologically unitary, so that contact between locations can be maintained by moving solely within the shape, in practice, when any indentations exist, contact between extreme points will be through zones of adjacent districts. The effect therefore will be similar to that of noncontiguity, and hence will possibly inhibit ease of voter participation and party organization.

The negative motive of compactness and contiguity conditions in districting has been much more explicit: It is simply an attempt to prevent unfair districting of the gerrymander variety. In building up an electoral district from smaller base areas, such as city blocks or rural counties, the drawing of any single boundary will involve making a decision every time base area boundaries join. If the decisions are largely made on partisan political grounds, the result may well be a series of the peculiarly shaped districts with which we are all familiar.

If the above discussion of the purposes of shape measures as districting criteria is accepted, it leads us to conclude that the measure we need should be sensitive to indentation divergences from compactness, while concentrating on the junctions of the base area boundaries where the basic districting decisions are carried out. The indentation index I_A can be applied in just this way.

I_A is a shape measure based on angles rather than one of the more usual distance-based indices. Any shape can be considered a closed curve made up of a finite number of straight line segments. Adjacent pairs of lines define the interior angles of the shape which may be reflexive (greater than 180°) or nonreflexive (obtuse and acute). Every indentation will be represented by a reflexive interior angle. Thus the total number of reflexive interior angles is an *absolute* measure of indentation. This simple measure, however, will partially reflect the number of straight line segments used to describe the shape. This problem is overcome by relating the number of reflexive angles to the number of nonreflexive angles and total angles. The following expression thus defines a *relative* measure of divergence from compactness due to indentation:

$$I_A = \frac{N - R}{T}$$

where N is the number of nonreflexive interior angles, R is the number of reflexive interior angles and $T = N + R$. For all compact shapes that are convex, $R = 0$, $N = T$, and therefore $I_A = 1$. In contrast a five pointed star has five acute angles at the points, five reflexive angles between stems, resulting in $I_A = 0$. These are the two limiting cases, since N cannot be greater than T and R cannot be greater than N if the curve (shape boundary) is to be closed.

---

[9] For instance, the measures proposed by Reock, Schumm and Gibb.

[10] For instance, the measures proposed by Schwartzberg and Miller.

[11] For the use of such measures in political districting problems compare: Henry F. Kaiser, "An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 10 (May, 1966), 200–23. James B. Weaver and Sidney W. Hess, "A Procedure for Non-partisan Districting: Development of Computer Techniques;" *Yale Law Journal,* 73 (December, 1963), 288–308. For the use of such measures in other problems, see: Ronald B. Boyce and W. A. V. Clark, "The Concept of Shape in Geography," *Geographical Review,* 54 (Oct. 1964), 561–72; D. H. Blair and T. H. Biss, "The Measurement of Shape in Geography: An Appraisal of Methods and Techniques," *Bulletin of quantitative data for geographers,* 11 (University of Nottingham, 1967).

[12] This justification for considering shape in redistricting is more explicitly recognized in the British context where size and shape are related to problems of accessibility within a constituency; see David Butler, "The Redistribution of Seats," *Public Administration,* 33 (1955), p. 127.


IOWA
6
3
2
5
4
1
LYON
OSCEOLA
DICKINSON
EMMET
KOSSUTH
WINNEBAGO
WORTH
MITCHELL
HOWARD
WINNESHIEK
ALLAMAKEE
SIOUX
O'BRIEN
CLAY
PALO ALTO
HANCOCK
CERRO GORDO
FLOYD
CHICKASAW
FAYETTE
CLAYTON
PLYMOUTH
CHEROKEE
BUENA VISTA
POCAHONTAS
HUMBOLDT
WRIGHT
FRANKLIN
BUTLER
BREMER
WEBSTER
BLACK HAWK
BUCHANAN
DELAWARE
DUBUQUE
WOODBURY
IDA
SAC
CALHOUN
HAMILTON
HARDIN
GRUNDY
TAMA
BENTON
LINN
JONES
JACKSON
MONONA
CRAWFORD
CARROLL
GREENE
BOONE
STORY
MARSHALL
CLINTON
CEDAR
HARRISON
SHELBY
AUDUBON
GUTHRIE
DALLAS
POLK
JASPER
POWESHIEK
IOWA
JOHNSON
SCOTT
MUSCATINE
POTTAWATTAMIE
CASS
ADAIR
MADISON
WARREN
MARION
MAHASKA
KEOKUK
WASHINGTON
LOUISA
MILLS
MONTGOMERY
ADAMS
UNION
CLARKE
LUCAS
MONROE
WAPELLO
JEFFERSON
HENRY
DES MOINES
FREMONT
PAGE
TAYLOR
RINGGOLD
DECATUR
WAYNE
APPANOOSE
DAVIS
VAN BUREN
LEE

Figure 1. Proposed Congressional Districts: Iowa 1971

The application of I_A to the assessment of electoral districts is relatively simple. Any electoral district boundary may be generalized as a series of straight line segments between base area junctions.[13] (Obviously, we do not wish to consider indentations arising from base unit boundaries [rivers, coastlines, etc.] beyond the control of the districting procedure.) With electoral districts in this form, I_A may be easily calculated, thus permitting measurement of the degree of indentation of the district in terms of the base unit junctions where the ultimate districting decisions are made.

We can briefly illustrate the application of this measure using the Iowa Congressional Districts approved by the Iowa legislature in 1971. All six proposed districts exhibit indentations, and so we can expect I_A values of less than unity. To measure the degree of indentation we initially enumerate the number of base area junctions on a district's boundary, since each of these represents a decision on the part of the districting agent. Iowa's First Congressional District, for instance, has 24 base area junctions on its border. Of these, seven produce internal reflexive angles so that $I_A = (17\text{–}7/24) = 0.42$. The I_A indices for the other five districts can be similarly calculated producing the following results: 2nd—0.47; 3rd—0.68; 4th—0.52; 5th—0.64; and 6th—0.69.

Let us now consider the uses to which this shape measure can be put. Clearly it cannot be used as an absolute criterion since other factors such as population equality—might well be violated by a system of neat convex districts. In any case, a control on district shapes in no way prevents gerrymandering, since the required pattern of districts for unfair districting will depend on the underlying distribution of voter preferences.[14] Dixon concedes, however, that: "A rule of compactness and contiguity, if used merely to force an explanation for odd-shaped districts, can have much merit."[15] The I_A index seems particularly well suited to this role of evaluating proposed district patterns. By concentrating on indentations, it pinpoints divergences from convexity and thus may be used to "force an explanation." In our Iowa example it is immediately apparent that the three districts with low I_A values (1, 2, 4) include those counties (Polk, Linn, Dubuque, Johnson, Des Moines) from which the state's minority party, the Democrats, draw most support. The explanation that this suspected gerrymander forces, relates to the greater need for indented boundaries in this part of the state because of its uneven population distribution. At a more specific level, however, the two I_A values below 0.5 for the First and Second Districts do invite comment on their shapes particularly with regard to their common boundary. In effect this boundary locates Johnson County in the Republican First District thus "wasting" Democrat votes that the Democrats would much prefer to have in the more marginal Second District. No doubt this can be justified on population equality grounds although our boundary analysis does suggest a partisan effect from this neutral population criterion.

In this paper I have tried to develop a shape measure for evaluating electoral districts from an initial abstract consideration on the concept of shape. We are now in a position to return to the more exciting world of gerrymanders. Thus the most famous recent gerrymander, Tuskegee's "24 sided sea-horse"[16] encloses 12 reflexive angles and so has maximum indentation scoring zero on the I_A index. We can therefore conclude that, at the very least, I_A identifies the extreme cases. Furthermore, we now have a new tool specifically designed to force explanations of odd shaped districts that is relatively easy to interpret and can be easily understood and therefore used by professional and layman alike.

---

[13] Schwartzberg ("Reapportionment," p. 447) terms these points "trijunctions," since the base area boundaries meet in threes.

[14] This point is particularly well developed by Robert G. Dixon, *Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Chapter 18. See also Peter J. Taylor, "On Some Implications of the Spatial Organization of Elections," *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers* (forthcoming, 1973).

[15] Dixon, p. 460.

[16] Bernard Taper, *Gomillion versus Lightfoot: The Tuskegee Gerrymander Case* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962).

Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process*

Peter B. Natchez
Brandeis University

Irvin C. Bupp
Harvard University

Politics and the Budgetary Process

By an impressive margin the federal government spends more money, does more things, and affects more people than it did twenty-five, or even ten, years ago. But the record of innovation and expansion has not been uniform; rather the prosperity of individual programs has varied widely during this period. Some programs have continuously prospered, grown, and evidently become permanent fixtures in the governmental system: farm commodity supports, highway construction, Social Security, and, most recently, health care. Others seem to have thrived only temporarily: aircraft nuclear propulsion, manned space flight, and the "Green Berets"; while still others have an uneven history of success and failure and are constantly involved in political turmoil: AID, Model Cities, and the Atomic Energy Commission's "Plowshare" program.

What is responsible for the success or failure of governmental programs? Who (or what) determines our national priorities? Political scientists have long regarded the budgetary process as the richest source of evidence on these matters. The assumption has been that the budgetary process, the most important "action forcing" mechanism in government, reflects the aspirations and controversies which cause some programs to be favored over others. Within the budgetary process clashes of interest and priority should be expressed in real dollar terms. Evidence concerning the goals of program directors and clients, the support of agency heads, the surveillance of the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget), the strategic choices of the president, and the influence of Congress should all be contained in the data generated annually by the federal budget cycle.[1]

More recent quantitative analyses of the federal budgetary process do not, however, support these assumptions. Instead, a younger generation of political scientists has discovered "striking regularities" indicating that what happens in any given year closely resembles what had happened in the previous year.[2] Implicit in this approach is the view that the strategic and tactical choices, the interagency disputes and alliances, the battles with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the appeals for presidential support, all make very little difference. In the end what happens during any

---

* The authors wish to thank Don K. Price, Dean of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, and Richard G. Hewlett, Chief Historian, United States Atomic Energy Commission, for their advice and counsel. We have benefited also from the suggestions and criticisms of Professors Arthur Maass and Douglas Price of Harvard University.

[1] The "traditional" literature on the budgetary process is immense. The text and references in either Arthur Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955), or Jesse Burkhead, *Governmental Budgeting* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), provide convenient guides. Of particular interest are: Richard E. Neustadt, "The Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," *American Political Science Review,* 48 (September, 1954), 641–671; Arthur Maass, "In Accord with the President's Program," in C. J. Friedrich and K. Galbraith, eds., *Public Policy,* 4 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 77–93; Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its Evolution and Present Role," I and II, *American Political Science Review,* 39 (August and October, 1945), 653–684 and 869–898; and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., *The Spending Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943). The notion of an "action forcing" mechanism is, of course, Richard E. Neustadt's.

[2] Aaron Wildavsky's highly influential *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964) is the watershed. The ideas embodied in this analysis were more precisely formulated in Otto A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (September 1966), 529–547. See also, by the same authors, "On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," in *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making,* ed. Gordon Tullock (Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, 1966), pp. 63–133. This general analytic approach has been importantly extended by John P. Crecine. See his "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Resource Allocation" (paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Science, April, 1966), as well as *Governmental Problem Solving* (Chicago, Ill.: Markham Pub. Co., 1969). See also Ira Sharkansky, *The Routines of Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1969).

given period pretty much determines what will happen in subsequent periods.

There is, of course, an important element of truth in these findings. Administrative budgets are not rewritten from scratch every year; and it is a little silly to judge the consequences of policy innovations as if they were. Further, it is undoubtedly true that political historians (and public administrators) often exaggerate the importance of particular policies, choices, and competing personalities. After all, they find the business of public administration interesting precisely because it embodies great controversies between powerful forces—conflicts which seem both to be inherent in and to shed light upon the process of popular government.

Still, the gap between traditional and quantitative approaches to the budget remains. It is not enough to dismiss the conclusions of the older school out of hand, as the product of too much enthusiasm for public administration and the inevitable result of unsystematic research. Much of the traditional literature comes from men who in fact have served in government—participant observers, if you will—and their description of the central role of the budgetary process as a policy vehicle is important if only because that is what they saw happening.

The challenge of the quantitative budget studies is precisely over the question of how much public policy is embedded in the budgetary process. Their argument is that administrators rarely depart significantly from what they are already doing. They "muddle through" as best they can, making only marginal changes in the established operations of government. Consequently, agency budgets are massively stable from one year to the next.[3] Bureaucratic behavior and the budgets that result from it seem to reduce to a simple set of operating principles that, at the same time, leave no room for other explanations.

> The most striking fact about the equations [which describe the budgetary process] is their simplicity. This is perhaps partly because of the possibility that more complicated decision procedures are reserved for special circumstances represented by extreme values of the random variable. However, the fact that the decision rules generally fit the data very well is an indication that these simple questions have considerable explanatory power. Little of the variance is left unexplained.[4]

In the end, this line of reasoning may yet provide a new and strong foundation for the study of public administration. However, it may be also that the relationship between public policy and the budgetary process has been obscured by the way the problem has been quantified.

The theme of this essay is that the political choices and conflicts inherent in the administration of government have been unnecessary casualties of the quantitative revolution. The problem is essentially one of theory. After reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of the quantitative budget studies we will suggest an alternative approach to the manipulation of budgetary data, developing along the way a methodology that will uncover controversies over policy and priorities.

The Incremental Model of Budgeting

The budgets of federal agencies are developed over a period which begins as much as eighteen months before appropriations requests are acted upon by the Congress. During this period agency budgets are typically formulated to meet the guidelines established by the OMB speaking for the president and his administration. The initial budgets normally undergo a sequence of successive reductions and appeals often culminating in a presidential review.

The budgetary process itself is composed of six stages, though the precise pattern that is followed may vary slightly by agency and department, particularly in the final stages of appeal and presidential review. The process begins with the budget guidelines that are sent down by the OMB. These are deliberately varied from year to year so as to communicate to the bureaucracy a sense of limited resources and to direct attention to items that happen to be of particular concern to the administration. Usually agencies will respond to the OMB by preparing "flash estimates" or "preview budgets." These budgets serve to begin the process of negotiation, and, in the weeks that follow, a series of informal estimates are established indicating how much expansion is likely to be considered reasonable in light of the administration's priorities.

On the basis of this information, the agency's comptroller begins to aggregate budget requests from the operating divisions within the department or agency. Of course, division requests regularly exceed the amount of money that, according to the OMB, will be available. Hence these estimates are worked over by the comptroller with an eye towards bringing them in line with administration expectations.

---

[3] See in this regard Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review*, 29 (Spring, 1959), 79–88; and Charles Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[4] Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, p. 543.

The comptroller's recommendations along with each division's request constitute the material from which an agency budget is produced. It is during this part of the process that competition *within* the agency (or department) reaches its greatest intensity. Each division struggles for funds against the budgetary interests of the other operating divisions, each trying to avoid the heavy hand of the comptroller by shifting the burden of budgetary cuts to some other division's programs.

The easiest way for a division to protect itself is, of course, to gain the support of the department secretary or agency chairman. But the competition for funds often extends beyond the administrative framework in which the operating divisions are located. Thus, it is not unusual to find program directors drawing in other elements of government—congressmen, other bureaus and departments, consultants, lobbyists, etc.—in order to gain some vital budgetary advantage. (Admiral Rickover, for one, was so skilled at managing his congressional support that he operated virtually outside the normal review procedures of the AEC.) The department or agency must now produce a series of budgetary settlements that compromise the demands of its working parts along with the push and pull of external political forces while, of course, trying to hold to OMB guidelines.

The budgetary outcomes at this stage of the process become formal requests to the president for funding and are sent to the OMB for review. Acting "in accordance with the President's program,"[5] the OMB "marks up" each budget, item by item, program by program—cutting away wherever it can, accepting other requests as submitted, and occasionally, adding money to some project that the administration looks upon with special favor. For the managers of the federal bureaucracy, this is the most difficult part of the process, because it threatens to unbalance the blend of policies and priorities that has been arranged among a department's working parts. Yet the entire thrust of the OMB at this point is to attack budget requests that have produced unnecessary and expensive settlements. Budgets then are normally marked up with a heavy hand and returned to those who wrote them for reconsideration.

Here the agency or department has a choice: it can accept the OMB's actions as they stand or it can appeal to the OMB for some measure of restoration. It is important to note here that any further budgetary action by either the president or the OMB occurs only over contested items in the budget. Those items not disputed by the OMB or subsequently returned to the OMB by appeal are regarded as a settled part of the administration's budget. Thus, the budget is now agreed upon for the most part with only a small number of controversies remaining.

The OMB reconsiders those matters that are still disputed and again leaves the agency or department with a choice. Again the decision of the OMB can be accepted, thus settling the matter. There is, however, also the alternative of appealing the OMB's final action directly to the president. It is understood that each agency chairman or department secretary can argue for restorations directly before the president, much like a knight pleading before his king for special favor. The president's decision, of course, ends the process and the results are printed up and sent along to Congress (where specific issues can be reopened). Several things ought to be noted about the presidential budgetary reviews. The first is that this stage is centered on specific budgetary items and does not usually include a general review of the agency's or department's budget. Second, it is in these last stages of appeals that the budgetary process varies most widely. These variations usually reflect the relative stature of particular branches of government. (Thus military budgets, for example, have a preferred status in the appeal process.) Also, it is at this point that the standing of the department's chief administrator is determined. It is he who must go before the president and argue for funds that are presumably vital to his department's functions. Consequently, the degree of success that he has with the president is widely regarded as an evaluation of his administrative worth and, at the same time, a measure of the importance that agency or department has in the administration.

By design, then, the budgetary process produces a climate of scarcity in which the success of those who participate is measured by the number of dollars they are able to win. Indeed, the entire process of formulating budgets within agencies plays upon the institutional interests of bureaucrats so as to produce the explicit competition between alternative "policies."[6]

---

[5] See Arthur Maass, "In Accord with the President's Program," for an excellent discussion of the great subtlety and variation with which this phrase is used.

[6] For a thorough review of one such cycle, see Irvin C. Bupp, "Priorities in Nuclear Technology: Program Prosperity and Decay in the USAEC, 1956–

This competition among alternative programs seems to have been all but lost in the work of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky. These scholars have argued that agency budgets are produced by relatively straightforward incremental strategies and hence are not often an especially interesting source of conflict, not to mention change and innovation.[7] Specifically, they have examined the variations in fifty-six nondefense federal agencies from 1947 to 1963 and discovered that they can be explained very simply by a "set of simple decision rules that are linear and temporally stable."[8] In their most sophisticated equation (decision rule), Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky argue that the congressional appropriation of any agency is

> . . . a fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus a fixed mean percentage of a dummy variable which represents that part of the agency's request for the year at issue which is not part of the appropriation or request of the previous year plus a random variable representing the part of the appropriation attributable to the special circumstances of the year.[9]

This is to say that appropriations subcommittees normally give an agency some proportion of what it asked for, adjusted by things in dispute and special considerations peculiar to a particular year.

The point that Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky most emphasize is that their decision rules fit the data: ". . . the results are very good. We leave very little of the variance statistically unexplained."[10] In fact, for the majority of congressional decisions (appropriations) their equations yield R^2s exceeding 99 per cent, and for all but two show R^2s above 90 per cent. Further, these decision rules seem to square neatly with other research which suggests that the budgetary process in appropriations subcommittees has become an institutionalized series of actions sanctioned by an elaborate set of norms and behaviors.[11]

The creative insights upon which Wildavsky and others have built are contained in the writings of Herbert Simon and his colleagues.[12] The theme of this work is that people are quite limited in their ability to process new information, generate alternatives, anticipate consequences, and weigh values. The Simon-Lindblom administrator faces a highly complicated world, a world of multiple values and goals related to each other in unknown ways. He has no very reliable way of predicting the consequences of alternative courses of action and little information pertinent to assessing these consequences even if he had an acceptable theory. As Crecine has put it,

> [He] is a man with limited knowledge, limited information, and limited cognitive ability, making a policy choice in an uncertain world by "drastically" simplifying the problem and making marginal adjustments in past "successful" policies to formulate current policies.[13]

The phrase that captures the essence of the administrative situation is "organized complexity."[14] And nowhere are its consequences more apparent than in the making of budgets. The budgetary process is, after all, a complicated procedure in which officials are usually under the intense pressure of time and circumstance. One expects that whatever decision rules have worked in the past will be used again in the solving of current disputes. Indeed, one does not expect the level of disagreement to be very high, because individual administrators can be

---

1971" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971), chap. 1.

[7] Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, pp. 540–543, do make explicit provision for deviant cases in their analysis. These are cases that lie beyond the normal rules of budgeting that they describe; they are also cases that presumably involve controversy, change and innovation in the budgetary process. This line of thought is further developed in their subsequent article: "On the Process of Budgeting II: an Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," *Studies in Budgeting,* eds. R. F. Byrne, A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, and D. Gilfords (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 292–375.

[8] Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, p. 529.

[9] Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, p. 534.

[10] Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, p. 537.

[11] Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," *American Political Science Review,* 56 (1962), 310–324. See also Richard Fenno, *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

[12] Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior,* 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1957); Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957); Herbert A. Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1950); David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Richard Cyert and James March, eds., *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963); H. A. Simon, "Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," *American Economic Review,* 59 (June, 1959) 253–283; G. P. E. Clarkson and H. A. Simon, "Simulation of Individual Group Behavior," *American Economic Review,* 60 (Dec., 1960), 920–932.

[13] Crecine, *Governmental Problem Solving,* p. 11.

[14] Herbert Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," Reprint No. 113 of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology.

expected to request funds for what they are already doing, give or take a little bit.

These observations are all quite true as far as they go. Across aggregations of decision-making units (federal agencies, municipal administrations or individual budget-makers), behavior at time "T" can be shown to be a robust function of comparable behavior at "T — 1." What is striking is that administrative behavior is so very similar in all sorts of diverse organizations. State governments, business organizations, labor unions, organizations of every sort seem to promote the same sort of responses from those who administer them, responses that are rationalized in budgetary processes that do not seem to vary widely in effect from organization to organization.[15]

The trouble is that in politics the budgetary process, while certainly responding to the requirements of administrative life, is also a battlefield for conflicting priorities and alternative policies. The categories of analysis established by Wildavsky, Crecine, and others help us to understand the behavior of the pertinent decision maker as he attempts to resolve the problems that he faces. But this line of reasoning does not shed much light upon the sort of things which over time cause some activities to become the continuing policies of government while others fade and are discarded. It is this variation in the *competitive* success of alternative *programs,* rather than the cognitive processes of decision makers, which is central to the politics of public administration. It is this aspect of government that the "problem solving" perspective is inherently unable to explain.

Let us stress again that we are not quarreling with descriptions of administrative behavior. Quite to the contrary, our argument is premised on the findings of Simon, Lindblom, Cyert and March, and Wildavsky. Administrators in complex organizations *behave similarly*. However, accounting for these patterns of administrative behavior—itself vital to the science of public administration—is not the focus of our problem. We want to explain why some programs are repeatedly funded while others are considerably less successful, *given* that the behavior of their administrators is likely to be quite similar. This is to say that we are looking at a different level of public administration. Our focus is not on the behavior of administrators, *per se,* but on administrators as they are organized in terms of policy outputs, programs as they compete for dollars.

In a sense budget data present us with a measurement problem: *How are yearly government budgetary figures reordered so that they indicate policy choices and public priorities?* This is by no means an easy question to answer. For the budget reflects simultaneously a yearly *process of administration* and decisions among *alternative political priorities*. That is, budgets are at once measures of the way government is organized and of the policy decisions that the organization implements. Obviously, these are not the same things although they are nested within the very same data.

The fact that political choices and the budgetary process are so completely intertwined accounts for much of the confusion among approaches to public administration. What has happened is that the traditional scholars have spoken of public administration without placing it within the context of an annual, stable budgetary process. Thus, they have tended to write about policy as if that were the only thing that government was producing. In discovering that there is, in fact, a budgetary process in administration, younger and more quantitatively trained researchers assumed that the process of government, in addition to producing budgets, produced settlements on questions of public policy. Here the quantitative approach was a victim of its own theoretical and statistical precision. The budgetary process models worked so well that there simply did not seem to be anything left to explain.

The reason for the great statistical success of the quantitative budget studies lies in the fact that *agencies* were taken as the unit of analysis, yearly budget cycles being nothing more than replications of the same event over time. These data yielded to Wildavsky and his associates a simple set of equations (decision rules) that, by and large, seemed to describe how public policy is formulated while reserving more complex and sophisticated political strategies for a small number of "deviant cases." What has been captured—quite accurately—by this formulation is the great stability of the administrative structure of government. But because administrative categories have formed the basis of budgetary analysis, the entire process in which public policy is produced has been obscured.[16]

---

[15] Compare: Thomas Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966) with Cyert and March, and William Leiserson, *American Trade Union Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) with Crecine.

[16] In policy terms, the entire metaphor of normal and deviant cases is vastly misleading. With it, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky promote the idea that bureaucracy is largely inert, proceeding to do today

The first step, then, in untangling information on policy choices from data on the administration of government is to shift the level of analysis for agencies and departments to programs. This is to say that in the context of the budgetary process, programs are the operating units of public policy, that they provide "categories that are closer to being true outputs [of government] than the older categories."[17]

It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to make explicit comparisons *between* program budgets (although even with the data in this form a great deal can be done).[18] Programs vary widely in their scope, size, and content, and these differences are unfortunately reflected in their budgets. The amount of money necessary to fund a strong cancer research program differs substantially from the funding necessary to lift the incomes of the elderly above the "poverty line." Similarly, reducing the army's manpower budget by 100 million dollars has a markedly different effect from taking the same number of dollars away from OEO. In a fundamental way, then, all budgetary dollars are not equal; and while all policy outcomes are expressed in terms of dollars, some care must be taken to make this information commensurate across programs. This is to argue that merely shifting to programs as the basis of policy analysis is not in itself sufficient, that budgetary data organized by programs must themselves be transformed so that the relative prosperity of programs in the policy process can be measured and compared.

It should be added, finally, that programs have histories of support and opposition, and focusing explicitly on them returns this dimension to budgetary analyses. Agencies (or departments) usually do not have such histories associated with them (except in their first years of operation). They are normally accepted as part of the fixed institutional landscape, terrain that seems to change dramatically only during periods of great crisis and political turmoil. An important lesson of the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations is that changing the party in power does not open up already established agencies to direct attack. However, the relative priorities for programs within an agency (and even the relative standing of the agency as a whole) do vary quite widely from administration to administration, even though the agency continues as an established part of government.

Thus, the salient characteristic of established agencies and departments is their stability—both organizational and budgetary. And again, it is this aspect of government that Wildavsky and others have captured so well. Yet within departmental and agency boundaries (and occasionally between them, e.g., the case of OEO) there is a constant struggle by program directors, lobbyists, congressmen, state and local politicians, and White House personnel to fund new ideas and to continue the funding of old ones. It is a competition that draws to it people and institutions with radically different ideas and purposes, and that decides, in the end, what public policies we are to have.

From this perspective the struggle to establish new public policies looks very much like the competitive ideal in nineteenth century capitalism. Entrepreneurs—"policy entrepreneurs," if you will—seek scarce resources for their programs. In their quest for funding and political authority, they use every available weapon: pressure from various constituencies and groups, aggressive selling inside government, attracting congressmen as innovators or as protectors (congressmen who in turn often lobby other congressmen), pressuring the White House as well as receiving pressure from the White House, and so on through a diverse range of opportunities and strategies. The fact

---

essentially what it did yesterday, all without competition and controversy. The exceptions, by this logic, are reserved for a small number of deviant cases which involve "more complicated decision procedures."

The entire thrust of our argument is that the logic of the budgetary process involves public policies in a continuous struggle for scarce resources; that, if there is any "normal state of affairs" in the policy process, it is one of intense competition between programs for public funds. Further, this logic holds equally for policies that desire nothing more than to continue to do what they were doing last year. There is nothing simple or automatic about continuing. Again we must stress that we are speaking of policies and programs here, not the administrative framework in which they are managed. Thus when Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (pp. 544–545) suggest that the analysis of individual programs follows from the broad outlines established in their own work, we must respond that their emphasis on normal and deviant cases has started such research off in the wrong direction.

[17] Roland N. McKean and Melvin Awshen, "Limitations, Risks and Problems," in *Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the Federal Budget,* ed. David Novick (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) p. 286.

[18] For a thoughtful discussion which complements many of these points, see Charles L. Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968). Indirect, but vivid, support for many of the same arguments can be found in Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, and Nancy H. Teeters, *Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971). And at the municipal level see John E. Jackson's perceptive essay, "Politics and the Budgetary Process," *Social Science Research,* 1 (April, 1972) 35–60.

that political strategies vary widely as a result of the peculiar combination of resources that happens to be available probably explains why "the case study method" of public administration was never able to produce a cogent set of generalizations. But this should not be taken as evidence that there is no struggle, that the process is one of slow, incremental change. Rather it suggests that the policy process in the United States is an open one where all sorts of influences are at play, and where—because the process is a long and complex one (six stages plus congressional action over more than eighteen months)—the competition between policies is reinforced and accentuated.

The Case of the AEC

To make these thoughts more concrete, let us turn to the activities of a particular federal agency: the Atomic Energy Commission. Though now a mature agency with established purposes and programs, the AEC was created and in many ways has continued to exist in an atmosphere of uncertainty and conflict about the appropriate applications of a new and poorly understood technology.[19] Was nuclear technology to be applied exclusively to the development of weapons? Or were its applications ultimately to be essentially civilian and peaceful? Could peaceful applications be carried out with economy and safety? By whom, and under whose supervision? These and other questions have defined areas of sharp conflict among philosophies of government and among programs and personalities. The early history of these disputes has been compiled and is presently being published as a multivolume study of the Atomic Energy Commission.[20] A definitive account of the programs and controversies that developed over the years within the AEC, this material provides a rich historical context against which we can examine the AEC's activities as they are reflected in the agency's budgetary records. Perhaps more important, however, are the specific characteristics of the actual budgetary records upon which we have been able to draw. First, we have been able to identify and trace the histories in whole or in part of twenty-three distinct AEC programs during the period of 1958–1972. While these programs do not represent an exhaustive categorization of all AEC activities, they are all "real" programs as distinct from mere projects on the one hand or "accounting categories" on the other. The twenty-three identified programs are mutually exclusive but are not exhaustive of all Commission activities, comprising on the average about 90 per cent of any given year's total AEC operating budget.[21]

Second, within each of the fifteen "budget cycles," FY 1958–FY 1972, we have isolated six discrete stages beginning with the program divisions' requests to the Commission's general manager and ending with the official presidential budget for a given year. The intermediate stages represent the general manager's recommendation to the Commission; the Commission's "September" submission to the Administration; the OMB's "mark-up" of that submission; and the "appeal" of the "mark-up," either to the Office of Management and Budget or the president.[22] Consider now the data reflected in Table 1.

In Table 1 we have ignored the programmatic breakdown of the fifteen AEC budgets and have simply correlated the requests for allocations for each stage across the fiscal cycles for which we have data. For these fifteen observations, the funds requested at a given stage correlate almost perfectly with that requested at a previous stage and that granted at a subsequent stage. The perfection of these correlations is powerful support for Wildavsky's basic argument about the regularities of the budgetary process, but it suggests very little about the political conflicts which we *know* were taking place during the period spanned by this data.

---

[19] James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller, *The Control of Atomic Energy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948). See also David E. Lilienthal, *The Atomic Energy Years, 1945–1950* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

[20] Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, 1939–1946, A History of the USAEC*, Vol. 1 (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947–1953, A History of the USAEC*, Vol. 2 (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969). A separate study of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has also been prepared by Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan and is scheduled for publication in the Fall of 1973.

[21] One of the authors (Irvin Bupp), was for several years on the staff of the secretariat of the AEC and hence had access to the agency's internal financial records. This association led to AEC support under the auspices of the Office of the Historian for the research reported here.

It is perhaps also worth noting that the AEC is one of the very few executive agencies to have followed a generally consistent "output" format in its budgetary practices since its creation. This fortunate circumstance considerably simplified the problem of isolating and tracing distinct programs.

[22] This fifth "appeal" stage is the only one not strictly comparable across all fifteen years. Records of this process were often difficult to locate, and for FY 1959 and FY 1960 there is no evidence that an "appeal" as such was allowed at all.

Table 1. Correlations Between Budgetary Stages for 23 AEC Programs Pooled Across FY 1958-FY 1962

	Division	General Manager	AEC	OMB	Appeal	Presidential
Division	1.000					
Gen'l Mgr.	.996	1.000				
AEC	.997	.999	1.000			
OMB	.995	.998	.997	1.000		
Appeal	.996	.997	.997	.998	1.000	
Final	.995	.996	.997	.998	.999	1.000

For, within this apparently stable framework, five substantial AEC programs were cancelled altogether, two major activities experienced a sharp monotonic decline in their fortunes, three grew impressively, and most others fluctuated widely. Moreover, the picture is not very much different at the program than at the agency level.

When requests and allocations are correlated at the program level there is on the whole less close association across stages but the average magnitude of the correlation coefficients is still quite high. Most are in the .80–.90 range, and out of twenty-three programs only four show associations of less than .70 between pairs of stages. So, even at places where conflict is *known* to have occurred, the budgetary process perspective merely uncovers "striking regularities." Simply changing the units of analysis, that is to say, does not uncover the underlying political competition that structures the process of policy formulation; a more profound change is required.

It is at this point that we come to manipulating budgetary data themselves, to transforming dollars so that they will better reflect the competitive struggle for growth, for continued (or renewed) prosperity. The elements that we have to work with are: the agency in which programs operate (i.e., the administrative context), the past success or failure of a program in obtaining funds, and the action that is taken on program requests as they pass through the budgetary cycle (i.e., a program budget from initial request to final presidential decision).[23]

The raw data, of course, come in the form of absolute dollar levels of programs from year to year. And it is by transforming and recombining these data that we hope to create an "index of prosperity" which will reflect the relative political success or failure of programs as they compete for scarce resources. Such an index has to meet two different problems of comparability.[24]

The first has to do with the variation in the total AEC operating budget between FY 1958 and FY 1972, which was, of course, by no means constant over that period. In Table 2 below, we have computed the sum at each stage of the twenty-three programs on which we have calculated data. It varies from year to year, ranging from a low of \$2006.3 million in FY 1967 to a high of \$2568.5 million in FY 1963.[25]

It seems reasonable to argue that programs are equally prosperous only if each preserves its proportion of the total even as the total changes *both* from year to year *and* across the stages of budgetary process. A first step, then, toward operationalizing the notion of "prosperity" is to divide all program allocations at all stages by the total for that stage. This procedure, however, leads to a second problem of comparability.

There is great variation in the absolute magnitude of program budgets. Among the twenty-three AEC programs for which we have data, several have budgets in the \$5–\$10 million

---

[23] Congressional action is not included in our calculations, although a good case could be made for doing so. Congress is, after all, quite active in the budgetary process through its committee and subcommittee system; see Fenno, *Power of the Purse*. We are concerned, however, with the formulation of program budgets, not with their review. Congressional review of the budget really moves on to a different level of analysis. Of course, much of congressional influence is informal. As such, it should be entered into any explanation of why some programs prosper and others fail. This is again a different analytical problem from developing an index of program prosperity—the results of which can then be searched for appropriate causes.

[24] For a somewhat different, but also highly imaginative, approach to this problem, see John Jackson, "Politics and the Budgetary Process."

[25] For any given year or stage, the totals reflected in Table 2 are equal to about 90 per cent of the comparable total operating budget, the remaining 10 per cent being that portion of the AEC budget which we were unable to allocate to meaningful output categories. Since we are explicitly interested in competition among programs, the aggregated totals shown have been used as the basis for the transformation described in the text.

Table 2. Total at Each Budget Stage for 23 AEC Programs

(In $ millions)

Fiscal Year	Division Request	General Manager	Commission	OMB	Appeal	Final
1958	$2170.9	$2059.1	$2199.1	$2081.2	$2083.2	$2076.6
1959	2414.9	2235.4	2267.9	2253.9	2253.9	2252.3
1960	2575.7	2501.7	2510.9	2447.5	2472.7	2451.0
1961	2494.3	2409.6	2368.8	2206.6	2310.3	2296.4
1962	2538.7	2499.2	2491.1	2285.3	2306.5	2343.0
1963	2586.2	2428.7	2447.5	2389.8	2592.3	2568.5
1964	2781.2	2468.5	2586.6	2366.7	2548.3	2381.4
1965	2505.1	2428.1	2447.0	2294.5	2283.1	2239.6
1966	2323.8	2251.4	2257.4	2104.0	2195.3	2129.1
1967	2213.6	2098.1	2118.2	1986.0	2034.4	2006.3
1968	2399.9	1999.1	2110.1	2005.8	2053.6	2026.4
1969	2438.2	2272.8	2269.8	2151.7	2225.3	2180.5
1970	2376.0	2238.9	2274.4	2104.8	2169.9	2037.4
1971	2469.4	2285.1	2303.9	2024.4	2121.0	2013.7
1972	2420.7	2179.5	2150.7	1962.6	1990.2	1980.5

range, and a few have budgets that were greater than $400 million. The obvious consequence is that each of the smaller programs is a tiny proportion of the total agency budget and is thus "lost" for analytical purposes. For example, one of the most politically controversial AEC programs is "Plowshare," a project to develop nonweapons applications for nuclear explosives. This program has never commanded more than one per cent of the total Commission budget.

We need to normalize the percentages obtained by dividing each program budget by the appropriate total so that these small programs are not made to seem insignificant out of sheer tininess. To adjust for this problem we have first calculated for each budget stage a program's *mean* proportion of the total for that stage across either (a) all the years spanned by our data, or (b) when a program began or was cancelled within that period, the years during which the program existed. We have then divided a program proportion of the total for each stage/year by this mean and multiplied the quotient by 100, converting to a percentage. The effect is to normalize these percentages so that they average 100 for the period FY 1958–FY 1972, or, when appropriate, for the years a program existed. We believe that the characteristics of this index and its behavior over time are highly suggestive of the process of competitive growth, i.e., "prosperity" in which we are interested. Eventually we shall want to use "prosperity change scores." This is the numerical difference of the prosperity scores across years for a given stage and will be zero when a program's proportion of the stage total does not change over the years.

At this point, it is useful to state these arguments more formally. For a full array of budget observations for programs over a number of years across each budget stage, $D_{(i,j,k)}$, where

i = programs (1–23 in the case of the AEC),
j = a specified budget stage (1–6),
k = years,
T = Total agency budget for the sum of all programs

the corresponding array of prosperity scores, $P_{(i,j,k)}$ is defined as:

$$P_{(i,j,k)} = (Pr_{(i,j,k)}/\text{mean } p_{(i,j)})*100$$

where

$$\text{(a)} \quad Pr_{(i,j,k)} = D_{(i,j,k)}/T_{(j,k)}$$

for

$$T_{(j,k)} = \sum_{i=1}^{23} D_{(i,j,k)}',$$

and where

$$\text{(b)} \quad \text{mean } p_{(i,k)} = Tp_{(i,j)}/Ic_{(i,j)}'$$

for

$$Tp_{(i,j)} = \sum_{k=1}^{15} Pr_{(i,j,k)}',$$

and

$Ic_{(i,j)}$ = the number of years for which the ith program in the jth stage > 0.

Table 3. Four AEC Program Histories Expressed as "Prosperity Scores"

Fiscal Year	Rover (Nuclear Space Rocket)	High Energy Physics	Sherwood (Controlled Thermonuclear Research)	Nuclear Weapons (Research, Development and Production)
1958	25	20	87	69
1959	19	25	95	75
1960	28	34	130	67
1961	34	36	95	68
1962	56	51	88	80
1963	128	82	86	94
1964	187	118	83	92
1965	165	107	80	109
1966	174	122	92	105
1967	173	144	103	104
1968	131	149	108	110
1969	145	147	109	122
1970	103	156	114	129
1971	94	154	123	133
1972	33	150	97	136

In Table 3 we present the scores for four programs within the AEC, all of which show striking variance in prosperity. In fact, all twenty-three programs exhibited a lively and theoretically interesting variance, but limitations of space preclude discussing them all.[26]

We see quite vividly the growth, decay, and fluctuation of which we have spoken—all within the context of a roughly constant total budget. These variations were caused by political events, not the operation of a budgetary process. The sudden reversals in the fortunes of "Rover" were caused by various officials of three administrations having attached sharply different priorities to the undertaking. The competitive success of high energy physics resulted in part from the constant attention of the Atomic Energy Commission Chairman with a strong interest in pure research. High energy physics did not grow "accidentally" or "naturally"—indeed none of these curves represents any sort of "natural process." On the contrary, each is the record of a sequence of priority settings made within a political system. Programs do not naturally grow, decline, or remain constant, or anything esle. They are caused to do all of these by politicians and administrators making often difficult choices among competing claims upon scarce resources.

This "authoritative allocation of values" is the essence of the political process, a process that is vividly portrayed in these prosperity scores. The relative stability of "Sherwood" (controlled thermonuclear research) is not an illustration of organizational process in Lindblom's terms.[27] Sherwood has remained constant, has *resisted* competing claims upon its share of the Commission budget, only because it has been supported by the Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, and the president. Its constant level of prosperity is an indicator of stable political support, not of the operation of some "budgetary constant." Its support could have evaporated completely much like the nuclear rocket program's (Rover)—a program which received high priority in the early years of the Kennedy administration only to be completely abandoned.

Alternatively, consider the history of weapons. This has been a truly prosperous enterprise and one with an especially suggestive administrative history. The circumstances surrounding the 1950 presidential decision to build thermonuclear bombs left the Atomic Energy Commission with little influence over the future of this program.[28] The function of the Commission came to be one of merely fulfilling requirements for nuclear explosives in the establishment of which it played no role. The AEC, that is, played no role in setting the priority of weapons relative to other nuclear activities or among types of weapons. The competition for resources among the latter took place with the relative priority of weapons already set by forces external to the Commission. The weapons program record of continuous prosperity is largely the story of the consequences of the ac-

---

[26] For a full discussion of all twenty-three programs, see Bupp, chapters 1–3.

[27] Cf. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through.' "

[28] Hewlett and Duncan, 362–409.

Table 4. Arithmetic Mean of Prosperity Change Scores, FY 1958-FY 1972, 23 AEC Programs
(Presidential Budget)

Rank	Program	Mean	Rank	Program	Mean
1	High Energy Physics	9.0	13	Sherwood	0.57
2	Nuclear Safety	8.1	14	Rover	.43
3	Prog. Dir. and Admin.	7.1	15	Euratom	.08
4	Gen. Reactor Tech.	6.1	16	Training, Edu. and Information	−2.2
5	Biol. and Med.	5.4	17	Advanced Systems	−2.8
6	Cooperative Power	5.1	18	Spec. Nuc. Mats.	−3.5
7	Weapons	4.5	19	Pluto	−4.0
8	Naval Reactors	4.5	20	Army Reactors	−7.0
9	Civilian Power	4.3	21	Merchant Ship	−7.7
10	SNAP	4.1	22	Raw Materials	−13.6
11	Plowshare	3.5	23	Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion	−25.6
12	Isotopes	3.3			

tions taken in 1950. The program emerged from the "great thermonuclear debate" with a very real competitive advantage over other AEC programs. Weapons was a "stronger" program."[29]

These measures of prosperity permit us to summarize AEC program activities since 1956. We could, of course, just subtract a given program's prosperity in FY 1958 from its score in the FY 1972 and rank the program according to the numerical value of the result. The "net prosperity change" is not, however, an especially helpful number. Now, we can recover exactly the same rank ordering by working instead with "prosperity change scores." For any program, the mean of the distribution of these change scores across all fifteen yearly intervals is also an indicator of how that program has prospered during the period for which we have data. The numerical value of these indicators, moreover, has an instantly appealing interpretation. A glance at Table 4 shows that since FY 1958 fifteen programs have prospered and eight have not.

What does all this have to tell us about how priorities are established within government? There is growing interest in examining federal budgets to determine how the nation is allocating its resources and exercising its spending priorities. The authors of one of the best and most recent of such studies correctly point out that in order to understand what the federal budget for any one year says about the national priorities, one must pay attention to past trends.

> In determining priorities and formulating the federal budget, the President and his advisors do not start with a clean slate, deciding *de novo* how . . . the expenditures for fiscal 1972 should be allocated in meeting national goals. Recent history, prior commitments, current political realities, relations with Congress, economic and social events beyond the control of budget makers—all play a major role in limiting their ability to change radically the current shape of the budget. What they consider desirable must be tempered by what they consider feasible. . . . The margin of truly free choice is surprisingly small.[30]

Still, patterns of obligation and expenditure do change even at the aggregated federal level. Schultze and his colleagues, too, have found impressive variation in the objects of government expenditures over time. They proceed to infer changing priorities from changing absolute outlays.[31] But we also know that programs are in explicit competition with each other as they move jointly through the budget formulation process. A measure of relative priority levels must take account of this competition.

The prosperity index developed in the preceding pages does so; it extracts from each individual budgetary observation *a meaning determined by its context.* The essential idea here is that the individual budgetary figures must be seen as the product of two quite different processes. One is the *budgetary process,* the public accounting that organizations give for the dollars that they receive. The stress here is on organization, the continuing complex hierarchy of government—bureaus, divisions, agencies, and departments. And the key to understanding administrative behavior in these terms is in the incremental nature of the process. The other is the *policy process.* Here emphasis is on the competition among programs for scarce resources which are needed to expand, or to continue, or even to begin. The central problem in

---

[29] For a more careful definition of "program strength," see Bupp, chapter 2.

[30] Schultze et al. (1971), *Setting National Priorities.*

[31] Schultze et al., *Setting National Priorities,* 19–21.

Table 5. Product-Moment Correlations Prosperity Change Scores, Presidential Budgets FY 1958-FY 1972 with Weapons Program

Raw Materials	−0.47	SNAP	−0.26
Special Nuclear Materials	− .25	General Reactor Technology	− .44
Civilian Power Reactors	− .13	Advanced Systems	− .10
Cooperative Power Reactors	− .32	High Energy Physics	− .29
Euratom	− .19	Sherwood	− .37
Merchant Ship Reactors	− .28	Biology and Medicine	− .24
Army Reactors	ns*	Training, Education and Information	ns
Naval Reactors	ns	Isotopes	− .17
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion	ns	Plowshare	− .25
Pluto	ns	Program Direction	− .23
Rover	ns		

* ns = not significant

analyzing political competition between programs is to make the information about each comparable. Dollars are the operational unit of administration. Political competition is something else again. The great difficulty in untangling these two aspects of the budgetary process is that they occur simultaneously.

The methodological problem this poses can be handled by a series of transformations which in general affect different observations in different numerical ways but whose result is a set of numbers which now may be compared freely among themselves. Inspection of these numbers confirms the fundamental proposition of this preliminary analysis: in the context of the "massively stable" processes cited by other scholars, there is considerable variation in the fortunes of federal activities *at the program level.* We believe that the explanation of this variance constitutes the real challenge for further empirical analysis of budgetary data.

Analyzing Federal Budgets

What has been the nature of the competition among programs? Has it been a "war of all against all" or are certain activities capable of causing other less strong programs to "pay" for their prosperity either by exercising first claim upon newly available resources or by actually growing at the expense of lower priority activities?

Professor Russett has suggested that we may be able to recover some evidence about the extent of such "benefits" or "payments" by examining the patterns of covariation among yearly changes in program levels.[32] Since we now have strong *a priori* reason to believe the Atomic Energy Commission's weapons program to have been independent of other Commission activities for the past twenty years, the intercorrelation of changes in weapons prosperity with those in the other twenty-two programs seems especially pertinent. They are reported in Table 5.

It is clear that everyone pays for defense. With the exception of the Commission's various military reactor enterprises (the largest group among those with insignificant correlations) all AEC programs change scores are negatively associated with changes in the weapons program. As anticipated, the relationship between prosperity changes in raw materials and weapons is high and negative. Decay in the prosperity of the former has been strongly associated with the growth of weapons. But the latter has evidently not only benefited from the decline of this program, it has also in Russett's sense been able to make other programs, notably general reactor technology and controlled thermonuclear research, "pay" for its prosperity.

The difficulty with such patterns of covariation is that, though fascinating, they may also be *wholly spurious.* Certainly they do not in themselves illuminate the real causal processes which produce variation in the prosperity of programs. At most, the *sign* of the associational measure, particularly when it is negative, may provide some clue about the right questions to be asked. Thus in the case of the AEC weapons program one could plausibly accept the overall pattern of inverse association as empirical confirmation of what we suspect on independent grounds. But positive correlations among prosperity change scores have no obvious causal interpretation and the meaning of differences in magnitude between any pair of negative coefficients is totally obscure. More important, the covariation patterns cannot tell us why some programs are stronger than others. Assuming the competitive struggle for limited funds is not exactly a war of all against all, what is it that makes some more equal than others? Is it strong directors who make for strong programs by "running a tight ship" and by "effectively generating support at the agency and congressional levels?"[33] Directors generating such support are able to neutralize opposition by the most potent natural enemy, the Office of Management and Budget. Programs which are supported at the Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, presidential and congressional levels are prosperous; programs which are not supported soon fall victim to the exigencies of the budgetary process.[34]

---

[32] Bruce Russett, "Who Pays for Defense?" *American Political Science Review,* 63 (June, 1969), 412–426. See also, Bruce Russett, *What Price Vigilance: The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), especially chapters 5 and 6.

This widely accepted professional wisdom, then, contains a clear theory of the governmental process. National priorities are not set by administrators with national constituencies; they are set at the operating levels of federal bureaus—by program directors sensitive to their own clienteles. National priorities are established by bureaucratic entrepreneurship in a process which settles priorities without anyone being aware of them. In this regard, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's stochastic models perpetuate a fundamental error about the way government operates. The whole metaphor of an inert bureaucratic machine doing the same thing this year that it did last year misses the basic point. Priority setting in the federal bureaucracy resembles nineteenth century capitalism: Priorities are established by aggressive entrepreneurs at the operating levels of government. Programs prosper because energetic division directors successfully build political support to withstand continuous attacks upon a program's resource base by competing claims. As a consequence, the only matters which reach the president are those already in dispute. At the presidential level the administrative process is less one of "policy-making" than "dispute-settling." It is at this level that things are accepted simply because they have been accepted, that the desirable has to be adjusted to the feasible. On the whole, the differences which count, the actions which produce the patterns of relative prosperity and strength we have discussed occur at lower levels of the administrative process.

All of this is missed by taking the Wildavsky and Lindblom perspective. By concentrating on the underlying regularities of the administrative process, these scholars are obliged to argue (in effect) that except for learning adjustments, no changes of any significance occur. We have seen that real change does occur within this "massive stability," reflecting real conflicts over purpose and priority. The more telling point about the process is that the program director, the operating-level bureaucrat, is a central figure in the determination of public policy. The history of the Atomic Energy Commission's weapons program is far more typical of the way public values are allocated than is the dramatic termination of the aircraft nuclear propulsion program.[35]

This is a strong theory, and we must be careful to stress that our discussion is limited to the single agency on which we have data. But if this fact makes us somewhat cautious, we also feel that the concepts we have specified and the theory which underlies them are probably more —not less—applicable to other areas of government. The Atomic Energy Commission has been a fairly stable agency both in administrative organization and actual spending levels for the last ten years. That we find such great variation in the relative prosperity of programs here seems to suggest that we can expect greater fluctuations elsewhere, particularly in the controversial areas of social policy.[36] Do program directors occupy the same crucial position throughout the government? Is there more or less presidential leadership in other policy areas? For what programs is congressional intervention truly a significant factor?

These are the type of questions that need to be asked. By translating budgetary data into actual operating units of government programs, students of public administration should be able to provide more than speculative answers. Prosperity scores are themselves an important step in this direction, for they establish a measure of program prosperity and decay.

---

[33] These observations are based on a series of interviews with officials in AEC and the Office of Management and Budget.

[34] Russett's substantive conclusions have recently been challenged. See Jerry Hollenhorst and Gary Ault, "An Alternative Answer to: Who Pays for Defense," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (Sept., 1971), 760–764.

By respecifying Russett's regression model to include several dummy variables, Hollenhorst and Ault claim to detect important "sub-period effects." This more methodologically sophisticated approach, however, seems to us merely to compound the original theoretical error. The posited relationships are spurious.

[35] See, W. Henry Lambright, "Shooting Down the Nuclear Plane," Inter-University Case Program, ICP Case Series No. 104 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967).

[36] Congress appears to be much more active in the area of social policy. An excellent account of administrative policy in this area refers again and again to congressional intervention in specific programs. See Gilbert Y. Steiner, *The State of Welfare* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971). Or in a different area, Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

In his recent article "Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," *APSR*, 66 (September, 1972), 796–817, Professor Eugene F. Miller discusses on pp. 812–14 my views on the relevance of existential phenomenology to the philosophical foundation of political inquiry and comes to the conclusion that "there is much to be learned from Jung's reexamination of the philosophical foundations of political inquiry, but he does not provide us with a genuine alternative to an historical relativism" (p. 814). Because of lack of space, I shall limit my present comments to a clarification of a few crucial points and postpone what I hope will be a fuller dialogue to another occasion.

Since I take Miller to be essentially a Straussian or belonging to the school of contemporary political thought whose spiritual guru is Leo Strauss, I ought to mention a critique of Strauss's "essentialism" I wrote several years ago.[1] Then I agreed with Strauss that positivism created a moral vacuum in contemporary political thought. Yet I asserted that "while, as Strauss agrees, positivism takes the naïve life-world for granted and, for this very reason, may be charged with negligence, his essentialism is guilty of self-contradiction" ("Leo Strauss's Conception of Political Philosophy: A Critique," p. 515). Strauss tends to reject all modern thought, the thought which does not conform to the classical standards as he interprets them: thus, for him, the history of modern thought is a history of nonphilosopy. His essentialism must be understood in terms of his ontological supposition that "to be" is "always to be," that is, there is *physis* which is unchanging, permanent, and universal. Without *physis* there can be no ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. For Miller, too, without *physis* there is no valid ground for both "evaluation" and "explanation": to use the language of Stanley Rosen, who is critical of both Heidegger and Wittgenstein and whom Miller often cites with approval, there is only "nihilism." It must be pointed out, however, that Miller, unlike Strauss and Rosen, has not reduced positivism to a form of historicism, nor has he considered historicism as worse than positivism.

The word *historicism* has a controversial history in contemporary thought—from Karl Popper to Strauss, whose respective conceptions of it are diametrically opposed. Is existential phenomenology a form of historicism or historical relativism? Miller seems to think that it is. The belief that existential phenomenology is a historical relativism stems from a misunderstanding of the notion of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*). Inasmuch as the phenomenology of the life-world is a hermeneutics of social existence, so is Miller's epistemology a hermeneutics of *physis*. Take the example of Heidegger, whose philosophy I learned from the late John Wild (along with Edmund Husserl's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, William James' radical empiricism, and John Macmurray's philosophy of action). For Heidegger, the "world" is the most inclusive horizon of meaning which is radically historical (or temporal). To acknowledge man's historicality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) is not to commit one to historicism (*Historismus*). To say that man is temporal is, for example, simply to affirm him as a finite being—man "dies," and only human beings can "die." Upon a close examination, Heidegger's thought does not reject *physis* as *logos* or *aletheia*. Whereas Miller, like Strauss, wishes to defend the notion of *physis* understood by post-Socratics, Heidegger goes back to the primeval notion of *physis* in pre-Socratics. Further, Miller seems to be suggesting that phenomenological thought is merely an extension of the *Lebensphilosophie* of Wilhelm Dilthey. It is well-known that in defending the notion of philosophy as a "rigorous science" (*strenge Wissenschaft*) Husserl was critical of Dilthey's historicism.

Then the real question is not simply an affirmation or a denial of "human nature" as such —the latter being called "historicism." Rather, Miller is interested in defending that version of human nature which is unchanging and universal without which, according to him, there is no possibility of knowledge or intelligibility. Even if there is a constant and universal human nature, the question of how conflicting theories about the permanent structure or content of human nature can be resolved remains to be answered. Miller's version of human nature is the one which is claimed to have a set of predetermined characteristics, whereas for the existentialist view, the essence of man is open and indeterminate. Temporally speaking, the former is a fidelity to the past, whereas the latter is an affirmation of the open future in the passage of time. "For human reality," Simone de Beauvoir writes in *The Coming of Age*, "existing means existing in time: in the present we look towards the future by means of plans that go beyond our past, in which our activities fall lifeless, frozen and loaded with passive demands" (p. 361).

---

[1] "Leo Strauss's Conception of Political Philosophy: A Critique," *The Review of Politics*, 29 (October, 1967), 492–517. Miller's Straussian position is clearer in his "Political Philosophy and Human Nature," *The Personalist*, 53 (Summer, 1972), 209–21.

Like Strauss, Miller holds that the world of common-sense understanding (or, as Strauss calls it, the "natural world" of man) is the presupposed foundation of the scientific or philosophical conceptualization of political things. However, essentialism, Miller's notwithstanding, reduces the world of lived experience (existence) to the world of pre-fixed essence (*physis*). It is tantamount to a claim for the primary of *theoria* over *praxis*. According to Miller, "To know *that* a man is presupposes already some knowledge of *what* man is" (Miller, "Political Philosophy and Human Nature," p. 209): "existence" presupposes "essence." For him, therefore, without *physis* or in historicism "there is no possibility of obtaining knowledge that is objective, final, or absolute" (ibid., p. 218). In contrast to essentialism, in phenomenology the relevance of the life-world does not lie in its status as knowledge but instead lies in its status as the meaningful ground for human action, that is, as the original source of knowledge. So the geography of conceptual knowledge presupposes the natural landscape of preconceptual understanding. By exalting *theoria* at the expense of *praxis*, man himself is reduced to "a little abstract effigy" (Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, p. 169). By "opticizing" thought (Martin Buber, *Eclipse of God*, p. 40) or conceptual knowledge, essentialism loses the sight and importance of the life-world. It is then the quest for epistemological certainty or absoluteness that constitutes the central concern for Miller as "the distinguishing characteristic of human nature is man's desire and capacity to know" ("Political Philosophy and Human Nature," p. 219). The same temperament is shared, though strangely enough, by scientific objectivism whose slogans are, among others, conceptual rigor and predicative certainty.[2] By intending to elevate the intelligible, essentialism regards conceptual thinking as the activity of a disembodied and worldless mind. Whereas Husserl speaks of theoretical *praxis*, essentialism treats philosophy as if it is a lifeless activity.

Human dignity, which both Miller and I cherish, is not served or preserved by postulating a pre-fixed human nature. On the contrary, it is elevated by affirming freedom, the denial of a pre-fixed human nature, in a world whose meaning is not fixed but must be constantly won. As John Wild said somewhere, freedom is not a natural but an existential norm. For a predetermined human nature (and a predetermined history, too, for that matter) is the death of human freedom and dignity or, as B. F. Skinner has it, the triumph of the reinforced man "beyond freedom and dignity," (or more appropriately, "against freedom and dignity"). The existentialist thesis that the meaning of existence is not fixed but is constantly won is not an acknowledgement of nihilism in which everything is permitted. According to Simone de Beauvoir, existential philosophy not only permits an elaboration of ethics but also is the only philosophy in which ethics has its place. It makes possible a genuine ethical theory precisely because it focuses on *how* man *acts* rather than *what* he *is*. This is the reason why I called the essentialism of Strauss "an ontological determinism." The structure of good and evil is not of God-given nature but is a human gift which has to be worked by *us all* in coexistence or transaction. As Martin Buber puts it, only where there is mutual sharing, is there reality or responsibility—including the reality or responsibility of thinking. Man ought to be distinguished from God, as time is from eternity. In conclusion: it may be said that the differences between Miller's views and mine stem from two fundamentally different styles of philosophy and ultimately views on life itself. Perhaps one is "priestly" and the other "jesterly." Be that as it may, if I were to call a stand-off between our styles of views and to refuse to acknowledge the superiority of mine over his, I would be a "historicist," and that would make my contention superfluous.

HWA YOL JUNG

Moravian College

---

[2] For a phenomenological critique of behavioralist epistemology and ontology, see the author's forthcoming article "A Critique of the Behavioral Persuasion in Politics: A Phenomenological View," in *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Maurice Natanson, 2 vols. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

TO THE EDITOR:

W. Phillips Shively's recent article "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," *APSR*, 66 (December, 1972), 1203–1225 is to be commended for its critical questioning of the utility of the American concept of party identification in the Weimar setting. The identification of *tendence* or sociopolitical bloc as an alternative does provide a better fit for the overall evolution of electoral patterns in many European systems.

Yet I cannot help but quarrel with Professor Shively's all too general conclusion that "there is evidence that party identification in the sense of learned and enduring attachments to parties was not a factor in Weimar elections. Accordingly, the party identification theory of electoral stability apparently cannot help us explain Weimar voting" (p. 1220). This dichotomous present/absent approach to the question of lasting attachments to political parties cannot, in my opinion, be spread evenly across the board in the Weimar case without tending to distort our understanding of the phenomenal rise of the NSDAP as an electoral vehicle from 1928 to 1932. It is necessary to differentiate strongly, as scholars such as Lipset and Bracher do, between the qualitatively higher levels of voter stability, even through the worst depression years, of the SPD, KPD, and Zentrum, and the nearly complete electoral annihilation of all non-Catholic bourgeois parties (with partial exception of Hugenberg's anti-system Nationalists).

A more satisfactory approach might utilize party identification not as a dichotomous system-wide variable but rather as a party-specific variable within the *tendence* or bloc model. This, it seems to me, would more adequately take into account the organizational continuity of several parties and mass organizations, particularly the SPD and the Catholic parties, from the Kaiserreich to Weimar, as opposed to the hastily built Protestant bourgeois parties founded only after the Revolution of 1918.

The above revisions in the *tendence* approach might also be useful in comparing the development from Kaiserreich to Weimar to Bundesrepublik of party identification within each bloc. The mild recession of 1966–67 in West Germany and the accompanying quick rise (and equally quick decline) of the NPD, with many similarities to the NSDAP in ideology and voter appeal (see my *The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970]), indicates that this line of inquiry is still of substantive as well as theoretical concern in the area of German politics.

John D. Nagle

Syracuse University

To the Editor:

I believe that Professor Nagle has essentially restated here one of the arguments which I myself tried to make in my article. I distinguished there between party identification and loyalty to a socioeconomic bloc. Thus, I interpreted the collapse of the non-Catholic bourgeois parties as resulting from the fact that they represented the same bloc as the Nazi Party, and that in the near-absence of party identification, there was nothing to prevent their voters from moving to the Nazis. By contrast, the KPD, SPD, and Zentrum represented different blocs, and bloc loyalty prevented their voters from moving to the Nazis.

Professor Nagle, as I read his letter, would prefer to treat bloc loyalty as a type of party identification. I do not think this would be fruitful since, as I suggest in my article, there are theoretically interesting differences between the two kinds of loyalty, both in the way they are acquired and in the way in which they manifest themselves in the electorate.

Two of Professor Nagle's suggestions are particularly useful:

(1) At some points in my article, for convenience in writing, I referred to the "absence" of party identification among the Weimar electorate. What my interpretation of Weimar voting suggests, however, and all that is necessarily supported by my findings, is that the level of party identification in Weimar was very low. A dichotomy between the "presence" and "absence" of party identification is unnecessary and untenable.

(2) Professor Nagle's emphasis on the organizational history of the parties is well-placed. This could help to explain, for example, why the inroads of the Nazi Party on other parties of its bloc were so much more complete than the inroads of the Communist Party on its rival, the Social Democratic Party.

W. Phillips Shively

University of Minnesota

To the Editor:

Read the Mendelson piece in the latest, December 1972, *APSR*, "From Warren To Burger," 1226–1233, and came across at least one grievous error/boo-boo. (So it seems to me because I have just finished a soon-to-be-published volume on Justice Black and Due Process, etc.) Mendelson, on page 1228, claims that "there was no dissent" in the important case of *Boddie* v. *Connecticut*. There was, indeed, a dissenting opinion, a very forceful dissenting opinion written by a Justice of the Court since 1937 who had, since his elevation to the Court, fought against judicial intervention and oversight functioning regarding the social and economic activities of state legislatures: Hugo Lafayette Black.

In the *Boddie* case, as in countless hundreds of opinions before, Black criticized the employment of the Frankfurter/Harlan et al. "fundamental fairness"/"shock the conscience" standard to evaluate the reasonableness and constitutionality of state legislation. "Such a test," Black wrote in dissent, "willfully throws away the certainty and security that lies in a written Constitution, one that does not alter with a judge's health, belief, or his politics. I believe the only way to steer this country toward its great destiny is to follow what our constitution says, not what the judges think it should have said."

Knowing that Black would not like the thought of being associated with the subjective "shock the conscience"/"fundamental fairness" doctrine he so thoroughly criticized during his tenure as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, I do hope you print this correction.

HOWARD BALL
Hofstra University

TO THE EDITOR:

I am very disturbed by the political bias that Professor Yang used in his review of my book, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, APSR,* 66 (June, 1972), 654–655. It might well have been written in Peking or Taipei because both regimes have blacklisted me for years and jailed hundreds of persons advocating self-determination for Taiwan.

My main objection is that he ignored the key purpose of the book, which was to present the views of native Taiwanese at home and abroad toward their postwar condition. My personal views were not the focus, as Professor Yang implies, nor do I feel today as I did three years ago when the book appeared. The changes in world politics since 1970 affect Taiwan especially, and have turned many who used to support the Taiwanese cause toward Peking or the KMT. Today the right of all 15 million on Taiwan to decide their future is paramount.

Professor Yang's criticism of my aim does not stand up, but I prefer to allow readers to judge for themselves the difficulty of studying native opinions in Taiwan, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, or any Commuist nation. The book explains fully why I could not use quantitative surveys as I have often done in Japan (the USIA told me it has never been able to ask sensitive political questions in Taiwan polls). To suggest that I should have surveyed overseas Chinese opinions ignores the fact that most are not Taiwanese but mainlander descendants with little interest in or knowledge of Taiwan. I used all available secondary sources, including official Nationalist books and media, but never accepted official "facts" as automatically valid or relevant to the perception of the 13 million Taiwanese whose attitudes were my concern.

Finally, to claim that my book "performs a disservice to the betterment of Sino-American friendship" is to apply a standard which should never be used in academic reviews: I was not writing to please any government or further official policies. That would be the sole yardstick used by the two Chinese regimes in deciding whether or not to allow publication of a book. I am glad it is not used to censor American newspapers, magazines, or academic work.

DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR.
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

TO THE EDITOR:

I regret very much that Professor Mendel was "disturbed" by the "political bias" in my review of his book, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism.* First, the "key purpose" of the book was recognized rather than "ignored," if one noted my remarks throughout the review. My major reservation was that the author passionately represented the views of an elite minority as being the voice of all 15 million people in Taiwan.

Professor Mendel wants his readers to believe that both the difficulty of scientific research inside Taiwan and the inadvisability of interviewing overseas Chinese would justify "those limitations" in the measurement devices of his behaviorist methodology. Consequently, his readers are expected to accept his conclusions that only the views of certain elite minority groups can be presented. Surprisingly, Professor Mendel mentioned nothing about the statistical lacunae and factual discrepancies I had cited, even though "all secondary sources available, and all KMT official data" were consulted. Besides, debunkers would not be impressed with the omission of a well-balanced bibliography.

Inasmuch as Professor Mendel stated in his book that he could fulfill his duty as a political scientist "to make his research available to the public as well as to *governments* and other scholars," one wonders whether Professor Mendel would still disclaim any credit should his advice have been adopted by the American Government in 1969 and after. Since that time, changes in world politics and the Nixon Administration's new China policy have not only crippled the movement of Formosan independence but also disconfirmed the predictions of *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism.* Obviously, the counsel of Professor Mendel's book did not serve the best interests of the governments concerned. Finally, Professor Mendel admitted in his letter that his own views were not the focus nor does he feel today as he did in 1969 when he read the final proofs before publication, I am therefore puzzled why all his complaints became so imperative.

RICHARD HSIUH YANG
Washington University, St. Louis

TO THE EDITOR:

This is the first time that I have replied to a review of any of my books, and I hope it will be the last. Although he has penned an essay distinguished by his customary felicity of phrase and wit, Samuel Krislov also has indulged himself in various ad hominem speculations that detract from what (as I infer) he intended to be a generally favorable review of my *The Constitutional Polity, APSR,* 66 (September, 1972), 1043–44. Two points in particular demand correction: the first evidently may be comprehended as a slur on my present departmental colleagues, and the other as disparagement of my familial antecedents.

Krislov suggests that I attempted to discuss the possible impact upon the Supreme Court of radical ideology, because of the (evidently, undue) influence of my departmental colleagues at the University of Hawaii, rather than because of any serious interest I might have in the political ideology of Supreme Court justices. My Bacon Lectures were delivered in February, 1969, and they were published as the book which Krislov criticizes in 1970; I joined the faculty of the University of Hawaii in August 1971. The colleague influences to which I was exposed at the time I wrote the lectures were those of the Osgoode Hall Law Faculty of York University in Toronto, Canada.

Krislov states that "there are several class-origin digs by which Schubert seems to be asserting his own proletarian bona fides at the expense of middle-class colleagues." Hold that Tiger, Sam! What you evidently misunderstand is a remark in which I contrast our present phony affluence with the world of "our childhood, . . . a time when not just the urban ghettos and rural slums housed the relatively poor, but rather a time when almost everyone was absolutely poor for awhile." By "our" I intended to refer to Americans of my age group, and the statement was meant to be a description of social rather than personal history, as I thought and think the context (p. 133) makes abundantly clear. I have never previously thought it relevant to mention the matter, but my father was a graduate of Cornell, Phi Beta Kappa, Class of '14.

While I have the floor, I'd like to deal also with what Professor Krislov himself characterizes as his "greatest quibble," and in particular with the first two of his three questions—the third would take us out of judicial behavior and into the very different subject of the professional role behavior of sociologists, and I am content to let that matter rest on the differences of opinion that Krislov and I evidently entertain. All three of these points are necessarily questions, because he introduces them with the caveat that his difficulty may—as it does—stem from his lack of familiarity with the relevant facts. So I hasten to supply these facts.

(1) He "find[s] it hard to imagine the empirical base on which th[e] conclusion is reached" that John Clarke was more liberal than Cardozo. It doesn't take very much imagination; I scaled the Taft and Hughes Courts, as my book details; and my data show that Clarke was considerably and consistently more liberal than Brandeis, while Cardozo was not significantly so.

(2) On the Steel Seizure decision, Krislov's sententious clincher ("All historical events occur when they do") rather begs the question *why* they occur when they do, and really, I insist, leaves open the only question of other than pedantic interest—which is a specification of the conditions under which it is possible for particular types of events to occur. I said that the Vinson Court would not have decided the Youngstown Case as and when it did if Harry Truman were not a lame duck; and I stand by that remark, drawing some comfort from the recollection that my position is supported not only by Corwin himself ("A Judicial Brick without Straw") but also by such an independent and nonbehavioral public lawman as John Roche—both Roche and I have articles, contemporary with the decision, in *Western Political Quarterly,* and only a couple of years later Roche published a more general theoretical statement in the *APSR* ("Judicial Self-Restraint," vol. 49, pp. 762–72) while I ventured a more general and historically-oriented empirical statement in Chapter 8 of my *The Presidency in the Courts.* It is true that Corwin, Roche, and I may all be wrong; but without Krislov's having first taken our arguments into consideration, I find it hard to accept as responsible criticism his own cavalier statement that "It is almost meaningless or simply wrong" for us all to have reached the considered judgments that, quite independently, we did reach about the Steel Seizure Case. Krislov may feel that this is an instance of "inadequate footnoting"; but he will discover, I trust, that in annotating lectures for publication (as distinguished from writing a textbook) one must assume that the professional literature of a generation ago

eventually passes into the public intellectual domain.

GLENDON SCHUBERT
University of Hawaii

TO THE EDITOR:

Since I regard Professor Schubert's description of my review as "not unfavorable" as a considerable understatement, I am both surprised and genuinely sorry that offense has been taken where none was intended. The cited two feeble attempts at playfulness arose out of a desire to satisfy puzzlement, but were in no event slurs at nor disparagements of anyone. On these personal matters, I am happy to accept Glendon Schubert's factual corrections. Although I could cavil at his rendering of his rather complex relationship with Hawaii, my point would have been the same had the sentence read "colleagues at Osgoode Hall" or indeed "in the profession." That—the serious point—is, I suppose, conceded in avoidance; the conceptual category of "radical justices" is not obviously applicable to anyone on or likely to be on the Supreme Court, and is therefore curiously contentless and not parallel to the other categories developed in the work.

As to the substantive matters Schubert deals with after rising to personal privilege, I find my original positions at least arguable. My "greatest quibble" was explicitly not with the specific comparison of the liberalism of Clarke and Cardozo, but with such trans-historical comparisons without explanation of how the conclusion was reached. I am not sure scalar distance from Brandeis, based upon cases in the 1910s and '20s in one instance, and the '30s in the other, warrants the conclusion discussed; I am positive such conclusionary statements should have been buttressed in the book by their evidentiary base, however strong or fragile.

As to the *Youngstown* issue, my comment was on the sentence actually printed, not what Professor Schubert tells us he meant, let alone his incorporation-by-reference of the authority of Roche and Corwin. That delphic sentence—some might find it sententious, even—reads:

> Evidently, it could not have come at any other time than when it did, during the Vinson period and with an outgoing presidency at the nadir of its authority. (page 41)

This—the total discussion of the issues raised in his letter—not only fails to convey in any precise way what he meant, but also is destructive of the type of analytic thought he is arguing for in the book and the letter. By confounding sufficient and necessary conditions, it represents, in Hegelian garb, an unwarranted overgeneralization (Schubert now suggests only, at most, that the decision would not have occurred with a non-lame duck, and/or popular president).

In a book which pleads for and largely succeeds in developing systematic relationships, such assertions as the above two seemed out of place, whereas they might have been overlooked or accepted in a more routine work. It would, indeed, not be unreasonable for Professor Schubert to regard these criticisms as a compliment on the general level of effectiveness characterizing the volume.

To put matters in better perspective, let me add that these issues constitute a tiny portion of the book and considerably less than a major part of the review. The book is a fine and rewarding one, and the review, for the most part, deals with more important questions than are covered in these letters.

SAMUEL KRISLOV
University of Minnesota

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Volume Sixty-six. A while ago (June 1972, pp. 585–586) we published a short, snappy analysis of the contents of Volume 65 of the *Review*. Now we can do the same for Volume 66. In keeping with trends in the profession, we are pleased to be able to refer readers to Table 1, which gives 16 sets of figures for Volume 65, and includes lots of blank space for those who want to fill in comparable figures for Volume 66. Our comments will adhere only in part to the rather arbitrary format provided by the table, and in part we will wander off in other directions.

For example, we have noticed a bump in the number of articles devoted to Congress: six if you count articles on congressional apportionment, four otherwise. This is very suspicious; we all know that in a previous life the managing editor used to lurk around Capitol Hill. How ironic that none of the congressional articles are by associates, former associates, colleagues, former colleagues, students or former students of the managing editor. For some years now congressional scholars have been making the claim that theirs is a burgeoning field of study. Perhaps the word is beginning to reach the *Review,* even without the benefit of the managing editor's encouragement.

Nothing we have printed in the *APSR* in our time has earned us more favorable comment than the long symposium in Volume 66 on positivism and historicism. Why? We do not know. Is it an occupational disease of political scientists for us to be what David Braybrooke might call frustrated paraphilosophers? Is there something about the din of battle that pulls us out of the woodwork, rivets our attention, and sets the applause meter skyrocketing? Of course it is possible that no motives as base as these are involved, and that it is the substance of the issues debated in the symposium that really interested readers. In that case, it would appear that for many of us, there is something intriguing about cosmic hiccoughs emanating from far parts of our solar system, which may or may not make waves closer to home.

At any rate, the favorable response to this particular symposium gives us courage to persist in our occasional use of this device to stimulate thought and scholarship. The growth of this format reflects, we suppose, the managing editor's view that when we can get it, good conversation is better than a good monologue. Mounting symposiums is risky work, since it entails finding commentators who are not only appropriate but prompt, making certain that contributors get timely opportunities to see the materials they are supposed to comment on, assembling all the parts of the package in the proper order, and getting it into print seasonably.

We think all this effort is worthwhile in several circumstances. Occasionally we accept an article that criticizes, continues, or amplifies the work of another scholar in such a way as to create a presumption of scholarly privilege. Once in a while we accept an article that divides our readers in a fashion that suggests they had better have it out in public. In these cases, we try to provide a forum for the direct exchange of ideas on controverted topics. We think that direct exchange leads to less misunderstanding in a scholarly community over the long run than is the case when scholarly discourse develops, as sometimes happens, into piecemeal guerrilla warfare.

A third occasion for a symposium comes about when articles arrive from disparate sources dealing with similar or closely related problems, or with a topic that seems especially timely or urgent or newly emergent or crucial from the standpoint either of the theory or the practice of politics. In this case the symposium format may underline a theme, or announce a new community of interest. We do not do this third type of symposium as much as we could, if we knew more, or knew better how to predict or to identify important new areas of study.

Another continuing feature of the *Review* which made its debut in Volume 66 is the review essay. We think this is an appropriate vehicle for the stimulation of thought about major figures in political science, for the presentation of a synoptic view of reasonably well-bounded fields of study, or for the extended analysis of a cluster of books. No doubt other rationalizations will occur as time goes on.

A stray thought tugs at our mind as we contemplate the uses of the review essay. As our discipline flourishes and proliferates, it is bound to be increasingly true that in any given issue of the *APSR,* fewer and fewer major articles will address all our readers. Specialized knowledge, to which we are willingly and unavoidably committed, means that any one reader will as time goes on find the front of the book harder to read, and less of it directly engaging to his interests—whatever they are.

This creates a special opportunity for features in the back of the book: reviews, review essays, correspondence, editorial comments. Here, surely, we should all feel comfortably at home. If the front of the *Review* is a series of boutiques, the back should resemble an old-

Table 1. Some Comparisons

	Volume 65 (1971)	Volume 66 (1972)
1. Articles	46	42
2. Review Essays	0	3
3. Comments and Rejoinders	10	10
4. Political Psychology, Mass Voting, Attitudes, Participation	19	
5. Articles Having At Least One Table or Figure	35	
6. Presidential Addresses	1	1
7. Focus on U.S.	20	
8. Data About One or More Foreign Countries	12	
9. Formal Theory	13	
10. Public Law	2	
11. Public Administration and Organization Theory	1	
12. Policy Analysis	3	
13. Political Philosophy	3	
14. Elite Politics	2	
15. International Politics	2	
16. Congress	1	6

fashioned general store, where one shopper in search of a few yards of muslin can pause and exchange a word with another who wants a keg of nails.

Underlying this conception of the back of the *Review* is of course the notion that enough of us still have a need or at least a desire to cultivate our peripheral vision, that there are some things worth sharing that we can all share, that specialization, while important and probably indispensable for the increase of knowledge, is not all-important.

Having Fun? Colleagues occasionally ask the managing editor whether he enjoys the job. The fact is, like nearly everything else when seen from up close, there are joys and sorrows. Things to like about the job: The secretarial help. The chance to talk on the telephone. Advance looks at what interesting people are writing. The unmerited high status in the profession. Things not to like: Getting nasty letters. Having to say no. The high visibility in the profession that occasionally draws hostility.

The job description for the managing editor is somewhat deceptive. There are the daily chores that we all know about: answering the mail, assigning referees to manuscripts, reading evaluations, and deciding whether or not to publish. These activities can be worked without strain into even the busiest day provided good secretarial help is available and provided also that they are done on a daily basis and are not permitted to pile up.

The imposition of a daily routine on the managing editor probably does levy a hidden toll insofar as it interrupts the longer cycles assocaited with the production of serious scholarship. But that is a risk that most managing editors knowingly face when they take on the job.

In addition to these daily tasks, however, are activities that are more time and energy consuming than many people realize. The managing editor is a constitutional officer of the Association. This makes him a voting member of the Council, and takes him to the three or more Council meetings that are held each year. As the person responsible for the source of the largest part of the Association's income—and for a major fraction of its expenditures as well—the managing editor ought no doubt to participate as a member of the Council, At a minimum this arrangement gives other Council members a chance to complain about the contents of the *Review*.

A certain number of queries and invitations also come into the office, we assume *ex officio*. Our judgment is that we ought to respond affirmatively to a decent percentage of these, so as to fulfill the main long-range duty of the managing editor, which is to try to stay abreast of what's happening in the discipline. In a discipline as variegated and amorphous as political science, this is not an easy task. No single political scientist, no matter how well acquainted, can afford to rely for long on the network of colleagues he has when he assumes the managing editorship. So part of our job is to attend to the continuous renovation and renewal of the managing editor's knowledge of the profession.

These long-range items are not part of the conventional job description for the managing editorship. Nevertheless, they constitute real obligations, they take time, and they are important sources of the drudgery and fascination of the job.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior"

Peter H. Aranson, Georgia Institute of Technology, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Election Goals and Strategies: Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives"

Robert Axelrod, University of California, Berkeley, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition"

Harry W. Blair, Bucknell University, "Minority

Electoral Politics in a North Indian State: Aggregate Data Analysis and the Muslim Community in Bihar, 1952–1972"

Steven J. Brams, New York University and Morton D. Davis, City College of New York, "The 3/2s Rule in Presidential Campaigning"

Christopher Bruell, Boston College, "Thucydides' View of Athenian Imperialism"

Walter Dean Burnham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's 'Change in the American Electorate' "

Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Helvétius and the Roots of the 'Closed' Society"

William Cavala, University of California, Berkeley, "Changing the Rules Changes the Outcome: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention"

Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry"

Peter Eisinger, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation"

David J. Elkins, University of British Columbia, "The Measurement of Party Competition in Multi-Party Systems"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis"

Peter C. Fishburn, Pennsylvania State University, "Paradoxes of Voting"

Ronald P. Formisano, Clark University, "Deferential-Participant Politics: U.S. Political Culture, 1789–1840"

Virginia Gray, University of Minnesota, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study"

A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, "On 'Understanding' Fascism: A Review of Some Contemporary Literature"

Nobutaka Ike, Stanford University, "Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan"

Donald B. Johnson and James R. Gibson, University of Iowa, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa"

Kenneth Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems"

Stanley Kelley, Jr., Princeton University and Thad W. Mirer, University of Wisconsin, "The Simple Act of Voting"

Warren Lee Kostroski, Wittenberg University, "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns and Models"

Eugene B. McGregor, Jr., University of Maryland, "Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats"

Arthur H. Miller, Ohio State University, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970"

James T. Murphy, Wesleyan University, "Party and Pork: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works Committee Decision Making"

John C. Pierce, Washington State University, and Douglas D. Rose, Tulane University, "Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis"

David Ray, Stanford University, "Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893–1969"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "The Paradox of Vote Trading"

Douglas D. Rose, Tulane University, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The implications of Multi-level Policy Analysis"

Lester M. Salamon, Vanderbilt University, and Stephen Van Evera, University of California, Berkeley, "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation Among the Poor"

Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics"

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Washington University, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions"

Brian Silver, Florida State University, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities"

Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., University of Virginia, Arthur H. Miller, Ohio State University and Thomas E. Mann, American Political Science Association, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955–1970: The Democratic Study Group"

Timothy A. Tilton, Indiana University, "The Social Origins of Liberal Democracy: The Swedish Case"

Glenn Tinder, University of Massachusetts, Boston, "Beyond Tragedy: The Idea of Civility"

Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa, "Human Rights Without Discrimination"

Herbert Weisberg, University of Michigan, "Models of Statistical Relationship"

Roger E. Wyman, Rutgers University, "Middle-Class Voters and Progressive Reform: The Conflict of Class and Culture"

William Zimmerman, University of Michigan, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Processes: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory"

Man's Tools and Man's Choices: The Confrontation of Technology and Political Science*

VICTOR C. FERKISS
Georgetown University

Technology is such a pervasive element of contemporary human life that we usually are no more conscious of it than of the air we breathe. Technology is nothing new. From the time the first proto-man started using sharp rocks for weapons or tools, technology has reflected and shaped society's ideas and institutions. What is new is the dominant role of technology in modern society. If one accepts the definition of technology as "the institutionalization of utilitarian norms," centering on "the application of rational principles to the control and reordering of space, matter and human beings,"[1] one recognizes that the rise of technology is virtually synonymous with what is often termed development or modernization. Technology is the application of the principles of science—knowledge for its own sake—to human concerns. Because of the ubiquity of technology in modern society and its long history as a force in human life most social scientists have tended to take technology for granted, dealing with it as one of many variables which affect or are affected by human behavior, but not as something which might be central to their concerns. Within political science, for instance, only students of international relations have paid much attention to technology as such, treating it as one of many determinants of military power; only since the advent of atomic weapons has it been suggested that particular technologies might actually be at the core of the power relationship, as when it is said that no nation can rationally use nuclear war to advance its political objectives since no nation can "win" such a war.

But despite the relatively little attention given technology by academic social science and, until recently, even by professional historians, the last decade has seen a burgeoning of interest in the social implications of contemporary technology on the part of the public and of the general intellectual community. Discussion about the impact of the machine on human life and values goes back to the nineteenth century, but recent scientific and technological advances have given new life to old concerns and fears. To older debates about the impact of industrialism on society have been added newer, usually fearful, queries about the effects of television, the computer, and new discoveries in the life sciences. Rising concern with environmental degradation has promoted widespread questioning of the values underlying contemporary industrial society, an extreme form of this questioning being exemplified by elements of the "counter culture" movement.

Perhaps the purest distillation of the mood of fear and disillusion infecting many in modern Western society is to be found in the work of Jacques Ellul, whose argument that in our era the norms of technological growth and efficiency must necessarily reign supreme, finds widespread (if far from universal) acceptance among intellectuals. Less pessimistic in tone but virtually as deterministic in its assumptions is the contention of such social scientists as Daniel Bell and Zbigniew Brzezinski that we are moving into a "postindustrial" or "technetronic" age in which technology has become the major force shaping social dynamics and institutions.

Such assertions about the pervasiveness of technology in human life as are made by Ellul, Bell, Brzezinski and the rest strike at the very existence of political science as an autonomous discipline. Whatever formula one prefers to use to define its subject matter—power, decision making, or the authoritative allocation of values—political science necessarily assumes that human choice (essentially, conscious human choice) is at the heart of the historical process. It would be possible of course to conceive of and try to construct a science of politics which was deterministic in its premises, on the model of classical physics; indeed, such an enterprise is not without its adherents. But such a science would not only be more deterministic than contemporary political scientists would be willing to accept, it would be reductionist as well. Reductionist theories which make political behavior a function of some other kind of behavior or which deny the ability of men individually or at least collectively to decide on how the future will be shaped (within whatever physical or logical limitations may be postulated) make the study of politics a minor branch of something else. Worse yet, they strike at the human self-image as embodied in politics as such. The reduction of chemistry or pharmacology to physics might deflate the egos of practitioners of the former disciplines, but the chemical compounds themselves will not care. Making political institutions and behavior wholly dependent on technological factors not only destroys the autonomy of political scientists as scholars but of men as citizens.

---

* William Braden, *The Age of Aquarius: Technology and the Cultural Revolution* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Pp. 306. $7.95.)

Nigel Calder, *Technopolis: Social Control of the Uses of Science* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970. Pp. 376. $7.50.)

William G. Carleton, *Technology and Humanism: Some Exploratory Essays for Our Time* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970. Pp. 300. $12.50.)

Martin Greenberger, ed., *Computers, Communications and the Public Interest* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 315. $12.50.)

William Kuhns, *The Post-Industrial Prophets: Interpretations of Technology* (New York: Weybright and Talley. Pp. 208. $6.95.)

Emmanuel Mesthene, *Technological Change: Its Impact on Man and Society*. Harvard Studies in Science and Technology. (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 127. $4.95.)

Herbert Muller, *The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern Technology and Human Values* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970. Pp. 431. $10.00.)

Eugene S. Schwartz, *Overskill: The Decline of Technology in Modern Civilization* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Pp. 338. $8.95.)

Alan F. Westin, ed., *Information Technology in a Democracy*. Harvard Studies in Science and Technology. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 499. $12.50.)

[1] Robert A. Nisbet, *The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 244–245.

Evident, though largely implicit, in the rapidly growing body of literature fueling the society-technology debate are three possible approaches to the relationship of technology to politics. The first of these is *technological determinism,* which awards to technology the status of a completely independent variable. This viewpoint is embodied in the belief that whatever man can do he will do. Politics and culture are relegated thereby to the role of purely dependent variables. In technological determinism not only is technology an uncaused, unwilled cause which causes other things, but technological change is the sole and irresistible cause of all changes in all other fields of human activity. Under technological determinism all the other sciences which deal with human life are reduced to describing particular classes of events, all wholly determined by technology.

A second approach is to treat *technology as a conditioning variable,* one among many factors exogenous in its origins to the political process having necessary, significant, and definable effects on political ideas, institutions, and actions, like those historical and social factors (geography, genetic inheritance, population size, etc.) which are traditionally discussed in the first chapters of treatments of particular political systems in texts on comparative government. Technology as a conditioning variable, however, is often treated more deterministically than other such variables, because it is usually regarded as monolithic in its nature and social consequences and unidirectional in its development, impinging on all political systems in essentially the same way, if in differing degrees. Basic to this approach is the tacit assumption that, although its effects may be limited and may be mediated by other social forces, technology exists independently of any social decisions about its nature, and that its second-order consequences are universal and irresistible. The literature on political development or modernization especially exemplifies this acceptance of technology as a conditioning variable.

The third approach to the relationship between technology and politics postulates a *technology-politics interaction system* wherein technology and politics are mutually interacting variables, with technology, once existing, conditioning political life, while politics (human social decisions) condition the nature and extent of a society's technology. Studies of the history of science policy in modern nations, for instance, make it clear that Research and Development programs are not the products of a social stork but are the result of human decisions, and that, for financial reasons if for no other, not everything that can be done will be done, at least not at any given time or in any given context. By restoring technology to its place as a human creation rather than a deus ex machina, this approach forces us to focus on the public policy implications of scientific and technological possibilities.

The attitudes of any student of the technology-politics relationship can be classified as exemplifying one (or sometimes more than one) of these three approaches.

Technological Determinism

Curiously, one of the most extreme recent examples of an explicit willingness to swallow whole the position of technological determinism is to be found in a collection of essays by an author close to academic political science, William G. Carleton, Professor Emeritus of History and Political Science at the University of Florida. *Technology and Humanism* is something of a disappointment because few of the essays in the book (originally published in the *Antioch Review,* the *Yale Review,* and other journals) come to grips with any of the basic issues concerning the role of technology in contemporary society.

One essay which does deal directly with the power of technology, however, is "The Century of Technocracy," first published in 1965, which begins with the sweeping statement: "The overriding contribution of the twentieth century to history is technocracy: the technicalized, cybernetic, computerized society increasingly run by scientists, engineers and technicians. This society is drastically changing man's institutions and transforming his behavior and basic values" (p. 255). Taken at face value, what Carleton is saying here is that political science as he and we have known it is obsolete and must be wholly restructured around the technological variable. But, once having said this, he goes on almost as if nothing has happened. Scientists, he asserts, are becoming dominant everywhere; ideology is in decline and will be replaced as a savior in people's minds by machine technology. But Carleton fudges on the issue of determinism. Apparently, though we cannot control technological growth and change, we can tame it. This seems to be the implication of his exhortations not to let the machines control us but to control the machines ourselves for humanistic ends by means of the democratic process. While it might be unfair to accuse Carleton of Pollyannaism, the mildness of the bulk of his remarks, both substantively and rhetorically, contrasts strangely with the shocking implications of his general statements about the nature of the contemporary political scene.

Though William Kuhns, Professor of Communications at Loyola University in New Orleans, adopts the stance of detached expositor, his book, *The Post-Industrial Prophets: Interpretations of Technology* is a valuable introduction to the ideas of the advocates of technological determinism. His subjects include Lewis Mumford, Siegfried Giedion, Jacques Ellul, Harold Adams Innis, Marshall McLuhan, Norbert Wiener,, and Buckminster Fuller. Mumford is not, of course, a determinist, and his polemic against the consequences of contemporary technology seems sometimes to be based on an excessive optimism about man's ability to control his technology. Neither is Giedion, whose primary interest is in documenting technology's effects. Nor is Wiener, whose concern about the use man makes of the computer implies the existence of options. But the figures to whom Kuhns devotes most of his balanced, lucid, and thoughtful book *are* determinists, and Kuhns's own humanistic concern with human freedom illuminates the implications as well as the origins of their views.

Kuhns's division of the writers he discusses into schools of thought reflects his particular preoccupations as one of McLuhan's former associates. He argues that writers with a nineteenth-century bent, such as Mumford, Giedion and, essentially, Ellul, identify technology with the "work-performing, energy-transforming machine," while we are now learning "to identify technology with media and other forms of information control" (p. 8). This is a useful distinction, and insofar as it is a valid one it increases the problem of maintaining the autonomy of political science as a discipline. So-called "cybernetic" or communications models of politics are already claiming to give us superior insights into the political process. To the extent that they provide us with comprehensive descriptions of political action, and to the extent that communications patterns are technologically conditioned or determined, to that extent politics itself becomes technologically conditioned or determined. But while Kuhns is not concerned with politics as a discipline, he is concerned with the autonomy of man as a being, and he is optimistic. "While the mechanized conception of technology led almost inevitably to a polarization of man and machine, the media or information-control interpretation leads to a conception of organic continuity between man and his technologies" (p. 9). Put another way, if the old technology presented the specter of man's becoming dependent or subordinate to things, the new technology liberates him by making it possible for him to further extend his intellectual and spiritual range.

Yet whatever the normative implications of their work, the communications theorists to whom Kuhns feels closest do make politics a dependent variable of communications. Harold Innis, a distinguished Canadian economist who, unlike his disciple McLuhan, deals with historical change in an orderly fashion, has focused on the rise and fall of power structures. He argues that the media in use in any society (writing, printing, oral communications, etc.) are the independent variables and that when a new medium infiltrates an existing political system it then slowly subverts it. Since Innis's theory is essentially a kind of cybernetic determinism, it forces him to regard such things as censorship and information monopolies as the true sources of political power. McLuhan's divergence from Innis actually results from his extension of Innis's ideas. Less concerned with social structure than his master, he treats the media as not simply affecting the form of a society through changing the society's "temporal or spatial biases," but as having a direct influence on the human sensorium. "The medium is the message," his now famous catch-phrase, asserts that how one is communicated with crucially affects one's perception of the world—and one's personality itself—and does it directly, without the mediations of any other social force.

Buckminster Fuller is a prophet of technological determinism whose position is perhaps even more radical than that of the communications theorists, since for him even communication—to say nothing of politics—is simply an epiphenomenon of energy. For Fuller, the proper level of social analysis is the energy-man-object ecology of the planet as a whole. He is a systems-oriented thinker who has a utopian belief in the fundamental harmony of the world which is obscured and distorted by politics; this harmony, however, could be institutionalized, he believes, in a new organization of the whole based on economics in which energy and mobility patterns would be the fundamental variables and which would utilize the computer as a tool for systems analysis and control. Political scientists would do well to read Fuller; he has a great appeal to certain of the young who are dissatisfied with the present but cannot accept the negativism of Mumford or the pessimism of Ellul and find the essentially optimistic McLuhan limited in range. The new scientific utopianism which embraces thinkers as diverse as Fuller and B. F. Skinner may present a more potent challenge to political science than does traditional utopianism because it claims to be based on the data of the "hard" sciences which so many contemporary political scientists have chosen to revere.

Actually even Innis and McLuhan have a utopian streak, and Kuhns shares their normative bias. They divide cultures into spatial and temporal ones, the former based on writing and the latter on speech or (in McLuhan's paradoxical and debatable formulation) on visual media such as television. For this school of thought, oral tradition and sensibility "are interpersonal rather than impersonal." They tend toward "immediate and local forms of authority over distant, centralized forms," encourage "dialogue rather than a monopoly of opinion" and make learning "an involving and creating activity rather than a simple experience of information transmission" (p. 167). Whether the belief in the salvation of democracy through modern communications technology is valid (and Kuhns has his reservations) is a substantive question which is secondary to the assumptions which underlie it. Whether one answers yes or no, to ask the question is to assume a radical dependency of politics upon the media which is by no means self-evident. Also, Kuhns and his friends never really ask to what extent human political choice can determine the nature or the content of the media of a society, apparently assuming either that political decisions cannot influence them or at least that they do not do so.

Technology as a Conditioning Variable

Many of those who write about society and technology—perhaps most of them—are ambivalent about whether technology wholly determines our lives or merely affects them, and, if the latter, how much these effects can be controlled by human volition. This is to be expected. Unless one denies that changes in technology can really change anything, and insists that it is all simply a matter of old wine and new bottles, obviously technology is important. Yet to consider it all-important is to make it our master, and few will admit to being slaves if there is any basis on which they can deny it. This ambivalence—and sometimes downright confusion—is reflected in both the analytical and the descriptive treatments, although it is perhaps more pervasive in the latter, where it is easier to avoid a clear-cut resolution of the issue.

Herbert Muller, Distinguished Professor of English and Government at Indiana University, is almost explicit about his ambivalence in *The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern Technology and Human Values.* Muller takes the position that technology is just another factor in our lives, an important one but not so important as to change the basic rules of the social game: men are still men. But at the same time he asserts that technology has outmoded our eighteenth-century constitution, designed for the governance of an agricultural society, and he accepts the thesis that we live in a postindustrial society. In contrast to Carleton, he claims that we are in no danger of domination by a scientific elite. Technology can be used for good or evil; it is up to us. Yet he is uncertain about whether our system can be inventive enough to deal with the social problems posed by technology. Muller's work is rambling, bland, and often irritatingly avuncular in tone, but it is also balanced and remarkably comprehensive. Though the author embraces aspects of all three approaches to the man-technology issue, basically he seems to regard technology as a conditioning variable. Despite its title this is a book that even the most timorous can read immediately before retiring, possibly even with soporific effect.

Smaller in size but more intellectually ambitious is *Technological Change: Its Impact on Man and Society* by Emmanuel Mesthene, late director of the now defunct Harvard University Program on Technology and Society. Unfortunately, Mesthene tries so hard to be judicious as well as comprehensive that he leaves us confused about the extent to which technology is to be regarded as an autonomous force in society. But, as his title indicates, his main thrust is to accept technology as a given and to concern himself primarily with its consequences. Though he explicitly states that "technology is not independent of the society in which it develops and flourishes" (pp. 20), and that it is not "a somehow autonomous force that develops according to its own internal laws and lets the consequences fall where they may" (p. 20), the "sounder" view with which he associates himself is that social institutions play a role in "fostering" technological development and "mediating between technology and its effects" (p. 20). This is obviously quite different from arguing that we can control, shape, or reject technology in such a fashion as to avoid these effects.

Mesthene is deeply concerned with values, yet here too his ambivalence about the autonomy of technology is manifest. He argues that while "technology creates new possibilities [it] leaves their disposition uncertain" (p. 60). Thus technology is value neutral; the tools are given us, we can do good or evil with them—a knife can cut meat, excise a gangrenous limb, or murder a fellow human (whether such tools as H-bombs are good for anything is an issue Mesthene does not discuss). Yet he admits that not only do technologies have necessary consequences, about which differing value judgments can be made, but that changes in technologies can effect changes in the values of a society, which comes close to saying that technology is not value-neutral but self-validating. This implication in turn is only one step away from the view of Herbert Marcuse and his followers that in modern society technology has itself become an ideology in the strict sense of the word.

When he discusses the impact of technology on political life as such, Mesthene in effect treats it as a conditioning variable, the effects of which he approves. Technological advance, for instance, leads to "the enhancement of the public sphere" (p. 63) as a result of centralization and the enlargement of the effective social unit (both geographically and socially). Mesthene believes that technology can create the conditions for more direct democracy by making information more accessible to the public. We can dismiss the bogeyman of Ellul and others who see technology as necessarily submerging the individual, he holds, since technology, all things considered, will lead to something not unlike McLuhan's global village, save that for Mesthene, a former teacher of Greek philosophy, the ideal of the life lived in public is Periclean Athens. Although Mesthene has some reservations about direct democracy in terms of the ability of the general public to make operational decisions, he, unlike Kuhns, is not concerned about what might be the fate of the individual in such an environment. But, then, individualism never was a value for classical Greek philosophy.

Less deterministic, either explicitly or implicitly, are recent works by two authors who deal with radically different aspects of the impact of technology on society. William Braden, a knowledgeable, sophisticated Chicago newspaperman, is concerned about the impact of technology on the values of youth in *The Age of Aquarius: Technology and the Cultural Revolution;* while Eugene S. Schwartz, identified by his publisher as a "former senior scientist specializing in information sciences at the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute" in his book *Overskill: The Decline of Technology in Modern Civilization* discusses the physical impact of technology upon the human race. Both Braden and Schwartz could be classified among those treating technology as a conditioning variable in politics, but, because Schwartz deals in polemic and advocacy (though his work is heavily documented), while Braden is essentially a reporter and synthesizer, it is easier to know where Schwartz stands than where Braden does.

The question Braden asks in *The Age of Aquarius* is why what he assumes to be large segments of educated young people are in revolt against modern American society; (the book was written at the height of the perhaps short-lived "youth culture"). He therefore focuses on the issue of what relative weight should be assigned to problems of personal psychological adjustment as against objective social conditions in triggering youthful dissatisfactions. His extensive reading and his lengthy interviews with such persons as Bruno Bettelheim, Edward Hall, Richard Flacks, and Christopher Lasch seem to have convinced him that contemporary America is in the midst of a cultural crisis, stemming from a humanistic revolt against technology and its results. Paradoxically, technology is not only the enemy; it is also the precondition of the revolt, since, as Braden points out, adolescence as a distinctive sociopsychological status is the product of an affluence dependent on a high-technology economy.

It is often difficult to disentangle Braden's own views from those of the writers and interviewees he quotes or refers to (without, alas, citation). His own judgment about the extent to which man can resist or control technology is unclear. He comes close to embracing the Muller-Mesthene position that technology is something which is here and which has both good and evil consequences and that what needs to be done is to accept the former and reject the latter—a formula as unexceptionable as it is difficult to operationalize. But despite its lack of intellectual focus, *The Age of Aquarius* is a rich and rewarding meal for anyone interested in the interrelationship of culture, society, and technology. Time alone will tell whether the title of the book is a misnomer, whether it should not instead have been *The Year of Aquarius*.

For Schwartz, technology is not evil per se, though some technologies may be. The real problem is that if technology is permitted to grow at its present exponential rate, humanity is physically doomed. We can and we must work, he says, toward the creation of a less efficient society. Growing skepticism about the ability of technology to sustain ever larger populations, especially without insupportable side effects, is becoming increasingly common among social scientists as they begin to assimilate the ideas of the ecologists and population specialists. Increasing attention is being paid to the gloomy extrapolations of Jay Forrester and his Systems Dynamics Group at M.I.T. But Schwartz goes them one better in pessimism. Forrester and his colleagues believe that within technology itself lies the source of our salvation and that we can rely on the computer to do the multivariate analyses and produce the systems designs necessary for the kind of planning we will need if we are to avoid catastrophe. Schwartz denies that technology can save us from the dangers technology creates. Chicken Little is right; or, as Schwartz puts it, "the residue of unsolved problems arising from a multiplicity of quasi-solutions converges to a point where no techno-social solution is possible" (p. 76).

But even though Schwartz assigns to technology an overwhelming and, in effect, monocausal role in the doom of the world he is not a determinist, because he believes that somehow, even at this late date, man can save himself by an act of will. Population must be stabilized and resource utilization must be drastically cut back; our standard of living must be greatly reduced and men must become more self-sufficient than the "dependent urban dweller of today" (p. 297). Essentially, then, Schwartz believes in the primacy of politics over technology, though what form such a politics—such an act of anti-technological choice—would take, he does not even begin to tell us. While *Overskill* is a tract, it is a sophisticated one, and its very extremism makes it especially valuable heuristically to any social scientist who might be inclined to take the present physical context of the political system for granted.

Technological-Political Interaction

Of all the recent literature which deals with the interdependence of technology and politics and assumes that man is capable of choice even in dealing with his artifacts, none is more valuable, especially to the newcomer to the field, than Nigel Calder's *Technopolis: Social Control of the Uses of Science*. Calder, a distinguished and prolific British science editor, has written a book which is badly organized both as to data and ideas but is rich in information and insights, and the bibliography though short is excellent. Calder sees both modern technology in general and the second-order effects of particular technologies as radically transforming political ideas and institutions; he also recognizes, however, that our technologies are the result of human choices, especially choices about allocation of the scarce resources upon which technological development depends. Like other perceptive students of technology he sees communications as the most important current interface between technology and politics. Calder argues that a complete two-way information system (he calls such a device the "World Box") could lead either to centralization or to decentralization depending on human decision, and that it could play a vital role in what he regards as the clearly soluble problem of controlling the expert. He speculates that bureaucracy could be abolished, since, once the possession of information becomes more general throughout the society, special expertise (which in his opinion is the fruit not of skill but of secrecy) will become devalued and the functionally necessary roles of control and coordination will be performed by "in and outers" dividing their time between government and the universities or professions, acting always under a keen and watchful public eye.

Though on the technical feasibility of computer planning of world systems Calder is closer to Forrester than to Schwartz, he also recognizes that any increased ability to analyze and control future world systems will not do away with the need for political decisions about what questions are to be fed into the computer and about what weights should be assigned to particular values. In accordance with his belief that the science-technology issue will dominate the politics of the future, Calder attempts to categorize public opinion in terms of beliefs and attitudes about science and technology. Those who are inclined to let science and technology dominate society he calls the Zealots; those who are more skeptical about the benefits of such an arrangement are the Mugs, a suggestive if hardly definitive typology. Unfortunately he offers no data to indicate how the public lines up at present in terms of his categories. He himself, however, makes no secret of his hope and conviction that the Mugs will win.

The most clearcut recognition of the technology-politics relationship as one of mutual causation is usually to be found in case studies of particular problems, where the complex intertwining of cause and effect, necessities and alternatives becomes evident from a consideration of the empirical data and the political and social history of a particular problem. Two recent studies which focus on information technology are good illustrations. One is *Information Technology in a Democracy,* edited by Alan F. Westin, Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia, and published under the auspices of the program which had been run by Mesthene at Harvard. The other is *Computers, Communications and the Public Interest,* the report of a series of symposia held under the aegis of Johns Hopkins University and the Brookings Institution and edited by Martin Greenberger, Professor of Computer Sciences at Johns Hopkins. Both deal with a number of subtopics but cannot avoid tackling three substantive questions which point up some of the complex interactions between political choice and technologically conditioned human powers.

The first of these is the problem of civil liberties created by the ability of new forms of machine technology to maintain virtually absolute surveillance over the individual, a capacity which will be enhanced if and when (possibly quite soon) personal checks are abolished and we move to an economy based wholly on the credit card. The second is the problem of political control presented by total information systems similar to Calder's "World Box" which would make it possible for citizens to maintain surveillance of their government and would restore direct democracy though push-button electronic voting devices permitting expression of opinion on the issues of the day; alternatively, of course, such a system could lead to the totalitarian world envisioned in *1984.* Finally, there is the question of how societal values can be implemented more efficiently by combining total information technology with systems analysis. Could such a combination enable the world to deal effectively with the vastly complex problems of an increasingly interdependent technologically based society—problems such as urban decay, undesired international conflict, pollution and starvation, whose causes, consequences and remedies perhaps only the computer can fully analyze?

As might be expected, different contributors are interested in different aspects of these questions, and the focus ranges from the global to the minute. No consensus emerges from these two volumes. Their value lies in sharpening the reader's wits and increasing his knowledge. Perhaps the most provocative single paper in either volume is that of Anthony Oettinger in the Westin collection, which discusses the importance of the difference between "after the fact" and "real time" information processing and how this affects our ability to control organizations and societies. Socioeconomic planning designed to deal with the problems created by planetary interdependence would require a tremendous amount of information of a kind which is difficult to collect and process on a real-time basis, and the efficiency of any control functions built into such a system would be seriously impaired by such a lag. Oettinger's description of the difficulty of getting necessary information in time to the right people within corporate structures should give pause to those who envision running the world by computer. Even if we could program all our values into such a control system (and this, of course, is primarily a political rather than a technical problem—if Disraeli were alive today he would surely aspire not to write a nation's songs but to program its computers), we would still confront the problem of getting the necessary feedback from the real world into the information machine in time to make useful decisions.

What tentative conclusions about the role of the study of technology in political science and the fate of the study of politics itself can we draw from the works under discussion? The fact that the nearer we get to the mundane details of real life, the greater the apparent role of the political variable suggests that there is something inherently wrong with the concept of technological determinism. The widespread acceptance of the irresistibility and autonomy of technology is itself a force which threatens the autonomy of politics both as a field of study and as social reality; and since what is taken for granted cannot be effectively refuted, a major task of political science would seem to be the analysis of the reasons for the domination of this idea—or, more properly, this ideology—and its refutation. At the same time, much more needs to be done to create a body of empirical studies of the interface between technology and politics for two reasons: (1) to expand our understanding of the limits of political choice in relation to technological possibilities; and (2) to provide the raw material for a synthetic literature on which to base the study of technology as a crucial variable affecting modern politics.

Because man is a symbolizing animal and sees reality not directly but through structured perceptions, the study of communications must play an especially important role in any such enterprise. But to make communications the essence of politics would be a mistake. There is reality as well as perception, and cybernetic reductionism is as simplistic and nonproductive in the long run as any other kind of reductionism.

Finally, the need to pay more attention generally to technological variables in politics should, by forcing upon us a clearer understanding of the relationship between man's tools and man's symbols, between man's creations and his choices, lead to a clearer understanding of man himself as a social being, which, after all, is the real subject matter of political science.

BOOK REVIEWS

Bach, Beethoven, and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Philadelphia Orchestra. By Edward Arian. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971. Pp. x, 158. $7.50.)

Edward Arian's *Bach, Beethoven, and Bureaucracy* is a remarkably important work in the best, (and most radical,) tradition of the policy sciences. Arian studies the Philadelphia Orchestra from 1912 to the present from a unique perspective. For twenty years he was a member of the orchestra's string section and active in the musician's union. He has since become a Ph.D. in political science. The core of the book is Arian's argument that the Philadelphia Orchestra has become a large, impersonal, bureaucratized institution which maximizes values other than the pursuit of music for music's own sake.

Arian contends that economic, rational, bureaucratic management of a symphony orchestra has massive artistic, social, and cultural costs, and that these costs overwhelm the benefits of businesslike management. In order to survive, management must rely heavily on private charity, recording royalties, and box office sales. The major cost of relying on private charity to fund the orchestra is that fund raisers and large donors must control the orchestra's Board of Directors. Of the 128 people who served as directors from 1901 to 1969, 84 were listed in the Social Register, and they were predominantly big businessmen, bankers or attorneys. There are no professional musicians on the Board. The Board chooses the music director of the orchestra and essentially controls performing conditions and repertory. Consequently, financial and status concerns overwhelm musical concerns.

Recording royalties are the second major source of financing, accounting for at least 14 per cent of the orchestra's earned income. Marketing considerations, not musical ones, determine what gets recorded. Further, recording repertory determines performing repertory. Choice of repertory becomes a form of free advertising. Rehearsing a work for performance minimizes the time that it takes to record it later in the same week and reduces labor costs. Arian computes that in the 1960–61 and 1961–62 seasons, 44 per cent of the works performed served as an economic aid to recording. He comments, "Since the public buys what it is most familiar with and likes best, there is a strong inclination to cater to mass demand by programming and recording those compositions with the greatest popular appeal. Conservative audience tastes are at once created, sustained, and catered to, and a circle of conservatism is completed and continues to feed upon itself" (p. 23).

Dependence on the box office has similar effects. Innovative repertory, new music, or any other variation from the standard chestnuts mean empty seats, and the orchestra cannot afford to perform for free in schools, hospitals, poor communities, prisons, or anywhere else.

Arian's second line of argument is more provocative. He contends that the bureaucratization and routinization of art results in alienation from work among people who have chosen a career for its psychological gratifications.

Musicians, although trained to be soloists, are employed as anonymous members of ensembles, with no control over what music they play or over how it is to be interpreted. When it is played well, the rewards go to the conductor or soloist. No one notices the third man in the second violin section. This results not only in boredom and frustration with work, but with hostility toward the conductor, the first chair players, the management of the orchestra, and even the audience. Arian reports that, among orchestral musicians, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal disorders are unusually high. He does not discuss the rumored alcoholism and drug usage among performers, but he does make it clear that a lot of what we take to be unprofessional behavior is frequently a manifestation of alienation from work.

Let me suggest that these conditions are not limited to orchestras. Academicians are severely underrepresented on universities' Boards of Trustees. Organizational and financial considerations determine our course offerings and staffing decisions. Each of us is trained to become President of the APSA and to supervise dissertations, but we end up teaching mass lectures of introductory courses. Anyone who has sat through a faculty meeting or a departmental meeting knows the acrimony and bitterness toward the organization that follows from real or perceived powerlessness and lack of self-fulfillment. Analagous situations develop in hospitals, clinics, and law firms. Arian has studied an orchestra, but the demands of bureaucratic organization and economic pressures seem to have the same impact on artists and professionals that assembly lines have on factory workers. Were these findings generalized to the whole system, we would be forced to reconsider the entire structure of work life. If the people with the most psychologically rewarding and prestigious jobs are alienated from their work and manifest the normal consequences of such alienation, then the system is in jeopardy.

Arian thinks that federal funding will be the source of ways out of this dilemma. He argues that federal funding of the arts could not have a more conservative impact on the arts than their current dependence on private charity and that private censorship has been greater than governmental censorship. Ultimately, Arian argues, that the solution lies in the complete restructuring of the symphony orchestra. The orchestra must exist to serve music. This means expanding the audience, encouraging the composition and performance of new music, enabling individual musicians to play as soloists and in small ensembles, and so on. All of this can be done, he argues, only with federal funding and with the development of a new breed of arts administrator who cares about the arts, as opposed to being a super salesman.

I wonder if the solution will be so simple. Perhaps the mere perpetuation of large scale organizations, such as the Philadelphia Orchestra, inevitably generates alienation and powerlessness among its members, and conservative policies. I would suggest that in addition to providing federal funding for these organizations, there ought to be artists' subsidies, a form of guaranteed annual income for creative and performing artists. This would free the artist from any form of organizational pressure and would permit the uninhibited pursuit of art. Perhaps this will be followed by scholars' subsidies.

KENNETH SHERRILL
Hunter College, City University of New York

Thomas Jefferson as Social Scientist. By C. Randolph Benson. (Cranberry, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971. 333 pp. $10.00.)

Thomas Jefferson: A Well-Tempered Mind. By Carl Binger. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970. Pp. 209. $6.95.)

Liberty and science are the two fundamental principles of liberalism, in themselves separate and diverse, which liberalism must make inseparable. On the one hand, liberation of the body's appetites from natural fears and social conventions is dignified by the accompanying, progressive emancipation of the mind from tradition and falsehood; on the other, this liberation of the mind is justified and supported by the benefits it brings to the many who participate in it only imperfectly or indirectly, by living in an Enlightened Age. When liberty and science appear to diverge, therefore, especially when social science (the crux of the two principles) seems incapable of aiding liberty, or indifferent or even hostile to it, the liberal senses a crisis of liberalism, not merely a passing difficulty. In recent years the American liberal has had to live through the troubles of the Democratic party and of the university, his ancestral residence and his vacation home, and the experience has given him a psychosomatic pain. He has had to defend both while losing confidence in both. What task could be more useful and urgent to him and to others depending on him than to reconsider the thought of Thomas Jefferson, who held that liberty and science must progress together, who argued the special significance of America as an experiment for mankind in the possibility of such progress, and who, to carry on this American experiment, founded both the Democratic party and the liberal university?

Professor C. Randolph Benson's book presents Jefferson as a social scientist in the comprehensive view we require. He sees in Jefferson the spirit of Comte, whose comprehensive, "positive" science was to replace the reactionary votaries of religion and their destructive critics as well. But as Benson recognizes, Jefferson would have found Comte's authoritarian politics abhorrent. Today it would be inadequate but not misleading to read "B. F. Skinner" in place of "Comte"; and the retreat from liberalism sounded recently by that eminent social scientist illustrates our compelling need to assess both principles of liberalism together. How, then, were liberty and science joined together in Jefferson's thought, and what has happened to disjoin them?

These are not Benson's questions, to be sure; Benson wants to consider Jefferson as a precursor of modern social science. But his intention leads him toward the predicament in which we find ourselves. Part I of his book is on Jefferson's background, and makes clear that Jefferson looked on that background not as a formative influence but as an opportunity to make a new beginning, the experiment of men "trusted to govern themselves without a master." Part II, the bulk of the book, explains Jefferson's thought on "social structures and functions" in nine chapters divided conveniently if not systematically. Part III puts together "Jefferson as both social scientist and reformer."

To explain why Jefferson is but a "precursor" of modern social science, Benson allows that his social science was pre-Darwinian, and thus based on Newtonian and Locke-an natural law, whereas ours is post-Darwinian, and not based on an unchangeable nature of man. But this difference goes deeper than Benson concedes, for Jefferson's pre-Darwinian natural law appears to be the basis not only for his social science but also for his understanding of liberty. Jefferson could not have put his trust in the rights of man to secure liberty if *man* were mutable and if the human were not definitely separable from the subhuman. He could not have denied the justice of slavery if he had not found in his scientific researches that the Negro was not inferior to whites in moral sense. He also declared his "suspicion" that the Negro is intellectually inferior to the white, but this inferiority was not the critical one to him. Benson calls Jefferson's suspicion on this point "ethnocentric" (p. 226), and no doubt it is; yet now that social science has abandoned the moral sense as defining man, it cannot match Jefferson's honest candor in studying the intellectual endowments of different races or groups of men.

Thus we observe that Jefferson's pre-Darwinian thinking produces a difference with today's social science on what he called "natural aristocracy" and it calls "elitism." Jefferson is quite sure that a natural aristocracy of talents exists that must be distinguished from, and made ascendant over, the pseudo-aristocracy of the wealthy and the well born. But post-Darwinian social science is obliged to doubt the existence of a natural aristocracy; so it must either deny the need for aristocracy (because all men are by nature equal?) or acquiesce in the rule of a pseudo-aristocracy. Post-Darwinian social science could never assert that the purpose of secondary education is to rake the geniuses from the rubbish. Nor could it admit that with mass education "the briar and the bramble can never become the vine and the olive." Jefferson went on to say that "their asperities may be softened by culture"; so he still hoped for "great advancement in the happiness of the human race" (p. 179). But the ground of his hope remained the difference between briar or bramble and vine or olive, in his own metaphor of unchanging species. Men may be softened if we know what a man is, so that we know what a prickly or a softened man is.

Benson remarks that a surprising amount of Jefferson's thought concerned religion. He is right; religion was a problem in those days. But although Jefferson fought all his life for religious liberty, he did not go to the extent of our post-Darwinian indifference. Because he thought the nature of man was immutable and hence knowable, he was willing, as he said, "to make common cause even with error itself"; for man's natural moral sense may need to be sharpened by religion. We might ask, for example, which makes the more powerful indictment of slavery—the social scientist's accusation that it is ethnocentric, or Jefferson's famous blast? "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, that his justice cannot sleep forever. . . ." Let us take note of the admission that God's justice can sleep for a long time. Yet Jefferson assures us that it will awaken; and he speaks with the confidence of a man who knows the truth of the matter, in contrast to the social scientist who has to worry that he himself may be ethnocentric. It is not out of greater honesty that liberals today do not make common cause with error, but because they do not dare.

Finally, it might appear from Jefferson's pre-Darwinian certitudes that he was more optimistic or complacent than liberals today. But on the contrary, he believed that a certain "pugnacious humor" seems to be a law of man's nature. This humor is responsible for war and slavery, and it must be restrained not only by the moral sense but also by the free government established in the American experiment. He knew that the experiment might fail because of the force of that humor, but he believed he had ground for hope in the better side of man's nature and in man's self-interest. This ground, as Benson shows in a critique of Daniel Boorstin, saved him from the complacency of living in a "lost world" of local and temporal circumstance. But in the post-Darwinian world of accidental change, no experiment is valid for mankind; and the alternative to despair is complacency. Who then lives in a lost world, Thomas Jefferson or ourselves?

Dr. Carl Binger is a psychiatrist able and willing to certify, in his book reviewing Jefferson's life before 1800, that Jefferson had a "well-tempered mind." Dr. Binger does not, therefore, examine the record of Jefferson's apostasies during his presidency—a record which caused Henry Adams to doubt that a well-tempered mind could hold Jeffersonian principles. Still, he finds enough contrariety in the period he has chosen to decide that Jefferson's mind was composed of opposites, especially the masculine and the feminine. These elements, he says, combined in an unconscious process to release Jefferson's singular creativeness. Perhaps we should doubt that "combined" is the right word for what his masculine and feminine elements did together in the dark, but at present we can wonder whether the result was pre- or post-Darwinian. Is the well-tempered mind a new creation, or as Dr. Binger also says, a "normal" mind in the Platonic sense of "best"? In practice, Dr. Binger uses the latter, pre-Darwinian understanding with good sense and also with occasional, unobsessive resort to the formulas of a professional wig-picker. One could ask whether it is accurate to describe as "piling on the guilt" (p. 97) Jefferson's command to his motherless daughter to reread the letters he had written to her for her instruction. Was he not helping his daughter to live responsibly and thus avoid guilt? But on the whole it is welcome these days to read an analysis which assumes that masculine and feminine are elements of a well-tempered mind rather than roles in an ill-tempered society.

Benson and Binger offer a modern look at Thomas Jefferson, and they share the fault of underestimating the difficulties of appreciating Jefferson today. But both books are respectful of Jefferson's merits, unpresumptuous of their own, and well written.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR.
Harvard University

Academic Scribblers, American Economists in Collision. By William Breit and Roger L. Ransom. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971. Pp. 275. $8.50, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

The intention of this book is to describe the ideas which have influenced recent American economic policy. Twelve economists are surveyed, beginning with Alfred Marshall, whose *Principles* was published in 1890, and ending with Milton Friedman, whose ideas are at the center of economics today (and are explained here very well). In between are Veblen, Pigou, Chamberlin, Keynes, Hansen, Samuelson, Lerner, Galbraith, Knight, and Simons.

Even to try to survey so much is commendable, and the authors have done more. They take the reader through the ideas of the twelve in a way that shows they are competent theorists themselves. By that standard, economists judge each other. They will not censure a man who is vague about Regulation Q and may think the better of him for being above such details. Even if he is cavalier about single-equation systems, he will not be scored off. But let him miss an implication of the principle of maximization, and he is in jeopardy. A corollary is his attitude toward theory. If he says it is unrealistic, irrelevant, or tautological, he will be suspected of not understanding it as well as he should and be reminded of what Lady Bracknell said in *The Importance of Being Earnest* ("Never speak disrespectfully of Society, Algernon. Only people who can't get into it do that").

The authors are quite inside the society of theorists. They are able to use the basic writings of the twelve and do not have to take their ideas from a commentary, a paraphrase, or a textboook. Thus what they say about Samuelson comes from his *Foundations* and other writings that earned him the Nobel Prize. The chapter on monopolistic competition rests on Chamberlin's celebrated work and on the criticism that has revealed the power of neoclassical economics. That power is indeed a leitmotiv of the book.

What is included in a book of this kind should be left to the authors. They in turn should leave us to regret their choices. About Marshall, they might have said more of his equivocal attitude to the market and self-interest and less of returns to scale. They are properly critical of Keynes but might have been more so in view of the many things that are wrong with his *General Theory*. "We are all Keynesians now," President Nixon said. He was not speaking for the economics profession. The remark is an interesting example of policy being influenced by ideas that have become defunct, something Keynes himself had noticed, though not about himself.

The authors, while trying to be accurate and clear, have tried also to be interesting, a difficult thing to do and better not done at all. Mies van der Rohe once said he didn't want to be interesting—he wanted to be good. What may be interesting here is the biographical chit-chat, but it is less valuable than the economic theory which could have been explained in the same space. The explanations, as they stand, are as accurate as they can be. They would be more accurate if they were longer.

How clear they are is another matter. Some are very clear, like that of the ideas of Abba Lerner who is a model of clarity himself. Others, like the Hicks-Hansen synthesis, will be uphill work for the outsider. But they will be helpful to an undergraduate. Graduate students will find some of them useful. A crisp new econometrician will do well to read the chapters on Marshall, Samuelson, and Knight, there to discover that economic theory has a past, present, and future, or simply to discover it exists. The chapters on Veblen and Galbraith ought to be read by economic theorists, who unfortunately are inclined to ignore what is not congenial to them. The entire book is useful as a history of some leading ideas of the century. Readers from outside of economics, although they will come across some stiff bits, will find it worth their while.

The book, however, does have a limitation:

from the authors' viewpoint, a serious one; from the reader's, less so. The reader can use it to inform himself about economic ideas and need not be troubled by whether or not they have influenced policy. The question must trouble the authors because they wrote the book to show that influence. I do not think they have. To have done so would have required a much longer and more complex book. The history of that relationship indicates policy has influenced ideas at times, has been influenced by them, has ignored them, has been consistent with them without meaning to, and has departed from them by chance. Each of these connections can be illustrated by foreign trade policy.

To believe ideas rule the world is a pleasant thought for the economist (so long as he doesn't think much about the world his ideas are supposed to have made). It is one of the illusions fostered by Keynes. He said, about "the ideas of economists and political philosophers," that "the world is ruled by little else," that "madmen in authority . . . are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." He gave the book its title—an unfortunate one. Economists are not that bad; neither are political philosophers.

William D. Grampp
University of Illinois, Chicago

The Political Theory of Anarchism. By April Carter. (New York: Harper and Row, Torchbook Library Editions, 1971. Pp. vi, 116. $6.00.)

Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. By Stanley Rosen. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. Pp. xx, 241. $8.50.)

Terms of analysis become terms of polemic, to the confusion of scholars and actors alike. The subjects of the two books under review amply illustrate this; their diverse treatments also indicate something of the sort of rethinking which is needed for the era of postbehavioral politics.

April Carter's title seems somewhat infelicitous. At the outset Miss Carter (lately lecturer in politics at Lancaster University and currently tutor in the Open University) disarmingly grants that anarchist political theory seems a contradiction in terms. Yet she adds that anarchist thinkers are "spokesmen for values which the politically established and victorious have too often forgotten or suppressed." Is it simply a matter of positing "values"? Which ones—and in what sense *are* they, after all, "political"? Even on a sympathetic reading, the answers do not emerge readily from the following pages. But in her conclusion, Miss Carter explains that her interest is the links between anarchism and more "orthodox" political theory. Specifically, she suggests that the contemporary relevance of anarchism is not its potential for a systematic new theory or pure anarchist movement (she considers both possibilities dubious), but as an aid to the *reinterpretation* of liberalism and socialism, providing some ideas which may be "partially realized" in the activities of popular groups over time.

Better if this came earlier, and more clearly. But in principle, it provides for a judicious mining of "anarchism." Thus, Miss Carter's first three chapters basically compare anarchism with three "orthodox" paradigms: Hobbesian individualism, Tocquevillean constitutionalism, and Marxian socialism. If there are few surprises here, and fewer philosophical depths, the discussions do offer more than a pure proclamation of "values." Implicitly they indicate something of the complex links among normative, empirical, and practical discourse.

The most interesting sections are those in which Miss Carter tries to grapple, on a more explicit and more fundamental level, with the notion of "politics." True to the anarchist spirit, she distinguishes a "social" principle of cooperation from a "political" one of domination and coercion. Yet she recognizes the Greek idea of politics proper as an area of activity among equals, and takes the primary definition of politics to be "the public" realm. And she sees a need to re-explore such ideas, to develop a sense of "citizenship" and "community" which she believes has almost vanished from the contemporary activities and meanings of politics. Her fourth chapter partly brings together these scattered comments. There she examines some "elements which appear to stand right outside the normal political sphere," but which "all have relevance to any attempt to define the sphere of politics and the nature of political activity" (p. 89). And there her figures are the individualist (Max Stirner), the artist (Camus), the moralist (Tolstoy), the hero (Hobsbawm on bandits), and the coward (Falstaff).

Potentially, this sort of discussion leaps beyond the other portions of Miss Carter's book. But only potentially. Miss Carter fails to consider Falstaff as a kind of rebel (a mocking comedian, a wise fool), as well as a man of caution. Her treatment of Stirner as an anarchist, while conventional, is none too penetrating. (R. W. K. Paterson's *The Nihilistic Egoist* [Oxford: Clarendon Press for Hull University Press], also published in 1971, offers a far more problematical view.) Her only reference to Camus is to the abridged Penguin edition of *The Rebel,* from which Camus' most extended discussion of the pitfalls of artistic rebellion (surrealism) and his comments on Stirner are missing. (Vintage offers a complete translation, although copyright restrictions may make it hard to obtain in England.) Conceptual problems underlie these lacunae: Miss Carter really provides no "political" integration. She does contrast her explorations with Hannah Arendt's "attempt to set limits to the political realm" in *The Human Condition.* But ironically, Miss Arendt would seem to offer something of the sort of conceptual resource which Miss Carter needs. She does not argue (as Miss Carter believes) that politics is completely separate from other realms such as science and art, but presents a phenomenological interpretation of that "'cultural interpenetration" with which Miss Carter says she is concerned. To be sure, many of Miss Arendt's conceptions are double-edged. But so are the issues. Small wonder, perhaps, that from all her investigations here, Miss Carter seems to draw only a vague notion of "responsible citizenship"—one never clearly articulated, but ultimately presented simply as another abstracted "value." Shifting uneasily between reinterpretation and proclamation, her book cannot really be said to cohere.

Quite another matter is the book on "nihilism" by Stanley Rosen (professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University). Superficially, the analytic task here might seem easier: Nihilism has no positive connotations, and Professor Rosen's approach is thus one of coherent attack. But (precisely because it is "negative"), nihilism poses far more profound problems than does anarchism. And what is significant about Professor Rosen's attack is the level on which it operates. Complex, densely written, treating a subject on which too little has been done in English (especially by students of politics), his book immediately plunges its readers into a conceptual feast. Those who expect to get a relatively straightforward ideological dissection or history of ideas will find themselves confronted with much richer fare. Even in the chapter entitled "Historicity and Political Nihilism" both the idiom and the focus are likely to prove unsettling. For Professor Rosen takes nihilism to be fundamentally a *philosophical* problem; and he means by that, things undreamt of in empiricist epistemologies.

Even in his statement of this thesis, Professor Rosen makes few concessions to his readers. But a summary of it serves most readily to indicate the nature of his discussion. The thesis can be characterized as an elaborate extension of the Nietzschean definition of nihilism. Where "everything is permitted," he tells us, everything has equal worth—which means that nothing has any worth. But, he adds, this is only secondarily a matter of morality—and only secondarily a matter of our current historical situation. Nihilism is not a contingent phenomenon of historical practice, but a universal "theoretical" one, for it arises from the "dialectical" nature of man. "More fundamentally put, history, which in its modern sense has given rise to the modern form of nihilism, is a philosophical problem" (p. 137). Specifically, notions of morality derive from notions of rationality. And modern nihilism is essentially a problem of "the contemporary crisis of reason," "a radical deterioration in our conception of what it means to be reasonable" (pp. xiii–xiv); whereby the notions of the reasonable and the good have been detached, so that it is impossible to speak meaningfully of the goodness of reason. So it is that, in Professor Rosen's view, where everything is permitted, nothingness is manifest even in speech. Lacking any rationale, every "speech of justification" is really reduced to the senselessness and insignificance of total "silence." Reason becomes merely a matter of superimposing man-made categories on the world, a process of world-mastery which is also one of world-creation; man and nature are fused, and man's work becomes its own end and the only source of its meaning; philosophy thus becomes indistinguishable from poetry—and the goodness of *poiesis* becomes a purely "subjective" affair. Hence, for Professor Rosen, much contemporary "linguistic" philosophy is actually nihilistic; and the same is true of historicism, which takes the "ontopoetic" form of sacrificing the past for the silence of an unknowable future.

Politics thus recapitulates epistemology: no *logoi* without *logos.* Not for nothing is Professor Rosen the author of a previous work on Plato's *Symposium.* Here the *Republic* looms large in his recommendations for the resurrection of reason. But the treatment is by no means simple or doctrinaire. Professor Rosen acknowledges debts to two quite diverse masters, Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève. And he chooses as the special targets of his attack those two notoriously obscure moderns, Wittgenstein and (especially) Heidegger. A formidable array: the details of Professor Rosen's handling of it are impossible to reproduce here. By treating "nihilism" so broadly, and by taking Heidegger as his main focus, Professor Rosen at times appears to mirror the obscurity he attacks. Theory, reason, speech, practice—one would like to have the crucial terms explicated in more leisurely a fashion. And similarly one would like amplification of many passages—the defense of Plato against Heidegger, with Plato's insistence on a return to the cave being taken as a *political* analogy which indicates a defense against nihilism (Is there no "silence" implicit in Plato's use of analogies?); the brief references to Marx (Could he not be said to have unified theory and practice only theoretically, rather than to have replaced the former by the latter?); the dispatch of Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy in a single chapter, as a conventionalist form of *poiesis* (Why no reference to the famous passage on calculation and *Lebensform,* in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics?* And how can Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance be reduced to a "common form" which is "very much like a Platonic Idea" [p. 10]?).

Within this plump volume there are several slimmer ones struggling to get out. Yet it is a powerful book. The "dialectic" of conservative and radical with which Professor Rosen ends is provocative indeed, in its reintroduction of a classical content into a usually denatured term. His treatment of Plato contains much of value. And one general implication of his book is that "ontology," in some significant sense, is unavoidable—a point which needs reiterating nowadays. Some readers are liable to be put off by the obscurity and complexity. Others may reject the philosophical stance; many will choose to accept one set of notions and ignore others. It is doubtful that Professor Rosen's overall thesis will win much acceptance. But those who ignore his book do so at their peril. It vigorously poses issues which have been too long neglected by both political scientists and political theorists in English-speaking academe.

R. L. Nichols

Monash University, Australia

Politics and Social Insight. By Francis G. Castles. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1971. Pp. 137. $6.96.)

This book, while issuing yet another call for interdisciplinary exchange, is at the same time germane to the continuing debate between positivism/behavioralism and historicism/antibehavioralism in the social sciences. (For example, see this *Review*, September, 1972). The possibility for interdisciplinary studies rests on Castles' assumptions concerning the nature and methods for attaining knowledge in the social sciences. Acknowledging a partial validity to historicism and the relativity of knowledge, Castles nevertheless argues that social scientists can assume their knowledge does have "pertinence to the problems of the real world" because it "can be tested by evidential reference to the real world," i.e., an empirical assertion can be "contradicted by all men irrespective of their normative frame of reference" (p. 44). Castles' rejection of historicism is biased by his implicit assumptions of the accessibility of the "real world" and the intersubjectivity of human knowledge. He rejects, however, an ardent empiricism by insisting upon the scientific utility of nonempirical statements that give "psychological impetus to scientific imagination and insight" (p. 45). By implication, the criterion of utility is apparently insight, not verifiability. He does accept empirical techniques as essential, but fears a "disproportionate emphasis on them." He bases his "limited confidence in the evidential basis of a science of man" (p. 45) upon the testability of empirical statement, falsification, and a "methodology of faith." Asserting faith in insight he turns to "metatheoretical models, and other untestable 'noble abstractions'" (p. 47) to provide hypotheses capable of being tested. While his insistence upon the "need for insights prior to investigation" (p. 46) is somewhat similar to historicism, their purpose is to generate testable empirical research. According to Castles, although metatheory is unscientific (unfalsifiable), it does serve a useful function and should be judged only by the utility of its insights. The book, then, fails in its sketchy, incomplete, and somewhat traditional attempt to develop a coherent middle position between positivism and historicism.

Castles, a British sociologist, emphatically rejects a narrow interpretation of politics, as well as any institutional and methodological restrictions on its study. Utilizing a paradigm which includes formal political structure and "wider social reality" he dismisses attempts to identify politics logically with any limited part of it. While eschewing the possibility of self-contained boxes such as "Descriptive Politics" or "Political Analysis," he also dismisses a political sociology that avoids political evaluation and prescription because of its "neurotic fear of being thought unscientific," and a political philosophy that is "unwilling to admit explicitly" its "reliance on the findings and perspectives of other disciplines" (p. 8). Since social science disciplines interpenetrate one another, to refuse to admit "the relevance of other disciplines" (including literature) is to limit the available range of insights. The same is true for research methods. There can be "no *a priori* assumption that the perspectives and methods of a particular discipline are inappropriate" (p. 4). His argument, in my opinion, is compelling, but it is dependent upon the validity of his paradigm.

Finally, the author develops some familiar perspectives—the metatheories of functionalism, conflict, and anomie/mass society—which he deems important and fears will not be provided by a political sociology (by political scientists) which "takes from sociology only certain highly visible elements, and not all those perspectives that would be available to a general sociology of politics" (p. 11). Exactly why political scientists are more imprisoned in their discipline than sociologists is left unexplained. Castles takes Rex's ideal types of individual interactions, "perfect co-operation, perfect conflict, and perfect anomie" (p. 13), develops these into three idealized ways in which individuals can react to societal norms, and finally, creatively delineates how these concepts express the core insights contained within his three metatheories. "Perfect co-operation" becomes the core insight of structural-functionalism, with its emphasis upon system stability; perfect conflict between individuals prefigures social conflict theory; and perfect anomie, or individual normlessness, stimulates the approach of contemporary theorists of mass society. His development of these three orientations is well done, but offers very little that is new.

Unfortunately, in a book as brief as this many ideas are merely hinted at; his two-page conclusion only suggests that these conflicting metatheories might be complementary—each concentrating on a different level of human behavior (i.e., conflict at the group level, etc.)—and necessary for a balanced perspective. The book is dated; most of its sources are pre-1968; nevertheless, it is a worthy interdisciplinary effort that could be utilized in a variety of undergraduate courses.

STANLEY W. MOORE
Pepperdine University, Malibu

Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law. By Carl Cohen. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 222. $2.95.)

Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice. Edited by Hugo Adam Bedau. (New York: Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. 282. $1.95.)

It has often been observed that American political thought has tended to treat fundamental philosophic problems as self-evident truths. Not given to philosophizing about politics. American political thinkers have instead produced a body of thought preoccupied with mechanical problems and characterized by legalistic, technical discussion. The best contemporary evidence of the continued validity of this criticism is the recent profusion of works on civil disobedience. Only in America could Abe Fortas's *Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience* be condemned as authoritarian, repressive, and fascist. Virtually all of the writers on the subject concede the necessity—indeed, the desirability—of civil disobedience under certain circumstances. The debate is, thus, reduced to questions of where, when, and how. A particular thinker's liberalism or conservatism can then be measured by placing him on an "ideological" scale ranging from those who see the streets as a sort of public forum to those who suggest that they might also be used for the conveyance of traffic.

Both of the volumes under review manifest the narrowness of this theoretical framework. Professor Cohen's book is full of observations and insights which, in the hands of a Burke or a Burckhardt, might serve as the premises upon which a radically thoroughgoing critique of civil disobedience could be constructed; Professor Cohen, however, comes down on the disobedients' side. Professor Bedau's anthology presents not divergent points of view but variations on a theme. This is not to deny that either is useful reading on its own terms. But the reader must be aware of the limitations of those terms, least he approach either book with unwarranted expectations.

Professor Cohen sets himself the task of developing a philosophic framework within which "individual acts [of civil disobedience] may be more fully understood and appraised" (p. 210). Despite a yeomanly effort, he does not entirely succeed.

For Cohen, "civil disobedience is an act of protest, deliberately unlawful, conscientiously and publicly performed" (p. 39). It is *not* simply public protest; it is *not* conscientious objection; it is *not* rioting; and it most definitely is *not* revolution. In his uncompromising assertion that civil disobedience is reformist only and not revolutionary, Professor Cohen will not win the accolades of those such as Professor Howard Zinn who maintain that it can be either. Nor will he endear himself to the apologists of the New Left by maintaining that civil disobedients "should be punished" (p. 76), not for their civil disobedience, but for their deliberate, albeit conscientious, violation of a particular law.

Having set forth what civil disobedience is not, Cohen distinguishes four genera of civil disobedience: direct and indirect, political and moral. (By recognizing as legitimate indirect civil disobedience, i.e., the violation of a law which is not itself the object of protest, Cohen, of course, goes beyond what Fortas would accept.) He further sorts out several species of political disobedience (civil disobedience toward the realization of a desired result rather than simply a public statement of personal conscience), i.e., pressure, confrontation, and resistance.

After establishing these criteria of recognition, Cohen turns to the task of identifying criteria of justification. From the outset, he disclaims "any effort to show that civil disobedience, taken generally, is always justified, or is never justified" (p. 93). Maintaining that justifications are contextual, he examines the legal, moral, higher-law, and utilitarian justifications for civil disobedience, but though he rigorously and inclusively states the problems, he resolves none of them. Rather he turns to a critique of seven arguments against civil disobedience. But to demonstrate the inadequacies of your opponents' arguments does not substantiate the validity of your own. Indeed, in his last two chapters Cohen examines and finds wanting two of the most common contemporary arguments advanced to defend much civil disobedience, those based upon the First Amendment's protection of the freedoms of speech and assembly and upon the Nuremberg Judgments. These unquestionably are the most satisfying presentations and manifest a familiarity with and understanding of judicial precedents and processes too often lacking among legal philosophers.

Cohen's examination, however, is disturbingly bland and bloodless. Interspersed throughout the text are nineteen case histories; dealt out like so many playing cards, these actual examples of civil disobedience are sometimes used for illustrative purposes but are never analyzed at length. Had Cohen done so, he might more clearly have recognized the morally disturbing potentials which civil disobedience presents. Although he cautions that "civil disobedience is not child's play" (p. 35), Cohen never seems to appreciate the tensions which exist in real-life disobedience situations. The behavior I have witnessed as a graduate student and faculty member in California during the past decade bears not the slightest resemblance to the rosy fantasy which Cohen apparently uses as his model. He asserts that civil disobedience "invariably . . . is . . . civilized" (p. 31); my own observations suggest that many civil disobedients seem to have a commitment to hostility.

In the end, Cohen's analysis is equivocal. But perhaps his equivocation arises because he has forthrightly attempted to deal with a difficult subject not susceptible to the facile treatment, rhetorical sleight of hand, and oversimplification characteristic of Zin and his ilk. Unlike Zinn, who advocates unlimited freedom of expression for the "good" guys only [see Zinn's book review, 85 *Harvard Law Review* 897 (1972)], Cohen recognizes not only that there must be some limitations upon civil disobedience but also that what's good for the Weathermen is good for the Ku Klux Klan. In this respect, Cohen's analysis, whatever its shortcomings, is a welcome, even-handed redressing of the balance in the literature on this subject.

Much the same may be said of *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice*. Professor Bedau has drawn together in one reasonably brief and inexpensive volume several thought-provoking statements on the subject. Following an introductory essay by the editor and an excerpt from Thoreau, the book is divided into three parts. The first section deals with civil disobedience against racism. The second is entitled "Against War," and the third presents four abridged essays debating the justifications for civil disobedience. The book's virtues, however, are also its vices. Perhaps if one has seen one reader on civil disobedience he hasn't seen them all, but it seems that way. Certainly, *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice* duplicates several collections of readings already available. Moreover, Bedau has achieved a brief volume either by selecting several essays too short to permit developing important themes or by utilizing the editorial scissors too freely. But, on the whole, the merits outweight the defects, and the volume's inclusiveness and its price make it pedagogically attractive for use in political theory or public law instruction.

It should be apparent from these somewhat impressionistic appraisals that Cohen's analysis and Bedau's anthology are both worthwhile either for personal reading and edification or for class assignments. But the American Camus has yet to make his appearance.

RICHARD Y. FUNSTON
California State University, San Diego

On Historical and Political Knowing: An Inquiry into Some Problems of Universal Law and Human Freedom. By Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. 159. $6.50.)

On Historical and Political Knowing, though a long soliloquy, is nonetheless much too short for tackling all the questions the author feels he is up against: "What do we mean by truth, by meaning, by freedom, whether of a particle of a man, or an organization? What do we mean by prudence of action in an uncertain world?" (p. xii). Professor Kaplan, dismayed by what he perceives as defection from the ideals of science, attributes the mischief to certain "current misconceptions" that "lie, at least in part, in the realm of philosophy" (p. vii). The philosophical foe is divided into two camps: the "common language" philosophers, represented by Dray and Scriven, who would seemingly abandon the methods of systematic social science in favor of raw, untestable intuition; and the ideologists—those ancient enemies Hegel and Marx—whose siren songs apparently still have the power to lull social scientists into shipwreck upon the rocks of dogmatism. The "good guys" include Peirce, Dewey, Morris Cohen, Karl Popper, and Carl Hempel, though it is chiefly Hempel (and his formulation of the covering law model of explanation) upon whom the author relies in his philosophical battles.

Professor Kaplan is no unreconstructed positivist or scientific hardhat preaching the *realpolitik* of tough empiricism. Rather, he is sensitive to a dimension of scientific inquiry that he variously calls "existential" or "subjective," a dimension which sets limits upon what can be objectively known by positive science. Professor Kaplan is somewhat ambiguous in describing how this theoretical limit operates upon inquiry, for he cites as evidence of its existence such diverse things as relativity theory, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem: "In the realm of logic and mathematics, Gödel has shown that any mathematical system that can be shown to be consistent is necessarily incomplete in the sense that it cannot be used in principle to prove all true statements involving the symbols in the axioms" (p. x). Such brief references, however, cannot be considered more than ceremonial, and, in any case, Professor Kaplan is wrong about what Gödel showed; many mathematical and logical systems are both consistent *and* complete. At times Professor Kaplan portrays the theoretical limit of science as posed by a "problem of self-reference: the fact that the act or state of knowledge cannot include itself" (p. xi). At other times, the epistemological borders of science are set by the consideration that "all scientific models, whether biological or physical, are necessarily closed and complete; and all existential worlds including even those of physics are necessarily open and inexhaustible" (p. 143). "The world of knowing is open" Professor Kaplan insists, "the world of the known is closed. The world of knowing is the world of continuing interaction. The world of the known is the world of closed scientific explanations and of analytic truths" (pp. 144–45).

Are we being offered a counsel of hope, a celebration of existence over theory, freedom over prediction and control? Not at all. Freedom, in Professor Kaplan's conception, "cannot be examined apart from the constraints imposed by the characteristics of an entity. A ball on a surface has the freedom to act in accordance with the laws of mechanical equilibrium but not to run along tracks. A railroad train has the freedom under appropriate circumstances to move along the tracks in whatever direction the tracks go" (pp. 146–7). Are those examples the best paradigms for exploring the concept of freedom? Professor Kaplan, to be sure, maintains that freedom has to be redefined "for different kinds of entities" (p. 146). "The freedom of a ball to roll is dependent on its globular shape. The freedom to act morally depends upon a framework for and a capacity for moral choice" (pp. 156–7). If there is a difference between such "freedoms" as the "freedom" to roll and the "freedom" to act morally, Professor Kaplan's apposition nonetheless conveys a belief in their similarity. His entire discussion of freedom emphasizes what many would take to be the very opposite concept; namely, that of constraint. For he contends that "every freedom requires a set of consistent constraints. These constraints are not mere limitations on the specified types of freedom but are the very grounds for their existence" (pp. 157). I don't think the "ideologists" whom Professor Kaplan deplores would find his conception of freedom too objectionable.

The most interesting discussion in *On Historical and Political Knowing* is contained in those sections where Professor Kaplan attempts to settle the hash of the "ordinary language" school. At issue are certain criticisms of Hempel's covering law model of scientific explanation, criticisms that Professor Kaplan finds irrelevant, or worse. Now, the covering law model of explanation was, among other things, an attempt to provide an anatomy of the notion of explanatory power. "Why do explanations explain?" was one of the basic questions that the model was supposed to answer. But before *that* question can be answered, one must first decide what an explanation is. For Hempel, an explanation is basically a certain kind of linguistic entity—an *argument* having premises and a conclusion, and not a single sentence as many of Professor Kaplan's examples erroneously suggest:

> (a) "Poison kills" is a truistic explanation of an apparent "why" type (as is "power corrupts") but a weak and unreliable one. (b) "Poison deprives the blood of oxygen" is a better explanation that begins to answer "why" type questions. (c) "Poison deprives the blood of oxygen, leading to cellular brain damage, leading to non-transmission of neural messages across synapses, leading to the cessation of breathing and the stoppage of the heart, in the absence of which life is not possible" is still a much better explanation of the "why" type (pp. 18–19).

Hempel's "ordinary language" opponents tend to conceive of explanations basically as acts of communication rather than linguistic entities. Each of the major components singled out by Hempel as an essential element of explanatory power—deductive validity, generality of premise, truth of premise, etc.—has been disputed as not being essential for explanatory communication. Consider, for example, Professor Kaplan's own illustrations cited above. Neither (a) nor (b) nor (c) is an argument, and therefore none of them can be "deductively valid." None of them is true ("systemic" poisons such as prussic acid operate in the manner indicated by (c) but "corrosive" poisons such as lye do not). But these "failures" need not prevent any of the above sentences from being part of a successful explanatory act of communication. For example, if someone wants to have explained to him why Jones expired after taking prussic acid, asserting (c) might do the necessary explanatory job, even though (c) is false, provided that it was clear to all parties that one was talking about the particular incident and not about all incidents of poisoning. Nor is asserting (c) necessarily a better way of explaining something than asserting (b) or (a), as Professor Kaplan maintains, for suppose a person didn't understand what synapses were. It must be conceded to Professor Kaplan that opponents of the covering law model have not yet explained, in satisfactory fashion, why explanations explain, but it is surely wrong to consider, as Professor Kaplan tends to do, that the attack on the covering law *model* of scientific explanation is an attack on science itself.

HASKELL FAIN

University of Wisconsin

The Party of Eros: Radical Social Thought and the Realm of Freedom. By Richard King. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972. Pp. 227. $7.50.)

Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression. By Murray B. Levin. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. Pp. 312. $8.50.)

Radical Libertarianism: A New Political Alternative. By Jerome Tuccille. (New York: Perennial Library, 1970. Pp. 130. $1.25.)

King, Levin, and Tuccille all explore radical ideas, groups, or thinkers operating in American political life. King examines the views of left-wing theorists in America who have been noted for their defense of sexual liberation—theorists such as Reich, Goodman, Marcuse, and Norman O. Brown. His study presents a chapter on each of his figures, reporting their history, the pattern of the development of their thought, and their essential message. It is basically a book to explore for information rather than argument. Levin considers the fate of radical dissenters in America since the days of the post-World War I Red Scare. His purpose is to study such broad themes as American political psychology, American political ideology, and their interactions with our political experience. His conviction is that for most of this century our liberal consensus has allowed us to repress dissenters far too often and in violation of the possibilities of America. Tuccille enthusiastically reports on the emergence of a genuinely radical-libertarian faction within American conservatism. He discusses the program of contemporary radical libertarians and its recent history, and he puts forth a vigorous argument for this political position.

Whatever their similarities, however, these three books are substantially different in style and quality. Professor King's *The Party of Eros* is a work of careful scholarship. Unlike so many books about currently fashionable thinkers on the Left, his book avoids uncritical adulation as well as polemical denunciation. Generally, King is a calm, thoughtful chronicler. His treatment of Marcuse is an especially powerful illustration of his approach. King refuses to succumb to the temptation to leap into the controversies that surround Marcuse and his work with yet another highly tendentious position at the expense of the goal he seeks: a precise, disciplined elucidation of Marcuse's ideas.

King does develop his own view sharply and quite fully in a concluding chapter. There he indicates his substantial reservations about "the party of Eros." He also links "the party of Eros" to some extent with the gurus of the counterculture. This judgment seems to confuse genuinely creative social thinkers with second-rate popularizers, such as Charles Reich.

King often raises probing questions, which he poses quietly and sometimes devastatingly. But at other times his balanced considerations are a bit lifeless. Perhaps the problem is that he chose to analyze each man's thought chronologically, book by book. This tends to turn his chapters into excellent book reports. King also may be faulted for a curious emphasis in a book about sexual radicals: he seriously neglects Brown, while dealing at length with Goodman, a mild sexual radical at most. In fact, King's chapter on Goodman is fascinating and revealing, but his brief consideration of Brown is less successful. He does not enter Brown's world, nor does he seem to want to. There is little evidence that King appreciates Brown's puzzling, but also dazzling, creativity. Consequently, King does not give us a full sense of Brown, and since Brown is surely the most radical thinker of the group, this is a disappointment. When one finishes King's *The Party of Eros,* however, one knows he has read a book that is learned, thoughtful, and balanced.

Professor Levin's *The Politics of Hysteria* is interesting when it discusses the Red Scare of 1919. Insofar as it is a case study of an example of "the democratic capacity for repression" it seems to have lessons to teach. But as the reader moves through each of the seven chapters, the book becomes progressively more focused on exposing a seemingly endless list of sins in contemporary America, especially including our bondage to sundry myths of the liberal tradition. In his chapter six, Levin makes clear his dependence on Louis Hartz's analysis of America in *The Liberal Tradition in America,* but he converts Hartz' doubts about American liberalism into stinging condemnations, regarding the liberal tradition as intolerant, repressive, nationalistic, "totalistic" and generally quite without any saving graces.

Levin's book gives a social-psychological overview of the supposed propensity of Americans to fall victim to myths and conspiracies. His fourth chapter concentrates on this particular weakness of America, but Levin's analysis is so general and so intensely normative that it falls well short of the standards of many practicing political psychologists, including those he cites, such as Murray Edelman.

Underlying Levin's discussion is an outraged radicalism. Levin protests inequities in this country in the name of social justice and individual liberty. But at the same time he is apparently no admirer of the common person; he depicts the average American as little more than a fool, readily manipulated by elites skilled at myth-making and trickery. Thus while he bewails the elitism he sees in American society, he ignores the elitism that is central to his own outlook.

Jerome Tuccille's *Radical Libertarianism,* represents yet another style of book. Tuccille is one of a group of writers today, including the more famous Karl Hess, who have written and thought about the connection of the radical Left and libertarian Right. Tuccille's book, which is utterly devoid of Levin's chic misanthropy as well as King's scholarly accomplishment, is designed to encourage an awareness of the right-wing form of libertarianism. He presents, in a spirited and subjective way, the dubious case for a political outlook which includes a kind of free capitalism plus virtual political and social anarchism.

This might be a good book for a contemporary issues or modern political theory course. It is easy to read and often entertaining, especially in its wonderful description of the clash at the 1969 Young Americans for Freedom Convention between the libertarians and the more traditional conservatives. It also raises many issues of importance, including the utility of present political labels, the future of conservatism, the role of the state, and the validity of thinking in terms of abstractions like the "public interest."

Tuccille wants to get rid of everything statist from the draft to welfare to pollution controls. His reliance on the reduction or abolition of the state to solve every problem is often excessively monistic: for instance, holding lotteries and bazaars is not likely to solve the welfare mess, nor are private means particularly likely to stop pollution. But Tuccille is a constantly lively and inventive disputant, who can teach something to any reader.

ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Political Theory and Political Science: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry. By Martin Landau. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. Pp. xi, 244. $6.95.)

Martin Landau lets the cat out of the bag early: "There are, frankly, many people who are just dumb, or who ply fashion and ride bandwagons—or whatever. The theory of probability tells us that this will be so in any population, whether traditionalist, behavioralist, or post-behavioral revolutionary. Vitiating, then, scientific methods on this count is like invalidating baseball because there are lousy batters" (p. 12). He puts the cat back in the bag two hundred pages later in a comment on the science-art controversy in public administration that can be extended to all political science: ". . . this controversy, and its attendant confusions, has led to a good deal of acrimonious debate ('quarreling' is perhaps more accurate) which has more to do with the problem of professional status and self-identity than with the intellectual issues involved" (p. 202).

In between, Landau gives the lie to Schiller's dictum that "against stupidity the very gods themselves contend in vain." In a series of sophisticated essays on the methodology of political investigation, Landau neither plays God nor puts up with dumbness, fashions, or professional quarrels. Carefully selective in the choice of some very smart people as his intellectual targets, or better, of their arguments, he cuts through metaphorical nonsense, spongy conceptualizations, opportunistic double-talk, empty rhetoric, ideological dogmas, sloppy thinking, professional distemper, political *Weltschmerz*, and other disciplinary maladies to which we have been treated, if not accustomed, in recent years.

However, Landau's critiques are not for critique's sake. The objective, throughout, is to clarify what science can or must mean in political science, and he does so with great elegance in thinking, with great economy in writing, and with great seriousness in purpose. Beyond these virtues, there is another that has of late been in short supply—an extraordinary dose of mental sanity. He enjoins us, for instance, that before using, misusing, or abusing Kuhn's interpretation of normal science and scientific revolution, we had better consult the historians and philosophers of science, who, on any number of grounds, are something less than enthusiastic about this particular theory of knowledge making. Or he suggests that we apply Mannheim's sociology of knowledge to Mannheimian analysis itself and see what we get—intellectual chaos (of which we have a great deal in any case). But all of this is done without the kind of pejorative style that, in some academic circles, has become a substitute for thought. Indeed, Landau proves himself to be a twentieth-century thinker (if I may use a perhaps obsolete term) in the tradition of the Enlightenment. If that makes him a traditionalist, so be it. If it makes him a post-, post-post, or post-post-post-something-or-other, that's even better.

Although written over a period of ten years, the eight essays brought together in this volume do not constitute the usual potpourri of miscellaneous writings by a prolific author. They are held together by a single theme that is given its most precise statement in the last chapter, on "Due Process of Inquiry." I have rarely read so sensible a statement of what the "rules of method" in scientific discourse are all about; and the reader may well want to begin with this chapter as a more systematic introduction to Landau's thought as a whole than can be found in the first chapter, not previously published, on "Science and Political Science: Some Observations on Prevailing Complaints" in which Landau defines his own observational standpoint in the context of contemporary disciplinary polemics.

Landau's approach to methodology is by way of inquiry into the vocabulary and grammar of political science. The approach has its richest payoff, it seems to me, in another previously unpublished paper on "Objectivity, Neutrality, and Kuhn's Paradigm"; but its simplest and perhaps clearest treatment is found in the earliest essay, published in 1961 and entitled "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis" (Chapters 2 and 3). The approach is further applied and exemplified in Chapters 4 and 5, "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science," and "The Myth of Hyperfactualism in the Study of American Politics." I am reciting the chapter titles to give an inkling of the broad range of Landau's concerns and to alert the book's large potential audience, but also to suggest why I cannot possibly devote sufficient space to reviewing the subject-matter of any particular chapter.

The importance of the "dictionary problem" is demonstrated in Chapter 6, "Development Theory: Some Methodological Problems," which begins with an analysis of Riggs's optical lexicon and ends with a discussion of the difficulties involved in epistemic correlation between facts and values, or means and ends. The problems of grammar and vocabulary are most critical where theoretical knowledge and applied knowledge meet, and where the languages of science and the languages of common sense are being confronted. Enthusiasts of the "cult of relevance" might give particular attention to Chapter 7, "Political Science and Public Administration: 'Field' and the Concept of Decision-Making." Because their memory is short (and, I daresay, their knowledge of our discipline's history limited), they may discover why the "post-behavioral revolution," so called, is mostly old hat for those who have lived through the years of torment when the subfield of public administration was in search of a "field." Even what Landau, responding to Easton's curious reversal of position, has to say on "relevance" in the opening chapter may become relevant.

Needless to say, perhaps Landau's thought is so agreeable to me because I agree with most of it. Beyond this, however, Landau emerges in this book as one of the most erudite of contemporary scholars in political science—and erudition is in short supply along with sanity. He is clearly at home in our own discipline, but also in the other sciences and in the philosophy of science. I have really only two related comments to make. On the one hand, for those of us who spend most of their time in the crucible of empirical research with its emphasis on technique, Landau's rigorous conception of method and its problematics will serve as a reminder of the fragility and perishability of our labors if they are not grounded in "due process of inquiry." On the other hand, while I appreciate Landau's insistence on methodological clarity, if not purity, I must ask him to sympathize with some of the theoretical and technical compromises that theory-oriented empirical researchers tend to make and, in the present state of disciplinary development, perhaps must make, if they are to come up with at least some tangible discoveries before senility overcomes them. Granted that we stand on the shoulders of giants and move pebbles rather than boulders—to mix a metaphor. But, then, as Burton's saying goes, "a dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant may see farther than a giant himself." I am confident that Martin Landau appreciates this more than do lesser minds.

HEINZ EULAU

Stanford University

Social Determinants of Moral Ideas. By Maria Ossawska. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 190. $9.50.)

Maria Ossawska has written a charming and informative book on the sociology of morals, a nonsubject that may some day become a subject. Although she is a distinguished Polish philosopher, not a professional sociologist, Professor Ossawska writes more about society than about morals, perhaps because she doesn't question what "society" means, but thinks "morals" is indefinable. One might suppose that the indefinability of a key term would make her pessimistic about the future of her subject, but that is not the case. Professor Ossawska believes there is a genuine sociology of religion, and that "religion," too, is indefinable, so she proceeds happily to try to develop a sociology of morals.

In order to be a social science, the sociology of morals must first contain descriptions of the morals of a society at a given period of time and, second, formulate laws specifying that one moral code emerges, flourishes, wanes, and dies under particular social conditions and that another moral code has the same fate under other social conditions. Ossawska foresees little difficulty in moral description, and quotes Durkheim approvingly: "Moral facts are facts like any others; they consist of rules of action which can be recognized by some distinctive characteristics; thus it must be possible to observe them, to describe and classify them" (p. 17). It is in finding social determinants of moral ideas (promised in her title) that Professor Ossawska has greater difficulty.

Still, the difficulty in sheer description of the moral ideas prevalent at any time is revealed by Ossawska's taste for ideal types. If one can't actually describe an accepted moral code in all its nuances, and in its variations from a philosophical statement of ideal belief, one can substitute the philosophical statement for it. Thus the actual beliefs of a hedonist society are unlikely to be exactly what Aristippus or Epicurus said about pleasure and pain, but if one can't describe what the people in that society believe, with genuine differences from group to group and person to person, one recourse is to restate Aristippus or Epicurus and call that more or less systematic exposition an ideal type. In choosing the ideal type rather than the living belief, Ossawska writes as a philosopher rather than a sociologist, although she has the massive authority of Max Weber behind her choice.

Yet the social determinants of moral ideas are more difficult to establish than the prevalence of those ideas. Ossawska spends fifty pages constructing ideal types of the bourgeois ethos and the nobility ethos. The very names suggest that these moral codes, or some variant of them, emerged with particular socioeconomic classes and will probably wane or die with their disappearance. However, Ossawska denies that correlation and, indeed, can discover no social determinants for either ethos. The morality of Hesiod, she points out, as enunciated in his *Works and Days*, was very similar to the ideal bourgeois type, and the ethos of the nobility can be found in some pastoral groups of mountain dwellers.

When Ossawska utters one of her rare positive conclusions, the difficulty of establishing particular social determinants for moral ideas is most apparent. A typical conclusion is that the lack of disapproval of homosexuality in contemporary Japan is probably the result of overpopulation. One standard scientific reading of this assertion is: Under conditions of overpopulation, the people of a nation do not disapprove homosexuality (Japan is overpopulated; the people of Japan do not disapprove homosexuality). On this reading, it makes sense to say that the assertion, the Japanese do not disapprove homosexuality because Japan is overpopulated, is true only if there is a general law to the effect that such attitudes always occur in overpopulated nations. To establish the general law one would have to examine other overpopulated nations, like India, and discover the same attitude. The law, I suspect, would not fare well.

On still another reading, Ossawska's statement becomes: Under specified conditions of personality and character (based, to be sure, on particular traditions and social environment), the people of a nation respond to overpopulation by ceasing to disapprove homosexuality. One trouble with this reading is that, when we specify all the traits of personality and character, we will probably be talking only about the Japanese. And it will be very difficult to know what traits are relevant to this special response to overpopulation. If we find there are other peoples with the traits we think relevant, they will have to live in an overpopulated nation or we cannot use their behavior as evidence of the truth of Ossawska's assertion. Such are some of the hazards in trying to develop a sociology of morals.

Like the sociology of religion, the sociology of morals would be almost denuded of experiment and would rely heavily on descriptive and statistical findings, questionnaires, interviews, and history. Comparative and historical study would search for social conditions present when a moral code is also present and absent when the code is absent. Just as the sociology of religion does not question whether any religion is true, the sociology of morals will not question whether any moral code is good. But both subjects can be concerned with the adequate or inadequate functioning of a religion or a moral code in a society at a particular time. For example, under some conditions, prevalent moral ideas may perform the function of adjusting and adapting social activities to each other; under other conditions, the same moral codes may be nonfunctional or dysfunctional. Religions are in just the same case. Under some conditions, they provide a social cement; under others, when there is, for example, an encounter of religions, as in seventeenth-century Europe or contemporary Ulster, they make for bloodshed and chaos.

An examination of the functioning of morals may bring social and political conclusions that social study without a moral component would miss. Ossawska would not approve because she is suspicious of all functional theory, but if we cannot improve on her practice I fear the sociology of morals will be still-born.

Ralph Ross

The Claremont Colleges, Scripps College

Sexuality and Class Struggle. By Reimut Reiche. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 175. $6.95.)

As regards sex, W. C. Fields once remarked, "There are some things better and some things worse, but there is nothing quite like it." Perhaps something similar can be said about the treatment of sex in social science literature: there is nothing quite like those books that attempt to blend eros and Marxism, psychoanalysis and socialism. One thinks immediately of works by Reich, Adorno, Marcuse, and Osborn, among others, and, at another level, of the sex-and-politics graffiti that in recent years youthful revolutionaries have scribbled on German, French, and American walls. The message of most of these books and graffiti was that capitalism and war promoted and thrived on sexual repression, whereas socialism and peace were both cause and effect of good healthy orgasms. It followed from these assumptions that efforts to restrict sexual freedom, whether emanating from religion, law, conventional morality, or the institution of marriage itself were, in a word, counter-revolutionary. While it is unlikely that such revolutionaries as Chairman Mao, Fidel, and Brezhnev subscribe to these views, most young radicals, especially the German Marxists, continue to regard the sexual revolution as an indispensable accompaniment of economic and political revolution.

German Marxist Reimut Reiche—one is tempted to refer to him as the counter culture's Third Reiche since he follows hard after Wilhelm and Charles—takes sharp issue with the position that monogamy, fidelity, homosexuality, and the institution of the family itself will necessarily, like the state, wither away in a Marxist society; indeed, he is at pains to demonstrate that, far from disappearing, such practices and institutions will take on a purity of meaning and function that they are incapable of achieving in any capitalist order. In Reiche's opinion, the capitalist *Playboy-Penthouse* ethic, because it is dominated by market values, inevitably emphasizes the quantitative aspects of sexual freedom as opposed to the qualitative side. But for Reiche, the quantitative or "anything goes" aspects constitute a "false sexuality," the sexual counterpart of the "false consciousness" that the Marxists have always opposed to true working-class consciousness, i.e., awareness of the class struggle. True sexuality, according to Reiche, does not consist of unlimited single and group copulation, access to pornography, legalized prostitution, lessons in masturbation, and the like, but is basically made up of "full genital sexual enjoyment." True sexuality, in short, involves what Erikson has called "mutuality" or the capacity to feel, to respond, to empathize, to give as well as to receive.

Indeed, if I understand Reiche correctly, true sexuality cannot exist without love or at least deep affection, and here he is parting company not only with the practitioners of sexual politics, in Germany and elsewhere, but with the orgasm supremacists who dominate the encounter-group movement. Unlike the former, Reiche does not assume that free love in a commune is an adequate substitute for the bourgeois family; unlike the latter, he does not believe that sexual satisfaction is almost entirely a matter of tactility and technique. Building on what is essentially a psychoanalytic model of child and adolescent development, Reiche argues that there can be no maturity for the individual unless he can leave behind him the oral, anal, and phallic states of development as he moves toward "genital primacy" and the capacity for healthy object relations.

Reiche also maintains that such growth is impossible except in a socialist society, and here, of course, many who are equally critical of our sex-as-a-commodity culture will be inclined to disagree. Does "true sexuality" exist in any of the socialist countries, and if so, where is the evidence? Perhaps more important, what is the historical, philosophical, or logical proof for the proposition that relations between the sexes in a socialist society will be inevitably more humane than such relations in a capitalist society? It is not enough to demonstrate that sexual needs are perverted in the contemporary western capitalist world, and it is even less adequate simply to assert, as Reiche does, that "true sexuality" can be achieved only under socialism. Would that this were so! How glorious it would be if we could still believe, as many of us once did, that socialism would usher in the era of perfectible man! Perhaps it all is a matter of faith, and in that event it is absurd to demand more evidence or logic from Reimut Reiche than from, say, Pope Paul. Surely Mr. Reiche is as much entitled to his "next world" as the Pope is entitled to his—and considering that Reiche's includes "true sexuality," who would want to emigrate from it to eternal but sexless salvation on the Mount of Olives?

Arnold A. Rogow

Hebrew University and City University of New York

Systematic Thinking for Social Action. By Alice M. Rivlin. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. Pp. 150. $5.95.)

I have no idea how far back in history it is necessary to go to identify the early pleaders for rational decision making in government. Certainly a knowledge of either Latin or Greek would be essential, and the scrolls with the earliest admonitions must be in very delicate shape.

But the voices of both the distant and immediate past have done little in the human resource area either to create order out of chaos, to bring about effective distribution of public funds instead of ad hoc allocation based on political expediency, or to institutionalize systematic assessment of program efficacy. This book, based on a series of lectures that Alice Rivlin gave at the University of California at Berkley, is both a concerted call for continued efforts to improve the way government works and a sensitive analysis of why the strategies of the past several decades have yielded so limited results.

Dr. Rivlin is admirably qualified. A well-trained economist now at the Brookings Institution, she has extensive experience in government, including a stint as Assistant Secretary of HEW with responsibilities for planning and evaluation. In the essays in this book, her worldly knowledge is intertwined with her scholarly learning. Indeed, an expanded bibliography might have made the volume more valuable for the student and for those not fully familiar with the literature in the area.

The early chapters of this brief book focus on (1) cost-benefit analysis; (2) specification of social goals, indicators of social change and comparative payoff from programs; and (3) evaluation of program impact. They are followed by more extended discussion of strategies for program evaluation. In each discussion, Dr. Rivlin makes use of her intimate knowledge of federal programs on education, income maintenance, and health. She argues strongly for innovative programs and their assessment, large-scale social action experiments and program accountability. She is quick to acknowledge the limited utility of work up to now and careful to specify why this is so. Thus, to cite some illustrations, she suggests that lack of a behavioral model of the population has hindered the analysts' contribution to decision making on income security, and that the state of research methodology has curtailed the potential benefits of experimental evaluation studies. Readers who are expert in the technology of cost-benefit analysis, evaluation research, and so on may feel her discussions are both elementary and simplistic. But one must keep in mind that the volume is based on a set of public lectures.

My major criticism is Dr. Rivlin's stance in the volume. I think she sees the policy researcher far too much as a passive technician, rather than as a change agent who initiates and promotes modification in government programs and policies. True, better behavior models, more elegant methodological designs and more efficiency in the conduct of research would help. But not as much, to my mind, as would smarter people who are politically sensitive and who possess intense zeal and ambition to improve the quality of life. In brief, Alice Rivlin is not emphatic enough about the importance of the very characteristics that underlie her own successful participation in government: Technical astuteness and basic social science knowledge are important but the millennium demands analysts with a special posture, a strong point of view, and a vigorous insistence on rationality.

HOWARD E. FREEMAN

Brandeis University and Russell Sage Foundation

Organizational Growth Through Decisionmaking: A Computer-Based Experiment in Eductive Method. By Beatrice K. Rome and Sydney C. Rome. (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. xiv, 242. $15.00.)

The authors call the empirical work that forms the core of their book an "experiment," but I have some reservations about that description. What they report are their observations on a single group of 24 subjects who, for a period of three months, operated a very elaborate computer simulation of an organization rather than a real one. The "experimenters" took a role in the simulation as a supervising authority to which the subjects were subordinate. Without ever appearing personally, they used their position in the simulation to send down directives which they hoped would promote the development of organization. They also engaged in manipulations of the computer program which were not divulged to the people operating the organization it simulated. They were, in sum, considerably more influential than is usual among participant observers. While it is true that they exercised a degree of control usually identified with experimentation, they did not have either a commitment to the repeated observation of certain fixed or systematically varying conditions or a systematic basis for deciding how and when to intervene in their subjects' patterns of behavior. "Experiment" does not, therefore, give an entirely correct impression of the study they report. They grew their test-tube organization not with the purpose of testing the validity of existing ideas but with the hope of stimulating in themselves new insights into the development among a set of individuals of the property of being organized. The results do not appear to me to justify either the tremendous cost of the study or their years of effort in executing and analyzing the "experiment."

From scattered remarks in the book I would estimate that ten to twelve man-years and perhaps a year of computer time have been invested in this project. (There are six man-years —24 graduate students for three months each —in subject time alone.) Nonetheless, the authors provide only very sketchy information on their programs and proceudres and no indication that such material can be found in other documents. This makes the book of little use to those interested in employing simulations in the study of organizational behavior. Nor is the book a contribution to the ongoing development of the body of organizational scholarship. No major work of any theorist of organizations or bureaucracy is discussed or even cited.

Such shortcomings might be tolerable in a book that was dense with interesting ideas, but *Organizational Growth Through Decisionmaking* is not. It does begin with an interesting question: Assuming that organization develops gradually rather than appearing full-blown, what are the constituent elements or relationships which being organized entails, and is there some sequence in which they are most likely to be observed? Unfortunately, neither their exploration of this question nor their proposed answers are at all profound.

All but the first 36 and last 18 pages of their text are devoted simply to recounting the history of their laboratory group's growth and activity. The Romes promise to show that each of the 44 "developments" they describe is distinct from the others, is universal in character, and occupies a necessary position in the unfolding of a logical sequence of stages. But all they actually deliver is a summarizing sentence or two at the close of their detailed factual description of each "development." These remarks are generally little more than common-sense restatements of what has happened (e.g., Development

20—"The subjects here demonstrated a competence to discriminate between technical action and action to execute policy and a competence to translate this discrimination into deed" [p. 131]). They do not provide good reasons—often they provide no reasons at all—for believing that each described development represents a single coherent stage of growth, likely to occur in most organizations, and likely to occur in a particular ordinal relation to other stages of growth. Yet in the conclusion of the book this is what the authors assert they have shown.

In fact, given certain disturbing features of their research, there are compelling reasons to believe that many of the events they report are not likely to occur in the order they observed—or even to occur at all. Although the Romes stress, as most of us would, that people organize to pursue purposes, they deliberately refused to specify for the subjects what was to be achieved in the operation of the organization. Since the Romes took the role of an unseen superordinate body sending down orders to the laboratory group and evaluating its performance, the subjects were left to guess what the experimenters wanted them to do. The relevance of the resulting behavior to a typical organizaion thus seems questionable.

Such doubts are reinforced by a numbr of additional facts. The organization which the subjects were to run was so complicated that even after months of operation ". . . the task of servicing the entire input load [was] too difficult for the group to solve . . ." (p. 185). Moreover, the experimenters appear to have been blind, if not cruel, in their reaction to the subjects' mounting frustration. The Romes report, with satisfaction, that the second leader of the group did not act on his expressed desire to "sabotage" the whole simulation. They never ask why he felt that way. They quote, without any apparent sense of its peculiarity, the following exchange of messages with the group leader: " 'You're working us too hard. You want blood or something?' Our reply, 'Yes, indeed,' was not further acknowledged by him" (p. 195). They see nothing requiring explanation in the subjects' references to their superordinate body as "Big Brother," as being "unreasonable" and "incomprehensible," and as having "an authority complex." Eventually the subjects held a private meeting to reorganize the group's leadership. During that meeting they refused to admit any nonsubject personnel, they made no notes, and they turned off the experimenters' tape recorder. The Romes, who amassed 11,000 recorded messages during this study, thus got no data on its single most important event. Somehow they were unable to recognize that this was an act of rebellion against them *as experimenters* rather than against the role position they were enacting in the simulation. They blandly report the whole incident as another of their universal stages of organizational growth—"Asserting Administrative Autonomy (Development 33)." The effect is rather like reading an episode from the asylum of *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* retold from the point of view of Big Nurse.

Taken together, the absence of scholarship, the poor research design, weak intellectual work, and inhumane treatment of subjects provide reasons for rejecting virtually everything in the book except its guiding question. Financial responsibility rests with the Systems Development Corporation and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

MICHAEL D. COHEN

Stanford University

The Sociology of Progress. By Leslie Sklair. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Pp. 287. $10.00.)

On the face of it, this is a very annoying book. The young author publishes here a revised version of his doctoral thesis at the University of London, serving as an object lesson on all the ills of behavioral sciences. His central thesis is based on a definition he introduces—the difference between innovational and noninnovational progress. If we take the author at his word, the difference makes no sense because progress is defined as "the end point, temporary or permanent, of any social action that leads from a less to a more satisfactory solution of the problems of man in society" (p. xiv). Innovational progress is explained to be what we knew to be progress all the time—"progress by means of the production of new things, ideas and processes" to which the phrase "with maximum impact on society" (p. xiv) is added, though after reading the book I still do not know what this means. Noninnovational progress is achieved by "maintenance and diffusion of the familiar things, ideas, and processes" but the author is loathe to leave well enough alone and adds "with minimal impact on society" (p. xiv). Now aside from arbitrarily reducing here four possibilities to two (i.e., maximal maintenance and minimal innovations), as noninnovational progress hardly qualifies by the author's definition, he asks how can you improve an existing human society and have minimal impact on it?

I dwell on these twin concepts because Professor Sklair reminds us several times that they are "the crux of the matter." He then proceeds with a poor man's Parsons tour de force of showing us how Rousseau, Comte, Ellul, Marx, Weber, and several others all were struggling to reach his distinction but did not quite make it. In the process he succeeds in making several scores of generalizations about man, history, society, theory, ethics, and their relations to each other.

Nevertheless, this is a far from trivial book. It deals, in its tortured way, with one of the core issues of the era. It asks, in effect, is it not time we cease to identify progress with the inventions science and terminology continuously foist upon us while disregarding achievements in other areas, from greater humanization to evolution of more responsive institutions? While the perspective is hardly novel, we must note that the book was published in 1970 and written as a dissertation before the need to worry about noninstrumental progress was popular. If Sklair succeeds in introducing this notion into behavioral theories, often a few steps behind the spirit of the times, his ink will have been well expended.

The second part of his volume also indicates his heart is in the right place; he boldly favors a "sociological ethics," a morality which draws and builds on the findings and conclusions of the study of society, man's needs, and aspirations. His ethics are based, first, on the assumption that the survival of human society, is morally worthwhile and that social justice is "on balance the most satisfactory basis of social organization" (p. 197). While I must admit to being somewhat annoyed that the author ignores 80 pages I devoted to the same issue in *The Active Society,* he clearly produces some important insights. Thus he breaks out of the sterile dichotomy that behavioral sciences must be either scientific or a basis for value judgments, by suggesting that universal human needs, which can be ascertained empirically could and should guide our decisions. And he ties his sociological ethics to his theory by reminding us that man's needs include many which only "noninnovational progress" could provide for.

The book is richer than this review reflects because I focused on its main thesis, and much of its value is to be found in numerous scholarly asides about various theorists of progress and sociological theorists which preceded Sklair. I expect that with his homing instinct for "relevant" and macroscopic issues well developed and with his command of the field, Sklair will be heard of and deserves to be heard.

AMITAI ETZIONI

Columbia University and Center for Policy Research

Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians. By Ronald H. Stone. (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1972. Pp. 272. $8.00.)

Ronald H. Stone, a former student of Reinhold Niebuhr's and currently Associate Professor of Social Ethics at Pittsburg Theological Seminary, has written a very helpful "intellectual biography" of Reinhold Niebuhr (d. 1971), one of this century's major theologians (although Niebuhr disclaimed the title of theologian), ethicists, and political philosophers. Conceding that Niebuhr's thought can be analyzed from several interwoven perspectives, e.g., theology, ethics or political philosophy, Stone concentrates on the latter, attempting to "correct onesided theological interpretations . . . without committing the error of reducing his theology to the level of politics" (p. 9). Stone's corrective to other interpretations of Niebuhr's politics is to recognize that there is no central doctrine from which the remainder of Niebuhr's thought is derived and to emphasize the importance of a chronological study, not only because Niebuhr's writings reflect a tension between immediate political situations and reflection but also because his thought evolved over time. Stone identifies four major periods in this evolving political philosophy: the liberal, the socialist, the Christian realist, and the pragmatic-liberal. He does not deny the continuities and the presence of some elements, often implicitly, prior to their full development, but he does think that

> each phase is characterized by the movement of certain concepts of political philosophy from the periphery of his thought to the center, by a solution to the ideal-real issue which differs from the solution of the preceding period, and by Niebuhr's recognition that his thought in this phase is significantly different from his thought in the preceding period (pp. 10–11).

One continuous thread is Niebuhr's relationship, both positive and negative, with liberalism, which he criticized from Marxist and theological perspectives before he rediscovered and reappropriated it. Another important thread is the basic question of Niebuhr's political philosophy: the relation of man's imaginary communities to his actual communities.

After a chapter which sketches Niebuhr's early years, the book covers the main periods mentioned above and then turns to a fuller analysis of his view of foreign policy since World War II. In the sphere of foreign policy, Stone emphasizes both the influence and general adequacy of Niebuhr's political realism; but he also moves beyond exposition to indicate some weaknesses, for example, the need for a closer relationship between morality and politics, for a more careful analysis of terms than Niebuhr provided, and for case studies of decision making.

The concluding chapter, entitled "The Relevance of Faith," deals with Niebuhr's social ethics in relation to faith. Stone contends that although Protestant social ethics "cannot remain content with all of Niebuhr's answers, he quite consistently asked the right questions" (p. 231).

Although many readers will want more detailed studies of particular aspects of Niebuhr's thought, including its relation to other patterns of reflection, and will make harder and perhaps deeper criticisms of his thought, they will find in this volume a sound and valuable overview, by no means uncritical, of his intellectual odyssey. In addition to its value for the scholar, the book should also be very useful to students coming to Niebuhr for the first time.

JAMES F. CHILDRESS
University of Virginia

The Logic of Science in Sociology. By Walter L. Wallace. (Aldine Publishing Company, 1971. Pp. 139. $6.00.)

In this extremely compact book, Walter Wallace lays out the ingredients of the scientific enterprise. He reviews the main components of science—observations, empirical generalizations, hypotheses, theories, and the rest—in a very lucid manner. In addition, by using an ingenious map that sets these components in relation to one another (figure 1, p. 18), he is able to trace the complex interactions among them. Most of the text consists of a recitation of the norms to be observed in measuring, developing propositions, constructing theories, and testing. Though abstract, the book is exceptionally clear for the most part; it is an ideal theoretical-methodological primer that might well be assigned reading for the first week or two of first-year graduate courses in both theory and research methods.

The work is scarcely original. It relies heavily, and by and large uncritically, on the received wisdom of theoretical methodologists such as Blalock, Braithwaite, Kaplan, Merton, Nagel, Popper, Wartovsky, and Zetterberg. Nevertheless, Wallace is so skillful in selecting from and synthesizing the ideas of these men that the volume, despite its unoriginality, stands as a useful and unencumbered exposition of the essentials of the scientific method.

One of the strongest features of the book is Wallace's insistence on the distinction between (a) the standards by which a theory is to be assessed, and (b) the biographical experience of the scientist. Thus, on pp. 16–17, he summarizes the basic relations among the components of scientific knowledge (for example, between empirical generalizations and theory) but quickly adds that, in the scientist's experience, there are a variety of ways of arriving at these relations—by lucky guesses, by formal derivation, by trial and error, by teamwork, and so on. Many discussions of science are obscured by the mistaken assumption that the specification of the norms by which scientific knowledge is evaluated constitutes an idealized description of a scientist's behavior. Wallace does not fall into that error.

Early in the first chapter, Wallace, following Montague, distinguishes among the authoritarian, mystical, logico-rational, and scientific modes of testing the truth of statements. In particular, he indicates that the logico-rational model depends on the "rules of formal logic," whereas the scientific mode depends on "the observational effects of the statements in question with a secondary reliance on the procedures (methods) used to generate them" (pp. 12–13). This distinction between "logico-rational" and "scientific" later turns out to be somewhat misleading, because in his subsequent discussion of theory, Wallace repeatedly stresses criteria of logical structure as important in assessing the *scientific* adequacy of knowledge. The distinction between logical and observational criteria for truth is a valuable one, to be sure, but Wallace should have avoided any implied identification of the scientific method more or less exclusively with the latter.

Wallace's discussion of empirical generalizations and prediction in science would have been improved by a discussion of the *conditional* character of most scientific knowledge. For example, in discussing the functions of scientific theories, he indicates that "theories can predict empirical generalizations that are still unknown" (p. 57). That formulation leaves something to be desired. It suggests that scientific theory generates generalizations that can then be discovered in nature. It seems to me, rather, that theories provide the investigator with a knowledge of the conditions under which empirical regularities may be expected. The empirical regularities may have been perfectly well known all along; it is their new significance that scientific theory underscores. Furthermore, these regularities may never have occurred empirically, as Wallace's quotation suggests; and if they have, then this may have been only in a laboratory under which the special conditions appropriate to the theory can be created. If

Wallace had considered the use of experimental and other types of controls in generating scientific knowledge, he would have strengthened his account of the nature of empirical generalizations and predictions.

In general, the exposition is carefully constructed and consistent. It is occasionally marred, however, by carelessness. As examples: (1) On p. 63 and again on p. 66 Wallace stresses that a scientific theory should be "nontautological." He never explains or illustrates this criterion. Nor is the criterion self-evident. Certainly the scientific investigator should avoid making empirical statements that are true by definition rather than by observation; but at another level—the level of formal theoretical structure—there is a sense in which it is *desirable* that a theory be tautological, i.e., that derived propositions are simply different ways of stating the general conceptual relations in a theoretical structure. (2) On p. 78 he characterizes the statement "all human groups are stratified" as a hypothesis. Surely in that form it reads more like an empirical generalization, because any "if-then" relationship—which is characteristic of a hypothesis—appears to be lacking. (3) On p. 99 he speaks of "predicting and testing new observations." The terminology is odd; one predicts events and tests propositions, but according to linguistic convention, does neither for, but rather makes, observations. (4) The word "sociology" deserves little place in the title of the book. The bulk of the text concerns scientific discourse in general and presumably applies to all scientific disciplines; everything that is sociological about the book lies in the few concrete illustrations of general points made about the scientific method.

NEIL J. SMELSER
University of California, Berkeley

Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War. By George T. Blakey. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970. Pp. 168. $7.00.)

In April 1917, shortly after the United States declared war on Germany, several historians met in Washington to discuss "what History men can do for their country now." The group, which included J. Franklin Jameson, Frederick Jackson Turner, and James T. Shotwell, decided that historians could put their special talents to good patriotic use. Though not every historian could shoulder a rifle, each could surely "aid in supplying the public with trustworthy information of historical or similar character." To facilitate this, Jameson and the others created the National Board for Historical Service. In addition, the Committee on Public Information and the National Security League recruited historians for essentially the same purpose.

In *Historians on the Homefront* George T. Blakey describes the activities of these organizations in considerable detail. His account, while narrow in focus, is clear, judicious and straightforward. It is based on extensive research not only in published sources, but also in the records of the National Board for Historical Service and the Committee for Public Information, and in the papers of historians who took part in the war mobilization. Not surprisingly, Blakey finds that historians "succumbed to the pressures of national bias and placed war aims above scholarly restraint," that "their propaganda work represented a severe break with scholarly historical standards" (pp. 104, 148). Blakey concludes that there is no way of reconciling the canons of scholarship with the demands of patriotic service.

Most of the book consists of an elaborate proof of this argument. The author devotes separate chapters to the historians' pamphleteering activities, public lecture tours, efforts at censorship, and attempts to persuade teachers to instill patriotism in the classroom. Various agencies distributed more than 33 million copies of pamphlets written by historians, most of which, Blakey holds, "reduced war issues to black and white, infused idealism and righteousness into America's role, and established German guilt with finality" (p. 52). Moreover, scholars vouched for the authenticity of most of the "Sisson Documents," which purportedly proved that the Bolsheviks were in league with the Germans but which were later exposed as fraudulent. Other historians suggested that public-school teachers could make the study of ancient times relevant to the world of 1917 by pointing out that "ancient Caesarism and imperialism are living forces in Germany today."

Yet Blakey points out that many historians, including some who contributed to the propaganda barrage, had serious doubts about what was happening. Professional historians, who had themselves rebelled against a school of amateur filiopietists, and who took pride in their commitment to scientific method, recognized the potential hazards in government service. One Wisconsin professor, for example, warned that making inaccurate historical analogies in order to stimulate patriotism would play "into the hands of the pseudo-historians." Still another scholar wrote his former mentor: "I have often wondered what you would think of this kind of work—propaganda work—whether a scholar should do it or not." Andrew McLaughlin of the University of Chicago expressed a similar ambivalence: "Perhaps few of us are able entirely to disentangle our scientific historical fibres from our swelling patriotic muscles, but most of us can try."

In 1917 many scholars supposed such a feat was possible, but few would ever think so again. With the wave of revisionism in the 1920s, those who had echoed the wartime line of Allied innocence and German guilt came under fierce attack. One of the sharpest critics, Harry Elmer Barnes, had himself worked with the National Security League during the war, and might in part have been seeking "intellectual absolution for his propaganda sins" (p. 133). Blakey notes that historians did not repeat their mistakes during World War Two. Having once been burned, they became battle-shy. Indeed, Blakey finds in the World War One experience a warning for all who would combine scholarship with political activism: "The craft of history since 1918 has become a very delicate art, producing a durable commodity only when cultivated in a political vacuum" (p. 151). Surely not everyone will accept this view, but Blakey has shown that a strong case for detached scholarship can, in fact, be made by studying the classic case of involved scholarship.

RICHARD POLENBERG

Cornell University

The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy. By Donald F. Bletz. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 338. $16.50.)

It is usually fruitless to quibble about book titles, but the prospective reader of this volume should be warned that the title is misleading. It suggests that the book will reveal the part actually played by military officers in determining U.S. foreign policy, perhaps explaining how the Pentagon brass led us into Vietnam, for example. We do not find that kind of revelation here. The author is not concerned with showing us how military professionals have influenced the course of U.S. policy but with arguing that high-ranking officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be trained to understand and appreciate the political factors in military decisions. Without saying so specifically, he implies that the days when a hard-fisted bomber pilot like General LeMay could rise to the highest level of responsibility in the U.S. government are gone for good. In the future we are more likely to see as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff officers who have not only graduated from the National War College but have also earned the Ph.D. in political science. In the meantime, it is refreshing to see a book by an Army colonel open with a quotation from Plato's *Republic*. Perhaps it is a sign of the times.

With the nation and its armed forces now going through a painful period of self-examination, serious studies of this sort by military officers should be welcomed by the academic community. Their shortcomings as seen by professors of political science ought not to be allowed to obscure their merits. An Army officer with thirty years of service in a wide range of assignments who is now conscientiously attempting to draw some conclusions from it all deserves to be listened to. The author entered the U.S. Army as a private during World War II and has now risen to the rank of colonel. The Army encouraged his educational interests and made it possible for him to attend civilian graduate schools. He is now on the faculty of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania and is a Ph.D. candidate in international studies at American University.

Colonel Bletz begins his analysis with the observation that since World War II, military officers have been called upon more than ever before to deal with political problems. A new dimension has thus been added to military professionalism. Mere military proficiency is no longer enough—if it ever was. The overall objective of the volume is, in the author's words, "to examine in detail the extent to which the requirements of this new dimension have impacted on the military profession in order to make a valid judgment on the degree to which the national interest is being served and to recommend courses of action for the future" (pp. 8–9).

Much of what follows this statement of objectives is not of great interest to civilian readers, and much of it is already familiar to students of American military history and foreign policy. The major theme of the book is the development of the military profession (and military schools) from the days of the Indian wars to the Cold War era, with emphasis on the military officer's role in implementing national political decisions. The main problem we now face, as Colonel Bletz sees it, is how to give officers in the higher grades more training in the social sciences without diluting their military expertise. At the same time we need to organize the decision-making process of the federal government so that well-qualified military professionals can contribute to the process.

Colonel Bletz is greatly concerned that the "politico-military equation" be properly balanced. By this he apparently means that both political and military factors must be taken into account in proper proportions when we determine national policy. Virtually no one would dispute such an obvious principle; it is in its application that the difficulty arises: What are the proper proportions of each element in the equation in specific situations? What were they in Vietnam, for example? The book does not shed much light on such matters.

As for Vietnam, Colonel Bletz concludes that at the lower level of military professionalism—strictly military expertise—the war was well fought. The weakness came at the higher level of professionalism—politico-military expertise. The military techniques used in Vietnam, we are told, were frequently inconsistent with the political objectives. The "politico-military-equation" was apparently not balanced. Unfortunately, we are not shown in specific terms just what the trouble was.

In the future, Colonel Bletz hopes, the political science now being studied in the military schools will have greater influence on policy. Future generals and admirals will have some understanding of political ideas. But the skeptical reviewer cannot help wondering *whose* political science will have influence. On Vietnam, for example, will we be guided by Hans Morgenthau or Robert A. Scalapino? Our speculation on that point comes to an abrupt end on page 265 when we read Colonel Bletz's cautious conclusion that, "it is not the business of the professional military officer to make political decisions" nor even to make recommendations of a political nature. All he can do is "ask the relevant questions" and hope that the "politico-military equation" will somehow be balanced by the civilian authorities.

HARRY C. THOMSON

De Paul University

Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion. By Leo Bogart. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972. Pp. 250. $9.95.)

This book deals with a complex of important matters. There are in it a great many facts—more specifically, descriptive statements of processes, findings, and uses for political survey research in contemporary America. Moreover, one gets the feeling in reading the book that Bogart could, might, is just about to, bring it all together in the context of social-psychological and sociological theory and from the perspectives of the scholar-journalist that he is.

But he doesn't.

So it turns out to be a book like most books, falling far short of greatness.

First, review-fashion, a word about content. The title is not especially helpful. The book is a series of essays on the uses to which political polling is and might be put, from the perspectives of candidates/incumbents, citizens (active and passive), and media managers. The dilemmas of leadership, participation, representation, and change processes are observed and commented on in various places through the twenty-one (for some reason unnumbered) chapters and eight "parts." The first two parts and the last agitate the old questions of the place of commonpersons' opinions in direct and representative democracies.

The middle five parts of the book deal with opinion change at both the individual and social levels. Many interesting facts and some provocative commentary are presented in chapter headings like "Changing One's Mind," "The Causes of Inconsistency," "Opinion Under 'Proletarian Dictatorship,'" and "Shocking Opinions." But things fall apart. The middle does not hold—nor, for that matter, do the ends very well.

The book is strewn with insights and intellectually titillating assertions—that polling is *essentially* conservative (p. 60), that extreme views are valuable in a democracy because they expand the possible range of middle movement (p. 101), that anonymity and opinion-inconsistency are positively related (p. 132)—but they are hardly ever dealt with systematically or in context. On the positive side, however, the work is a cache of occasional information of journalistic and commercial poll data of a kind that someone like Bogart has access to but we in the more sheltered academic world do not.

Yet, as I say, the work doesn't come off as a *work*. It is an unsatisfactory book because it doesn't seem to have any design and because it's not thorough enough. Bogart never makes clear what he's trying to do in the book as a whole; he gives only a vague hint in the last paragraph of his preface. He never articulates his views about what the relationship should be between popular preferences and public policy. In places a kind of simple direct-democracy seems to underlie his views of democratic theory; but in other places he seems to understand that public policy is never static and therefore that even if we knew what to do today, we wouldn't know what to do tomorrow, that survey research is a tool for leadership (a scalpel or a dull ax) and not a mandate, and that the media can also use opinion research in a variety of self-serving and other-serving ways. But these and many other critical matters are more alluded to than discussed. Examples there are aplenty, but there is never any sustained commentary.

Bogart has not sorted out and clarified the level-of-analysis-problem. He moves carelessly from the individual to the social levels—even, on page 76, carried away, personifying opinion, saying ". . . it responds to drama, it heeds the appeals of respected leaders, it cringes at the prospect of disaster, it is bored by the repetitious and the inconclusive." Again, there are lots of hints and examples of linkage between individual opinions (or processes) and aggregate opinions, but they are not tied together or put into any context. On a different but related matter, that of the pervasive publicness of political elites, his short chapter "Private Opinions and Public Roles" is rich with illustrations but has almost no analysis at all.

Finally, it's unclear for whom the book is written. For students and scholars, no doubt; also for journalists and media managers; and, one supposes, for the attentive citizenry who care about American democracy in practice. Because there are a lot of interesting facts, and examples of survey use/misuse, and because there are many intellectually-provocative one-liners, all three presumed audiences will find it of some worth; but because of its designlessness all three will also find it less than fully rewarding.

BERNARD HENNESSY
California State University, Hayward

The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America. By David S. Broder. (Harper & Row, 1971. Pp. 280. $7.95.)

An able and liberal political journalist here joins the ranks of those alarmed by what they understand to be the declining health of the American polity. Broder assigns the responsibility mostly to an unresponsive and deteriorating political process, and offers as his chief remedy the reinvigoration of responsible party government. His writing, conveying honest anxiety and earnestness, nicely combines moderation of tone, constructive criticism, and gravity of content. But the ground traversed is by now excessively familiar, and the remedies proposed—though Broder is not optimistic about their realization—are from an earlier era and are neither well thought through nor clearly related to the ills diagnosed.

Our crisis, as seen by Broder, reflects not merely the severity of escalating unsolved problems but a loss of popular confidence in government, especially by blue-collar workers, minorities, and college students. This political malaise feeds on the failure of political parties to perform in our time their historic function of clarification and unification for the citizenry: "The governmental system is not working because the political parties are not working" (p. xxiii). The reasons and/or symptoms include divided party government under Eisenhower and Nixon; constraints on presidential initiative stemming from narrow election victories, as with Kennedy in 1960 and Nixon in 1968; the personalized presidencies of Eisenhower and Johnson, each committed to different types of consensus politics hostile to effective party development; and increasing voter independency of party and willingness to split tickets. Above all, the pluralistically fragmented governmental structure and process, which gives some interests a persistent advantage, has failed to promote grappling with America's pressing problems.

The range and gravity of the crisis sketched by Broder contrasts strongly with the considerably narrower political process "causes" he emphasizes. Further, the process reforms advocated by Broder turn almost entirely on the notion of the political parties as "the instrument of national self-renewal" (p. xi). He endorses the thrust of the 1950 report of the APSA Committee on Political Parties, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," and in full awareness of its rejection by most political scientists. But Broder does a poor job, logically and empirically, in buttressing his preference, especially since he is fair in recognizing many of the durable and ongoing obstacles to party government in America.

Like many other commentators on the topic, Broder confuses reforms which strengthen presidential leadership with those which facilitate party government; the implicit assumption that the former must serve the latter is wrong. Similarly, developing party-based stronger collective leadership for Congress may or may not contribute to a more centralized and disciplined national party. As for Broder's enthusiasm (as of 1971) for the Democratic party's convention "reforms" as an important step toward greater party responsibility, it suggests not so much a flawed crystal ball (a common disability) as a meager understanding of what party government means and requires. In keeping with Broder's stubborn resistance to the conclusion that the times are increasingly unsupportive of the kind of tight, responsible two-party system he envisions as a panacea, he pays little attention to such decentralizing trends as separatism and community control.

Beyond the questionable consistency of major parts of Broder's prescriptions, there is the larger problem of whether responsible parties could or would attend to resolving the major ills of the polity. Perhaps so, but Broder is better at asserting the linkage than at arguing or proving it. At bottom, then, the study is more successful in conveying a sense of alarm and urgency to readers about the necessity for change than in persuading them of the necessity, desirability, or feasibility of the particular process reforms urged by Broder.

ALLAN P. SINDLER
University of California, Berkeley

Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. By Walter Dean Burnham. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970. Pp. xii, 210. $6.50.)

This is a puzzling book. It starts off with regression-based discontinuity coefficients and t-tests applied to series of American election results, and it finishes with statements like the following, "The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the American polity has entered the most profound turning point in its history" (p. 188).

I have read this book twice during the last two years, and while I am duly impressed and provoked by the conclusions, I must admit I still do not fully understand how Professor Burnham arrived at them. There are many statements in the book that suggest profound thinking about the relationship between democratic institutions, the social and economic order, and popular control of public policy. The empirical base derives largely from the analysis of aggregate voting patterns in the nation as a whole and in selected states and localities, as well as from some survey data on party identification. I do not so much find fault with the data analysis, which is often suggestive and insightful, as with the premises for the connections with Professor Burnham's overall conclusions.

Much of the book flies much closer to the ground than the author's concluding statements suggest. The first three chapters constitute a study of past realignments. Burnham begins by offering a definition of critical realignment, which he seems to mean as empirically derived from the common characteristics of previous examples. But unfortunately, his standards for the definition are not clear, and he makes no attempt to show systematically that the commonly recognized realignments had all or even most of these characteristics.

The closest he comes to relating a portion of his definition to empirical data on the past is in Chapter 2, "The Periodicity of American Critical Realignments"—periodicity being one of the elements of his definition. Here he applies the "discontinuity coefficient" in conjunction with a t-test to a series of national elections in order to identify critical realignment years, and finds that the midpoint years 1854, 1874, 1894, and 1930 stand out. He concludes that sure enough, with the exception of 1874, there is a striking periodicity in the data. He does comment on the marginal values of the coeffficients for 1854 and on the very high values for 1874, but he does not make it clear whether we have discovered a new major realignment in 1874 or whether we have merely confirmed his observation about periodicity. It would have helped if he had indicated more clearly what his data were meant to show and if he had done comparable empirical studies of the other elements of his definition. Those who look to this book for a contextual treatment of the causes and consequences of past realignments will probably be disappointed. Yet this seems not to have been Burnham's intention, and he does have more to offer.

The remainder of the book is the most interesting part, in my judgment. Burnham discusses the rules changes and "systemic forces" of the "System of 1896" and their consequences in terms of reduced turnout and reduced partisanship. The rules changes were "devices by which a large and possibly dangerous mass electorate could be brought to heel and subjected to management and control within the political system appropriate to 'capitalist democracy' . . . a remarkable solution to the problem of adjusting mass politics to the exigencies of industrialism" (p. 90). This is a pregnant statement, and I am prepared to be convinced of its validity. The consequences of some of these changes for the political participation and power of the southern black are well known. Yet if Mr. Burnham has clear ideas on what these changes prevented the total electorate from doing to the capitalist system, or what the voters were prevented from doing for themselves, we would all be enlightened if he spelled them out.

"The Onward March of Party Decomposition" is traced, with some interesting tangents to changes in the nature of political campaigns and the institutionalization of the House of Representatives. Burnham does not know whether the decomposition of party is part of a pre-realignment process or whether it will make realignments as we have known them impossible in the future. He clearly finds the trend dangerous because parties are "the only devices thus far invented by the wit of Western man which with some effectiveness can generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the many . . . powerless against the relatively few who are . . . powerful" (p. 133).

Burnham finds the foreseeable realignments almost as troubling as the continuing decomposition of party. Several possibilities seem to him to have "as large a civil war potential . . . as any critical realignment in our history" (p. 170). If this is the case, the absence of a crystallizing factor is doubtless fortunate, especially since "it is probable that any force great enough to produce 'classical' realignment under present conditions would also be great enough to break the system altogether, with consequences of incalculable magnitude" (p. 173). If the lack of party identification is to save us from such a realignment, the consequence may be the termination "of the historical role in reshaping our institutions and our political system which has been played by the American electorate from time to time" (p. 174). The book concludes with the observations that "a decisive triumph of the political right is more likely than not to emerge in the near future," or perhaps an *Obrigkeitsstaat* along the lines of Imperial Germany (pp. 192–3).

This is a profound book, and whether he is right or wrong, Burnham has much to tell us. The book is like an iceberg, with much remaining below the surface. I wish the terms of the argument by which he arrives at his conclusions were clearer and lent themselves more easily to evaluation. On the other hand, when one contemplates the gravity of the conclusions, one can understand why he may have wanted to publish before all of the logical connections of his arguments were spelled out.

WILLIAM R. KEECH

The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill

Regional Economic Development: the Federal Role. By Gordon C. Cameron. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1970. Pp. 161. $4.00.)

The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism. By Richard E. Wagner. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971. Pp. 119. $7.50.)

Although these two books have in common the subject of federalism and various policy issues of the United States federal system, they are so different that I shall discuss them separately.

Wagner's book is one of a number of recent technical economic studies devoted to the problems of collective choices respecting private versus public goods, and types and amounts of public goods. The central problem is the familiar one of obtaining possible gratification of individual preferences in collective decisions. "If majority coalitions are wholly unconstrained, majority voting will tend to produce socially wasteful budgetary choices" (p. 13). The larger the governmental jurisdiction the greater the probability of budgetary inefficiencies. With no space to discuss the argument, I jump to several important conclusions:

(1) There should be greater flexibility to reshape subnational governmental jurisdictions. On efficiency grounds, "if a group of citizens within one state want to form a new state," . . . or, "if a group of citizens within an area incorporating parts of two or more states want to form a new state, they should be permitted to do so" (p. 64). For "the mere availability of the option of secession produces an equalization of bargaining power and protects against geographical discrimination" (p. 65). The propensity of wealthier citizens for forming enclaves to escape contributing to the support of poorer citizens can be overcome by making income redistribution primarily a national responsibility, which Wagner advocates.

(2) The more comprehensive the government and its budget, the lower the degree of taxpayer control; "consolidation diminishes taxpayer perception of changes in the price of any single budgetary component and increases the immunity of politicians to competitive pressures" (p. 53).

(3) Contrary to conventional wisdom, governmental consolidation within metropolitan areas therefore should be viewed with suspicion. Once the income redistribution function is taken over by the national government, budgetary efficiency becomes the main objective of local governmental organization, and in Wagner's view efficiency can be better attained by many smaller jurisdictions than by one or a few larger ones. Inefficiencies of small jurisdictions having to do with economies of scale and externalities can be handled by negotiation among jurisdictions or by contracting out.

(4) Of the various forms of federal grants, only unconditional grants satisfactorily meet efficiency tests. The prevailing multiplicity of conditional grants frustrates efficiency in many ways. As for block grants, "If revenue maintenance is not required, [they] are indistinguishable from unconditional grants. If revenue maintenance is effectively practiced, block grants degenerate into a particularly oppressive form of conditional grant" (p. 59).

These are provocative conclusions. It is not deprecating Wagner's scholarship to say that many will disagree with much of their content, for much of the argument rests upon the primacy of individual preferences and decisions and a view of individuals as economic homonids, with the knowledge and inclination to follow the intricacies of making budgets, producing and delivering public goods. In the real world, most people pay little attention to local government and the processes of providing services other than to squawk when services fail.

Wagner falls into an error, common to economists, of assuming that small constituencies are better public decision makers than large. There is considerable evidence that in the real world, smaller jurisdictions, which according to American mythology are the representatives of democracy in its purest form, tend to be run by small cliques, to resist innovation, to have poor communications among constituents, to make decisions unsystematically, and otherwise fail to meet the conventional tests of "good government."

In short, while Wagner is well worth reading for a well-ordered presentation of one school of economic thought, many of his most important policy conclusions are infeasible and many, in this reviewer's opinion, are unsound. They are unsound not because of faulty reasoning but because of his premises, which reflect far too simple views of the nature of government and human beings and their relationships to society.

Cameron's study concentrates on the case for federal intervention specifically to raise employment and income in backward and lagging domestic areas. The backdrop is the Public Works and Development Act of 1965, the administrative issues created and left unresolved by that Act, and the subsequent operating experience of the Economic Development Administration (EDA) through 1969.

"Rapid national growth," says Cameron, "has not eradicated severe and persistent imbalances between the demand for labor and its supply in literally hundreds of small and medium-sized labor markets in every U.S. region" (p. 127). He lists four categories of areas: (1) rich labor-surplus areas in which massive immigration has caused labor market disequilibrium; (2) old industrial urbanized areas with ossified export structures; (3) rural areas still relatively productive, but with heavy unemployment caused by substitution of machinery or other technology for farm labor; (4) the chronically poor, unproductive and worked-out mining areas, characterized by low per capita income, often heavy unemployment, and large out-migration. The justification for federal action to relieve economically backward and distressed areas is that the federal government is the only instrument fiscally able to help them.

The need for assistance to at least the first three categories of lagging areas is clear enough, and clearly only the federal government can intervene effectively. Whether the federal government, given its own political and economic constraints, including serious knowledge gaps, can accomplish much is another, largely unanswered, question.

One of Cameron's major contributions is a thorough analysis of various alternative policy measures. He concludes that one of the most promising approaches is to concentrate resources on stimulating regional development centers—middle-sized cities which can be the nuclei for economic agglomeration. Concentrated investment is likely to have several advantages over the same amount of investment more spatially diffused over a region.

A second valuable contribution is the review of EDA policies and programs. Cameron gives the agency good marks, on the whole, for imagination and vigor. It was greatly handicapped by the necessity of placating congressmen by scattering its limited funds widely, and by the narrow range of its development activities.

I have two main criticisms of the study. First, the analysis is almost entirely abstract—of the "on the one hand this, and on the other hand that" variety, which demonstrates the complexity of formulating policies but does not lead to many firm conclusions. If offers few data and no illustrations or case studies. Cameron is highly respectful of the overwhelming power of "market forces," but doesn't adequately identify or analyze them. Much of the analysis appears implicitly to be based on manufacturing, though the author recognizes that manufacturing is now a slow-growth industry. There is little discussion of the implications for future regional development of current economic trends, particularly the rapid growth of tourist, vacation, retirement and other service industries. The case of Vermont (where this review is being written) illustrates how a state lacking resources and industry, but with the wisdom to preserve its environment, can evolve into an area of such great attractiveness that one of its principal concerns is deterring undesirable growth.

The second major criticism has to do with Cameron's failure to relate regional underdevelopment to the lack of any considered national policy respecting economic growth and the location of population and industry. As he notes, some of the greatest problems have stemmed from federal behavior in encouraging the concentration of highly specialized centers (as in defense and aerospace industries) which are then devastated by shifts in federal priorities. One gathers that the federal decisional process is one of the main economic forces alluded to by Cameron, and that for reasons intrinsic to the federal establishment it is little better directed at reducing economic dislocation than are other economic forces.

Lyle C. Fitch
Institute of Public Administration, N.Y.

Lawyers Before the Warren Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957–66. By Jonathan D. Casper. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972. Pp. xi, 221. $9.50.)

Jay Casper has written a fascinating book about lawyers in private practice who argued reapportionment, civil rights, criminal procedure, and loyalty-security cases decided by the Supreme Court with full opinion. He also provides an excellent concise review of the substance of litigation decided during the 1957–66 period of "activism and progress," the dominant trend of which was "toward equality and freedom" (pp. 18, 19), showing the Court's spotty record in the loyalty-security field and its unwillingness to go beyond narrow grounds in the sit-in cases, as well as its better-known criminal procedure shift from case-by-case to broad rule. Substance and process are joined in another theme, the conjunction between participants' goals and policy adopted, with contrasts between narrow grounds urged and broad policy adopted in criminal procedure, and broad, multiple grounds urged and narrow decisions handed down in the sit-in cases. The Court's role as a conflict-generating institution is also stressed: the Court opens or reopens issues for others, setting their agenda and refusing to let them avoid issues.

Casper is principally concerned with a lawyer's *clientele,* the group or interest a lawyer perceives himself as serving (his most salient reference group); this clientele may or may not be his particular client and may not be involved in the case at all. Agreeing with this choice of concept, I think he too quickly dismisses *role* as an alternative concept because it is undifferentiated. One could ask whether a lawyer representing a group was expected by relevant others to behave differently from one interested in representing only a specific client, important, given the controversy over NAACP and ACLU priorities in representation of individual clients.

Casper's categories are the Advocate, interested primarily in his particular client and in short-term considerations; Group Advocate, focusing on a particular group over the longer term; and Civil Libertarian, interested in broad, enduring social principles. Because the categories seem to be established from lawyers' goals, the author stresses that, although empirically related, (reported) goals and social interests served are conceptually distinct. Casper also distinguishes between lawyers' views on the roles of law (conflict-resolution and social control versus social change and sustaining democracy) and the bar (passive or active). Most lawyers either believe in law as a resolver of conflict and a passive bar (Traditionalists) or in law as a force for social change and active bar (Reformers). Most Advocates are Traditionalists, while Group Advocates and Civil Libertarians are mostly Reformers. The author makes good use of analysis of those who do not fit this pattern. Thus we see that several black civil rights lawyers were Traditionalists and that the experienced criminal lawyer may get interested in recurring issues *qua* issues even though he doesn't have a commitment to his clients. We also find out about the effect of ideology in the choice of career pattern, the question of who will be appointed in criminal cases, and about members of the Radical Bar and lawyer-politicians in reapportionment cases.

Areas of litigation differ in recruitment patterns and lawyer types. Lawyers in criminal procedure cases, predominantly Advocates, entered a case by court appointment at various stages of the case. Most lawyers arguing reapportionment and loyalty-security cases, Group Advocates or Civil Libertarians, were involved from the initial trial; one-third of the civil rights case lawyers did not enter until the Supreme Court level. Because of their ideology and the Court's stress at the time on both the facts of a case and the "totality of circumstances," Advocates generally argued technical grounds. This was reinforced by their clients' high personal stakes—long prison sentences or death. Advocates argued broad points to win cases, not because they wanted the policy; thus the Court's broad criminal policy was an *un*intended by-product of the Advocates' goals, reminding us not to infer motives from results.

The Group Advocate, perceiving in "we-they" terms, had personal, ideological, and institutional contacts with his clients, resulting in a personal commitment to them not shared by the Advocate and Civil Libertarian vis-à-vis their clients. Lawyers entered reapportionment and loyalty-security litigation primarily through friendship; they entered civil rights cases mostly through group contacts. In the early loyalty-security cases, Radical Bar lawyers had both personal and ideological ties to their clients; the Civil Libertarians who took the later and safer loyalty oath cases had neither. Group Advocates, ambivalent about grounds to raise, may, as in the reapportionment cases, use broad ones for pragmatic reasons, but Civil Libertarians would be interested in them for abstract reasons. Casper also suggests that Group Advocates can be counted on in times of repression, whereas Civil Libertarians may be "fair weather friends."

Most of the cases Casper's lawyers argued were decided before a development attributable in large measure to decisions like *Gideon:* the recent substantial growth of public defender offices, which Casper suggests will produce more lawyers concerned about general problems of the disadvantaged. Yet one wonders. Institutional demands on public defenders can blunt their idealism and lead to increased plea-bargaining, "package dealing," and indifference to clients. In his balanced speculation, Casper recognizes that these results may occur at the trial level, but he suggests that frequency of involvement with issues might lead to stressing broader policy matters and that appellate public defender divisions would be more inclined to raise the large issues.

In this volume, in which one needs to look hard for something to criticize, Casper has given us an important addition to our knowledge about the lawyers' role in the policy process, and, because of the "clientele" focus, a contribution to the group theory of the legal process. Because of the study's importance and the questions it raises, it is sometimes difficult to keep in mind that only the Supreme Court is covered. What we now need is a replication for the post-1966 period and interviews both of Casper's respondents about other cases and of lawyers who petitioned for *certiorari* but were unsuccessful in getting to oral argument before the high court.

STEPHEN L. WASBY
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building. By Roger Cobb and Charles Elder. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972. Pp. 182. $3.50.)

Political scientists frequently use but rarely study the concept of the political agenda. While notions such as gatekeeping, demands, mobilization of bias, and nondecision making are familiar conceptual wares, the explicit questions of how and when problems gain agenda status have, for the most part, not been treated systematically. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder offer an introductory framework and a useful perspective on how problems become political issues and assume their place on the political agenda. The two political scientists critically evaluate system, power, decision making, and group approaches, and then they construct their own group conflict paradigm of agenda building. Though the paradigm is probably of only modest value, Cobb and Elder successfully sort out, define, and examine many of the important questions about agenda building.

Perhaps most noteworthy is their distinction between two basic types of political agendas—systemic and institutional. The systemic agenda refers to issues that are defined by members of a political community as warranting government action. Cobb and Elder suggest three prerequisites for issue access: (1) widespread attention or at least awareness; (2) view that action is required; and (3) view that action is appropriate for government. The institutional (or formal) agenda consists of those sets of items that are explicitly up for consideration before a governmental body.

After reviewing four major approaches to agenda building as noted, Cobb and Elder, adopt a group conflict approach, which hypothesizes that political issues result from procedural or substantive conflicts between two or more identifiable groups for either scarce resources or scarce positions. And borrowing heavily on Coleman and Schattschneider, the authors view conflict as a dynamic process.

Cobb and Elder distinguish five characteristics of issues that influence their likelihood of reaching the public docket. Adapting Parsons's pattern variables, they focus their definitional dimensions on the nature of the issue conflict. They point to the scale of groups—organizational skills, extensity and intensity of communications, size, resources—as of major importance in issue expansion. In addition, they elaborate major roles the audience can play in the expansion of issue conflicts.

Cobb and Elder devote several chapters to issue expansion. Their basic position is that "the greater the size of the audience to which an issue can be enlarged, the greater likelihood that it will attain systemic agenda standing and thus access to a formal agenda" (p. 110). They discuss the types of symbols used to enlarge the scope of a conflict and the crucial role played by mass media in terms of various strategies to enlarge controversy and muster support.

Cobb and Elder do not foreclose inquiry into agenda-building. Their general paradigm, while suggestive, is largely a catalogue of possible ways in which a problem may become a political issue, Few research studies are cited. While one chapter is devoted to case examples, it is primarily discursive and reportorial—and probably the book's most unsatisfactory chapter. As the authors recognize, the framework lacks "systemic elaboration and rigorous empirical inquiry" (p. viii). The paradigm offers ideas and hypotheses rather than ready-made explanations or research designs. Also, the exclusive focus on group conflict raises many of the familiar criticisms of omission often leveled against "group theory"—the failure to recognize, for instance, the role and importance of other political forces such as the executive, legislature, bureaucracy, and political parties.

The analysis of Cobb and Elder primarily centers on how issues achieve systemic agenda standing. But because they do not delineate or propose measurement methods, it is not clear how students of agenda building can operationally distinguish among systemic issues. As Charles Jones points out, many problems—e.g., race or education—are highly interrelated and represent a "bundle of actual problems." And in my view, rather than suffering from a lack of access, the systemic agenda seems to be overcrowded with issues. Cobb and Elder acknowledge that recognition on a party platform is indicative of an issue's having attained standing on the systemic agenda. If so, the 1972 Democratic and Republican platforms provide ample evidence of our bountiful systemic concerns. Moreover, television has transformed the living room into a public arena, introducing the viewer to an overwhelming number and variety of systemic issues. Attention to agenda building should perhaps focus more heavily on the formal agenda and the influences on the range and types of policy alternatives for issues considered by "authoritative decision makers."

The exclusive focus on group conflict means that other major sources of agenda issues are not examined. For one, the mass media are more than passive intermediaries for the interplay of interest groups. As Murray Edelman suggests in *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* politics for most of us is a "passing parade of symbols." The mass media play a pivotal role in selecting, highlighting, and developing the symbols of politics as well as acting as "fourth branch of government" brokers for public and private decision-making groups. And second, government bureaucracies are a primary source for agenda items, systemic as well as institutional. These two examples underscore the conclusion that interest-group conflict is only one approach to agenda building; others such as general systems and decision making may offer equally useful paradigms for how problems become public issues.

Despite shortcomings, Cobb and Elder have written an excellent overview of agenda building. Examining questions largely neglected, the book should be a notable stimulus to explanations and research on the "dynamics of agenda building." It should be read with particular interest by students of public opinion and participation.

RONALD O. LOVERIDGE
University of California, Riverside

The Apportionment Cases. By Richard C. Cortner. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 283. $10.95.)

Reapportionment: Law, Politics, Computers. By Terry B. O'Rourke. (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. Pp. 111. $2.00, paper.)

It seems the fate of movements for reform in American government to be oversold. Perhaps this tendency can be traced from Henry George's single tax, through Bryan's free coinage of silver, to the "reapportionment revolution." But reapportionment is different, for the reform was adopted, and early results are in. Some judgments can be made. One remembers in wonderment the excitement of the middle 1960s, when the National Municipal League rushed to publish reapportionment decisions made by the most obscure courts. The Supreme Court had spoken, and "one man, one vote" in the state legislatures was the first step toward urban salvation.

These two volumes are based on different assumptions and written from different historical perspectives. Their purposes and formats contrast sharply. Yet they complement each other. Professor Cortner uses the term "revolution" approvingly; he is confident that the one man, one vote standard is a landmark in the continuing definition of the constitutional right of equality, and his book tells much of how it came to pass. Terry O'Rourke's voice is that of disillusionment. The Court's rigid mathematical standard has, he feels, created more problems than it solved. In particular, it facilitates "vastly more sophisticated" gerrymanders. Treating representation as involving an individual right—the right to cast a vote that is "undiluted"—the Court is precluded from considering the essence of representation, which deals with the influence of groups and parties.

The title of Professor Cortner's book is somewhat misleading. Rather than encompassing the total development of case law in the field, he is largely concerned with two landmark decisions. *Baker* v. *Carr* was the Tennessee case which, in 1962, held that legislative apportionment is a justiciable matter setting aside the "political questions" doctrine of *Colegrove* v. *Green*. In 1964, the Court chose the Alabama case of *Reynolds* v. *Sims* as the vehicle for enunciating the one man, one vote standard.

Cortner is interested in the genesis of the cases, the personalities of those who argued and decided them, the routes followed through courts of appeal, the arguments made in briefs, and the technicalities cited to distinguish a particular case from previous ones which established an unfavorable precedent. Cortner recounts such details for these two cases in leisurely but lucid prose. In the process, he tells us a great deal about the politics of Tennessee and Alabama, and we perceive the evil for which a judicial remedy was sought through the eyes of the original litigants. The constitutions of both states provide for periodic, population-based apportionments; both had been last apportioned in 1901. Rotten boroughs had become absolutely fetid. Sixty years and federal court intervention were required before the two legislatures performed their unpleasant, but constitutional, duty.

It is this sense of the *status quo ante* that is missing from O'Rourke's volume. In commenting on the cases, he emphasizes dissenting remarks that prophesy the difficulties now being experienced with the one-man, one-vote standard, which he describes as a "facile and question-begging premise" (p. 16). While O'Rourke's analysis is largely an exercise in hindsight, Cortner's is remarkable for its uncritical praise of the "revolution." Although published in 1970, the book barely notes developments since 1964. Cortner's historical account of the Tennessee and Alabama cases is carefully researched, including extensive interviews with the litigants and their attorneys. Any future scholar interested in these two cases will perforce need to acquaint himself with Cortner's volume. As if to emphasize the book's status, the note describing its type face reports that "the paper on which the book is printed is designed for an effective life of at least three hundred years."

Cortner's final chapter is an able analysis of the conditions under which the Supreme Court may successfully make policy. He compares the apportionment cases, in which the Court was successful, with the desegregation and school prayer cases, in which the Court's policy depends too much for implementation upon non-judicial actors. This chapter stands alone, for it depends only marginally on the account of *Baker* and *Reynolds* that has gone before. It is recommended as a succinct account of the possibilities and limitations of the Court's role in American politics.

Published as one of the "Domestic Affairs Studies" of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Terry O'Rourke's paperback volume has a slight air of impermanence. Basically, it is a status report upon a still developing issue. It consists of three independent chapters that are logically and chronologically related but lead their author to no general conclusions. In the first chapter, the author describes the *Colgrove, Baker,* and *Reynolds* decisions. He next describes the narrowing of the judicial standard to rigid arithmetical equality in 1967 and 1969 and its applicaiton to 80,000 units of local government in *Avery* v. *Midland County*. The author concludes the chapter by suggesting that the Court's treatment of the issue probably precludes it from affording relief to litigants who claim their political influence has been diluted by partisan gerrymandering.

The second chapter describes the political reaction to the *Reynolds* decision, including the abortive Dirksen Amendment and the equally abortive effort of state governments to call a constitutional convention. Then he considers the impact of legislative redistricting upon state governments and finds that the prediction of urban benefits has fallen far short of the mark. Reapportionment enthusiasts oversold their remedy, and, by the time it went into effect, the suburbs, rather than the central cities, were often the beneficiaries. He summarizes research by Dye, Derge, Friedman, Hofferbert, and others, which indicates that the quality of its legislative apportionment is not the only, or even a very important, determinant of the quality of a state's government. He concludes with figures for thirteen large, politically competitive states which demonstrate that the gerrymander is alive and well.

The first two chapters each end by setting the stage for the third, which sketches the history of the use of computers to outline proposed district boundaries, and provides a case study of their use in California. O'Rourke demonstrates —if there was any lingering doubt—that, with the aid of computers, it is a simple matter to draw district boundaries that are absolutely equal in population yet implement flagrant partisan gerrymanders. This can be done even while rendering districts that may be compact and contiguous and respect local government boundaries. The Republican computer in California was particularly cleverly programmed in 1970.

O'Rourke's book is brief, well written, and hard-hitting. Hardly a definitive account of the reapportionment controversy, it does provide an admirable introduction to the current state of play on the issue. The moral garnered from reading these two books together is that, if we insist on calling the federal court decisions on reapportionment a "revolution," we will be charged by our students with a credibility gap.

Karl A. Lamb
University of California, Santa Cruz

Constitutional Law and Politics, Three Arizona Cases. By Richard C. Cortner and Clifford M. Lytle. (The Institute of Government Research: "Arizona Government Series," 9; Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1971. Pp. 137. $3.00, paper.)

The Arizona Train Limit Case, Southern Pacific vs. Arizona. By Richard C. Cortner. (The Institute of Government Research: "Arizona Government Studies," 8; Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1970. Pp. 47. $1.50, paper.)

Great constitutional cases do not arise in a political vacuum, nor is their importance limited to a few principles of law. While political scientists have employed the case study as a device to demonstrate the political functions of the judicial process, there remain too few in-depth analyses of major litigation from the initiation to the impact stage. Political scientists at the University of Arizona currently are mining these raw materials from the political history of their state. The Institute of Government Research is publishing a series of short paperback volumes, each a case study of a major event in the state's history. While these volumes will be of interest to those concerned with interest groups, legislative behavior, and public administration, the two recent volumes commented upon here will be of particular value to scholars and to teachers of constitutional law.

In *Constitutional Law and Politics, Three Arizona Cases,* Cortner and Lytle examine three major civil liberties cases: the *Miranda* case setting guidelines for police interrogation, the *Gault* case attacking problems in the administration of juvenile justice, and the litigation involving the Arizona Loyalty Oath, *Elfbrandt* v. *Russell.* The authors introduce the legal and political background of each case early, following it by a discussion of how and why litigation was initiated. They turn next to the strategies and techniques of litigants and attorneys and typically include an encapsulization of the major arguments submitted in briefs before the Supreme Court. The text of the decision is set out—at some length—followed by a brief epilogue.

Although the authors contribute little to our knowledge of *Miranda* v. *Arizona* (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), the discussion of *In re Gault* (387 U.S. 1 [1967]) is more valuable. *Gault* was the second major step taken by the High Court to reform the nation's juvenile court system. The description of what happened to fifteen-year-old Gault highlights the inadequacies of the system. Of interest is the depiction of how Gault's attorney established a record at the habeas corpus hearing which proved decisive upon review, as well as the discussion of the unimaginative, narrow, and formula-ridden handling of the case by the Arizona courts.

The emotional and practical drain of being the central figures in a major civil liberties test case is illustrated in the story of the Arizona Loyalty Oath Case (384 U.S. 11 [1966]). Of thousands of state employees, only six refused to sign the oath. The Elfbrandts alone saw the case through, having to support themselves during five years of unemployment and seeing that the litigation was subsidized.

Perhaps the most interesting of these studies and the most adaptable for teaching purposes, is the short volume on the train limit case, *Southern Pacific* v. *Arizona* (325 U.S. 761 [1945]). Professor Cortner lucidly describes the legislative history of the statute, the interest of the Railway Brotherhood in preserving it, the interest of the railroads in voiding it, and gives sufficient information to understand the problems of safety. He describes the many stages of the sixteen years of litigation and provides sufficient data to make comprehensible the relationship of the Arizona litigation to changes in the railroad industry and to litigation in three other states.

These studies, which read easily, are useful for supplementary reading in courses on the Supreme Court, judicial process, and—especially—constitutional law; these courses traditionally have focused too much upon the Supreme Court and upon the dissection of abstract principles and judicial logic at the expense of an understanding of the interrelationship between the courts and other actors of the political system in the constitutional process. (Teachers interested in a casebook integrating the case method with case studies, are referred to the same authors' *Modern Constitutional*

Law, Commentaries and Case Studies [New York: The Free Press, 1971].)

While the Arizona studies are useful additions to the literature and adaptable for classroom use, they tend to be a little thin. One hopes that in any future case studies the authors would offer more about the political genesis of the litigation. The non-Arizona reader could also desire an analysis of the factors in the situation unique to Arizona—the structure of its judicial system, the backgrounds of the judges of its supreme court, the party breakdown in the legislature. The political scientists would profit from a greater attempt to link Arizona events to litigation elsewhere, something accomplished well in the *Southern Pacific* case but not in the other case studies. Perhaps the texts of the Supreme Court decisions, which consume an unnecessarily large portion of the text and which are easily attainable elsewhere, could be sacrificed on behalf of additional analysis. And with growing attention to impact analysis, the all-too-short epilogue ought to be expanded into a much closer examination of the acceptance or resistance by Arizona institutions of the Supreme Court Decision.

Despite some weaknesses of execution, the direction of the scholars of the University of Arizona ought to be emulated by those of us in other states. If their state, one of the youngest "of the several states" has spawned three dramatic cases within one decade, how very many case studies can be cultivated from the gardens in our backyard. One would hope that the work of Arizona's political scientists will stimulate a large yield from elsewhere in the Union.

JEFFREY B. MORRIS

The City College of
The City University of New York

The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership. By Robert Eyestone. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971. Pp. 197. $8.50.)

Eyestone's book is important in its own right and as an early book-length product of the City Council Research Project, a large-scale survey of 435 city councilmen in 89 San Francisco Bay area municipalities. The resulting data include individuals, aggregates and whole councils in units. In concept, design and the topical importance of suburban politics, the book is part of the growing body of work moving local government studies into the mainstream of political science research. While not ignoring wider economic and institutional factors, Eyestone seeks to focus on a political explanation for local decision making.

The author's idea is briefly that metropolitan areal settlement patterns result from the history of proximity to employment and market centers as affected by transportation technology. Different locations in the metropolitan area thus go through a sequence of development, but the regulating agents currently affecting settlement are subject to continuous change. This idea takes the form of a typology of "urban realms," based on the work of Vance, a geographer, and is described by the author as "intuitively understandable" (p. 41). The seven categories are based on at least three separate criteria: type of dominant land use, location within the metropolitan area in relation to commuting pattern, and time of settlement. Later in the book, the realm categories are collapsed into three—core, suburban and fringe cities. The classification is used as an introductory typology and later as an analytical variable. *Policy leadership* is exercised when the external developmental forces create the opportunity for local council choices which are determinant. Eyestone defines two kinds of local expenditures as particularly revealing of policy choice—planning and amenities (optional services including parks, libraries, recreation and health). Neither is a hard local service without which the city cannot function, yet each represents a decision by a council. While perceptions of policy problems vary from realm to realm, neither planning, mentioned more often in the developing cities, nor amenities is cited often in an absolute sense by any of the councils. With both aspects, some operational problems are present. For planning, expenditures are often related to a desire to protect the integrity of community values through land use control, rather than a conscious policy based on the advantages of planning *per se*. With amenities a similar problem is that those cities with residents able to provide their own amenities may not see it as a public policy matter. As the author later points out, the planning and amenities aspects are just one set of policies in which leadership can be exercised and studied, and it sometimes appears that other policy areas might have been more productive for clearcut policy-making analysis, although the purpose and specificity of the author's model deserve the consideration he gives it.

To study city policy choices, Eyestone develops the notion of policy profiles. Cities high on both planning and amenities expenditures are labeled advanced; those low on both, retarded; those low on either one and changing on the other, emergent; and high on one aspect with the other changing, maturing. In addition, there are transitional sub-phases for those high on one aspect and low on the other. The 89 cities break about equally into the categories through the use of medians as cutting points. Using scale scores, Eyestone finds that councilmen in the maturing and advanced cities have slightly higher positive attitudes toward change, and fuller concepts of city future role. Councilmen in maturing and advanced cities tend to be more "political" in style, those in retarded or emergent cities more "pragmatic" and "fatalistic." Voting splits occur most often on advanced councils, least often on retarded councils.

The author turns next to establishing the correlates of the policy profile categorization. Knowing councilmens' perceptions of problems is not directly helpful in predicting policy choices. The data demonstrate that density increases regularly with the direction of policy as defined, generally population increase exerts the same effect, as does tax rate but not per capita expenditures. Using policy development as the dependent variable (by assigning scores as if it were a ratio scale), the author finds in a series of regression analyses that future role scores (though the scale seems to incorporate different dimensions) and the population variables of density/growth rate are relatively strongly predictive. Multicollinearity presents a problem in interpreting these findings, and it is also evident that most of the variables contribute little to an explanation.

The urban realm typology, as can be seen by rearranging Table 5-2, shows a regular and continuous though not complete relationship with policy. Yet when density is removed from the regression equation, the realm residual effect is insignificant. Since the realm rubric was constructed in such a way that density is an implicit variable (injecting elements of circularity for parts of the analysis) this finding ought not to be dismissed easily, because density itself appears throughout the analysis as a main factor, logical albeit stark. The author notes that a close examination of the cities which are exceptions to the tendencies found with the aggregate indicators would highlight policy leadership, but he does not fully exploit that class of cities analytically.

Again drawing on the realm types, the author then constructs models using the promising variables for planning and amenities separately. The models based on simple and partial correlations do suggest some of the relationships of aggregate and attitude variables in producing the expenditures, while the further steps of multiple correlation and regression coefficients yield these results: In each group only one or two variables account for most of the variance or are significant; with the exception of density for amenities and future role for planning, the effect of the variables in the model is different in the three city categories; and in each multiple correlation the variables included explain less for the suburban cities. Hypothesized differences based on realm in relation to policy spending do emerge, while the aggregate variables continue to be dominant. The more explicitly political variables originally seen as linking the environment to policy leadership have a more diffuse and unpredictable relationship to policy. Thus the outlines of metropolitan development and policy are clearer than the choice mechanisms.

The book raises questions and presents or suggests ways of finding answers. Are local governments dealing on such a rudimentary level, or so constrained by their environments, that we cannot develop a political theory of local policy? Do the lines of local representation have too much slack to trace them productively? How is political style related to substance? What are the unknown variables needed in the model equations? To provide fuller answers, we need further monographs of the project and additional research efforts which can build on the base Eyestone has established. At the exploratory and multivariate stage at which we presently find ourselves in this kind of research, the mixed findings on the political variables and the willingness to grapple with typological problems add to the basic value of this book in developing an approach. The author's analysis improves our grasp on collective decision making and urbanization theory.

EARL M. BAKER

Temple University

President and Congress: Power and Policy. By Louis Fisher. (New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1972. Pp. vii, 347. $7.95.)

Repeated conflicts between Congress and the president over Viet Nam policy, the 1972 effort to grant President Nixon an item veto over federal spending, and a host of lesser tensions between the executive and legislative branches of government focus attention once again on the proper role of Congress and the presidency in national policy making. Few questions about the federal government have received as much scholarly attention as this one, but despite the abundance of such studies, Louis Fisher's book is a notable addition to the literature. Fisher deals with important—one is tempted to say "relevant"—questions and he treats them well.

President and Congress is an historical review of the theory and practice of the separation of powers in the United States. Fisher argues that the political experience of the Founding Fathers inclined them in favor not of a rigid system of separated powers but rather a flexible system of checks and balances that allowed ample room for the president and Congress to decide, on a pragmatic basis, who was to do what in different areas of policy making. Many writers have, of course, noted and deplored the liabilities of a system in which policy-making roles are achieved as a result of struggle, not neatly prescribed by charters or organized along tight party lines. Fisher's contribution is to examine the variety of ways in which Congress and the presidency have adjusted themselves to a system of separated institutions sharing powers. Three issue areas are covered in the book: spending, taxing, and war.

What is most impressive about the history of these issue areas is the degree to which Congress has ceded broad discretion to the executive. Lump-sum appropriations that give only vague directions to the executive as to how money is to be spent, contingency funds (that, for example, allowed President Kennedy to establish the Peace Corps), the authority of the president to transfer money from one category of appropriations to another (the method by which President Nixon gave aid to Cambodia following the 1970 invasion), the reprogramming authority of the executive which permits the shifting of funds within appropriated items, "no-year" money which is spent when the executive decides to spend it, impoundment which allows the president to nullify congressionally-approved programs, and unauthorized commitments (Teddy Roosevelt sending the fleet around the world and forcing Congress to pay for the trip)—all of these add up to an impressive array of executive branch spending powers. Congress (more precisely, the Senate) has so far refused the president blanket item veto powers over appropriations, but if such a move should occur it would be in line with ongoing practices rather than being a sharp new departure. When it comes to taxation, Congress has (with the exception of the tariff) jealously guarded its powers; the historic legislative power of the purse, on the other hand, appears to be increasingly more shadow than substance.

Regarding the war powers, Fisher makes a persuasive case that Congress has ceded too much power to the executive, and he illustrates his case nicely with an examination of the Safeguard ABM issue. The alleged characteristics of the executive branch that uniquely equip it to handle foreign affairs—unity, concern for the national interest, expertise—do not, in Fisher's view, hold up well under intensive scrutiny; thus there is no justification for the congressional inferiority complex in matters of war and peace. Foreign policy making in the executive branch is characterized by fragmentation, log-rolling, and disunity; defense procurement is marked by collusion between private contractors and the Defense Department; and the celebrated expertise of the executive has not prevented huge cost overruns or the firing of experts who fail to abide by the seemingly universal injunction attributed to Sam Rayburn: The best way to get along is to go along. The list of horribles, though familiar, is nonetheless strong support for the argument that Congress should reassert its prerogatives in foreign policy making and restructure its procedures to ensure that it is a significant participant in the day-by-day processes that determine American foreign policy.

Once the Johnson policy in Viet Nam became politically untenable, dozens of congressmen suddenly became concerned over executive warmaking powers. Fisher's arguments are likely to fall on receptive ears. But the crucial test for Congress is a prospective one, not Viet Nam. What Congress is willing to do, and what those in Congress specializing in foreign affairs are willing to do, depends heavily on the direction of the political winds at any given moment. The current situation favors congressional resurgence in foreign affairs, and there are many signs that the imbalance in favor of the executive branch is changing. But it takes more than a single disaster or an act of will for Congress to reclaim its power in foreign policy making. A more fundamental change is a new consensus inside and outside Congress—a consensus in which the president shares—that American involvement in foreign wars should be decided not on a piecemeal basis by the executive but only after long, searching public debate. The Viet Nam experience exposed the dangers of the accretion of presidential war powers. The legacy of Viet Nam, therefore, may well be a fundamentally different context for foreign policy making than has prevailed in this century.

Political scientists who are looking for systematic data collection and hypothesis-testing will be disappointed with this book. Many of the author's findings are, furthermore, commonly found in the literature on Congress and presidency. Still, the author presents a good case that in addressing old questions about governmental institutions we should not be hamstrung by dubious arguments over the intent of the Founding Fathers. They, like their successors in office, used theory to embellish an argument, not to prove it. *President and Congress* is good traditional political history and, as such, is a useful primer for those interested in debating time-worn but still timely issues of American national government.

JOHN F. MANLEY
Stanford University

The State of the Cities: Report of the Commission on the Cities in the "70's." By Fred R. Harris and John V. Lindsay, co-chairman. (Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 114. $4.95.)

Those of us who live in or study the city have been aware of an "urban crisis" long before the American public was temporarily shocked out of its complacency by the riots that occurred in 1967 and 1968. Since that time, some effort has been made to ascertain why the disturbances occurred and how they could be prevented in the future.

The most prominent and most widely distributed study of the 1967 disturbances was the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Commission), which suggested that as a result of a continuing pattern of racial discrimination and conflict the nation was becoming polarized into hostile camps of blacks and whites—a situation that would steadily worsen unless improvements occurred in education, housing, jobs, and police-societal attitudes towards minority groups.

The State of the Cities, a report of the Commission on the Cities in the '70s, was sponsored by the National Urban Coalition and cochaired by Senator Fred Harris and Mayor John Lindsay. It sets out to answer three main questions about urban life three years after the Kerner Report was released: "Has America changed? Are the cities better or worse? Are there new problems, challenges, that have arisen in three years?" It looks for its answers by visiting on the one hand several cities previously affected by disturbances, and on the other, cities like Phoenix and El Paso which escaped previous difficulties but had large minority populations. In each city, the Commission members toured the ghetto areas and spoke to governmental officials, leaders of business and civic groups, and the "man in the street." From these contacts, plus staff background papers, the final report was assembled.

The Commission concludes that despite widespread agreement that the poor conditions of life in the urban ghettos were largely responsible for the disorders of the 1960s, "most of the changes in those conditions since 1968 . . . have been for the worse" (p. 4). We are told that housing is still poor, schools are even more turbulent, crime and drug addiction have increased, welfare rolls are higher, and police-minority-group relations are just as hostile. Reference is also made to the tendency of an increasing proportion of blacks and Mexican-Americans to inhabit the central cities, while the suburbs continue to be overwhelmingly white.

This report dramatically highlights the continuing nature of urban problems in our society, and also demonstrates the failure of government policy makers to cope effectively with these problems. In several respects, however, the study is disappointing. Its main shortcoming is a lack of originality. Over the past several years many studies such as this one have been released by governmental and citizens groups. Each documents the poverty, discrimination, and feelings of despair experienced by ghetto residents, and each suggests essentially the same solutions. The Commission itself acknowledges this point, and instead of making new recommendations, it suggests instead that those proposed in the past by groups like the Kerner Commission be fully implemented.

Another deficiency relates to the contents of the document. The actual report is fairly short (32 pages), and much of it is highly impressionistic. The details of conversations held with residents of the cities visited, plus a narrative account of problems faced by them in their daily lives can provide the reader with valuable insights. It is difficult, however, to generalize from these findings. One might also ask why so few cities—six in all—were examined. The only other source of documentation comes from the background papers which are mainly condensations of previously published governmental or scholarly reports. In their present form, they make little contribution to increased understanding of the urban scene. It would seem that what is needed at this point is not another report by a "blue-ribbon commission," but rather, research into why previous remedies have not been enacted or proved successful, and what concrete plans for action can be formulated.

RICHARD D. FELD
East Texas State University

The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896. By Richard J. Jensen. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. xvii, 358. $12.50.)

Professor Jensen of the University of Illinois at Chicago has made a significant contribution to the ever-growing field of 19th-century political history. His analysis goes beyond emphasis on a single election or issue to stress the importance of underlying conditions in American society that were operating to upset the political equilibrium in six midwestern states.

The Midwest became a Republican stronghold at the time of the Civil War electoral realignment. There were few signs in the early 1880s that within a decade this dominance would be seriously threatened. The succession of Democratic victories in state and congressional elections from 1889–1891 gave some indication that the change in voting behavior involved more than short-term defection. The stability of party identification which had been so characteristic of the post–Civil War years appeared to have been undermined. If the voters who had crossed party lines had undergone full-fledged conversion of loyalties the election of 1896 might indeed have been "critical" and a lasting partisan realignment might have resulted. When the reorientation occurred, however, the Republicans were again dominant, and a party system had been established that would persist in this region for another generation.

It is Jensen's theory that the succession of landslides was the direct result of the intensification of social conflict. He stresses the importance of religion in 19th-century American life, and emphasizes its role in determining party affiliation and in shaping political issues. Pietists struggled with liturgicals in every denomination, and the conflict became intense whether the issue concerned the prohibition of the liquor traffic or restrictions on church schools. When it appeared that the moralists had achieved success in several states through control of the Republican party machinery, the political results were decisive. Only if pragmatic professionals could curb the crusading amateurs, or if new issues appeared, could the GOP hope to recover its former position of supremacy in the Midwest. The recognition of diverse cultural and moral belief systems among the electorate prevented the continuation of old-style monolithic campaigns, whether pietistic or partisan. The Republicans made a remarkably successful adjustment, and McKinley's pluralism attracted increasing support from nearly all ethnic groups in 1896. The Democratic party moved in the opposite direction, and Bryan's moralistic and millennarian crusade alienated many of the voters who had contributed to the success of the party earlier in the decade.

The author does not ignore economic matters, but he argues that some historians have overemphasized class conflict. He concludes that in these states and in this decade economic issues were less important than cultural conflicts. Campaigns waged on the tariff or monetary issue, for example, did not arouse the same high level of antagonism among immigrant voters as those that involved religious and ethnocultural allegiance. The impact of the severe 1893 Depression was significant, but the elections of 1894 constituted a decline for the Democrats rather than a great advance for the GOP. This view supports the conclusion of Paul Kleppner in his recent study of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio that the shift away from the Democrats cut across all social groups. The citizens who chose to express dissatisfaction by staying away from the polls were important, but those who sought a political alternative in a third party were not. Whatever success agrarian radicalism had in other sections, the Populists were not a major force in this part of the Midwest. The evidence in both studies indicates that even under the impact of widespread economic distress, the tradition of party loyalty helped retard the decline of Democratic strength. After 1896 the voters who had changed political direction found themselves part of a political organization that had become more tolerant of social diversity and that held power during a period of improving economic conditions. Thus what may have been temporary deviation became a more durable relationship within a new majority coalition.

This analysis of party affiliation in a period of political change suggests possibilities for further research. We need studies of state politics at other times and in other regions to determine whether the Midwest was unique and whether a similar polarization of religious and cultural attitudes played a significant role in altering the voting behavior of the American electorate during the 1850s and the 1920s.

The critical essay on the sources is both comprehensive and discriminating. The documentation reveals skill in locating new and significant information. The material presented in the tables and in the appendix indicates to some degree the extent of the statistical investigations. Professor Jensen has been a leader in the group of historians who have been promoting the use of quantitative analysis in historical research. His book is an excellent example of what can be accomplished when sophisticated statistical techniques are used to discover patterns of stability and change, and to clarify historical relationships over a period of time.

James A. Meldrum

Elmwood Park, Illinois

Environmental Law and Policy: Readings, Materials and Notes on Air Pollution and Related Problems. By James E. Krier. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971. Pp. 480. $13.50.)

Professor Krier's collection of readings is an excellent compilation of materials on the pollution problem and, taken as a whole, is also a provocative examination of alternative approaches to pollution control. Although its focus is on environmental law, it deals in broad-ranging fashion with many problems of public policy.

Krier states (p. 293): "The materials that follow focus primarily on the air pollution problem, but the issues they raise are of much broader significance. Consider the materials not in isolation but in the context of all the machinery of the legal system and the limitations of the real world." The materials selected, the manner in which they are organized, and the author's probing notes and questions facilitate the reader's ability to put the materials in a broad context.

About half the readings are court cases and articles from law journals. Most of the landmark cases, from William Aldred's Case (decided in 1611) to Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, are included. The other readings cover a wide gamut of authors and subjects. Economists are well represented, particularly J. H. Dales, but also Kneese, Wolozin, Gerhardt, and Mills. There are several excerpts from Naderite John Esposito, the transcript of a television debate on the internal combustion engine, and a detailed and very good analysis of the inner workings of the San Francisco Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. Most of the selections were written in the late 1960s, but more recent events, such as implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, are also covered.

The book is divided into three sections: the problem of pollution; the pollution problem and the courts; and pollution control legislation and its administration. The first section provides Krier's basic framework which is drawn not from the law but from welfare economics. It is best summarized in a selection from Calabresi (p. 139):

> Problems of misallocation of resources and externalities are not theoretical but empirical ones. The resource allocation aim is to approximate, both closely and cheaply, the result the market would bring about if bargaining actually were costless. The question then becomes: Is this accomplished most accurately and most cheaply by structural rules (like anti-trust laws), by liability rules, by taxation and governmental spending, by letting the market have free play or by some combination of these?

The extent to which the courts can efficiently allocate resources is discussed in the second section. As might be expected, the courts have not been consistent in their application of doctrines such as nuisance and trespass. Some of the judges have weighed the social costs and benefits in arriving at their decisions, while others have read the law to preclude a balancing of the social consequences. The limitations of the courts as a vehicle for setting pollution policy are described, although the key problem of the courts' ability to deal with scientific questions is not given much attention.

The selections and commentary dealing with pollution control legislation reveal Krier's doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal air pollution legislation. Two rather bland descriptions of the 1967 Clean Air Act are followed by savage blasts from Esposito. The concluding portion of the section on legislation is devoted to a discussion of pricing systems, and the reader is led to side with the theme of a reading from Larry Ruff (p. 424): "About all that can be said in favor of this price method is that it is logical, fair, comprehensive, practical, and much better than any of its alternatives." Krier's economic framework leads him to the same conclusion most economists have reached—namely, that a pricing or effluent fee scheme would be superior to the current regulatory system.

A book of readings, if it is to be an effective educational tool, should have a framework and a point of view. As the above indicates, *Environmental Law and Policy* meets this standard admirably. At the same time, its selections are balanced and well-chosen, and it successfully forces the reader to consider for himself the difficult questions posed.

The Krier volume would be an excellent text for courses in environmental law or the role of law in meeting societal problems. Its legal focus makes it less useful for courses in public policy, but the variety and high quality of its selections would make it a very good supplementary text for such courses.

J. Clarence Davies, III
The Council on Environmental Quality

Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty. By Robert J. Lampman. (Chicago: Markham, 1971. Pp. 168. $3.95, paper.)

Robert Lampman has written *the* primer on American poverty. He has distilled more good sense, pertinent information, and focused concern about American poverty into 168 pages than is contained in any collection of books and articles ten times this length. A catechism on this book should precede immersion into the eschatology and econometrics that characterizes most of the poverty literature.

The style of this book is refreshing. Lampman has a single-minded concern about American poverty. This book is drawn primarily from his own writings on this subject for more than 20 years and from those of his colleagues at the Institute for Research on Poverty at Wisconsin. At the time poverty became a major political issue, Lampman was one of perhaps a dozen Americans who had done serious scholarly work on which to base policy strategy, and this book was written to maintain public concern about poverty against the competition of other issues and against a legitimate skepticism about the efficacy of many public programs. He is a nominalist and wields Occam's razor with zest. Income poverty is defined as a state of low income. Poverty is a different condition from alienation, disability, discrimination, despair, inequality, powerlessness, and unemployment; although these conditions are often related, eliminating any one of these conditions will not eliminate the other conditions, and each deserves to be studied on its own merit. Once one accepts this mental set—a focus on income poverty—most of the data fall into place, and the major policy alternatives become apparent. Finally, Lampman is a rather old-fashioned economist, in the tradition of the Wisconsin institutionalists. One can only infer his theoretical structure from the strength of his argument. There is not an equation, a statistical test, or an indifference curve in his book, but he draws intelligently from the theoretical and empirical work of others. The major technical strength of the book is a very careful reading of the census data. For these reasons, and not in spite of them, Lampman has more to say about American poverty—to both scholars and men of affairs—than do most of us, singly or in combination.

The first three chapters efficiently summarize the intellectual and political background shaping American poverty policy. These chapters do not bring the reader quite up to date, because they exclude both the recent developments in welfare economics and public choice theory and the recent debate over welfare reform, but they provide a sufficient stage for the analysis of contemporary conditions.

The middle four chapters are the main strength of this book. These chapters summarize and analyze the current characteristics of the poverty population, changes in the level and composition of the poverty population since 1947, and the projections of this population. Lampman uses the Social Security Administration definitions of poverty incomes without reservation, recognizing that this yardstick, like any yardstick, is arbitrary but nonetheless useful. His major findings deserve repeating:

- The poor are much like the rest of us, except their incomes are lower. For example, the representative poor family is white, lives in an urban area outside the central city, has an able working family head, and is not on public assistance.

- Poverty is disproportionately high among the aged, the disabled, families headed by females, minority races, those with little education, and those who live in rural areas, although only little education among these conditions characterizes the majority of the poor. In contrast, most of the people in each of the above groups are not poor.

- For many of the poor, poverty is a transitional status. Around one-fourth of the poor in one year move to a higher income group in the next year.

- The proportion of the American population with poverty incomes fell from 30 per cent in 1947 to less than 12 per cent by 1970, despite a relative increase of four population groups with a higher incidence of poverty.

- Much of the reduction of the poverty population has been due to economic growth. Other major contributors were the increase of public transfers and the movement of people to higher income occupations, industries, and regions.

- The American tax system has been only mildly equalizing for several decades. Although total transfers have increased rapidly, less than 40 per cent of these transfers accrue to the pre-transfer poor. Even this smaller amount has had a major effect in reducing poverty, reducing the per cent of the total population in poverty by 10 per cent and the poverty gap of the post-transfer poor by over $10 billion.

- Recent projections of the poverty population suggest that the poor will number around 8 per cent and the poverty gap will be reduced to about $5 billion by 1975. The composition of the poverty population is not expected to change much, despite the relative immunity of major groups in this population to economic growth.

These conclusions suggest that elimination of American poverty, in terms of establishing a floor under family income, is achievable in this decade, without a major increase or reallocation of public funds and without a major restructuring of our society.

The final two chapters summarize the broad strategies for reducing poverty and considerations for selecting among these strategies. Although these chapters are not definitive, whole sections deserve quotation as guidelines for maintaining perspective and focused concern about American poverty. Lampman finally opts for rather marginal changes in government programs—$2 billion to raise public assistance minimums in the low income states, $4 billion to supplement the incomes of the working poor, and $4 billion to increase job-related education and training and to create jobs for the poor. My own quibbles with his suggested strategy are minor: My sense is that he underestimates the value of a wage-subsidy system for the poor and overestimates the value of education and training, but these are technical details which could be worked out. One hopes that the views expressed in his final sentences are widely shared:

> Ending income poverty does not require and will not achieve a transformation of society. It is a modest goal. . . . Dedication to the goal of eliminating income poverty requires that we scrutinize every expenditure made in the name of the poor to make sure that a great share of the benefits go to them. We should proceed, not with utopian expectations, but with the belief that achievement of this particular goal, along with progress toward other social and economic goals, will be a worthy achievement in the slow evolution of the good society.

William Niskanen
University of California, Berkeley

America on Trial—The War for Vietnam. By General Thomas A. Lane, foreword by General A. C. Wedemeyer. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971. Pp. 297. $7.95.)

Evidence can be assembled to argue that the late President Ngo-dinh-Diem was overthrown by the South Vietnamese generals in 1963 at the behest of American public opinion rather than of Vietnamese public opinion; that if he had not been murdered on the spot he would have returned to power within two or three years; that more blood has been shed in Vietnam because he was overthrown than would have been shed if he had not been; that the Indochina Communist Party is heir to the old Bolsheviks of the Comintern; and that the communist bloc has remained "monolithic" in this one arena of the world revolution if in no other. But General Lane shows no inkling of what the evidence is: he argues from prejudice alone.

Working from a handful of superficial secondary sources, and with no direct knowledge of his own to supplement them, he bludgeons the reader with an unremitting tirade of chauvinistic invective. U.S. administrations, he declares, have persistently shrunk from hitting the Chinese and Vietnamese communists hard enough. The culminating sin has been the Nixon doctrine, arrived at on misleading advice, the identity of whose author—Sir Robert Thompson—gives the sinister show away. That British counter-guerrilla expert, General Lane declares, lent his international reputation in 1969, for selfish British reasons of state (p. 211), to the false report that things were going well in Vietnam and thereby abetted President Nixon's soft-on-Communism foreign policy. In fact, General Lane's finger points at the British as multiple culprits—over Nationalist China and Korea as much as over Vietnam—because they have persistently "vetoed" (pp. 46 and 287) America's pursuit of a foreign policy in American interests, with the unworthy purpose of safeguarding their wretched colonialist possessions in Hong Kong from Red Chinese retaliation (p. 76). What is needed now ("by 1973"—pp. 229–31) is the mounting of an "invulnerable nuclear capability" in defiance of Russia and China, to coincide with the return home of American forces from both Asia and Europe. Rebellions will then break out, apocalyptically, in all Communist countries. Thus the Free World will be saved.

As political or strategic analysis, this book is laughable. The author contrives to introduce some element of inaccuracy into nearly every statement he makes; the silliest is that, going from China to Vietnam, one "crosses the Himalaya mountains" (on p. 29 and again on p. 68). He deserves to be thrown to the Concerned Asian Scholars.

Dennis J. Duncanson
University of Kent, England

Federal Funding and National Priorities: An Analysis of Programs, Expenditures, and Research and Development. By Leonard Lederman and Margaret Windus. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 213. $15.00.)

The authors of this book had a very limited purpose; they wished to demonstrate exactly what the title suggests about trends in federal spending over the course of a decade (1961–1971). They deduce from these statistics changes in national priorities. In addition to gross spending for federal programs, they also separate out expenditures for research and development, and relate these to their parent programs. As they state in their preface, they are concerned with "what is," not with "what should be." Their major source of information is *The Budget of the United States*.

This book can have some value as source material to political scientists, although its authors are economists. They have accomplished their limited objective in a workmanlike manner. This reader, however, found it disappointing on a number of counts. The bulk of the study describes all the major federal programs, grouped into what the authors call "supergoals," and indicates the trends in spending of each. The writing style bears a close resemblance to that of the principal source of their data. Occasionally, the authors suggest some of the common criticisms of the programs, but space limitations prevent serious discussion of these. The almost total absence of any commentary or opinions makes for rather unexciting reading. Their findings will hardly be surprising to anyone who follows the ups and downs of federal programming. Because their data only cover actual expenditures through the Johnson administration, one gets little insight into changes in priorities effected during Mr. Nixon's first term. The way the data are presented offers little opportunity to judge who are the principal beneficiaries of federal spending. And, they do not distinguish direct federal spending from grants to cities and states, an exercise which would have been useful.

To sum up their conclusions, the authors find declines during the decade in the percentage of total outlays in their "supergoal" categories of "national security," "space," and "commerce, transportation, and communications," while "income security and welfare," "education, knowledge, and manpower," and "health" showed significant increases.

Their final chapter, entitled "The Likely Future," is based on past data trends and "judgments about the possibility of breaks in these trends due to already apparent changes in priorities . . ." (p. 183). The authors predict continued growth in the areas that grew in the 1960s.

Frank C. Colcord, Jr.

Tufts University

City Managers in Legislative Politics. By Ronald O. Loveridge. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. Pp. 224. $8.50.)

Students of local government are well aware of the traditional controversies surrounding the role of the city manager: Should managers make policy, or should they merely confine themselves to administration? Are managers motivated solely by a concern for efficiency, or do they have broader social goals?

In his useful and readable study, Ronald O. Loveridge avoids the exhortative, debating approach which has characterized much of the literature in this field. Instead, the author provides a systematic analysis of the ways in which city managers define their policy roles and participate in the political process.

Loveridge's analysis is based on interviews with city managers, mailed questionnaires to city managers, and interviews and questionnaires with city councilmen—all in the San Francisco Bay Area. The study is part of the City Council Research Project of the Institute of Political Studies at Stanford University.

In examining city managers' views of their proper policy roles, Loveridge found "overwhelming agreement that the city manager should be a policy innovator and policy advocate" (pp. 49–50). Eighty-eight per cent of the managers studied agreed with the statement that "A city manager should assume leadership in shaping municipal policies" (p. 49). When the author turned to city councilmen, however, he found a very different conception of the proper role of the city manager. Eighty-seven per cent of the councilmen in the sample agreed that "The city manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council" (p. 86). Councilmen consistently voiced the opinion that the city manager should serve as a staff aide and adviser to the council.

Given this policy role conflict, city managers were found to utilize a number of strategies in dealing with councilmen. Loveridge discovered that the manager might consult informally with individual councilmen, authorize staff reports to prove certain points, hire outside consulting firms to make recommendations, prepare the agenda in ways which would influence policy decisions, and so forth. By using these strategies, managers could influence policy without unduly increasing councilmanic anxieties.

Although there was a substantial area of agreement in city managers' definitions of their role, Loveridge does identify different levels of support among managers for the view that they should make policy. And the author found that these differences in normative policy orientations were reflected in styles of political behavior. Those who endorsed a strong leadership role for managers tended to advocate major policies and to work actively with community groups, while most of those who defined the manager's proper role in a more limited way revealed themselves as avoiding contentious policy questions.

One of the most interesting parts of Loveridge's study is the identification of sources of differences in orientation among managers themselves. Loveridge presents a number of background factors which are found more frequently among aggressive political managers than among their more constrained counterparts: college education; social science major; graduate work; outside appointment (not on city staff); apprenticeship in city management; short period of service (15 years or less) in municipal government. The author also argues persuasively that professional identification and participation in the International City Managers' Association can be forces in the development of an ambitious definition of the manager's role.

Another strong section of the book is that in which the author documents the widely differing opinions of city managers and councilmen about the proper role of managers in the policy process. But the identification of this conflict in role perception raises some questions which are not answered in the study. Although Loveridge does describe strategies by which a manager can further his goals in the city council, he does not deal with the question of open hostility between manager and council. Given the differences in role perception, one would expect serious confrontations to take place. And if such is not the case, what is the explanation? Loveridge's findings show that city managers do participate in policy initiation and leadership. Are they so adept at masking such activity that councilmen are not aware of what is going on? Or are councilmen able to invent face-saving rationalizations for managers' active involvement in the making of policy? It has often been said that councilmen hold a trump card in their power to fire the city manager, but it would be interesting to know how often—and under what conditions—this power has actually been used.

The weakest segment of the book is the last chapter, "City Manager in Community Politics," in which a number of broad assertions are made without any supporting evidence. Dealing with the question of city managers and democratic values, Loveridge makes the following statements: "Probably no member of the local elite is more open to diverse public influences than the city manager" (p. 160). "The manager often represents those whose interests are not represented in the elite. Negroes provide a good example" (p. 161). "Unlike . . . most elite members, the city manager champions the general welfare of the community as opposed, for example, to the special interests of business, labor or civic groups" (p. 161). Such claims demand considerably more explication and support than this volume provides.

In fairness, it must be noted that the last chapter is somewhat speculative in tone and, at any rate, not crucial to the study. The rest of the book is a carefully argued, well-written contribution to our understanding of the perceptions and behavior of city managers.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

With All Deliberate Speed. Edited by John H. McCord. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. vii, 205. $7.50.)

This frequently interesting set of essays says a great deal more about the practice than the theory of civil rights. As Professor McCord writes in his foreword, the authors here are not detached academicians, but "crusaders and public teachers for civil rights" (p. vi). Following a useful general summary of the development of civil rights from the Civil War to the present (written by the student editors of the *University of Illinois Law Forum,* where the symposium first appeared), there are articles on education, public accommodations, and housing, which discuss prospects for future progress toward equality in the context of analysis of the current legal situation. The article on employment opportunities is a detailed case study of a successful action by the federal government intended to serve as a model for the future.

As a book which captures the state of civil rights at a particular point in time and makes proposals for action in the immediate future, *With All Deliberate Speed,* is in some respects already outdated. A good deal has happened in the four years since it was written, and the advice it offers on tactics is therefore no longer entirely relevant. In the intervening period, for example, the decisions in the *Mecklenberg* and *Holmes* county cases have dramatically accelerated the pace of school desegregation in the South, and the Philadelphia plan and other federal affirmative action programs have changed the picture in employment.

But there is another and more subtle sense in which the passage of time tends to undermine the book. All of the authors base their analyses and proposals on the assumption that full equality can and should be achieved by governmental action. Increasingly, however, doubts grow as to whether this is indeed possible or desirable. This is by no means to suggest that the authors here are wrong in their assumptions, but that they fail to take account of the objections which are more and more being raised against them.

This is clearly true of the piece on equal educational opportunity by Robert L. Carter, former NAACP General Counsel (1956–68). Its lucid and informative analysis of the developments since *Brown* v. *Board of Education* rests on the assumption that ". . . segregation, in and of itself, denies equal educational opportunity" (p. 62). But this assumption must now be confronted with Christopher Jencks's carefully documented judgment that ". . . the case for or against desegregation should not be argued in terms of academic achievement" (Jencks et al., *Inequality* [New York: Basic Books, 1972], p. 106). Carter also falls short in devoting only a brief and rather cryptic paragraph to what he admits to be the "growing clamor for something called community control or decentralization" (p. 83). It seems especially true here that the determination to have governmentally imposed integration, and therefore presumably equality of educational experience, blinds him to other very real values to be taken into account on the other side.

The same sort of point can be made even more forcefully about the liveliest and most intellectually stimulating piece in the volume, Meiklejohn Library President Ann Fagan Ginger's article on housing. Ms. Ginger looks upon housing as a public utility, a necessity to be provided to each of us by the most efficient possible means. Seen from this perspective, the private housing market is naturally found to be unfair and inefficient. In contrast to the current state of affairs we are given a nostalgic picture of those systems, from feudalism to the company town, which once provided housing for the worker. Then we are offered a model for the future in which a single government agency would control the provision of housing for each of us, bringing back the benefits of feudal stability and eliminating discrimination ". . . on the basis of race or financial condition" (p. 177). Of course this would mean that housing is no longer private property. But most of us don't really own our own houses anyway (the bank does), and we already get most of the vital services which make our houses habitable from the government. Why not recognize the fact that private property has ceased to exist and adopt the proposed model?

The answer lies in those considerations which Ms. Ginger chooses to disregard. Admitting that we are already far too dependent on banks and governments to claim that our homes are really our castles, it is still essential that we maintain and extend our right to choose, shape, and live in our homes as freely as if they were our castles. What would happen to what remains of our freedom to order our private lives as we choose, if we were faced with a centralized bureaucracy every time we wanted to make a major change in our housing, or the way in which we live in it?

But setting aside the problem of the desirability of such a system, growing experience with welfare bureaucracies should lead us to question the assumption that it would work. At least it is clear that the effectiveness of such a bureaucracy can no longer be taken for granted.

This is a book which may be most important, then, not as a blueprint for the future, but as a monument to a period of singleminded confidence in the government's capacity to solve the problems of equality, if only everyone would try hard enough: a period which is now rapidly coming to an end.

ROBERT S. GERSTEIN
University of California, Los Angeles

This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798–1898. By Paul C. Nagel. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 376. $9.50.)

Historians have long been intrigued with the problem of defining the distinctive attributes of American nationality. Differing in their conceptualizations of the problem and in their methods of attacking it, they have produced a rich and varied literature on this baffling theme, to which Dr. Paul C. Nagel's impressive study must be added.

Nagel, who previously explored attitudes toward Union in his *One Nation Indivisible,* now examines "what being an American implied to the citizens of the Republic." He is concerned with the sense of nationality, rather than of nationalism, that found expression in representative statements by political leaders, publicists, and intellectuals. Thus he focuses on self-conscious interpretations of the nation's perception of its "calling" or "trust." Instead of the consistent, almost static ideological commitments identified by such scholars as Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, and David Potter, Nagel finds ambiguity, agonizing doubts, and intolerable anxiety.

Beginning in 1798, as the young republic became aware of the full range of foreign and domestic threats that imperiled its existence, Nagel details the prevalent despair about the survival of the national experiment. After 1815, he tells us, the concept of a trust emerged, and although its nature was variously defined, there was constant fear that innovation, disunity, and man's evil nature would result in betrayal of the trust. The ante-bellum decade brought conflict between those who called for a stewardship of preservation and those "restorationists" who urged a dynamic quest for liberty, even at the price of Union. Then came the "atonement" of the Civil War, and with it the anticipation of a new birth of freedom.

But, in Nagel's view, the hoped-for regeneration proved illusory. Although both the Union and republicanism has been maintained, the sordid influence of Mammon threatened to pervert the high calling which had to be realized if nationality was to be achieved. Escape from the agony of an intolerable trust was accomplished in 1898, when the nation turned abruptly away from preoccupation with its shortcomings to embrace a new trust, that of pursuing a disinterested stewardship of moral betterment throughout the world.

So intricate and shaded is Nagel's treatment of his central theme that any *précis* can merely be suggestive. His study is important for the confirmation that it gives to the accepted notion that America has been singularly concerned with its calling, for the new emphasis it places on the extreme anxieties that such concerns produced, and for his suggestion, which I do not find quite plausible, that an escape from the old trust was achieved after 1898.

Among the weaknesses of the study I would cite the idiosyncratic conceptualization of "trust," the extreme reticence of the author to interpret his findings in general terms, and a scheme of organization that is often baffling. Others may share my bewilderment at Nagel's enigmatic conclusion that the republic can only fulfill its trust through humility. Students of American nationality will find the work more useful as a well-selected record of the varied perceptions of national goals than as a contribution to their theoretical understanding of the problem.

RICHARD P. MCCORMICK
Rutgers University

Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. By James T. Patterson. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972. Pp. xvi, 749. $12.50.)

On a sloping lawn near the U.S. Capitol there stands an imposing hundred-foot tower, a memorial to Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio, placed there by unanimous act of Congress two years after Taft's death in 1953. No other Member of Congress, past or present, is so honored. In 1957, a special bipartisan committee of the Senate selected Taft as one of the five most significant figures ever to sit in the Senate. Both these signal honors attest to the special esteem in which Taft was held by his colleagues. Because he was the son of a President of the United States, several times himself a presidential hopeful, and leader of his party in Congress, it was inevitable that Taft would attract the attention of a biographer.

It was by no means inevitable, however, that Taft would receive a fair or sympathetic hearing at a biographer's hands. Most of his colleagues respected Taft for his intelligence, his mastery of facts, and his analytical power. Few of them liked him, however, or even knew him well, and many found him stubborn, narrow-mindedly ideological, and cold. "Taft has the best mind in the Senate—until he makes it up," was a famous remark. He is remembered today for the Taft-Hartley bill, a law regulating labor-management relations enacted over President Truman's veto and widely regarded by union people as antilabor. Taft denounced the Nuremberg trials as ex-post-facto, and encouraged Joseph McCarthy in his assaults on the reputations of persons linked with the State Department. He was the foremost conservative politician of his time, yet he regularly sponsored bills for federally subsidized housing and aid to education. He opposed the excessive interventionism of the Marshall Plan but supported General MacArthur in Korea. As a member of the Yale Corporation he deplored the employment of left-wing professors but demanded that they be left strictly alone in the pursuit of their work. He was strongly partisan, a party regular, and highly conventional in his address to most questions, yet fiercely self-reliant and independent in his drive to master issues and present them in his own way. He wrote all his own speeches. And for all his conventionality he was never a religious man. He was for years an undisputed leader in an institution known far and wide as the world's most exclusive gentleman's club, yet in his personal relations he was relentlessly unclubable—awkward, shy, and brusque.

James T. Patterson has done even-handed justice to this remarkable mélange of characteristics, neither forcing an interpretation upon recalcitrant contradictions in his subject's character, nor permitting an undue fascination with warts to obscure the main features of Taft's portrait. Patterson, whose previous work was on the conservative coalition in Congress, enjoyed the full cooperation of the Taft family, and exclusive access to a formidable treasure-trove of family documents. In addition he seems to have combed through or interviewed every other plausible source for letters, diaries, and recollections. Although he has written an authorized biography, it is nevertheless an independent work of scholarship.

Two features in particular distinguish the book: Patterson shows a remarkably thorough grasp of the dynamics of congressional politics and of national politics more generally throughout the entire 60-year period of his narrative. And he is absolutely fair-minded in discussing the activities of Taft and his contemporaries. It is now fashionable in historical writing to commit the sin of anachronism, in which the historian parades his knowledge of how things turned out—plus his presumably superior moral insight—so as retrospectively to weigh and judge the acts of his subjects. By scrupulously refraining from any such nonsense Patterson has immeasurably enhanced the value of his book. He has also produced a well-informed and illuminating portrait of a significant American and the politics of his times.

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

The Long Struggle for Black Power. By Edward Peeks. (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. 448. $7.95.)

The Black Man and the American Dream: Negro Aspirations in America, 1900–1930. Edited by June Sochen. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Pp. 372. $2.95.)

For Blacks Only: Black Strategies for Change in America. By Sterling Tucker. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. 211. $4.95.)

Differing in format, these books have similar concerns and common subject matter: the black experience in America. Each is timely and useful and has its particular merits. *The Long Struggle for Black Power* is a brief, well-documented history of major ideas, movements, and personalities in the saga of black Americans. *The Black Man and the American Dream* is a selection of articles on the American race problem, primarily by Negro authors, from periodical literature appearing in the first three decades of the twentieth century. *For Blacks Only* is a terse, personal, thoughtful analysis of the present state of the black revolution and pragmatic proposals for meaningful change.

The essays in Professor Sochen's book were taken from the *Nation, New Republic, Crisis* (NAACP), *Opportunity* (Urban League), and *Southern Workman* (Hampton Institute). They examine major aspects of Negro life: education, health, employment, migration, progress, discrimination, disfranchisement, etc., in the context of American values and goals.

Sochen's analysis of five dozen articles by Negro authors leads her to conclude that black writers in this era generally shared the values of white America and "used the rhetoric, methodology, and goals of the American Dream in their struggle for equality" (p. 3). Though aware of views of black radicals such as Monroe Trotter, Chandler Owen, and A. Philip Randolph, she finds little intense social ferment. She is amazed that black intellectual thought reflected faith in the democratic process and the possibilities of substantial progress within the American system.

Most reform movements in twentieth-century America, however, have been mounted on a similar faith. Thus, in view of the dynamic potential of many of America's professed ideals, the tortuous history of the black experience, and the realities of the Negro's struggle to survive in a hostile environment, this reviewer finds Professor Sochen's amazement difficult to understand. Most of these essays are well written, interesting, worth reading, especially Alain Locke's brilliant interpretation of the "New Negro," and Abram Harris's erudite analysis of one sector of the American Left. Harris reflects the intellectual potential that made him an outstanding scholar and teacher in economics (not sociology, as Sochen mistakenly claims).

These writings address many of the race issues still confronting—and dividing—black and white America. In these days of the "cult of blackness," when the legitimate quest for black identity and respect sometimes leads to counterproductive self-delusion, it can be helpful to consider the caustic comments of George Schuyler and the rebuttal of Langston Hughes. Michael Gold's presumptuous piece is another reminder of some white men's readiness to proffer unsolicited advice to the black brother.

Peeks's *Long Struggle* is a solidly written book, reflecting the author's graduate study in journalism. Based primarily on secondary sources, the volume is profusely documented by much of the best literature on Afro-Americans; and Peeks draws effectively upon his personal contact with the civil rights movement as a reporter covering historic events of the 1950s-'60s.

Peeks organizes his narrative around the theme of self-help, which he perceives as a major strategy in the struggle for black survival and progress in America. Viewing organization of the Free African Society in 1787 by Richard Allen and Absalom Jones as the beginning of organized Negro self-help, Peeks traces this phenomenon in the creation of various types of voluntary associations. Enforced segregation and pervasive oppression forced black Americans to establish organizations to abolish slavery, aid the sick, bury the dead, educate youth, acquire land, establish businesses, fight discrimination, and so on. The establishment of churches, fraternal orders, banks, etc., reflected the Negro's recognition of the importance of group efforts. Peeks relates self-help to the antilynching movement, the fight against disfranchisement, segregation in public accommodations, discrimination in employment, the courts, and housing.

Peeks draws vivid portraits of black leaders who moved boldly upon the American scene and had massive impact on public opinion and race relations. He discusses black nationalism, boycotts, integration versus separatism, nonviolence versus violence, electoral politics, protest politics, and many other ideas, actions, and movements evolving out of the black man's struggle to find strategies for liberation. He presents in sharp, balanced perspective the cross-currents in Negro life, and the conflicts which have divided and weakened black leadership in the fight against exploitation and institutionalized racism.

Though it covers ground familiar to the social historian, particularly black scholars, nevertheless, most readers—especially students and the general public—can profit from reading this book. It should be required reading for those cocksure militants who lack understanding of the essential continuity of black protest and who tend to think that the fight against oppression began in the 1960s.

Tucker's *For Blacks Only* is not an exercise in scholarly documentation. It is a brief, stimulating statement, distilled from the active mind and rich experience of a man long and actively involved in the black struggle. The author has held responsible positions in the civil rights movement as national coordinator for the Solidarity Day March in support of the Poor People's Campaign and Vice-chairman of the 1963 March on Washington.

Whereas Peeks believes the civil rights movement has entered a new phase, Tucker feels it is dead. But despite America's retreat to conservatism, despite the deliberate abrasiveness of some embittered blacks, despite the polarization of the races, and despite white repression and black rage, Tucker believes that there are strategies which can be used to effect significant change within the system. He feels that the anger and energy of blacks can be channeled into constructive work. On the basis of his experience as activist and Urban League executive, Tucker shows how coalitions with other groups can successfully attack crucial problems in education, housing, employment, crime, political power, and representation.

Like Peeks, he defines and dissects black power and identifies its positive and useful aspects. Both Tucker and Peeks celebrate black pride and racial solidarity but reject black separatism. Tucker recognizes the uses and the strong appeal of separatism, especially to the powerless. He notes how overemphasis on cultural uniqueness and "the current fashionable focus on black identity serve white racism" (p. 99). Both Tucker and Peeks agree that Negroes cannot effect their liberation by their efforts alone; they must have help of white allies. Tucker understands how disillusionment with the slowing of civil rights progress led to expulsion of whites from some interracial organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality. He also realizes, however, that "it cannot be a long-term strategy" (p. 105).

Tucker and Peeks, like the black writers in Sochen's volume, reject revolution and violence as counterproductive. Tucker is aware that, unlike white radicals, "those who grew up in the ghetto and know the realities of police repression find little purpose or carthorsis in provoking violence, in engineering confrontations, in baiting cops" (p. 145).

Tucker and Peeks know that there is no single or simple solution to the complicated, deep-seated problems facing black Americans. Both authors recognize that the black minority must develop and implement a wide variety of flexible strategies in order to achieve liberation. They see strong political organization and wise use of the ballot as a vital avenue to real power. And both agree that blacks, operating from a position of organized strength, must form coalitions with other minorities and elements of the white population.

ROBERT E. MARTIN
Howard University

The Politics of Economic and Human Resource Development. By Randall B. Ripley. (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. 184. $8.00; $3.75, paper.)

The Politics of Economic and Human Resource Development is the fifth book in the Bobbs-Merrill policy analysis series edited by Thomas R. Dye. These volumes all claim to offer original theoretical formulations in the emerging field of public policy. Ripley, professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, erects his own "analytical framework" on the premises of "systems theory" as elaborated by David Easton and by other scholars who have favored its constructs and metaphors. This framework he applies to four brief case studies of programs in the area of economic and human resource development: the Economic Development Administration, the Job Corps, Model Cities, and Appalachian redevelopment (through the Area Redevelopment Administration and the Appalachian Regional Commission).

Its chief merit lies in its assembling materials on the legislative politics, the implementation, and the social effects of each of the four program packages. Its corresponding defects, however, are that the legislative histories are dull (we are spared, it seems, the account of not even one roll-call vote), that the accounts of program implementation are superficial, and that program evaluations are unsophisticated—and occasionally credulous.

It is to Ripley's credit that the analytical framework is explicitly developed and consistently applied to all four case studies. Unfortunately, the propositions entailed by the framework are so abstract as to be either trivial or meaningless (e.g., "Policy process variables figure importantly in the production of policy statements" [p. 14]). Their application to the empirical materials is therefore arbitrary and unilluminating. For example, one of the four "policy process elements [which] emerge as particularly important" regarding the Job Corps is that "Job Corps officials agreed: that their primary goal was to help enrollees become employable in decent-paying jobs" and also that "their mission involved not simply subsidy but the manipulation of job opportunities and the redistribution of useful skills" (p. 90). Even if it were clear what exactly is meant by "the redistribution of useful skills," it would still not be obvious why these facts are "policy process elements." Nor is there any explanation why they rank among the four "particularly important" such elements in the history of the Job Corps.

Another peculiarity of Ripley's framework is that "policy results" include *statements* as well as actions and outcomes. Hence we learn that one of the three Job Corps "results" was that "societal policy statements were expansionist throughout the Johnson administration" but more restrained under Nixon.

Ripley's lack of success with the development and application of analytical frameworks puts him in company with most other scholars who have essayed the same task. What is perhaps unique to the effort under review here is that its shortcomings are especially evident owing to Professor Ripley's commendable wish to take his own framework seriously enough to use it explicitly and consistently.

EUGENE BARDACH
University of California, Berkeley

Federal Service and the Constitution. By David H. Rosenbloom. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971. Pp. 267. $8.00.)

Government employment has increased sharply in the last decade: from 8.4 million in 1960 to 12.9 million in 1970. This growth, coupled with persistent and vocal demands for the provision of steadier and better government service, and the increased activity and militancy of public employee unions, has brought many of the problems of federal, state, and local employment into the public eye. Mr. Rosenbloom's book, therefore, is welcome. It is a well-written and easy to read sketch of the federal employment relationship from the beginning of the Republic. It is, however, no more than this, and accordingly, it will be of little value to the political, historical, or legal scholar.

Rosenbloom traces the growth of the federal service from 1776, through the spoils system, the reform movement and the development of the modern civil service. His is a straightforward and accurate presentation, but it lacks the rich texture of good historical writing. The facts fail to sparkle, for they are not mounted in their social or political setting. Nor is there the narrative drama that fixes events in the reader's mind.

The author's principal concern, however, is not with history. He is interested in "the constitutional relationship between the citizen and the state in public employment." His approach to this relationship is set forth in the book's introduction.

> The relationship is most usefully thought of as the degree of differentiation between the constitutional rights of citizens when in or in application for, and when out of or not in application for, public employment. The concept of such a relationship is intended to comprehend the distinction between citizens in public employment and others with respect to the ways in which the state may legitimately

act upon the constitutional rights of one or the other, but not both. Therefore, the relationship can take two general forms. It is nondiscriminatory when the roles of citizen and public employee are thought to be entirely compatible and there is no differentiation between the constitutional rights of citizens which is dependent upon public employment. The relationship is discriminatory when the roles of public employee and citizen are not believed to be wholly compatible and differentiation of constitutional rights is dependent upon the fact of public employment. The relationship is negatively discriminatory when the constitutional rights of public employees are subject to greater restriction and it is positively discriminatory when they are afforded additional constitutional rights. It is logically possible for the relationship to have positive and negative elements at the same time and for those elements to balance each other to cause a neutrally discriminatory relationship (pp. 1–4).

Armed with this analytic tool, Rosenbloom examines the federal service and finds that, during most of its history, the public employee has suffered negative discrimination. He has, as a condition of his employment, been forced to surrender some of the freedoms—speech, privacy, association, etc.—that he otherwise would have enjoyed. The trouble with this analysis is not that it is wrong, but rather that it is incomplete. It tells the reader nothing about the comparative intrusions on individual freedom suffered by employees of private employers. Of course, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to the private employer, but that is not a sufficient excuse for the book's incompleteness. Consider, for example, the editorial writer who loses his job because his views differ from those held by his employer. Is he not in the same unhappy position —i.e., unemployed as a result of the opinions he holds—whether his employer is the government or the *New York Times?* I do not mean to suggest that the law should treat the private and public employee the same (that was Holmes's mistake in the policeman case). I do mean to suggest that neither the law nor its critics are free to ignore the comparison.

Moreover, Rosenbloom's examination of the case law in such areas as loyalty/security or employee political activity is pedestrian. All of the constitutional and statutory decisions he addresses have been better analyzed elsewhere; yet this analysis is not satisfactory. There remains important work to be done. Take, for example, the question whether political neutrality can constitutionally be imposed upon a public employee. The issue in part is whether such an imposition violates the employee's right of free association. Surprisingly, we know little about that right. Is it mainly instrumental as Tocqueville argued, "a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority"? If it is, then its reach must be judged in terms of the goal it seeks to serve. And that goal—preventing the tyranny of the majority—may well be furthered by the political neutrality of public employees rather than by their active involvement in the political process. If, on the other hand, the right of free association is seen as desirable in itself (and quite apart from whether it furthers a separate societal goal), the power of Congress to restrict the political activities of federal employees may, indeed, be meager. I suspect Tocqueville's vision is correct, but I am far from sure. I *am* sure, however, that Rosenbloom has not illuminated this or the many other hard legal problems touched upon in *Federal Service and the Constitution.*

Harry H. Wellington
Yale University

Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965. By Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 1970. Pp. 268. $8.95.)

Prophet in Politics is the second half of a two-volume biography of Henry Wallace by Edward and Frederick Schapsmeier, professors of history. The first work covered the agrarian years, 1910–1940, and this effort completes the project. Beginning with the period shortly before World War II and concluding with Wallace's death in 1965, the authors examine Wallace with affectionate accuracy in his roles as wartime administrator, diplomat, cabinet officer, presidential candidate, and agricultural scientist. With less objectivity and frequent apology, they recount his activities as critic, maverick, and polemicist.

The Schapsmeiers have combed most of the relevant manuscript collections and have also corresponded with or interviewed scores of people who had political relations with the former Vice-President. Thus their book is likely to be the standard source on Wallace for some time. It is thoroughly documented (more than 500 footnotes) but written in a somewhat labored and frequently didactic style. In addition, the Schapsmeiers are uncritically fond of their subject. They picture him as a fervent idealist, totally dedicated to God, world cooperation, and humanity. If Wallace had the driving ambition, selfish thoughts, or partisan motives most men need to reach the threshold of the presidency, it is well concealed from the reader. His miscalculations and political errors often are blamed on innocence, candor, noble objectives, or on others who misled him. The authors seem determined to protect Wallace—even from himself, and even when he doesn't need it.

Wallace was in many ways an admirable though perplexed man. He was an extraordinarily religious person who endorsed World War II, but found the Cold War irrational and unconscionable. He was a trusting, almost naive, leader in a world of pragmatic heads of state determined to maintain and aggrandize their power. He was a propagandist for peace oblivious to the need for a base from which to operate, and a leader of the moderate Left without quite comprehending the significance and responsibilities of his position. As a politician, he was evidently insensitive to the machinations of the men around him. As an agricultural scientist, he was not always perceptive of the complex relations between science and religion, science and war, and science and world affairs.

For the most part, the authors stick closely to Wallace's activities with little analysis of the larger political environment in which he moved. The rift with Truman over foreign policy is well described, but the discussion of the election of 1948 is an egregious example of the lack of extended treatment one would hope to find in a definitive work. Too much of the brief discussion of Wallace's presidential candidacy is spent defending his inconsistencies and explaining how he was duped by the Communists and fellow travelers. Surely Wallace was a victim of his own compulsions and ideals as well as of those with whom he was associated in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. Old liberal friends deserted him in his third-party candidacy, and his long and distinguished service to the nation was depreciated. Yet, in perspective, many of his principles were sound. His positions on Russia, the Cold War, and world cooperation hardly need exoneration today.

Henry Wallace was a deeply spiritual public figure who crusaded for his conception of what was good for humanity. As a politician, philosopher, and scientist, he was only partially successful, but this informative and compassionate biography, more descriptive than analytical, fails to completely explain why this was so.

DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON
University of Iowa

Budget Innovation in the States. By Allen Schick. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. Pp. 223. $6.95.)

There have been several efforts to reform budget procedures during this century. Ranging in time from President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency to President Johnson's efforts to spread Planning-Programming-Budgeting throughout the federal establishment, the reformers have sought to stretch the concern of budgeters beyond the narrow realm of financial control. Most proposals would recast budgeting to emphasize information about the details of programs and the goals of policy. Unfortunately, few of the reformers or their critics have tried to maintain consistency of terminology. The contemporary student of budgeting who would try to place present efforts in the perspective of the past must first wrestle with several meanings of "performance budgeting," "program budgeting," "fiscal control," "management," and "planning."

Allen Schick of Brookings does a creditable job of sorting out the history of budget reform in the United States and offers a standard vocabulary that seems to have a proper place for each major thrust: into would-be uses of the budget that stress "control," "management," or "planning." "Line-item" budgets serve control purposes, while "performance" budgets represent the demand for improved management of resources. "PPB" is a mixture of several orientations, with policy-planning dominant. Dr. Schick describes the complexity of PPB as a source of some problems. He argues that it is more a plastering together of different components than tightly integrated system. Its components—and their labels—promise different things to different people, who then work at cross-purposes while they seek to implement their views of PPB. Throughout the book, the author relates his tale of budgeting to the larger political process: what perspectives characterize various participants in budgeting (administrator, central budget office, chief executive, legislative), and how each component of a reform has brought support, opposition, or apathy from various actors.

It is no fault of the author that the book came out only shortly before the Nixon Administration announced the end of PPB and its replacement with yet another scheme. We must wait for the next summary treatment of budget reforms—or perhaps an article by Allen Schick—to understand how much form or substance lies within this recent change; and what it tells us about the preferences or capacities of government budgeters.

This book attempts to integrate description and analysis of budget reforms in the national government with descriptions of budget reforms in the states. Yet the allocation of space in the seven chapters does not match the promise of the title. The first two and the last two chapters deal with budget reforms in general—almost exclusively with events in the national government—while most of the middle three chapters deal with the states. Yet while Chapter 4 is labeled "The Status of PPB in the States," it offers little information specific to the states; most of it could pass as commentary on the problems in adopting PPB by federal agencies.

The states are slighted not only in terms of the quantity but also of the quality of the attention devoted to them. Budget reforms in the national government are broadly and convincingly analyzed in as complete and attractive a discussion of budget reforms as any I have seen. Schick takes to task both the most optimistic of the reformers and the most caustic of the critics; he identifies some goals that seem feasible as well as some features in the structure of budget making that discourage certain greater hopes. In his conclusion Schick suggests some tantalizing—although briefly described—alternatives that might appear in the next rounds of reform.

The material on the states is disappointing. There is little effort to relate material on changes in budgeting to the different modes of state politics and policy making. Implicitly and occasionally explicitly we read that budget reform begins in Washington and comes later and piecemeal to the states. Yet we read that at least three states adopted components of PPB before many of the federal agencies did. We do not learn why some states adopt the reforms more quickly or thoroughly than others; we find no detailed explanation or assessment of PPB couched in the context of state politics or economics. Schick offers simplistic descriptions of changing budget procedures in a few of the states, sandwiched between cogent analysis of budgeting in the national government. There is scarcely a word about the states in the final two chapters that offer some theorizing about budgeting. His descriptive chapters on the states do not seem to inform his analysis of what happened in the recent flurry of budget reform, or what changes in procedure may hold on after the flurry subsides.

The combination of meaty treatment of national affairs and lackluster treatment of the states is confusing and unfortunate. Schick knows enough about budgeting to deliver better on his promise to write about budget innovation in the states. He buries much good material on budgeting in the national government in a book that is made unsatisfactory by its alleged focus on the states. This reviewer's advice is to scratch the second half of the title, and to read Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7. The result is a good book.

IRA SHARKANSKY

University of Wisconsin, Madison

American Communism in Crisis, 1943–1957. By Joseph R. Starobin. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 331. $12.95.)

Except for the pre–World War I Socialist Party, the American Communist Party was between 1938 and 1948 the largest and most important radical or revolutionary movement in American history. One might even make a case for giving first place to the Communists on the basis of their greater discipline and internal cohesion as well as their more extensive field of influence. Individual Communist party members spent more time and energy for the party than did individual Socialist party members; many Communist sympathizers and fellow-travelers were the equivalent of Socialist party members in their service to the party.

In any case, scholarly interest in the Communist movement has been far less than its relative importance would warrant. Much more attention was paid in the nineteen-sixties to the I.W.W. than to the Communists, no doubt because the radical mood found the I.W.W. more sympathetic politically or emotionally. Serious study of the Communists in their "middle period" in the nineteen-thirties has hardly begun and is now long overdue.

From 1930 to 1939, the Communist Party's membership rose from about 7,500 to at least 75,000 and possibly closer to 100,000. In 1948, the Party still claimed almost 70,000. It was able to overcome the two crises of the previous decade—brought on by the German-Soviet pact and the expulsion of its most successful leader, Earl Browder—without serious losses. But from 1948 on, it headed downwards; and as a result of the internal crisis which tore it apart in 1956–57, it became little more than another radical sect. It has succeeded in making a modest recovery in the past few years, but it is barely back where it was about 1932, without the same élan and momentum.

The questions that beg for answers are: Why and how did it rise in its period of growth? Why and how did it fall in its period of decline?

We now have the answer to the second question before getting one for the first. Roughly the same ground was covered in a previous book by Professor David A. Shannon, published in 1959. But Professor Starobin has had a dozen more years in which to gather material and ponder it; he has also had the inestimable advantage of greater intimacy with the party's inner workings. In this field, it is invaluable to know where the political bodies are buried, and Professor Starobin, without writing an autobiography, has made the most of his personal experiences. His book supersedes everything that has been written on this period; it belongs with the few indispensable works on American radicalism in general and American Communism in particular.

The main fascination of Professor Starobin's story is that it shows in fine detail how a radical or revolutionary movement can try to commit suicide at the same time that an attempt is being made to murder it. Without its own suicidal tendencies, the victimization suffered by the Communists in the McCarthy period would probably have hurt the party to a considerable extent, but it could never have done as much damage as the party did to itself. There was far more official violence against Communists during the depths of the depression, but it did not stop them from tripling their membership between 1930 and 1933.

Professor Starobin has written the definitive account of the Communists' self-inflicted wounds. On the assumption that a cyclical economic crisis, on the order of the depression of the early 'thirties, together with a Soviet-American war were imminent, the Communists began to make preparations to go "underground" as early as 1947, some time before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy began to do his dirty work. These apocalyptic expectations did not prevent them from taking part in—and taking apart—the Wallace movement the following year, an intermezzo of opportunism for which they paid dearly by being forced to break with the larger labor movement. The Communist aspect of the Wallace movement has never been dealt with more clearly and subtly than by Professor Starobin. Nevertheless, the party was apparently able to hold on to most of its *cadres* and a large part of its postwar membership until 1951, the crucial year in Professor Starobin's account. The most striking section of his book tells how the party leaders decided to go "underground," to conduct a witch-hunt inside the party that would have made Senator McCarthy suffer torments of envy, to shatter far more Communist lives and dismantle far more of the party's organizational machinery than all the congressional committees and volunteer Communist-hunters were capable of doing. Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech," the Polish uprising, and the infinitely tragic Hungarian revolt, all in 1956, came as shock waves hitting a party that was already diseased and demoralized. Those who think that McCarthyism was mainly responsible for the American Communist Party's undoing in the nineteen-fifties are especially advised to read this book.

Professor Starobin's conclusions are in part somewhat less satisfactory. Throughout his book, he shows how the American Communist leaders looked to Moscow for inspiration and even tactical guidance, despite the official dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. The following year, Browder sent to Moscow exactly those party documents which Jacques Duclos used against him in 1945. Starobin himself went on a mission to Moscow in 1951 to find out what the Soviet leaders thought about matters that struck him as "almost entirely technical" and "insignificant." Steps were taken to insure continuing contacts. Nevertheless, Professor Starobin writes: "All the evidence suggests that the C.P. leaders never really *knew* what either the Soviet Union or the international movement wanted of them—except for them to keep in step at every turn" (p. 231). This is a most peculiar exception. Was it not enough for the American leaders to know that much in order to know what the Soviet Union or the international movement wanted of them?

One need not agree with every nuance or interpretation in this book to consider it, as I do, a major contribution in this field. No one who wishes to understand what happened to American Communism can afford to ignore it.

THEODORE DRAPER
The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.

The Institutionalized Presidency. Edited by Norman C. Thomas and Hans W. Baade. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. Pp. 239. $8.50.)

The American presidency is in "a constant state of flux," and it is therefore necessary "to reappraise the presidential office with a view toward developing a new set of perspectives for the 1970's" (p. 1). With reappraisal as their theme, Thomas and Baade have collected nine articles whose unity lies in their examination of the presidency as an ongoing institution rather than as the instrument of any one incumbent. The collection includes a number of worthy articles: Joseph H. Kallenbach on the hidden implications and unforeseen results of constitutional amendments relating to the presidency; Harvey C. Mansfield on different approaches to reorganization of the executive branch and their reflection of the differing political objectives of the president and Congress; Marver H.

Bernstein's history of the failure of attempts to improve management of the executive branch; Allen Schick's history of the failure of the Bureau of the Budget and a tentative assessment of the Office of Management and Budget's potential; Norman C. Thomas's overview of the sources of information available to the president and the limitations of each; and Hans W. Baade on West Germany's examination of its own executive, with possible implications for the American presidency. Three articles, however, are of particular interest.

The first, by David L. Paletz, presents an overview of the literature on the presidency and classifies it according to the different perspectives of the authors. This in itself is useful; far more significant is the way Paletz utilizes his material to show that trends in political scientists' approaches to the presidency mirror changes in the ideology of the political activists with whom the writers identify. Paletz suggests that writers tend to react to the most recent incumbent in formulating their theories, and that the theory accorded orthodoxy at any given moment is directly dependent on the dominant political values of the time. If he is correct, the next spate of theories should mix post-Johnsonian reaction (the president has too much unchecked power in foreign affairs and should consult with Congress before acting) with post-Nixonian reaction (the president has a chance to score great unilateral coups in foreign affairs and should pay more attention to the domestic needs of the people). The inevitable contradictions in the reactions should inspire commentators to ask whether they might not eschew formulating their theories backwards (i.e., deciding what they disliked about the last president and adjuring all future Chief Executives to do otherwise) and turn instead to a more abstract consideration of the extent and kinds of power any president and any Congress should have if the constitutional system is to function properly. A first step, of course, is deciding what "properly" means, which brings us to the next article of significance.

Senator Walter F. Mondale's article is a defense of his proposed bill to establish a Council of Social Advisers in the Executive Office. Its purpose would be to maximize full social opportunity for all Americans through improved social policy making. Mondale's dual assumptions, therefore, are that the ultimate purpose of the constitutional system is equality of opportunity, and that further institutionalization of social scientists within the executive branch would rationalize the social policy-making process. The merit of Mondale's first assumption is matched by the naivete of his second. There are social scientists and there are social scientists, and one might wonder in what way the contributions of those like Schlesinger, Moynihan, and Kissinger—not to mention the warriors of the abortive War on Poverty—have extended equality of opportunity. It is interesting to note, however, Mondale's third implicit assumption, which is that overall planning for social justice must of necessity originate in the executive branch. Thus, along with the political scientists represented in the volume, Mondale appears to believe that the presidency is destined to ever greater size and power and that the only questions remaining are those of organizational design. (President Nixon's pre-Watergate personnel shifts, which were in effect an attempt at reorganization, indicate that he, too, accepts this premise.) Mondale here reflects the majority of his colleagues in Congress, who can usually be counted upon to give their all in the fight to render their institution as impotent as possible.

The most impressive essay, destined to become a classic in the field, is Thomas E. Cronin's " 'Everybody Believes in Democracy Until He Gets to the White House . . .': An Examination of White House-Departmental Relations." Cronin is concerned with the "gap" (p. 147) between the President's function of formulating policy to meet the nation's needs and that of running the bureaucracy in the implementation of such policies. The particular problem he examines here is the relationship between the bureaucracies of the White House and the Cabinet departments, and the technique he utilizes is the summation of interviews with forty-three recent White House Staff members. Cronin explores the extent and nature of the built-in conflict between the two bureaucracies; the consequences of the blurring, by Kennedy and Johnson, of the distinction between staff and line functions; the tendency of activist presidents to try to do too much too fast (which leads the reader to wonder whether the presidential term should be extended or whether the functions of the presidency should or can be more limited); the different time perspectives of the departments and the White House staffers; and the results of retaining the implementation function by the department bureaucrats even while they share the policy-making function with the staff. (It should be noted that President Nixon apparently attempted to solve the problem of the conflicting bureaucracies by substituting his own loyal appointees for the traditional career bureaucrats in the jobs of Assistant Secretary for Administration in the several Cabinet departments.) Finally, in an excellent section on the Cabinet, Cronin supplements and updates Fenno (*The President's Cabinet,* 1959), and suggests a discernible difference in power between the "inner" and "outer" Cabinets.

The wealth of material contained in the essay is extraordinarily useful, but even more impressive is Cronin's blending of empiricism with analysis. He has never fallen prey to the fallacy that an empiricist must not think and evaluate both quantitatively and normatively, and the conclusions he draws about the implications of his material are of the utmost value. He notes that the conflict between the bureaucracies is a fluctuating and highly differentiated entity, varying with such factors as the personnel in each, the policies which are important to the president at any given moment, the kind of function performed by each aide (domestic policy, budget problems, congressional relations, etc.), and the styles of the various presidents. He concludes, in part, that the conflicts between the bureaucracies should be categorized according to their appropriateness in a democratic system and that certain kinds of conflict should be encouraged. This applies particularly to those conflicts which will generate information and alternative policy choices for the president.

This is a volume devoted to the question of how the presidency should operate rather than what the president should do. Since, as indicated by Watergate, organization tends to define the parameters of possible action, the question is an important one. The value of the book is that it will undoubtedly stimulate consideration of the various possibilities for organizational reform, and, one hopes, the potential effect of reform on policy.

PHILIPPA STRUM

Brooklyn College, City University of New York

The Third House: Conference Committees in the United States Congress. By David J. Vogler. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971. Pp. 133. $6.50.)

It would be hard to overestimate the importance of congressional conference committees, and for that matter, the difficulties involved in researching this crucial stage in the legislative process. One reason for both the importance and the difficulty is that the conference committee is, in the late Congressman Clem Miller's terms, "the ultimate flowering of the power of seniority." The senators and representatives who meet to reconcile and sometimes go beyond differences on legislation between the two houses are almost inevitably the ranking committee and subcommittee members, majority and minority. By definition these are busy men, hard to gain access to, difficult to get them talking about what happens. Some other phases of the legislative process, like marking-up a bill, also take place behind closed doors, but most of the give-and-take of conference committee decisions seldom becomes public—the reports, themselves, and the debates which follow may cover up more than they reveal. For all of these reasons as well as the sheer range and variation of activity (something like ten per cent of all legislation passed goes to conference, including nearly all major bills) this "end game" remains one of the most fascinating but least understood phases of the legislative cycle.

Thus, it was with some anticipation that I looked forward to reviewing Professor Vogler's tight little monograph on *The Third House.* By and large, he builds well on the thin literature focusing upon conference committees: the "classics" by McCown (1927) and Steiner (1950), isolated findings from legislative case studies from Bailey (1950) to Paletz (1970), and generalizations from the committee-centered research of Fenno (1966), Manley (1970) and others. One intriguing question—why is it that almost all of this literature, with the exception of Fenno, grows out of dissertation research?

Vogler opts for aggregate analysis of many cases (all conference decisions taking place over five Congresses, 79th, 80th, 83rd, 88th and 89th, N = 596) rather than an intensive case study approach. Thus, he bypasses the problem of interviewer access altogether. Indeed, there is no explicit evidence that he interviewed any congressmen or staff about the process. Still, his careful qualitative analysis does provide a number of useful generalizations beyond Wilson's earlier cryptic dismissal of conference committee activity as "at best a haphazard method of compounding legislation, liable to suffer many singular accidents, and impossible for a busy people to understand when they occasionally look on with unwonted attention" (*Constitutional Government in the United States,* 1908, p. 107).

The author is interested in a number of questions: Who goes to conference, to what extent is the majority party over- or under-represented, is it the committee seniority or the subcommittee ranking which is likely to control, who wins as between the two houses and their related pairs of committees, and what form does conference bargaining take? By the nature of the research mode he has adopted, Vogler tends to provide more satisfactory answers to the first three questions, gets into greater difficulty with the latter two. His analysis is primarily based upon public documents: the language of conference reports, debates in the *Congressional Record,* committee membership and rankings from sources like the *Congressional Directory* and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.*

For answers to the question of "who wins," he turns to descriptions from *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs:* "in most cases the House prevailed"; Senate conferees conceded to the House version . . . ;" and so on. It is on the basis of 297 such judgments favorable to one house or the other that Vogler makes his case. Regardless of whether or not one shares Richard Fenno's observation that "the central question of conference committee decision making is 'Who wins?'," it remains quite unsettling to rely on judgments about the dependent variable at least two steps removed from the language of the conference committee reports, let alone research into how the participants perceived the outcomes. The question of "who wins, who loses" is never easily answered, even when it is a matter of reconciling differing dollar amounts. All too often a majority of Senate conferees may yield on a number of amendments in order to obtain House conferee approval for one section which they deem critical. In fairness to Vogler this kind of detailed evaluation can seldom be extended beyond three or four pieces of legislation in any one Congress. Still, if one believes that the questions of "how" and "why" and "with what consequences for whom" are at least as important as "who wins," then he is likely to come away from Vogler's analysis feeling more than a little troubled.

Vogler's next to last chapter is an attempt to apply theories of formal organization and bargaining to conference committee activity based on overviews of 34 of the more conflictful cases scattered over the five Congresses. Although the theoretical refinements are suggestive, their integration with data is, at best, marginal—an occasional quote from the *Congressional Record* or the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.* Outside influences on conference committees—the executive branch, interest groups, and constituency influences—get all of a page and one-half! Despite this monograph's limitations, and they are sometimes severe, the author has made several contributions. He has ordered the literature, outlined some the parameters for the study of conference committees, and developed some useful generalizations about who participates, if not necessarily who wins. As the author himself concludes: What we have learned about conference interaction palls in comparison to what must be learned . . ." (p. 113).

Robert L. Peabody

The Johns Hopkins University

AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus. By T. W. Adams. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 284. $6.00.)

This is the first detailed work published in English on the Communist party of Cyprus. Professor Adams's study grows out of his long and persistent interest in the political affairs of Cyprus, as indicated by his two previous publications on Cyprus: *U.S. Army Handbook for Cyprus* (1964), and (as co-author) *Cyprus Between East and West* (1968). In the introduction to his work on AKEL, the author expresses his concern that "much of what is written about the party comes from polemicists and journalists who are strongly biased" (p. 1). Although Adams shows that he has undertaken long and arduous research in order to complete this volume, it cannot be considered a definitive work on this subject.

The general tone of the book tends to be polemical. From the very beginning, specifically in his preface (p. x), Adams engages in a polemic against Mr. Papaioannou, the leader of AKEL, in which Adams justifies the objectivity of his two previous works on Cyprus. The book is replete with sweeping generalizations about the character of AKEL's leadership, many of which are unfounded. For example, Adams states "AKEL is still a sleepy party ruled by an insecure and unimaginative group of old men" (p. 9). In another place, he describes the leadership of the party as "AKEL careerists" (p. 201), by which the author implies motives of opportunism that he does not satisfactorily substantiate. If one accepts Adams's characterizations about AKEL and its leadership, one finds it difficult to understand how this very party gained the highest proportion of votes cast in the 1970 Cypriot Parliamentary Elections (40 per cent), a fact which the author reports in the book's postscript (p. 205). One would have to admit that the Communist leadership in Cyprus must have been doing its homework very well, indeed.

I agree with Professor Adams that AKEL does not presently exhibit the dynamism it showed during its formative years, especially during the 1940s and early 1950s. This, however, has not minimized its influence. AKEL did encounter difficulties for its neutrality during the E.O.K.A. armed struggle in 1955. On this point, concerning AKEL's miscalculations at that time, the author handles the analysis well, especially in his historical presentation in Chapter 1 and in later references (pp. 59, 117). AKEL's miscalculations notwithstanding, I believe that the author misses an important point regarding AKEL's influence among the Cypriots (Greek-Cypriots). He fails to account for, as well as analyze, the fundamental fact that AKEL represents an ingrained and stable social force in Cyprus. The party's popular appeal among the Cypriot masses has to be seen in connection with its major contributions in the labor movement, and its impact thereafter in the elevation of the Cypriot working class. One cannot be expected to understand AKEL's influence in Cyprus without analyzing it as a distinct social force.

In some areas of the book, a number of points deserve a more detailed discussion. For example in chapter 4, entitled "AKEL's Conflict and Integration with the National Environment," Adams gives an inconclusive analysis of the character of the other political forces in Cyprus. A good in-depth discussion on EDMA and its successor, The Patriotic Front, would have shed light on the understanding of the "New Political Parties in Cyprus" (p. 147). In another instance, one would have to go a bit far to call EDEK a Socialist Party—a better characterization would describe it as having a program with strong "socialist" tendencies.

The chapter on "The National Environment" (Chapter 3) is rather weak, specifically the presentation on the "Greek-Cypriot Ruling Structure," the "Esoteric Tendencies of the Cypriots," "Socio-Economic Structure," and "Greek Social Structure." The analysis of these topics is too general.

Two final strictures: A number of weaknesses could have been avoided if the author had not relied so heavily on translations; and an opinion survey of the rank-and-file membership of AKEL and PEO would probably have yielded a more critical understanding of the subject matter of this book.

STANLEY KYRIAKIDES
The William Paterson College of New Jersey

Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. One, 1917–1922. Edited by G. Adhikari. (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1971—distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, Mo. Pp. xxiv, 640. $6.50.)

Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920–1939. By John Patrick Haithcox. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 389. $12.50.

During the past few years the Communist movement in India has attained a degree of respectability and influence that was noticeably lacking earlier. At the state level, leaders of the two major communist parties (the Communist Party of India, or CPI, and the Communist Party of India-Marxist, or CPM) have become Ministers and patron-wielders. At the national level the CPI has gone into alliance with the Congress party, in such a way that its leadership is now being consulted fairly frequently by both state and central governments. Moreover, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi apparently decided after the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 that India's north wind must prevail over both its east and west winds, with the result that she has surrounded herself with a number of former and present pro-Moscow communists as advisors, and they are presently engaged in a collective attempt to lessen India's dependence on the West while countering those Chinese thrusts in Asia that do not parallel their perceptions of the interests of India.

Having gained respectability and influence, both of India's communist parties (CP's) have begun to use their fairly elaborate research and publishing wings to write party histories. Aside from the ego-satisfaction that can be derived from such an endeavor, there are also practical reasons for this phenomenon. Since the split in the united CPI in 1964, both the CP's have found it necessary to rewrite history according to their own current tactical and strategic lines. Then too, both CP's have an aging leadership (the average age of the top committees in both parties is mid- to late sixties), with the result that the "old-timers" feel some compulsion to have things written down *their way* before they pass from the scene.

Dr. G. M. (known to his party comrades as "Doc") Adhikari's collection is the first in a series of sourcebooks, officially approved by the CPI, and it is intended as "basic documentary material" for "an authoritative history of the party" (p. vii). Although the book was originally designed to cover the period 1917–1925, the author found that nine years of Indian communist documents would be too much for one volume, so the present effort is restricted to only six years (1917–1922). In addition to the documents reproduced, more than a hundred pages of introductory and explanatory notes by party historian Adhikari tell the reader what he

(Adhikari) thinks should be learned from them.

There are several problems with the documents: (1) letters and communications to and from leaders of the present CPM—some of whom (such as Muzaffar Ahmad) were especially important in the formation of the united CPI—are missing; (2) many of the "documents" are extracts or excerpts of longer letters, newspaper articles, or pamphlets, edited by Dr. Adhikari on the basis of what he thought was most important; (3) the volume by no means contains a complete listing of even the most important documents of the period (Adhikari complains that he could not get the full cooperation of the Government of India's central intelligence department, which has copies of many of the documents this volume lacks); and (4) many of the documents—such as the excerpts from M. N. Roy's writings—are available in more complete and accurate form elsewhere. To be sure, there are some interesting things here, but one is struck by the fact that they were all written originally in English, which means that many of the indigenous Indian sources on communism during this period are completely neglected.

Dr. Adhikari's introductory notes may be valuable to someone who is trying to fathom the minds and tactics of pro-Moscow Communist-wallahs in India, but they are of little use for anyone trying to understand the position of the Communist movement in its Indian environment. Adhikari describes the period 1936–1947 as the time when "the party develops into a mass political organization on an all-India basis" (even though at present his CPI gets about 5 per cent of the national vote by appealing to certain regions and communities, but is essentially without a "class" base). During the period 1954–1964, Adhikari argues, "the party emerges as the leading opposition party," a rather hollow claim in a situation where the CPI has been outpolled by other opposition parties in almost every state and national election since India's Independence in 1947.

Both Dr. Adhikari and Professor Haithcox do point up the way in which pro-Moscow Communists have historically been concerned with attempts to penetrate the ranks of India's nationalist leadership. Indeed, Haithcox justifies another in a long series of books on M. N. Roy by pointing to the "new material" he has collected on Roy's relationships with Lenin, with Congress party leaders in India, and with the Congress trade union movement. Through the eyes of Haithcox, Roy is seen hobnobbing with Lenin and other international Marxists, walking the villages with Nehru, being defended by the Congress "High Command" when the British arrested him, and, through his writings and activities, influencing the course of nationalist politics particularly in the 1930s. There is indeed some new and valuable material here, and Professor Haithcox has emphasized facets of Roy's life that usually receive less emphasis.

Professor Haithcox quotes without comment from a British intelligence estimate in the 1930s (reported by Roy himself, in a letter to Louise Geissler) to the effect that Roy was "the only man who could make communism a real danger in India" (p. 197), and that Roy "stands out heads and shoulders above all other Indian communist leaders with the possible exception of Dr. G. M. Adhikari." There is little in Haithcox that would confirm such an estimate, indeed, there is a good deal that would make one seriously question it. Haithcox rejects the argument that Roy's failure to rally India's left wing behind him in unity during the 1930s could be attributed to "inordinate ambition," instead arguing that Jayaprakash Narayan "came closer to understanding the reason for failure" when Jayaprakash pointed to "the ridiculous idea held by every miserable little party [including Roy's] that it alone was the real Marxist Party, and that every other party had therefore to be exploited, captured or destroyed" (p. 237).

If Roy was a factionalist first—and at various times in his life a nationalist, Communist, socialist, or radical humanist second—then Haithcox has certainly captured the spirit of "Royism." On the basis of a wide variety of primary and secondary sources Haithcox traces out many of Roy's factional maneuverings and modifications in his political philosophy, through which, in the judgment of Professor Haithcox, "runs one constant theme—the quest for human freedom and dignity—to which Roy devoted his entire life" (p. 299).

Two irritations make the Haithcox book unsettling to read. First, since it is primarily intended as a work that will fill certain gaps, it does not fit together in very systematic fashion, has no major themes that flow consistently through its pages, and sometimes shifts abruptly from subject to subject. Second, Princeton University Press not only resorted to the increasingly frequent publisher's cop-out of putting footnotes at the end of the book, but it then tried to correct for the resulting clumsiness by scattering some of the more informative footnotes at the bottoms of pages. The result intensifies the reader's feeling that he or she is sometimes being subjected to a field researcher's unfinished notebook.

M. N. Roy was undoubtedly an enchanting character, and he perhaps wrote (while his followers provided for the preservation of) as much material as any man that ever lived. Although each of his comrades in the various Indian leftist mvoements has written less, the combined literary output of the Indian left is formidable. If only because Indian Communists are frequently so fascinating, have gained a degree of influence and respectability, and have so many of their letters, pamphlets, articles, books, novels, short stories, and other documents tucked away somewhere, we can rest assured that there will be many, many books like both of these.

MARCUS F. FRANDA
American Universities Field Staff,
New Delhi, India

Student Alienation: A Venezuelan Case Study. By Robert F. Arnove. (New York: Praeger, 1971. Pp. xxiv, 209. $15.00.)

This case study of student alienation at the University of Oriente in Venezuela is very good. Some might argue that it is more social psychology or educational sociology than political science, but for the scholar interested in political socialization, political psychology, or political development in more general terms, this work has real merit. Unlike most case studies, the material presented here has general application, and the careful discussion of methodology employed is a real contribution for those who seek greater sophistication in carrying on this sort of research, in developed as well as emerging areas. Professor Arnove has developed a sensitive instrument for measuring attitudes in an institutional setting, in this case testing for alienation in a university.

After an Introduction in which he discusses his general rationale and research plan, the author offers seven substantive chapters and a concluding summary. The substantive sections discuss such matters as the impact of university social structure on professional efficacy and upon political efficacy, the relationship between professional efficacy and political activism, student political involvement, and the concept of the efficacious student as modern man. In toto, the book offers a comprehensive picture of political activists in a provincial university whose students are recruited mainly from the poorer sectors of the population, comparing them with the alienated *universitarios*. Contrary to popular wisdom on the matter, Professor Arnove finds that the Latin American student activist usually is academically successful, while the more violence-prone alienated student tends to be fatalistic and politically passive, and somewhat less successful in his intellectual pursuits.

In terms of physical presentation this book probably is overpriced. It is short and has no index. The 146 pages of typed-offset text and 46 pages making up ten methodological appendices contain few maps or illustrations, and the tables also are typed. Even in this era of fantastic costs for book making, $15.00 seems excessive. Considering the quality of the substantive contents, it is a shame that Professor Arnove's work may be priced out of the general academic market.

ROBERT E. SCOTT
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The United States and the Trujillo Regime. By G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1972. Pp. 245. $10.00.)

The Trujillo regime was one of the most cruel and harsh dictatorships ever to exist and is a perfect choice for a case study to demonstrate the dilemmas faced by the United States in dealing with nondemocratic governments. The policy of the United States toward Latin America is frequently criticized very severely, and Atkins and Wilson attempt to evaluate that criticism through careful analysis of the intricacies of United States relations with the Trujillo regime.

In an effort to make the study more than a historical-descriptive survey, the authors employ a "policy framework" model analyzing policy in terms of "policy objectives, policy instruments and techniques, and capability analysis" (p. 4). While the authors make an elaborate presentation of their analytical framework in the first chapter, the framework is not very rigidly applied in their analysis. Their analysis of United States policy toward Trujillo hinges on the conflicts between the nonintervention doctrine and promotion of democracy and stability in Latin America and particularly the Caribbean.

Despite the failure to apply the framework consistently, Atkins and Wilson present a very useful and interesting study. As they point out, it is the first study to cover the entire span of United States-Trujillo relations. Indeed, they review pre- and post-Trujillo relations with the Dominican Republic as well. The chapter on the post-Trujillo era is an excellent analysis of the problems created by the political vacuum which follows the overthrow of a well-established dictatorship.

The recurring theme of the analysis is that the United States must recognize that its policy has to be adapted to differing cultures and experiences. The Latin American development experience is different from that of the United States, yet United States policy makers are often unwilling to accept the fact that political development can take forms different from ours. The authors' definition of political development seems to be "representative democracy," an indication that they may follow the same tendency for which they criticize the policy makers.

In attempting to evaluate the policy of the United States toward Trujillo the authors constantly ask whether it could have been any different, and if it had been different would the Dominican Republic have fared differently. They answer their questions by noting that the United States has to deal with political realities, and although it might want to promote democracy in Latin America, there are very real practical limitations to what it can accomplish. In effect, critics of United States policy are usually answered with a justification of the policy on the basis of political realities. As the authors point out, one of the political realities in their case study is that Trujillo was extremely shrewd in recognizing where his best interests lay—usually in strong alignment with the United States, at least until the late 1950s when the United States cooled toward him. Although the authors do raise some criticisms of their own, the major emphasis of the work seems to be on justifying United States policy rather than analyzing it. Nevertheless, the study does represent a great deal of in-depth analysis not previously available and the authors' technique of working in fascinating detail makes it a very interesting one as well.

The authors conclude that the United States has been largely unsuccessful in its policy of fostering democracy but that it has had other impacts on the area. They are particularly critical of the United States' tendency to view political development in terms of economic growth. The frequent Latin American obsession with economic development resulting in neglect of the development of political institutions may be attributed to the United States' unbalanced emphasis on economic growth.

The volume will be particularly useful to the student who wants a good review of the major United States doctrines in its Latin American policy. Particularly instructive is an analysis of the inconsistency in and the problems of defining the various policies. Also very helpful is the thirty-nine page bibliography which is the most complete available on the Dominican Republic.

The authors are successful in making this case study what a case study should be—a lesson about some larger concern. They have made the Trujillo regime a good example of the dilemmas and embarrassment of the United States in dealing with dictatorial regimes while espousing democratic ideals. In addition they have demonstrated that there are many political limitations on the power of the United States to influence its neighbors, even though it would appear to have an imbalanced advantage.

N. JOSEPH CAYER

University of Maine, Orono

Bureaucracy and Politics in India. By C. P. Bambhri. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971. Pp. 349. Rs. 36.)

Dr. Bambhri's thesis is that Indian institutional structures are insufficient to control the bureaucracy and that unless the political parties establish legitimacy and hegemony over the bureaucracy, it will continue to arrogate power to itself. His analysis is divided into two parts. The first is devoted to an exposition of the party system, the institutional controls of the Indian Parliament and the Prime Minister over the bureaucracy and the organization of the bureaucracy itself. The second half seeks to illustrate these theoretical relationships by case studies of T. T. Krishnamachari, M. H. Patel; Krishna Menon as Defense Minister; the Voice of America Agreement; Lal Bhadur Shastri's relationship to the bureaucracy; and the conflict between Gulzari Lal Nanda and L. P. Singh.

Indian political development has been characterized by the conversion of a nationalist political movement to a polarized party system. In the transition, the disappearance of symbolic leaders of the Independence movement, the reemergence of local and regional political aspirations, the absence of a parity relationship between electorate and political leaders, and the slackening of momentum of developmental efforts, have pushed the crucial decision making upon the bureaucracy.

The author's characterization of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) as generalist, unresponsive, elitist, middle-class, and urban oriented does not fairly assess its contribution to nation building in the post-Independence era. A one-page analysis of the other classes of Indian civil service hardly does justice to their accomplishments in railway, transportation, health, and hydroelectric power development.

Students of Indian politics should carefully read the chapter on institutional control in order to understand the technical parliamentary maneuvering in dealing with the various issues which faced the nation.

Indecisive and second-rate political leadership factionalism, political defections, communal groups, the lack of meaningful social dialogue leading to national consensus—all result in the conclusion that the "bureaucracy is left free to accomplish whatever it sees fit" (p. 111).

The five cases studies offered display the various patterns of relationship which may emerge. They illustrate the following patterns:

(1) Strong supporting bureaucracy, strong political leaders, strong supporting party, strong opposition party attack (T. T. Krishnamachari—H. M. Patel).

(2) Strong opposing bureaucracy, strong political leader, strong supporting party, strong opposition within supporting party (Krisna Menon as Defense Minister).

(3) Strong bureaucracy, weak political leader, strong opposition party activity (agreement with Voice of America).

(4) Strong bureaucracy, weak political leadership, divided support within ruling party (Lal Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister).

(5) Strong bureaucracy, weak political leadership, strong opposition from segments of ruling party and opposition groups (Gulzari Lal Nanda—L. P. Singh).

What disturbs this reviewer is the subtle innuendo that an administrative bureaucratic conspiracy against political leadership exists in India.

> It must be stated here that bureacracy is never indefensible. It operates the levers of power in a very subtle and annonymous manner. The fraternity of the ICS, when a brother ICS is attacked, tends to combine together and pulls the string in a subtle manner and reaches the highest echelons of political decision-makers (p. 251).

Ultimately a more evenhanded evaluation may be reached which will give the ICS greater credit for maintaining higher ethical values in government than would prevail if the English tradition of the bureaucracy did not persist. Innuendoes of conspiracy will be tempered by the realization that the power vacuum left by the British was filled in part by those who had experience in governing under well-defined standards, even though they may have also been elitist, western in cultural outlook, and generalist in orientation.

BENJAMIN N. SCHOENFELD
Temple University

Education and Politics 1900–1951: A Study of the Labour Party. By Rodney Barker. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 173. $10.25.)

Social critics from Matthew Arnold to Raymond Williams have recognized the influence of education in determining class stratification in Great Britain. While the aristocracy and the newly rich segregated their children in public (i.e., boarding) schools, a state system of elementary education for the mass of the people did not develop until after 1870. If literacy was more widespread in England than in many parts of Europe, it was not universal until the end of the Victorian era. One might, therefore, expect the Labour Party to be preoccupied from its inception with educational reform as an essential instrument of social change. Yet, as Dr. Barker demonstrates in his study of Labour's attitude towards education between 1900 and 1951, the party consistently accorded the issue a low priority among its professed goals. Rarely in the vanguard of educational reformers, Labour politicians were content to adopt the remedies of other parties, endorsing those changes which promised to disseminate benefits more widely, but eschewing innovation. However much it aspired to a more egalitarian social order, in practice Labour adhered to prevailing elitist values, including the notion of education as a competitive contest in which only the deserving attained the prizes.

Labour's educational sights, the author contends, "were fixed on the top of the nearest summit" (p. 101). Thus in the early years of the twentieth century it aimed at nothing more than an extension of the opportunities provided by the elementary school and the concession of free places in secondary schools for working class children. Only after the introduction of universal secondary education in 1944 did the party begin to consider the social implications of private schools. Throughout the period Labour concerned itself not with the content or even the structure of education, but with its accessibility. Like wages or housing, education was regarded as a commodity whose distribution might be rendered more equitable, but whose basic premises were not in dispute. For Socialists, Barker suggests, "the problem was not to abolish the peaks of inequality, but rather to obliterate its troughs by massive improvements in the condition of the people" (p. 101). Such conflict as existed in Labour thinking was between those who wanted equality of opportunity, associated with unhindered access to the academically prestigious grammar schools, and those who sought equality of provision, attainable only through a more uniform educational structure that avoided the pitfalls of early selection. The majority of Labour politicians clearly favored a system which retained the grammar school as an exclusive institution but facilitated working class entry. Many of the early Labour leaders who had been denied educational advantages saw their own success as a model of mobility. They objected not to class distinctions, but rather to those obstacles to advancement which fortitude and fair competition could not overcome. If Labour generally supported legislation that extended opportunity, many of its spokesmen judged educational questions in terms of immediate benefit for the wage earner. Thus during the debates over the Fisher Act of 1918, trade unionists opposed provisions for continuing education that might deprive families of the wages of adolescents. Conversely, during the 1920s Labour ministers proposed the raising of the school-leaving age as a means of reducing unemployment.

Barker interprets this indifference to the broader educational issues as reflecting a lack of Socialist principle, presumably on the grounds that Socialists genuinely committed to social change would have adopted a radical educational policy. Instead of reconstruction, Labour settled for fair shares and tended to emulate the pragmatism of the older parties. None of this is very new to students of British politics, but the author seems to regard his analysis as strongly revisionist. In his view other historians have egregiously exaggerated the Socialist ingredient, ignoring the fact that Labour was firmly in the "tradition represented by liberal collectivism and social radicalism" (p. 11). Barker announces, as though it were a startling discovery, that Clause IV of the party constitution avoids the term Socialism, and he proposes "Labourism" as an appropriate designation for party ideology. But surely it would be more sensible to accept the Socialist self-description at face value and to assess its significance, than to reject it for lacking specificity and for failing to measure up to some objective criterion. What is distinctive about British Socialism—its strength and its weakness—is its very eclecticism, its strong roots in a democratic, liberal tradition, its disregard for the finer points of the class struggle. If Labour was indifferent to educational matters, it was because Socialist politicians, probably unwisely, regarded them as less important than common ownership and full employment.

As a survey of educational policy, the work is competent, but the larger questions are all too often lost in a morass of conference resolutions and committee reports. The focus tends to be on politics at the center, to the neglect of any intellectual dialogue carried on in pamphlets and periodicals. Even the writings of R. H. Tawney, cited as the architect of Labour views, receive only cursory examination. Adult education is briefly sketched, but no attempt is made to explore the content of W.E.A. classes or weekend schools. Nor is there any effort to explain the shift in Labour's attitude after 1951 in favor of the comprehensive school and toward greater concern "with the shape of society, and even with the quality of life" (p. 97). Although the author offers a useful elucidation of Labour's views on education, his contribution to a deeper understanding of the party is slight.

F. M. LEVENTHAL

Boston University

Unions, Parties and Political Development: A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia. By Robert H. Bates. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 201. $12.50.)

Demonstrating the crucial importance of copper for Zambian well-being—in 1966, copper represented 95.3 per cent of the £236 million in Zambian exports—Professor Bates calls our attention to an important problem facing the Zambian government, as well as other governments confronting the dilemmas of rising demands on scarce resources. The problem is how to transform an organization designed for making demands—in the Zambian case this is the African Mine Workers Union—into an instrument of government for the limiting of demands and for the increasing of production.

Despite vast increases in capital investment since Zambian independence, average productivity has decreased by 12 per cent, while wages have gone up, and industrial discipline has faltered. Bates shows that in its attempts to rectify the situation by exerting political control over the organization of the AMWU, the government has largely failed.

Though the government has been successful in convincing the national leadership of the AMWU, it has failed to convince the local branch leaders, who time and again have rejected government orders to curtail wage demands and to promote industrial peace. In some of the strongest chapters of the book, Bates shows convincingly that branch leaders cannot follow government directives because their position rests not on the good will of the government, but on the militancy with which they are able to articulate their workers demands to the expatriate managers. In the few cases where the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the ruling party, has tried to substitute its own men for labor leaders, it has been rebuffed by the rank and file. For the rank and file does not seem to want to take a "national" view of Zambian development. The workers are jealous of their rights and prerogatives, and their reference groups are not the poor peasants in the villages, but seem to be the expatriate managers and supervisory staff whose wages have grown from precolonial levels. This places UNIP in a difficult bind: Should it side with the workers against the foreign companies it would hurt the Zambian development program; should it side with the companies against the workers it would look as if it defended expatriates against Africans. It would seem that one solution might be nationalization. But even after August 1969, when nationalization of the copper industry took place, the rank and file refused to sanction government imposed union leadership.

Bates's book deals in an original way with a significant issue of political and economic development too long neglected by the literature on the "third world." It is rich with insights and detail, and it is written with great clarity. It may be suggested however, that by viewing the conflict between government and the union in organizational terms only, Bates may be neglecting two other problems of interest to political scientists, the first pertains to the survival of industrial democracy in Zambia, and the second to the problem of class formation in Africa. Turning to the first, the question may be posed: how is it possible that the principle of industrial democracy—the free and fair elections of branch union officials—has not been subverted in Zambia when it has been politically abrogated in so many other of the third world countries? Is the ruling elite so committed to democratic procedure that it refuses to exert force on the AMWU? Or contrarywise is it that the AMWU has the power to insist on democratic procedure? If it does, where does this power stem from? Bates does not tell us.

Nor does he address himself to the issue of class formation. Though he brings out with some force the structurally induced conflict between African workers and expatriate managers, by referring to the political class as "government," Bates overlooks the possibility that the rank and file does not accept government directives because it finds illegitimate the economic and status positions of the governing elite.

We have evidence from other parts of Africa such as the Nigerian General Strike of 1964, and the Sekondi-Takoradi strike in Ghana under Nkrumah, that African workers are responding not only to the immediate context of industrial relations, but to the broader context of class formation. In postcolonial African societies class formation is proceeding from the top down, from the pinnacles of the political class made up of successful politicians and senior civil servants down to the unmobilized peasantry. Somewhere in the middle, nearer the political class than to the peasantry lies the industrial working class. But it is a class which has not as yet learned to accept its position below that of the political class. Why should an industrial worker with ten years on the job make less than a young parliamentary secretary straight out of university? The answer is obvious only in societies where criteria for class formation such as educational level have become widely legitimate. In African societies, the legitimacy of class differences is still very much in question, and as long as such questions persist, there will be conflict between industrial workers and governing elites.

Robert Melson

Purdue University

The Nyoro State. By John Beattie. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 280. $9.75.)

The great merit of this work is that it makes Beattie's important studies of this major Ugandan kingdom easily available to specialist and newcomer alike. Basically it is an expansion of the first half of Beattie's earlier student text, *Bunyoro, an African Kingdom* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), and as is to be expected from its author, it is a humane book, written in clear, uncongested English, with a minimum of the foreign language terms with which anthropologists sometimes protect the sacred inviolability of their message. Three main sections deal with myth and history, with the traditional kingship, and with changing political relationships and roles in the colonial period. The book ends with an essay comparing the traditional Nyoro kingdom with its more highly centralized neighbor and rival, Buganda. In taking up these topics, the book provides a useful synthesis of its author's earlier writings on the kingship, chiefs, chiefship, land tenure, and "democratization." New material and analysis bring the history of Bunyoro, in general terms, up to the abolition of the kindgom in 1967 and treat more freely and fully than before the major internal political dispute at the time of Beattie's fieldwork in the early 1950s—the attempt to wrest from the king the control of appointment to chiefships which he had obtained under the 1933 Bunyoro Agreement.

Much is therefore provided by this book, but the reader, particularly the reader to whom a good deal of the material is already familiar, repeatedly finds himself in the ungrateful position of asking for more. This is partly because Beattie's reputation runs before him. He has always been concerned with the political in general and with the effects of European overrule on indigenous politics in particular, and he has contributed most valuably to the understanding of African kingdoms under colonial overrule and in precolonial days. His work on the limits of despotism in traditional African settings and on the paradoxical results of Indirect Rule policies, leading in the Nyoro case to a more than traditional measure of autocracy, are important instances of this concern, raising expectations of a major new work. High expectations are also aroused by developments in the disciplines concerned since the 1950s, the growth of African history as a specialized field of research, the eruption of political scientists into Africa, and particularly the movement of political anthropology from its early preoccupation with administration and its functional alternatives to its current awareness of competitive processes as a major theme.

And finally, Beattie's text itself constantly raises expectations by stimulating the reader's imagination and suggesting questions beyond the kinds of analysis and explanation actually offered. The reader is told, for instance, of the myths and traditional histories of Bunyoro and their congruence with social and political values. He is reminded that such stories have no necessary, unchanging form so long as a written version has not become the sole authority: names and generations in the royal genealogies, for example, have multiplied prodigiously since they began to be written down. He is likely therefore to ask how these stories and their possibly varying forms actually related to the political process: Who knew them, and who told them? In what contexts were they told? What was their importance to their hearers? Were there rival versions? And so on. The reader has also been reminded that new media for the dissemination of such material were already becoming available: some of the earliest publications in the indigenous language were of this kind. He is therefore certainly likely to be interested in the changing situation and its relevance to the political importance of the old stories, and possibly to the creation of new ones.

In a rather similar way, the chapter on "The Modern Kingship," to take a further example, offers tantalizing glimpses of the king, his chiefs, and his people in action. A senior chief spears the king's special bull as it roams the capital one night, and he is dismissed from his post and prosecuted for it. Through the recounting of such incidents the reader is left in no doubt that there was a bitter contest between the king and his opponents, but this does not lead on, as he hopes it will, to a systematic analysis of the parties and the interests involved in the dispute, of the resources they could bring to bear and the strategies they pursued. It is clear in this context, incidentally, that Protectorate Government officials were very much a part of the relevant political field, and it is a pity that the book's "Nyoro State" frame of reference tends to leave them as peripheral "voices off stage." Again, in the crucial area of appointment to chiefships, Beattie provides fascinating material on the kinds of people who became chiefs, the procedures prescribed, and the way in which, according to rumor, things actually occurred. The reader's appetite is whetted for a final direct discussion of how some individuals succeeded in obtaining preferment, how others failed, and how preferment was related to the larger political process. The discussion does not come and he is disappointed.

The book conveys strongly a sense of what it was like in Bunyoro in the 1950s, and through its basic categories of traditional and modern, it places its observations within a general framework of change. The ungrateful reader may ask for more but he has been given much already. It is valuable to have Beattie's political material concerted into a single volume; and it is a volume which will provide as useful an introduction to the more detailed study of African kingdoms as his earlier volumes have provided for other and more general fields of anthropology.

S. R. Charsley

Glasgow University

Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949. By Lucien Bianco, translated from the French by Muriel Bell. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. Pp. xiii, 223. $8.50.)

Dozens of fine monographs on modern China have appeared during the past two decades, and all provide important insights into various aspects of Chinese history and institutions. And now Professor Bianco, with an unerring eye for the essential and germane, has tied all these strands together and has produced the best introduction to Chinese Communism ever published. (This is one case in which the blurb is absolutely true.) I know of no other work on modern China that can match its cogency of analysis or its lucidity and succinctness of presentation. Bianco's work is much more than another display of the Gallic talent for grand synthesis. His expertise on the peasant problem showed him where to look for the real motive force in the rise of Chinese Communism.

Why did the Communists succeed in winning the support of the peasants? Bianco agrees that the Japanese invasion of 1937 gave Mao the opportunity to exploit the rising tide of nationalist sentiments. He then goes on to show that nationalism was not the only ingredient in the Maoist formula for revolution. Nationalism was in fact the common platform of all Chinese politicians and leaders in the 20th Century, but as Bianco points out, "It was through Communism that nationalism triumphed" (p. 166). The difference between the Communist and other brands of nationalism was that "in addition to being authentic patriots they [the Communists] were genuine revolutionaries, men who understood the needs of the people, knew what changes had to be made, and set about making them" (p. 159). By providing the peasants with better government, by allowing them to participate in the governing process, and by affording them greater social justice, the Communists won mass support during the Second World War. That support not only enabled them to resist the Japanese, but it gave them power to win the postwar civil conflict. When the war broke out in 1937 there were 80,000 men in the Red Army. In 1945 there were 900,000, plus a militia force of 2.2 million men. Yet as Bianco reminds us, this was not the whole story. "It was during the Second World War that the Kuomintang *lost* the civil war" (p. 159). Kuomintang leadership was incapable of ameliorating rural distress during peacetime. The war aggravated this social misery and created even greater challenges which further exposed the government's inadequacy.

In explaining the Communist success Bianco focuses on the essentials. A turbulent peasantry and a pervasive nationalism—fired by a significant measure of xenophobia—added up to a revolutionary situation that could not be relieved through gradualist methods. (Here the author is particularly instructive in showing the inefficacy of well-intentioned rural reformers who attacked the symptoms rather than the causes of peasant poverty. He tells us of idealistic students who tried to promote hygiene by distributing pamphlets on the use of toothbrushes to the peasants when these people did not have the price of one toothbrush for an entire family.) The Communists created a disciplined party and effective army using this social and emotional force. Bianco furthermore makes it quite clear that it was not just that the Communist leadership was more efficient or capable in exploiting this objective situation, though as a good historian he notes that the presence or absence of effective leadership is in itself an important historical datum. The entire history of China since the Opium War of the last century shows that China could not stand up to the West until it fully mobilized its resources, both human and material, and that such a mobilization was impossible as long as the socioeconomic structure was dominated by the gentry-landlord stratum. The social revolution was therefore an indispensable condition for realization of nationalist goals. The Kuomintang, however, became even more conservative as the war progressed. "Installed in the back country and cut off from the merchant bourgeoisie of the eastern ports and great cities, its social base consisted almost exclusively of that most conservative of classes, the large landowners" (p. 160). Real agrarian reform would have threatened to destroy the social base upon which the Kuomintang was built.

As Americans digest the implications of Bianco's account for United States policies toward Asia, they should be reminded that many of his important conclusions were being reported to Washington by official American observers more than 25 years ago, when the Communists were first emerging from obscurity. In September-October, 1944, for example, John S. Service, after several months of close observation of the Communists, reported that "The peasants support, join and fight with the Communist Armies because they have been convinced that the Communists are fighting for their interests, and because the Communists have created this conviction by producing tangible benefits for the peasants. . . . The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for" (see Service's *Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations,* Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1971, pp. 152, 161). As for the Kuomintang war effort, the most devastating criticisms can be found in General Wedemeyer's reports of 1944–45, reproduced in the official U.S. Army history (see *Time Runs Out in CBI,* by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1959). If Washington subsequently failed to understand the reasons for the victory of Communism in China, it was not due to lack of information.

In proving once and for all that Chinese Communism is an indigenous phenomenon with deep roots in Chinese society and history, Bianco also brings Mao Tse-tung's role into proper perspective. He sees Mao as a "mediocre theoretician" whose "strategy seems to represent the triumph of common sense" (pp. 79–80). But in questioning the myth of Mao's infallibility and profundity as a thinker, Bianco makes Mao's greatness seem much more credible. More than any other modern Chinese leader Mao was aware of peasant bitterness, and no one worked more persistently to turn this bitterness into a political and military force. Bianco sees Mao's greatness in terms of his heroism, toughness, audacity, and the "courage to free himself from dogma" (p. 80). The author nevertheless reminds us that given the backwardness of a country like China, the real test of this heroic leadership begins only after power is won.

Bianco's perceptive and well-balanced study must be read by everyone who wants to understand what the Chinese revolution was all about.

Harold Z. Schiffrin
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Compiled and annotated by Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert Flanz. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1971– . Twelve volumes, loose-leaf, $69.00 each.)

In addition to the first volume of this compilation, supplied by the publisher for review purposes, I have been able to examine three of the five further volumes which were issued in 1972. All four conform to a basic design which is to provide, for each country, (1) a chronology of constitutional development, (2) the text of the current constitution in English, and (3) an annotated bibliography of selected primary and secondary materials relating to the country's constitutional life.

The over-all plan calls for approximately 10,000 (!) loose-leaf pages of text, to be brought up to date by annual supplements. The editors commit themselves, in an introductory statement (which is of bibliographical interest itself as a review and assessment of previous efforts along the same lines), to currentness of the collection as their first priority. If they succeed in this, they will have created a uniquely valuable research resource. This will be especially true if the updating includes not only constitutional documents but also the chronologies and bibliographies.

Examination of the first four volumes indicates that the chronologies are almost uniformly excellent and the bibliographies soundly representative. (I missed under "Uruguay" references to the work of Ernst-J. Kerbusch, and I suppose that others will spot comparable omissions, but generally the scope of the included literature is international and current.)

The only comparable collection in the English language is Amos Peaslee's *Constitutions of Nations,* now in the third edition. It, however, lacks the flexibility of the loose-leaf format, its chronological summaries are much briefer and often not current, and the bibliographical material of the latest edition is quite limited. "Blaustein and Flanz" will undoubtedly replace Peaslee as the prime reference work for information on the constitutions of the nations.

Francis H. Heller
University of Kansas

The West German Legislative Process: A Case Study of Two Transportation Bills. By Gerard Braunthal. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. xviii, 290. $11.50.)

In tracing the stormy course of two transportation bills in the mid-1950s, Professor Braunthal usefully contributes to what, one hopes, will be an increasing number of empirical studies of the West German legislative system at work. The author, privileged to receive access to confidential ministry files, provides a revealing glimpse of the executive role in legislation and of interest-group interaction with the administration in the Federal Republic. This perspective lends depth to his discussion of the more public phases of the legislative process in the West German parliament. Students of German politics and of comparative politics will welcome this brief but searching study.

Underlying the Transportation Finance Act of 1955 and the ill-starred Highway Relief Bill was the growing competition which the burgeoning trucking industry gave to the railroad system of West Germany. By 1952–1953, the Bundesbahn faced a financial crisis, and the road network showed signs of strain. The two transportation measures powerfully affected major productive enterprises of the country, and evoked strong responses from a considerable variety of interest groups. The ensuing controversy divided the coalition cabinet, notably the Ministries of Transportation, Finance, and Economic Affairs, and cut across party lines. It sparked a CDU/CSU rebellion on the floor of the Bundestag. The Highway Relief Bill was permitted to die in committee. The tax provisions of the Transportation Finance Act then became the main stakes in the battle of the interests. In its final form, the Act fell considerably short of providing a blueprint for future transportation development. Braunthal's step-by-step account of the two bills is located in the context of both earlier and later transportation policy in Germany.

Regrettably, Braunthal chooses not to consider in any more than a handful of cursory footnotes Gerhard Loewenberg's masterful volume, *Parliament in the German Political System* (1967). He does not comment on Loewenberg's scheme of case selection, which prefaces, and is exemplified in, more than one hundred pages on lawmaking in West Germany: "The examples chosen have been selected, not so much as representative, but as limiting cases of the kinds of treatment which legislation receives in the Bundestag. They indicate the perimeter within which most cases occur" (Loewenberg, p. 282). By contrast, Braunthal does not make clear the grounds for choosing the two transportation bills to illuminate the West German legislative process.

Braunthal professes an interest in testing some general hypotheses:

> The more political actors involved in the decision-making process, the more difficult it becomes to measure their power and responsibility in any one decision; the more opposition develops to a bill, the more concessions the executive makes to the political actors of the other subsystems (political parties, legislature, and so forth) to assure its passage, and vice versa; and the greater the adverse economic impact of a bill on interest groups, the greater and more successful their resistance (p. xi).

Nowhere, however, does he provide operational definitions of the key terms of these hypotheses or place conditions on the evidence he will accept. Nor does he indicate how it is possible for the two transportation bills alone to serve as a test for the hypotheses.

Apart from these conceptual difficulties, the book is a useful supplement to constitutional descriptions of the West German legislative process. In what it says of the functioning of the ministries, the cabinet, and major interest groups in the controversy over the two transportation bills, the book casts light on aspects of the legislative process not normally open to public scrutiny.

Arthur Bruce Boenau
Gettysburg College

Police State. By Brian Chapman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 150. $5.00.)

Since Hitler's Germany, the term "police state" has come into everyday usage. It has assumed a negative connotation, projecting visions of arbitrary and draconian police actions, executed with total disregard for human rights, freedom, and dignity. Consequently, the term is often used (or misused) by those opposed to police generally as they attempt to sway public feeling. The author posits an important question: "Why is it that the idea of police rule is so much more offensive than the idea of, say, military government?" (p. 94).

Although primarily descriptive of European police states, Brian Chapman's book impressively clarifies the term and puts the concept of a unitary police organization into proper perspective. It does so by tracing the history of the term "police state" from its origins to its entry into the English language and presents collateral information in a logical, orderly fashion. Chapman identifies and analyzes three different classes of police states: (1) traditional; (2) modern; and (3) totalitarian.

Although the descriptive chapters are not as fast-moving as his later material, they are necessary for a thorough understanding of the comparative forms of centralized police. Each class is examined in detail, using a comparative approach that allows easier identification of the similarities and differences among classes.

Of special interest to American readers is Chapman's analysis of certain European police methods. He argues that spying, brutality, and the arbitrary use of power are certainly concomitants of any police system, but that their incidence cannot be taken as prima facie evidence of a police state. In fact, these methods result naturally when any police agency is regarded with indifference by an apathetic public.

Brian Chapman sees alienation from the public as a breeding ground for overt abuses and usurpation of police powers. Taking his argument a step further, the author reasons that it is the social reformers, through their insistence upon immediate social change, who actually catalyze the emergence of a police state. So the police state stems from the regime's virtually unbridled authority to use coercion to maintain order, i.e., the status quo. This virtually forces the police, as agents of the state, to resist change and engage in periodic violence.

Chapman's analysis of Germany's political evolution from a modern to a totalitarian police state under Hitler's rule should prove enlightening to students of public and comparative administration. In this context he examines and explains the administrative intricacies involved in the development of a police state noting that police apparatus must become superior to political administrative officers, the judiciary, and the military before a true police state can exist.

Although the book deals with the concept of the police state as a political phenomenon, Chapman's chapter on police psychology is highly relevant to practitioners and academicians interested in the administration of criminal justice. In this chapter, the author cuts to the very heart of police work and examines the "whys" of such police issues as role, violence, corruption, loyalty and morality. While based on European experience, Chapman's observations apply to the contemporary American scene. Moreover, the analogy of the police profession to a combination of soldier, priest, and artist is especially provocative, though not new. (See: August Vollmer, *The Police and Modern Society*. Berkeley: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration, 1936, p. 22.)

In summary, *Police State* is short, readable, timely, well documented (74 citations), and based on substantial research (56 authors are listed in the bibliography). It should be useful to students of political science, particularly those whose interest is comparative government. The book will have little value to American police practitioners, however, for it deals only with European police states. Brian Chapman has achieved his goal of enabling students and others to understand and apply a key concept in political science.

SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN
University of Oklahoma

The Indian Army; Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation. By Stephen P. Cohen. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 200. $7.50.)

No aspect of contemporary India's national political life has been as ignored by scholars as its military system. This is in part due to the fact that Nehru's grand designs in foreign policy minimized the visibility of Indian military power. When that veil was torn in the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, most analysts began concerning themselves with new Indian strategies and ephemeral matters like nuclear options. Stephen Cohen chose instead to pursue a much more mundane but possibly more promising traditional approach to the history and structure of the military machine in the subcontinent. He managed to overcome some of New Delhi's historic and notorious sensitivity to such research, but at the price of analytical depth and descriptive candor.

The book is essentially a brief and clear historical primer on the Indian army with only one of the seven chapters on postindependence developments. (The book's subtitle should be read as a publisher's afterthought, not not author's intent.) The major questions examined by the author all concern the political control of the armed forces; civil-military relations, the nature and ethos of the officer corps, the recruitment and socialization of troops and the adaptation of military management to the three great crises of the twentieth century—World Wars I and II and partition/independence.

The most interesting section of the book explores the "Punjabization" of the army, a process that involved long-term strategic choices on recruitment, regimental organization, ethnocommunal balances in the forces and the relationships between officers holding different commissions. The chosen option left India and Pakistan with armies from a small and territorially discrete region of the subcontinent, with a great imbalance in communal representation (Sikhs and Muslims were greatly over-represented; high caste Hindus practically absent), and with regiments organized on ethnic and regionally distinct loyalties. This system failed to provide an adequately broad recruitment base in the World Wars, but it was an optimum approach to civil control by the imperial power.

The structure of the army system perhaps explains why Indian nationalism did not have a greater effect within the military forces. The chapter that deals with this matter focuses on the Indian National Army—a force of prisoners of war organized by the Japanese to aid them in the conquest of South Asia. Dr. Cohen believes that the political loyalty of Indian officers to the British was much more tenuous than has been generally thought, and that its political management must therefore have been a more important matter for imperial policy than is generally supposed. The INA trials after the war symbolized the dilemmas of officers caught between the values of organizational loyalty, behavior fitting and proper as a prisoner of war, and loyalty to the Indian national cause. The author sets forth the problem, but only hints at the way in which these questions were resolved, noting that "when full documentation is available it may well be seen that Nehru and Auchinleck played key roles in the relevant decisions" (p. 163).

The last chapter of the book deals all too briefly with the postindependence army and its management. There are no statistics on the numbers of officers, the sources of their commissions, the caste and locality of their recruitment, their training curriculum and specialization options, inter-service relationships or the changing social context of the profession of arms in India. Surely these factors shape self-image as much as an awareness of history. At the purely descriptive level, it would have been valuable to have the author's expert opinion on the Thimayya-Krishna Menon affair and on the charges and countercharges of military mismanagement in the Sino-Indian war. These comments are perhaps prime examples of the reviewer's sins—noting the book that wasn't written—but one is tantalized by what Professor Cohen appears to know but doesn't say.

In his next book, perhaps the author will address himself to many of these questions, and perhaps explain such statements as "Modernization will come to South Asia, but only at a pace tolerated by the military" (p. 2). Does the Indian cabinet *have* to consider army predilections on basic development choices? Is defense industry now an imperative dictated by the forces? Has the expansion of the military budget brought an equivalent rise in the voice of the army in national politics and in foreign policy?

There is something of the modesty of a dissertation in the book, and the scholar's painstaking appreciation of historical chance is also evident. Given the paucity and the sensitivity of information on the Indian Army, Dr. Cohen has done a service to all scholars in gathering and assessing basic structural and historical evidence. His knowledge, commitment, access, and experience will doubtless lead to a more empirical and contemporary study of Indian military organization, itself rapidly changing, in the future. Political scientists can look forward to his next book, to which this one will stand as the historical preface.

WAYNE WILCOX

Columbia University

Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa. By William B. Cohen. (Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 279. $9.50.)

As colonialism is being superseded by neocolonialism—and as imperial archives are gradually made available to scholars—the colonial period of Africa has been attracting an increasing amount of attention on the part of historically-minded social scientists. Some of the resulting work (like Ralph Austen's "Northwestern Tanzania under German and British Rule" or J. Gus Libenow's work on the Makonde) is mainly concerned with the impact of alien rule on indigenous African cultures; others, following Robert Heussler's study of "Yesterday's Rulers" (1963) have concentrated on the men and doctrines that made colonial policy what it was—sometimes, as in the case of Gann and Duignan, with perceptible sympathy and even nostalgia.

William B. Cohen's remarkable study of the French colonial service in Africa (*West* Africa, really) falls in the latter category. With a felicitous combination of scholarship and writing skill, he details for us the growth of a tradition of overseas service in what may well be the most homebound nation on earth. Tocqueville suggested that French colonial administration was a caricature of the metropolitan bureaucracy. The British colonial service, one might add, could be viewed, by contrast, as a caricature of English squirearchy. But the problems faced by any overseas bureaucracy were so unique as to make all such parallels rather pointless. The French colonial service numbered some 4,000 functionaries during the seventy-three years of its existence. A body of such size, insulated from day-to-day supervision and made up of members who had, for the most part, selected overseas service as a means of escaping the confining norms of French society, was bound to develop its own traditions of independence and esprit de corps, like some sort of white-collar Foreign Legion. What is surprising, in fact, is that it did so to such a limited extent.

Cohen rightly points out that the paper centralization of the French colonial administration was largely formal. Physical distance from Paris (or even from Dakar and Brazzaville, the regional administrative headquarters of AOF and AEF), the instability of French cabinets, and the resulting incompetence of the successive incumbents at the Rue Oudinot combined to leave the Commandants de Cercle in unchallenged control of their districts as the true *Rois de la brousse*. Nor did "Colo"—the famed *École Coloniale*—instill in French colonial service the rigid, uniform, centralized sense of values which the other *grandes écoles* of Jacobin extraction provided for almost every aspect of French public life.

In what probably represents the most original portion of his book, Cohen outlines the slow development of the École Coloniale, and its persistent struggle to achieve an excellence and prestige that could match those of *Saint-Cyr, Polytechnique, Normale Supérieure* and other such breeding grounds of the French meritocracy. It was not until the 1930s, however, that the graduates of the École Coloniale were able to fill a majority of the appointments to the corps of colonial administrators. Slight wonder, therefore, that "in their methods of administration, the colonial functionaries seem to have been relatively unaffected by the École Coloniale" (p. 121). What the author may have overlooked, however, is the extent to which French colonial administrators, whether or not they realized it, mirrored in their official behavior the norms of French political culture and thus tended to reproduce metropolitan routines rather than to improvise new methods, as their de facto autonomy might easily have permitted.

Bureaucracies are seldom at their best in an era of rapid political change. The French colonial service was no exception, and whatever sense of its purpose and "mission" it might have developed during the age of "classic" colonialism was largely diluted after World War II by considerations which it was not prepared to entertain. With his subject matter thus gradually fading away, Cohen falls back, during the last third of his book, on a description of French decolonization policy (or the lack of it). He does so competently—and, on occasion, brilliantly—but it is understandably not the most original portion of his work. It is at this point, however, that the reader is likely to become aware of a strange void, namely the almost complete absence of the Africans from the pages of Cohen's book. Houphouët-Boigny appears only once; Sekou Touré not at all. The dismantling of the chieftaincy system in Guinea—Touré's political masterstroke—is presented only through the rather anticlimactic comments of the French administrators whom he convened to legitimize his brilliant coup and who, whether or not they realized it, were being thoroughly manipulated by the Guinean leader. Methodologically, of course, there is nothing wrong with Cohen's treatment of his chosen subject: he is, after all, dealing with the colonizers and not with the colonized, but the absence of the colonized deprives his study of a dimension of reality which could have made it better rounded, if not more scholarly. Similarly, the author's laudable desire to maintain a value-free attitude toward his subject leads him to avoid dealing with the human quality of colonial rule. All French administrators, we are led to believe, were basically honorable men. Their professional shortcomings (documented by a skillful use of personnel files) are amply substantiated, but owing to the nature of the author's source material, these are appraised in purely bureaucratic terms. A good number of French administrators are reported to have been poorly trained, bungling, incompetent, and occasionally dishonest, but we learn little or nothing of what it may have been like for an African to live under their authority. Such is the price of objectivity. Despite such limitations, however, Cohen's book will be useful to anyone interested in the history and politics of colonialism, as well as to those who seek to understand the distinctive political culture of French-speaking Africa.

EDOUARD BUSTIN

Boston University

Les Républicains Indépendants: Valérie Giscard d'Estaing. By Jean Claude Colliard. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. Pp. 352. 25F.)

French political parties as institutions have evoked a burst of scholarly interest among French students of politics in the last several years. Since 1966, serious sociological studies by Frenchmen have been published in book form on the S.F.I.O. (by André Philip), the P.S.U. (by Guy Nania and by Michel Rocard), the P.C.F. (by Annie Kriegel and by Frédéric Bon et al.) and the U.N.R. (by Jean Charlot). The Democratic Center and the Radical-Socialists are the only national parties that have escaped such scholarly scrutiny, though the studies have varied greatly in thoroughness. This useful volume by M. Colliard falls squarely in this stream of work.

In large part, Colliard follows Charlot's *L'U.N.R.: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique,* both in compass and in structure. Their books are the most extensive, thorough, and scholarly of the lot. Both consist of a long first section (204 pp. for Colliard, 111 pp. for Charlot) presenting the development of the party chronologically, followed by another long section (129 pp. for Colliard, 190 pp. for Charlot) of topical analysis. Finally, each has a short documentary appendix (7 pp. and 37 pp.).

Colliard's greater attention to chronology results largely from the longer time span he covers (1958–70 compared to 1958–62). He labels his chronological section *"Les déchirements d'une révision"* and develops the theme that the movement was constantly torn between the past attachments of its leaders and members to traditional conservatism and their current conviction that the welfare of France (and of their electoral prospects?) required de Gaulle's leadership and, after his resignation, Gaullist unity. The author documents his thesis thoroughly and persuasively. The incohesiveness of the movement emerges clearly, and the crisis points and issues are quite visible, although their factional basis remains confused. We see Raymond Marcellin at the tip of the *"oui"* end of the spectrum and Giscard d'Estaing similarly extreme on the *"mais"* end, but the distribution in between is not clarified. Whether this confusion results from the situation in the party or from the author's method of presentation is unclear also.

The second half of the book is divided into two parts. The first analyzes the parliamentary elections of 1962, 1967, and 1968 and the caucuses of the *Républicains Indépendants* in the National Assembly and the *Union Parlementaire Républicaine et Rurale* in the Senate. The latter part looks at the extraparliamentary structure of the party, its doctrine and program, its influence, and its image.

His treatment of elections and caucuses is quite conventional. He performs the usual analysis of both voters and M.P.s by geographic, occupational, and demographic characteristics. He also studies the parliamentary activities of the caucuses. The section on the extraparliamentary aspects of the party is the shortest (31 pp.), quite in keeping with the party's character as primarily parliamentary. Under structure, he covers the *Fédération nationale des Républicains Indépendants,* and the finances and press of the party. The most striking impression to emerge from this section is the dominance of Giscard d'Estaing in this area of party activity. Under doctrine, he considers four main points: centrism, liberalism, European integration, and Gaullism. Unfortunately, this part of the study is especially skimpy (6 pp.). Surely, a comprehensive survey of R.I. speeches in parliament and election campaigns, party resolutions, and party publications could have yielded a more substantial review of its positions.

On the whole, M. Colliard has produced a very useful study on a political party that is especially difficult to understand. The *Républicains Indépendants* are peculiarly beset by ambiguity. They are Fourth Republic parliamentarians dedicated to Fifth Republic presidentialism; local *"notables" par excellence* riding the coattails of passionately anti-*notable* Gaullism; organized nationally by Giscard d'Estaing, yet fiercely independent of him in their constituencies; terrified of separation from orthodox Gaullism, yet equally wary of absorption by it. M. Colliard's book provides all the information and explanation necessary for an understanding of the movement, although his style lacks the punch to make that understanding vivid.

More seriously, he has passed up a number of opportunities to flesh out spots that are especially weak. For instance, he mentions no attempt to conduct special surveys for information on and opinions of R.I. voters, yet because of the small number of R.I. voters who appear in general voter surveys, their indications are notoriously unreliable. Even less understandable is his failure to survey R.I. M.P.s for his profile of them. Unlike the Charlot study, we find no long list of party leaders whom the author has interviewed. In short, the study is a valuable addition to our literature on French political parties, filling a major gap, but it lacks the stylistic sparkle and the imagination to make it a truly outstanding contribution.

William G. Andrews

SUNY at Brockport

Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. Pp. 368. $10.00.)

The significance of this book lies in its attempt to present Egyptian politics in a systematic framework, using as its analytical key the idea of charismatic leadership and its routinization. Having acquired his magical reputation through his diplomatic successes from 1954 to 1958, Nasser (or Nasir) sought to use it as a springboard for initiating changes in the outlook of Egyptians and the organization of their affairs, preaching the gospel of radical "Arab socialism," redistributing wealth, and launching ambitious development programs. Routinization was to come through the improvement of administration under a technically qualified elite, and through the newly introduced democratic institutions of parliament and the single mass party, the Arab Socialist Union. The author very competently describes these efforts in detail—ideological elaboration, reform measures, and institutional change—and explains why at best the routinization was only marginally successful. In an extensive and interesting discussion of the impact of the 1967 defeat on domestic Egyptian politics he shows how Nasser sought to deepen the impact of the revolution and particularly to breathe new life into the listless Arab Socialist Union.

The theme of charisma is certainly a useful and valid one in Nasser's case, and readers will appreciate Professor Dekmejian's systematic, authoritative, painstakingly documented, and level-headed analysis. Clearly he knows a good deal about his subject, and has thought his points through. He provides more comprehensive information on certain matters than is available elsewhere: the evolution of Nasser's ideology, for instance, and data on the social and career background of the 131 individuals who held cabinet office from September 1952 through 1968. Moreover, he writes intelligently and intelligibly. Overall, the book is well worth the attention of political scientists who want to read one work on the Nasser regime.

I do feel, however, that the concepts and tools of contemporary American political science not only have their limitations in enabling us to learn about such subjects as this, but may in some respects actually inhibit understanding. While Professor Dekmejian's work clearly commands respect, I am not so sure that he has managed to shine as much light on Nasser and Egypt as some others writing from a journalistic or diplomatic background, such as Lacouture, Stephens, Copeland, and Nutting, or others proceeding from an avowed Marxist framework, e.g., Anouar Abdel-Malek and Mahmoud Hussein.

The charisma-routinization formula, for instance, seems to have encouraged Professor Dekmejian to give inordinate attention to Nasser's ideological preachments, and to give the impression that the doctrines he enunciated, superficial as they often were, substantially reflected a determination on his part to translate his prestige into national improvements. The question here is not merely whether Nasser really thought the way he talked (Professor Dekmejian expresses healthy skepticism on this score), but whether his words were even intended to induce thought amongst his listeners. And is there any more reason to assume that Nasser sought to parlay his charisma into social change than that he sought to parlay his championing of social change into greater charisma?

Again, the significance of survey data about the elite can easily be exaggerated: the more we learn about the numbers of civilians with Ph.D.'s in high office in proportion to army officers, the more we may forget to ask what the role of each of them was in relation to the man at the top—who reputedly manipulated them all, but some with the help of others. The conspiratorial atmosphere that never disappeared from the regime and that surely stemmed not only from its origins in the 1952 coup d'état but equally from Nasser's own highly suspicious mentality, is not easily reflected by survey data nor by a systemic mode of analysis. It is mentioned (p. 191) that eight of the 131 in the elite survey had once served in military intelligence, but this statistic does not begin to indicate the importance of their role. Elsewhere (pp. 261–2, 268, 306–7) the author refers to the oppressive ways of the security police and to Nasser's "conspiratorial approach," as unfortunate by-products of military rule. Of course, this is a matter of judgment, but a good case might be made to the effect that conspiratorialism and repression were central to the very character of the regime, negating in advance whatever steps (such as the celebrated "March 30 Program" of 1968) might be taken to liberalize the political process.

To my mind the greatest gap in Professor Dekmejian's analysis has to do with the impact of Nasser's socialist programs on Egyptian society. The programs themselves are outlined in 13 brief pages of Chapter 9, "The Nasirite Theory and Practice of Arab Socialism," followed by a passage of equal length on the accompanying ideological pronouncements. But with minor exceptions the author does not follow up by telling us what difference Arab Socialism really made to the Egyptians; and this is a pity, since ultimately we must surely gauge Nasser's legacy by his success or failure in lifting Egypt's face out of the mud of poverty and backwardness. "Given the predominantly middle-class and upper-middle-class background of the leadership and its middle-class revolutionary aims," writes the author, "the potential for class conflict in Egyptian society remains real" (p. 294). If so, we need to know much more about the emerging shape of social affiliations and interests than the book provides. Professor Dekmejian would doubtless be among the first to agree that this sort of information is important, but I suspect that his adherence to the ideologically antiseptic tradition of the American science of politics has tended to inhibit him, like others, from devoting more enthusiastic attention to the dynamics of class relations.

MALCOLM H. KERR
University of California, Los Angeles

Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945. By Horst Duhnke. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972. Pp. 605. DM 72, or $23.00.)

Professor Duhnke's account of the Communist Party of Germany in the years of its impotence is a valuable scholarly work in several ways. As a sequel to the works of Flechtheim, Angress, and others on the KPD in the 1920s, it carries the history of the party forward to 1945. Designed on a far more ample scale than the works of Hermann Weber, this book is, first of all, an impressively complete history of the KPD in this era. As far as this reviewer can tell, Duhnke has read every German-language source relevant to his topic. The book also provides massive evidence for the process by which the remnants of the once proud movement of Rosa Luxemburg became a dependent instrument of Soviet policy.

Duhnke amply documents the emergence of the Pieck-Ulbricht leadership that was to dominate the postwar party, and he does so in a wonderfully clear exposition of very tangled circumstances. The author shows how the very weaknesses of the KPD, both practical and intellectual, in coping with the power of Hitler, worked to the benefit within the party of those leaders most responsive to Soviet demands.

Aside from the internal history of the KPD, this work also provides valuable material for the history of the German aspects of the emergence, fitful fulfillment, and decline of the Popular Front line. While here Duhnke's account will supplement a number of extant works (Buber-Neumann, Gross, Koestler, and Edinger, among others), it gives the most complete version of the KPD's difficult relationship with other German exile groups. One might have wanted a fuller treatment of the Trotskyist challenge to the KPD, as well as details of the fate of German Communists in Stalin's purges, if only for completeness in an otherwise unstinting work.

A theme running through this volume is the growing incoherence of the Communists' analysis of the reality confronting them. This fact, to an extent not sufficiently brought out by Duhnke, disarmed the KPD in the face of Soviet leaders who, while no better at understanding, had the power to avoid (until June 1941) the consequences of their errors. From the deadly foolishness of "social fascism," through the graveyard optimism of the first months of the Third Reich, during the superficial revision of the KPD line in the Popular Front phase, and in the hopeless "analyses" of the later years by a party increasingly out of touch with German life—Duhnke shows how at every step the German Communists found no adequate tools in their theoretical armory to understand the development of German life that had deprived them of their opportunity for power. Of course, some leaders (and followers as well) took comfort in dogmatic formulas, but that only increased their helplessness. The Communists were far from alone in this predicament, but they had staked the most—in lives, ambitions, and effort—on the correctness of their analyses.

This theoretical inadequacy of the KPD was matched by its practical lack of success. As Duhnke shows, perseverance, courage, and faith in ultimate success were insufficient to prevent the Gestapo from nullifying the Communists' efforts at building a KPD-led German resistance movement. Although Communist groups continued to appear to the very end of this era—the Leipzig-based group formed around Georg Schumann in 1943–44 was one of the most vigorous and interesting (although ultimately unsuccessful)—at no time was the Hitler regime in any measurable danger from all of this heroic activity. Indeed, if one reads this part of Duhnke's book while bearing in mind Edinger's study of the exile-SPD, one is left with the rather surprising conclusion that, even though the KPD had an acknowledged party leadership functioning in Moscow, the personal and intellectual dispersion of German Communism after 1939 was not much less than that of its Social Democratic rival.

It is a measure of Duhnke's achievement that his book raises a number of interesting and important questions in the reader's mind. One such question concerns the nature of a modern mass-party and the relationship of the leadership of such a movement to the mass of supporters. One of the Communists' more plausible claims at the time of Hitler's accession to power was that a party with millions of members and millions more supporters, which could elect eighty-one deputies to the last Reichstag despite Nazi terror, was a party which could not simply be swept away. Yet swept away it was—almost as completely as the Nazi party was after 1945. This study describes some of the tactical reasons for this decline, for example, the lack of credibility on the national question so evident in the Saar plebiscite of 1935. More broadly, this study suggests that modern mass movements owe more to power and authority than to ideological appeals or social situation.

In this context, the KPD's Leninist "organizational weapon," appears less important. It certainly enabled the party to maintain contact with small and scattered bands of loyalists, and it allowed the KPD to dominate the prisoners' organizations of many concentration camps, but it had little consequence when it could not be deployed in the political process.

Duhnke shows in detail how the KPD grappled ineffectually with the agonizing problems of patriotism in the face of a despised regime in its homeland. Ultimately, the Communists took refuge in following the Soviet line. They denounced other foes of Hitler who hoped for an Allied victory during the early phase of the war, then attacked these rivals bitterly for demanding justice for the Germans when Soviet policy favored territorial and population shifts.

The chief problem with this book is that the voluminous record is allowed to obscure these and other larger issues raised sometimes in only tantalizingly marginal ways by the author. When this German-language version of a University of California, Berkeley, dissertation finds its deserved American publication, Duhnke might do some massive pruning (say, of the long discussion of underground and Red Army espionage activity in wartime Germany) and close the work with a discussion of the significance of KPD's twelve years in exile, rather than, as now, simply breaking off the discussion arbitrarily.

HENRY KRISCH
University of Connecticut

Political Attitudes of Indian Industry: A Case Study of the Baroda Industrial Elite. By Howard L. Erdman. (London: The Athlone Press, 1971. Pp. 62. 22 shillings.)

Recently, the drift of American social science scholarship on India has been away from the village and into the towns and cities. As usual, such research has not devoted itself to the secondary analysis of materials already collected as it might in the United States, but has involved the collection of primary descriptive data, with a greater or lesser attempt to proceed systematically with analytic concepts leading back into the discipline and with an eye on comparable work done elsewhere.

Erdman's slim monograph reports on research he carried out in the Western Indian city of Baroda in 1966–67 on the political attitudes of business leaders. It is essentially descriptive, perhaps necessarily so in the absence of solid materials ready at hand, and makes few self-conscious attempts at systematization or conceptualization. To the extent that it is oriented to other literature, it attempts to correct earlier simplistic conceptions of business leaders as totally for or against the existing government, and to represent them along a continuum. Its primary focus is on political attitudes and not activity, and a basic economic determinism is invoked in explaining the origin of those attitudes.

Baroda emerges as a secondary business center, in the shadow of, but not completely dominated by Ahmedabad. Its leaders are primarily home-grown, although somewhat cosmopolitan in experience. Its industries are spread across that limited range that characterizes Indian manufacturers. And the social structure of its leadership is familial and hierarchical, not unlike the American business class as represented in Lynd's *Middletown*. In political attitudes, the Baroda industrialists approve of government actions in making land acquisition easier for them and the provision of cheap and dependable power. They disapprove the government's support of labor's position in industrial disputes because of the populist imperatives of contesting elections; an overgrown thicket of government rules, permits, quotas and licenses; and the government's habit of publicly breathing the fire of theoretical Marxism, while finding pragmatic, capitalist solutions to specific problems. Overall, Erdman sees the viewpoint of the industrialists as close to the conservative Swatantra Party view, on which he is, incidentally, a leading expert; and he hints that they would welcome the creation of an authoritarian government less tied to the need for securing popular approval. In view of the current move toward a left-oriented mobilization state in India today, prayers may be growing more fervent.

I have only two small disappointments to register as criticism. First, it would have been helpful if Erdman had made a more deliberate attempt to place his findings in a slightly broader context of similar studies in other countries. Second, although Erdman interviewed a substantial number of business leaders, one looks in vain for even the most general indications of the degree of consensus on particular issues and some notion of what characteristics of leaders went with what attitudes. I am not trying to suggest an uncalled-for numerical precision, but the notion that cases must be many and measurement precise before general quantitative description is useful is one of the banes of case study research.

Erdman's wok is a contribution to a still small, but growing literature concerned with Indian business elites, and as such it is very valuable.

RICHARD D. LAMBERT
University of Pennsylvania

From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969. By Herbert Feldman. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 340. $18.75.)

The present volume is the second in a projected trilogy by an Englishman long resident in Pakistan. Herbert Feldman has been writing about the Pakistan scene for almost the lifetime of the nation, and his work has enlightened a generation of students interested in South Asian politics and government. His earlier book, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), is judged by Mr. Feldman to be a prerequisite to this "sequel." I would concur with this assessment, for the author's opening chapter reads almost like a continuation of that volume. Moreover, readers are already put on notice that the third volume in this series will begin where this one leaves off. We are introduced to Yahya Khan, Ayub's successor, in a brief epilogue, thus preparing the way for the ultimate sequence of Mr. Feldman's narration of the Pakistan tragedy.

Mr. Feldman writes as a close-in observer of the daily happenings in Pakistan. He informs his readers that he has kept a detailed diary of what appear to him to be significant events. His publications, like the one under review, reflect this concern for day-to-day detail, but his analysis is somewhat thin. The author's strength, therefore, lies in his long and abiding interest in Pakistan, and for this reason his latest contribution is worthwhile reading.

If there is a theme in *Crisis to Crisis* it is the transformation of Ayub Khan from a professional soldier with a flair for administration into a power-grabbing dictator. Ayub, asserts Mr. Feldman, insisted on surrounding himself with personalities who, while assisting in the building of his personality "cult," also isolated him from the realities of his society. Although I cannot quarrel with the observation that Ayub was poorly or erroneously advised, Mr. Feldman's suggestion that Ayub was obsessed with power appears overstated. The author tends to focus on Ayub's "personality" and the conflict over the legal system, not the administrative state over which Ayub officiated but clearly did not subordinate to his will. I believe that greater attention should have been given to Ayub's dependence on the Army and higher bureaucracy. Mr. Feldman neither analyzes their more than supporting roles, nor for that matter, explains the constraints which the colonial bureaucratic legacy imposed upon Ayub. Ayub is a beneficiary of the preindependence system, hardly its master. Moreover, the perpetuation of the agrarian power structure and the traditional norms reinforcing it are overlooked in Mr. Feldman's treatment. Ayub Khan was a dominant actor, but despite repeated references to his imposing a dictatorship on Pakistan, the evidence thus far assembled seems to have been stretched to satisfy popular perceptions.

No one expects Mr. Feldman to be an apologist for Ayub. The failures of Pakistan's erstwhile President are too obvious and too gross for any objective scholar to sing his praises. Nevertheless, Mr. Feldman does appear to apologize for Ayub's actions in his *Revolution,* whereas, in this volume, he seems only too willing and ready to pillory him. Moreover, the author reads special significance into the amending of the 1962 constitution. While recognizing that this was Ayub's constitution, he seems to suggest that had Ayub not tampered with it, he would have been a far more successful governor. Notes Feldman: ". . . the longer-term effect of all this [amending] upon his political position was a decisive factor in his ultimate fall" (p. 23). It is difficult to believe that the constitution would have been any more acceptable to the intelligentsia had Ayub not interfered. The constitution which the attentive public clamored for was not granted, and that which Ayub's administration imposed upon the country was condemned from the start. Furthermore, despite all the demands for a written constitution in Pakistan there is little evidence that one would be revered over another. In Pakistan, the use of arbitrary power tends to be limited more by conditions than by constitutional principles, and even that which passes for the "rule of law" survives because it is in tune with the reality of power.

Mr. Feldman writes with clarity and labors to omit little from his narrative of these crucial years in Pakistan's history. The book is divided into fifteen chapters, each of which highlights a significant period or event. In the main the author's treatment is chronological; however, he also attempts to be topical, as when he devotes separate chapters to West and East Pakistan. In the latter there is ground for criticism. Given subsequent events and the publication date of this volume, the treatment of East Pakistan must be judged skimpy, and it is not fully incorporated in the text. Twenty-two pages in a text of 299 hardly does justice to the subject. The author's treatment of Pakistan's foreign relations and especially those with India is welcome, but there are questionable passages such as the prediction of little chance for an early renewal of Pakistan-Indian hostilities after the 1965 conflict. Mr. Feldman's belief that "India is too deeply concerned with internal political troubles which threaten its integrity as a single, sovereign state" (p. 118) is falsified by the events of 1971. Perhaps it can be argued that the 1971 drama was unpredictable. Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the East Pakistan problem and greater awareness of the east wing's relationship, even if only indirect, to the turbulence in Indian Bengal, Assam, and the tribal territories might have prompted a different conclusion.

Hence we arrive at the principal criticism of the book: Mr. Feldman could have produced a more important and timely work had he included the Yahya Khan period in *this* volume. This would have necessitated a more coherent analytical framework (and perhaps further delays in publication), but it also would have brought forth a more notable contribution. As is, the author set his sights on condemning Ayub Khan as a bumbling dictator. This determination, unfortunately, has prevented Mr. Feldman from giving his readers the larger benefits of his long and informed experience but he has provided us with an important chronology of the decade of Ayub.

LAWRENCE ZIRING

Western Michigan University

A Guide to Parliamentary Papers, 3rd ed. By P. Ford and G. Ford. (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972. Pp. xiv, 87. $8.50.)

Varied and rich as they are as sources for the analysis of policy making, British parliamentary papers in their many modes are apt to confuse the unfamiliar user. One's best guide is still a well-informed documents librarian. Lacking that, those new to these mysteries should consult the latest edition of the Fords' guided tour of parliamentary documents, appropriately subtitled "What They are; How to Find Them; How to Use Them." It updates the Fords' earlier work by including references to the changes in parliamentary structure and publication procedures made in the 1960s, and contains some new bibliographical aids. A somewhat musty work, it is nevertheless a must for reference libraries (though at the price few individuals will want or need to acquire it for themselves).

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH

Indiana University

Soviet Prison Camp Speech: A Survivor's Glossary. Compiled by Meyer Galler and Harlan E. Marquess. (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972. Pp. 216. $10.00.)

By now millions of Soviet citizens have had either direct or indirect exposure to prison dialect, and it appears frequently in work by dissident writers circulating in underground (*samizdat*) copies. Those interested in repression and opposition, political culture (especially the symbolic aspects of political communication), and Soviet politics in general will therefore find this book useful for several purposes. The six hundred and fifty-six items in the glossary detail physical conditions, norms, and values of prison and camp life. A useful forty-two page introduction gives background on the development of the dialect, some of its functions in the system of repression, a short content analysis of glossary terms, and a list of useful references. Compiled jointly by a former camp inmate and a scholar of Russian language, the book is limited in scope to those terms Galler encountered during his years (1942–1957) in Central Asian camps supplemented by some from the writings of Solzhenitsyn who served time almost simultaneously (1943–53) in roughly the same place.

A special vocabulary which can be adopted by anyone speaking Russian, camp slang is described as a ". . . substandard variety of Russian . . . 'tainted' by legal and administrative argot, obscenities, and frequently, by elements of uneducated peasant speech" (p. 15). Proverbs and sayings are most revealing of the basic concerns of prisoners and everyday conditions, particularly the morality of camp life and dealings with authorities. Profound alienation and a cynical despair is implied in such expressions as "Provided we've got the man, we can find a charge for him," and "Moscow does not heed tears." "He who can will swallow you" pertains more generally to the quality of life within the camps, and "Having nine lives, like a cat" refers to the remarkable resistance of female prisoners to camp life. Acronyms show political categorization and, therefore, help to delineate the legitimate boundaries of Soviet political culture. ZhVN, standing for "Wife of an Enemy of the People," betrays what Inkeles has termed the "virus theory of social pathology" ("The Totalitarian Mystique" in his *Social Change in Soviet Russia* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968]), providing the basic justification for the purge: once the social organism is contaminated, the absolute elimination of all carriers (the potential "enemies") is required. "Guilt by association," another common feature of the purge mentality, dictates that marriage to an "enemy" constitutes a state of contagion as well. Obscenities constitute a rather prominent feature of camp speech and are important from two points of view: For prisoners they serve as a mild form of open rebellion, while for authorities they are an instrument for downgrading and brutalizing their charges. "Call me a chamber pot but feed me" is the prisoners' pathetic exprssion of resignation to their impotence. A residual category of terms include specific references to the grim conditions of camp life; *výshka,* a death sentence or a watchtower; *vozhátiy,* a guard in charge of watchdogs; *podkídysh,* a "plant" or informer; and *samorúb,* one who maims himself in order to avoid hard labor and possible death from exhaustion. Still more of the grim tone of life "inside" is reflected in the examples of how words are used: for "stukách" (squealer or informer), "last night a squealer in our barracks had his throat cut."

To be sure, the facts and flavor of camp life reflected in this glossary and its long introduction can also be gleaned from fictional and autobiographical accounts; but there is special merit in the more systematic list accompanied by specific explication. Particularly interesting is the attempt to estimate the relative numerical strength of various content categories in camp terminology. Here the most important categories seem to be: names for fellow prisoners and authorities, 23 per cent of the total; terms referring to locale of prisons, 16 per cent; survival-oriented terms, 16 per cent; expressions relating to arrest and investigation, 14 per cent; and terms of abuse and derision, 11 per cent (pp. 36–37).

As the authors note, the gallows humor which repeatedly crops up in proverbs, sayings, and terms of decision must help "to reconcile man to the painful, unacceptable, and tragic aspects of his condition" (p. 37). Particularly expressive in this regard are the mutations of official slogans which constantly haunt both prisoners and everyday Soviet citizens as well. For prisoners "Being (*bytiyé*) determines consciousness" becomes "Beating (*byt'yó*) determines consciousness" and "Socialist vigilance (*bditel'nost*)" becomes "Socialist farting (*bzditel'nost'*)." Of course, such safety valves serve not only the prisoners but the regime as well, by slowing down the accumulation of collective frustrations which might hinder the smooth functioning of the coercive apparatus.

While Galler and Marquess make tantalizing beginnings at discussing some of the important theoretical considerations the content of their book raises, they do not carry through with much systematic speculation. This omission, however, seems to result more from their own backgrounds and the original conception of the project than from its faulty execution.

GAYLE DURHAM HOLLANDER
Hampshire College

L'An 40: La Belgique occupée. By J. Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-politiques, 1971. Pp. 517. $10.75, paper.)

Scholars interested in the political development of Western Europe often surrender the World War II period to military historians or memoir-writing notables. The connection between the war years, 1939–1945, and their sequel has not received much attention, possibly because of the belief that wartime disruption destroyed most patterns of political behavior. A major contribution of the lengthy and detailed study under review, *L'An 40,* is the explicit recognition that awareness of the events of World War II, specifically those of the crucial year, 1940, within Belgium, significantly extends our understanding of contemporary Belgian political structures and processes. There is no attempt to argue this case for other countries, which would at least entail a choice of different time frames, but the book itself is a convincing example for other specialists.

L'An 40 is the most recent of the full-length studies published by the Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-politiques (CRISP), well known among African specialists in the United States for its exhaustive dossiers on the Congo (some published by Princeton University Press) but recognized among only a few scholars for its distinguished analysis of nearly all aspects of Belgian politics. Jules Gérard-Libois, the leading figure in the establishment of CRISP in 1958 and presently its Director-General and his younger associate, José Gotovitch, bring to the study of the German occupation of Belgium a thorough review of the relevant secondary literature, a ground-breaking examination of the pertinent German archives, and a quantity of published and solicited memoir material. The description of Belgium's reactions to occupation in 1940 reflects several of the customary theoretical concerns of CRISP such as the mechanics of decision making, leadership recruitment, the structure of public opinion, and the morphology of groups. As a result, the perspective on the German occupation sharply diverges from the few other available accounts.

There is a rich treasure of information in this volume for those fascinated by Belgium or any other small European democracy and also for the more numerous students and scholars concerned with German politics, especially Germany during the Hitler period. Viewing the German occupation from the Belgian side makes it easier to detect the army/party/government conflicts concealed by some popular writings on the Nazi period. Unlike Holland or France, Belgium was placed under a military administration and ruled indirectly, the cause of much quarreling among the untidy chains-of-command of the German hierarchy. The book is equally informative in tracing the evolution of opinion toward the occupying administration in all sectors of Belgium's pluralist polity. It is true, of course, that collaboration existed alongside the Resistance in Belgium. Nonetheless, in roughly a five-month period, especially during the harsh winter famine that occurred in the latter months of 1940, the preponderance of public opinion swung from collaborationist tendencies to general hostility, a basis for diverse forms of clandestine activity in the rapidly organizing Resistance groups. Tracing this shift, scarcely affected by the activity of the exile government in London headed by Hubert Pierlot, is one of the major achievements of the study. The discussion of "collaboration" (a term almost entirely confined to polemical usage in the United

States) fairly takes account of the Nazi effort to capitalize on the permanent tension between Flemish and Walloons in Belgium.

L'An 40 displays an admirable freedom from partisanship in the treatment of events and personalities whose memory can still evoke a full range of emotional response among Belgians. The only explicit point of view adopted by the authors is revealed in the governing hypothesis that the "occupation brought into play the same political, economic, social, and cultural forces which fashion Belgian society in normal times" (p. 9). But a crucial difference exists in observing those forces at play in 1940 and today because war and occupation exacerbate "the natural tensions in society and furnish a privileged source for socio-political observation" (p. 9). The entire book makes a carefully documented and persuasive case for this view. The immediacy and influence of the events of 1940 on present-day Belgium are largely matters for speculation. It should be recorded, however, that *L'An 40* has developed into a publishing event in Belgium. Within a year of its appearance, it had entered its fifth printing and led to a brief sequel also published by CRISP, *Commentaires et Réactions,* a collection of reviews and other communications commenting on the book.

An omission of *L'An 40,* recognized by the authors, is any extended discussion of the impact of military developments on the political situation. For many political scientists, this gap is not as disconcerting as the failure to discuss directly the consequences of the availability of and access to interview sources and correspondents. There is also an occasional confusion between the opinions of sources and the analytic interpretations by the authors. These criticisms do not weigh heavily when placed in the context of the author's three-year effort in researching and writing the book, the need to maintain the confidentiality of some interview respondents and, particularly in the case of the senior author, a remarkable knowledge of Belgian personalities, groups, and political issues. The scope of this account of occupied Belgium during the first crucial year of World War II, the excellence of the historical and political analysis in each chapter, and the opening of important research vistas contribute to a work that merits a wide readership.

Howard Bliss

Vassar College

Manpower for Development: Perspectives on Five Continents. By Eli Ginzberg. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 331. $10.00.)

Eli Ginzberg, of Columbia University, is one of the central figures in manpower analysis in the United States. In this book he skillfully analyzes the economic, political, and manpower realities of his subject matter and how they interrelate. The book deals with manpower and related problems and prospects in twenty-seven countries as varied as Ethiopia and Sweden and as diverse in population as India and the Bahamas. It is based on the author's field studies since 1964 on five continents, and all except the first and the last chapters are based on his earlier publications.

The first chapter proffers as the focus for the book "the ways in which the leaders of those several countries have shaped their manpower policies with the aim of realizing their development goals" (p. 3). It then sets out as the "analytical schema" four categories of forces which determine a nation's human resources: the value system, the political structure, the economic organization, and the component parts of the manpower system itself. Unfortunately, the promise of a unifying focus is seldom attained. Ginzberg paints with a very broad brush but with quite different hues for the different countries with which he deals in any depth. The particular hue seems to reflect more often the author's impressionistic evidence than his concern for analysis under the schema he set forth. Nowhere does he draw explicitly on the work of others.

On many important matters, such as the nature and quality of Asian universities, which is the sole subject of Chapter 7, he offers very little substance on which to base his conclusions. His discussion of the universities of five countries covers a mere ten pages, of which less than two deal with India. Surely even Ginzberg's keen insight was sorely taxed to produce valid generalizations on such an important subject on the basis of his brief impressions and anecdotal experiences.

Such a work is valuable for its breadth of coverage rather than for its analytical depth. It is reassuring that the board brush is wielded by so accomplished a painter. At times, however, his brush becomes so wide in covering broad economic and political development and prospects that the manpower content is relegated to insignificance. Such abandonment of his theme is particularly evident in Chapter 14, "The Eastern Block," wherein Ginzberg devotes twelve pages to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, mainly in praise of market-oriented economic systems over the directed economics of those countries. What little he does with manpower in this chapter is not well done; for example, after acknowledging that these five countries are very different, he nevertheless attempts to characterize in one short paragraph "the educational system." In spite of Ginzberg's emphasis on the critical importance of institutions, his lengthly chapter on Israel merely mentions the Histadruth, despite the fact that this "government within a government" is that country's most significant and unique institution in manpower and in many related areas.

Ginzberg develops several themes which have often been neglected in discussions of manpower and economic development, e.g., the important role of the military in training leadership and manpower, the importance of management, the neglect of women as a manpower resource, and the negative as well as the positive aspects of foreign university training and of foreign firms in manpower development and utilization.

With few exceptions he finds that the higher educational systems of countries at every level of development are producing more high-level manpower than the countries can effectively employ, and that this increases discontent and political instability. Ginzberg gives scant recognition, however, to the fact that such general overproduction often disguises persistent and critical shortages of many high-level skills, particularly administrative skills for the public and private sectors, which continue to impede development in most countries.

Ginzberg correctly advocates the development of on-the-job training by public and private organizations as essential to the development of needed skills. He properly criticizes ineffective vocational education as a general problem. But in his chapter on Venezuela he misses the opportunity to offer as a contrast that country's innovative and generally successful system of vocational education (INCE). Ginzberg's one-paragraph discussion and analysis (p. 267) is not only superficial, but it also misleads the reader about INCE's role and effectiveness.

The author repeatedly stresses the importance of rural development as an essential alternative to urban overconcentration. Although many others have discussed this problem, Ginzberg's wide coverage of countries points up the generality of such a problem regardless of countries' vastly different characteristics and levels of development.

To this reviewer the main value of the book is its knowledgeable treatment of economic, political, and manpower circumstances, institutions, problems, and prospects as inextricably interrelated. What Ginzberg's treatment lacks in depth it more than makes up for by highlighting those important elements in the development and utilization of manpower which are common to very diverse countries.

JOHN C. SHEARER
Oklahoma State University

Naissance d'un Etat Noir: L'évolution politique et constitutionnelle du Dahomey, de la colonisation à nos jours. By Maurice A. Glele. (Paris: R. Pichon and R. Durand-Auzias, 1969. Pp. xii, 527. Approx. $10.00.)

Since independence in 1960, Dahomey has manifested chronic political instability under seven different presidents and four constitutions. Its highly politicized and faction-ridden army, seething with personalist ambitions, has already staged six successful coups and has become the primary destabilizing force in Dahomey today. Civil and military authority has also had to cope with increasingly radicalized assaults by primary and secondary school students and by unionists whose salaries have been eroded by austerity measures aimed at reducing civil service expenditures from the level of 75 per cent of the country's budget.

Maurice Glele's book is the first detailed study of Dahomey since Robert Cornevin's historical work in 1962. The author is a Fon from the Abomey royal family; he studied at the Sorbonne and is currently with UNESCO. During his research he has had access to many of the private archives in Dahomey and writes with the lucidity of one personally familiar with the major participants in Dahomey's long history of political strife. The narrative prudently ends with the onset of Soglo's military administration in 1965. The work is hence quite dated, for Dahomey has since had six additional civil and military regimes. The study is nevertheless a solid contribution to our knowledge of the Dahomean political context.

In his study Glele traces the political and constitutional evolution of Dahomey and pinpoints factors that have contributed to the pattern of acute political instability in this small West African state. Among these factors he notes the existence of intense vertical cleavages reinforced by historic antagonisms in the South, grievances in the less developed North regarding its exploitation by the South as a whole; the coalescence of regional allegiances around three leaders—Ahomadegbe, Maga, and Apithy—who have maintained for two decades an electoral stranglehold over their respective fiefdoms; a weak economy with exports never covering more than 45 per cent of imports; recurrent deficits necessitating austerity measures which disturbed unionists; dependence upon French subsidies, alienating radicalized students; government mismanagement of resources; personal ambitions in conditions of acute scarcity in the country that had produced the largest number of intellectuals and administrators in French Africa; and above all else, a failure of civilian leadership to coalesce and to move in the direction of national integration and economic development. Glele does not shy away from harshly indicting the Dahomean political elite. He is understandably biased in favor of Ahomadegbe (also of Abomey), because of Ahomadegbe's greater dedication to national unity and modernization. More annoying is the excessively strong language Glele employs in driving home his conclusions, rather than letting the facts speak for themselves.

The author's searing analysis of the failure of political leadership in Dahomey also challenges the meaning and utility of elections or plebescites in that country, which merely serve to reiterate the links between the masses and their regional political "bosses." Yet curiously, when Glele turns to prescriptive advice, his proposals are somewhat out of touch with Dahomean social reality. It is doubtful if the executive system and the nontribal parties he pleads for could survive Dahomey's traditional pattern of voting, especially since they would go against the current three-cornered division of power in the center. The stability over time of the clientelist vote was indeed attested to in 1970 when the triumvirate obtained *exactly* the same percentage of the vote in their core districts as in the 1960 elections, while Zinsou, the nontribal "modern" candidate obtained only 3 per cent of the vote. The solution to Dahomey's political problems cannot be sought in structural changes that leave untouched the underlying cultural cleavages and do not take into account the conflicting political ambitions in the center of the political vortex. Indeed, Glele's analysis itself underscores the complexities involved in establishing public and political order in this African State.

SAMUEL DECALO
New School for Social Research

The Twelve-Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany. By Richard Grunberger. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. Pp. viii, 834. $10.00.)

As we recede from direct experience of the Third Reich, and direct emotional involvement in its existence, we find the generalizations with which we explained its nature and origins less and less satisfying. Those who voted Nazi, those who joined the party, those who benefited from the regime, those who opposed it do not fall into simple categories. On many topics the Nazis had no policy: Had not Hitler made a virtue of being unencumbered with programs? On others their proclaimed ideals turned out to be sadly irrelevant: A woman's greatest joy might be to sew, cook and wear the Honour Cross of the German Mother, but who was going to make the munitions and drive the streetcars while the men were at the front? On others still, such as the churches, the army or capital-labor relations the party was divided and confused. The party itself never grew out of the habits acquired during the "time of struggle"; it remained a loose alliance of egotistical chieftains and mutually incompatible sectional interests, whom Hitler played off against each other. The Third Reich was less a system than a chaos. This does not mean that it is unanalyzable; David Schoenbaum's *Hitler's Social Revolution* and Martin Broszat's *Der Staat Hitlers* analyze society and political institutions brilliantly without losing sight of the improvisatory incoherence of their subject. It does mean that the chronicler of the Third Reich cannot be content with mere description, in the hope that the facts will speak for themselves.

It is the chief defect of Mr. Grunberger's massive and well-researched volume that it lacks a framework. His book is the sum of its parts, and though some of the parts are good, they do not really justify the 800 pages he has written. There are plenty of worthwhile insights. He warns us not "to discount the reserves of idealism tapped by the propagation of the idea of the folk-community" (p. 51). But the combined appeals of the gospels of collective selfishness and egalitarian sacrifice had curious effects: Evacuees from bombed cities complained that possessions stolen from the Jews had been unfairly distributed, and there was always an excess of volunteers for military firing squads, whereas the U.S. Army had the utmost difficulty in getting its most famous deserter, Private Slovik, executed.

Some of the chapters dealing with individual aspects of life in the Third Reich are excellent summaries, e.g., those on agriculture, the army, and consumption. Some are misleading, e.g., those on women and family. One would not gather from this volume that, given the conditions of total war, German women were rather sheltered and cosseted, as Speer and others have pointed out. The illegitimacy rates Grunberger cites seem to prove nothing in particular. And was the crowd who urged an unwilling woman to give herself to a threatening Russian soldier (p. 43) uniquely characteristic of the Third Reich? Mr. Grunberger should read Maupassant's *Boule de Suif.*

There is a lot of imprecise language. Why call Imperial Germany "pseudo-constitutional" (p. 2)? Its brand of limited monarchy is precisely what many continental Europeans thought of as 'constitutional,' as opposed to parliamentary or democratic government. We are told that "the Party was co-terminous with the state" (p. 130), but that "by and large the Party and the civil service remained distinct" (p. 132). And the identification of workers with the Third Reich in its last years must be ascribed to something other than their *embourgeoisement* (p. 201).

Despite its wealth of information and shrewd comment, the book shows an opportunity lost. The author has read widely, even if not always in the best sources. It is not an original book, but that does not matter. That there is a vast demand for a work that will explain Nazi Germany to the non-specialist reader was shown by the sales of William Shirer's amateurish *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.* A good synopsis of how the Third Reich functioned is more important than reading another fifty microfilmed security reports. But synoptic is not the word that *The Twelve-Year Reich* suggests to the reader's mind.

PETER PULZER
Christ Church, Oxford University

The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871: Struggles and Accomplishments. By Theodore S. Hamerow. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 456. $15.50, $7.95 paper.)

This book completes the two-volume work by Theodore Hamerow, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, on the social foundations of German unification. The work covers the period from 1858, when Prince William became regent of Prussia, to the formation of the German Empire in 1871. The first volume, subtitled *Ideas and Institutions,* appeared in 1969; it dealt systematically with the social structure, ideologies, and political forces of pre-imperial Germany. The present volume is a chronological account of the arrays of forces on various issues whose resolution led to the formation of the Empire. Drawing on biographies and memoirs, official documents and statistics, the press, and the propaganda output of parties and interest groups, Mr. Hamerow has produced a technically sound, gracefully written history.

His main point is that the political and economic order that had emerged in Germany by 1871 to last for nearly half a century was a result of a compromise between old and new capital in which the new industrial bourgeoisie accepted economic liberty without political rights and the old landed aristocracy sacrificed its corporatist ideology but retained its power and property. The immediate cost of abolishing the legal structure of a corporate economy was borne by the handicraft workers. But even before the legal basis of *laissez faire* was established in North Germany during the 1860s, industrialization had made major inroads. Mr. Hamerow shows that the law merely speeded up an inevitable process.

The same bourgeoisie that required economic freedom at home desired freedom of movement for persons, goods, and capital abroad. This was as true of the South German as of the North German bourgeoisie. In the South, however, the bourgeois proponents of German economic integration encountered strong opposition from governmental officials justifiably wary of Prussian domination. Indeed, the author contends that it was Otto von Bismarck who saw how far economic integration could be pressed, and who created a political order in which it occurred under the control of Prussia.

Readers familiar with the contemporary movement for economic and political integration in Western Europe may be struck by the similarity between the Rome treaty and recent plans for economic and monetary union on the one hand, and Bismarck's aims, first for the German Confederation (which included Austria), then for the North German Confederation (formed in 1867 by the states north of the River Main). Though Bismarck went further, advocating a common navy and a common system of civil law, he shared with the proponents of West European integration a desire for uniformity in tariffs, money and banking, the conditions of transportation and the migration of workers, and similar matters.

That the regulation of such matters fell, in the North German Confederation, to a Reichstag elected by equal manhood suffrage was due not just to the fact that the bourgeoisie stood to benefit most immediately from economic integration. It was due rather more to Bismarck's desire for democratic legitimization. Mr. Hamerow shows that, by creating a popularly elected legislature and occupying it with economic matters, Bismarck could achieve the appearance of democracy without granting a bill of rights, ministerial responsibility, or a parliamentary voice in foreign and military affairs.

Strictly comparable data are of course unavailable, but the desire for economic and political integration seems to have a broader base in Europe today than it did in Germany a century ago. Moreover, there is an active European bureaucracy in Brussels, conscious of its duty to carry out the Rome treaty. But until the integration movement acquires the force of a Bismarck backed by expanding industrial capitalism, one might question the extent to which it will make further advances, particularly in the political sphere.

Parts of the book are excellent political science. One thinks of an analysis of the elections to the constituent assembly of the North German Confederation and of several extended efforts at generalization on the social bases of political forces. This is a minor point, but I wish *Stand* (estate) had not been rendered as social class, a translation that does credit neither to the niceties of social-scientific terminology nor to the nuances of corporatist thought.

GLENN N. SCHRAM

Marquette University

Scottish Nationalism. By H. J. Hanham. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 250. $5.50.)

It is perhaps unfortunate that since the publication of H. J. Hanham's book the fortunes of the Scottish National Party have waned. At the time that it was completed, the S.N.P. had made broad electoral inroads into both major parties in Scotland and had captured a parliamentary seat at Hamilton. To many observers the apparent success of a political party claiming to represent the national patrimony of Scotland seemed perfectly logical at a moment when Britain's Ulster dilemma was intensifying. Sharing this optimism concerning a rebirth of nationalist sentiment in the peripheries of the United Kingdom, Hanham traces the historical and institutional roots of the movement in Scotland. The decline in S.N.P. performance during the past several years, however, seems to have confirmed what should have been discerned at the time—namely, the assumption that there was a nationalist revival and the further assumption that the S.N.P. represented such a movement were illusions. We must now conclude that at least one of the two assumptions was mistaken.

Hanham's theme is that Scotland has "all the characteristics of a distinct nation" (p. 15) and that "a new Scottish system of government has come into being which with little modification would be capable of providing the basis for an independent Scottish administration" (p. 50). It is apparent early on that he has overlooked the very essential distinction between "state" and "nation" and has failed to show how the presence of either one must of necessity lead to the other.

The book describes faithfully those institutions and patterns of thought that are typically Scottish and illustrates their historical development. Yet the author fails to make a convincing argument that these institutional and intellectual tracings have been converted into a popular nationalist movement. "In Europe," he asserts, "the normal basis for nationalism is the historic nation" (p. 10). That such historical determinism permits him to declare that when independence comes the Scots will be prepared to govern themselves is debatable; that it permits him to infer that Scottish nationalism has become a major political force is dubious.

The first section of the book is intended to show the historical distinctiveness of Scottish institutions. Hanham's treatment of Scottish history before the twentieth century, although perhaps overemphasizing separatist currents of thought, is nonetheless a balanced one. The author recognizes that Scotland has never been characterized by the homogeneity that some romantic nationalists have ascribed to it but rather has been plagued by recurrent fissiparous tendencies rooted in ethnicity, geography, religion, and economics. It is when he seeks to find continuity between historical nationalism and contemporary electoral politics in Scotland that he is treading on softer ground. Nowhere does the confusion of dispassionate analysis and political commitment become clearer than when in discussing the "anglicization" (or is it "modernization") of Scotland, Hanham concludes that "what most troubled thinking Scots was that the ordinary Scottish man-in-the-street . . . seemed to welcome the fact that he could now get in Scotland the advantages his southern counterparts enjoyed in England" (p. 47). It is almost as though Hanham were a Marxist confronted with the failure of the "inevitable" revolution to materialize. At such points the reader is uncertain whether Hanhan is *describing* a nationalist rebirth or is *calling* for one.

Elsewhere it is equally difficult to distinguish the author's empirical analysis from his own values. He argues, for example, that "what makes the demand for Scottish control of Scottish affairs so persuasive is that since 1918 the Scottish economy has gone through a very testing period" (p. 29). We are left uncertain as to whether economic deprivation is causing a resurgence of nationalism or whether it simply justifies such a phenomenon. One could argue after all that the Scots have been subject to economic bias from Whitehall. Since the demise of the Empire and the impoverishment of nineteenth century industries like shipbuilding and coal mining, Scotland has fallen upon lean times. The relationship, however, between Scotland's economic and political conditions is unclear.

In recent years political support for the S.N.P. has varied with the severity of unemployment and inflation. Yet, much of this variance can be accounted for in heavily Labour areas (such as the urban Clydeside) during Harold Wilson's tenure of office. This phenomenon probably represents less a direct translation of nationalist sentiment into S.N.P. votes than a protest vote against Westminster among those Labour supporters ideologically unable to cast their votes for Tories. The more consistent sources of S.N.P. membership have been in wealthy and rural pockets of the country, notably in the Highlands and Borders. This trend, unseen in aggregate voting data, indicates increasing localist sentiment directed against Edinburgh and Glasgow as well as against London. These conclusions are butressed by the appeal which the decentralized and parochially oriented S.N.P. branch organization has had in small towns and villages and by the relatively greater electoral success enjoyed by the party in municipal and parliamentary by-elections as opposed to General Elections.

As for the normative aspect of the economic argument, Gavin McCrone has shown that Scotland would not benefit from independence and that English money has prevented the gap in wealth between England and Scotland from growing larger than it is. But even were Hanham's inferences valid, the argument that relative economic deprivation leads to nationalist sentiment is by no means uncontroversial. Indeed, as the author's description of the "anglicization" of Scotland (pp. 33–49) suggests the reverse process may historically be more accurate.

Scottish Nationalism contributes to our understanding of Scotland's past and reminds us that constitutional and national issues are not confined to Africa and Asia. The book, however, lacks the theoretical underpinning that would permit us to assess Scotland's present and future. While emphasizing Anglo-Scottish differences, the author underestimates the very concrete integrative factors binding British society. Unless the reader shares Hanham's very real attraction to the notion of an independent Scotland, he will find it difficult to accept the historical determinism which the argument implies.

RICHARD W. MANSBACH
Rutgers University, New Brunswick

Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration. Edited by James J. Heaphey. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, in cooperation with the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration, 1971. Pp. xii, 276. $8.50.)

This is the sixth in the series of volumes in which the Comparative Administration Group has reported the work of its research seminars held during the 1960s. Like all the other volumes, it is the collaborative effort of a number of senior scholars (who assembled at the University of Pittsburgh in 1965), though each person's work is clearly identified in separate chapters. Trying to head off the reader who will proceed no further because this is just "another edited volume, held together only by the binding," let me report immediately that the present work is well worth one's attention. Its weaknesses with regard to focus and continuity, though surely visible, are no greater than in many works written supposedly by a single author. I admit that since I have contributed chapters to five different "edited volumes," my credibility might well be impeached. But I am also on record in this *Review* of having thrown, if not stones, at least some small pebbles at other people's glasshouses, i.e., "edited volumes."

In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters by the editor (pp. 3–31 and 260–271), the five substantive chapters of the volume span the spatial dimensions from the small confines of Indian and Pakistani villages with their unchanging faces (by Henry C. Hart, pp. 39–90), to the megalopoli of the post-industrial age (by Bertram Gross, pp. 216–259). In between we encounter a careful recounting of the American experience seen as "development" (by Emmette Redford, pp. 91–131), the spatial aspects of Soviet administration (by Jerry Hough, pp. 132–175), and an examination of the spatial patterns of human resources movements (by John C. Shearer, pp. 176–215).

In his opening chapter, Professor Heaphey develops a series of six themes which, he claims, are touched upon in some measure by the subsequent studies (p. 30). Only two of the five deal directly with "development"; the others suggest spatial aspects of political systems as a whole ("How the nation state must be spatially unified while allowing for spatial innovation," and "How placement of people affects development"), or of elements of the political system such as political ideology, political elites, and political culture. If anything, Heaphey is too apologetic for the work of his group. To be sure, "space" and "development" were not specifically defined anywhere in the volume, but there is really not much doubt in anybody's mind that at least "space" has been treated as a "primitive," and that the general notion of development administration is close to that of Edward Weidner, as quoted by Bertram Gross in his essay: "the term suggests the problems associated with innovational programs that upset traditional social processes" (p. 217). One wishes that Heaphey had sought out what is implicit in these studies, instead of pursuing only the explicit themes displayed by the various participants.

The five substantive chapters have characteristics and qualities which please as well as annoy; in some instances the same qualities manage to do both. The essays are attractive because they are the work of specialists who are looking at things they know well and try to ask questions about the significance of the spatial aspects of the phenomena with which they are concerned. Obviously, they do not share a common framework, and they do not subscribe to a single Kuhnian paradigm; they don't even look too closely at development administration, in some instances. But because they know well what they are examining, they speak with insight and imagination.

But this very preoccupation with their "hobbies" becomes annoying because the reader is left to puzzle out for himself what is the relevance for development administration of each author's contribution to the volume. Fortunately, at least one of them (Henry Hart) has made a serious effort to codify his findings systematically. In one other case, the essay is simply a long narrative in which the systematization promised at the outset is never delivered; unfortunately, Emmette Redford must be cited here. The other three cases fall between these two extremes. I would rate Jerry Hough's study of the Soviet experience second only to Hart's chapter on village development in the Indian subcontinent. (The larger work from which this chapter is drawn has also been published as *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making* [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969]). Hough does not present his findings nicely packaged in a series of propositions as Hart does, but he is sensitive throughout the study to his obligation to development administration as well as to possible "lessons" to be learned from the Soviet experience by the developing world. Though John Shearer's contribution is limited entirely to Latin American data and findings, he does attempt to suggest a number of conclusions which might be examined in other parts of the developing world, for he has found that the movement of high-level human resources is from the poor to the rich countries and constitutes, in effect, a subsidy of the rich by the poor. The relevance of these findings for development administration seems obvious, but Professor Shearer has not really explored them systematically. Finally, on turning to Bertram Gross's contribution, one leaves far behind the mud of Pakistani villages and the primitive cities of provincial Russia, to follow the author to whatever mountaintop he has picked to view the "birthpangs of a world society" (p. 247). To be sure, who would quarrel with the proposition that industrial man has conquered space—if we do no more than count the astronauts we have sent to and brought back from the moon since 1965, when these essays were written. But we are entitled to ask in 1973 in what way and to what degree we have advanced one inch towards the potentialities of the new individualism Bert Gross promised us (pp. 258–259).

Given the nearly free-form quality of this volume, it is no surprise that one of its central ideas, if not *the* central idea is so effectively (though unintentionally) concealed as to be passed over easily. Henry Hart, in his painstaking and imaginative examination of the possible avenues to development for the village societies of the Indian subcontinent, comes up against the inevitable conflict between the peasant society and culture at the village level on the one hand, and the development administrators and higher governmental officials on the other hand. Noting that this problem is generally looked at from the perspective of the center, he nevertheless suggests that we reverse the procedure and take ". . . a perspective which puts the village in the center and the government on the periphery . . ." (p. 75). (For a recent work on the center-periphery issue in developing countries see Richard Stryker's essays "A Local Perspective on Development Strategy in the Ivory Coast," in *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa,* ed. Michael F. Lofchie [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971], pp. 119–139; and "Political and Administrative Linkage in the Ivory Coast," in *Ghana and the Ivory Coast:*

Perspectives on Modernization, ed. Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971], pp. 73–102.) Is that not what he ought to have been doing all along? It is not the automatic assumption that the developed world is at the center and the underdeveloped world at the periphery that has led to so much failure in aid activities and development administration? Have the agonies of the Soviet regime not been due to the manner in which Moscow and the CPSU have seen themselves as the center and everything else as the periphery? Would this reverse perspective not have illuminated effectively the problem of the flow of high-level human resources? Is the customary center-periphery perspective not responsible for the failure to conceptualize U.S. development as anything but a centralizing dynamic, with Washington and the big corporations as the center and everything else as the periphery?

It would indeed, have been more gratifying and more useful if the members of the Pittsburgh seminar had been able to develop more self-consciously the true central themes of their common effort. But taking their work as a whole, we are enriched by their reporting, their theoretical formulations, and their insights. Perhaps others have better ground for the judgment that ". . . any regime in the Third World would, alas, be better off with the paperback *Handbook of Public Administration* of the United Nations than with a cordovan-bound set of the Duke CAG papers" (Warren F. Ilchman, "Comparative Public Administration and 'Conventional Wisdom,' " *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* 01–02 [Beverly Hills, California, 1971], p. 44). I am not sure that CAG papers were ever meant to be briefing materials; but they might, in the long run, turn out to have better staying power than the U.N. handbook. They are not engaged in "selling" patented solutions; they merely suggest what might be worth having, given certain specified conditions. But it would surely have helped all of us if we had not had to wait until 1972 to see in print the work completed during the summer of 1965.

ALFRED DIAMANT
Indiana University, Bloomington

Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 331. $17.50.)

Area specialists often hope that their research and findings will not only refine our understanding of their particular area but also contribute to the general theory and method of comparative politics. Their hope springs from a laudable scholarly ambition and from their painful discovery that a widely accepted model they had initially intended to use did not fit a particular set of national or international circumstances. Such a mixture of frustration and hope also characterizes Barbara Wolfe Jancar's carefully researched and well-documented study of the dramatic erosion and subsequent consolidation of authoritarian socialism in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. In examining the nature and transformations of the communist system in small countries of East Europe, Professor Jancar seems to have found the Friedrich/Brzezinski comparative framework of totalitarianism wanting. Accordingly, she suggests a new framework and a new terminology.

Since totalitarianism implies *unqualified* control, the author suggests a new concept of "absolute power monopoly" which implies only (?) *"exclusive,* rather than total, control, by virtue of which no other groups or individuals can compete with the ruling group. Depending on the situation, the ruling group may choose to terrorize or liberalize" (p. 6). The author identifies eight monopolistic tools of absolute control which their parent source, the Party, manipulates as an octopus does its branches: (1) state power (which includes the police); (2) law and legislation; (3) nationalized economy; (4) ideology and culture; (5) mass communications; (6) education; (7) mass organizations; and (8) social security and medical care. It is doubtful that this new term will gain wide acceptance, despite some merits of Jancar's newly refined analysis which rightly stresses that no rule can really be total. One objection to the new term "absolute monopoly" is simply that it is redundant (can there be a "relative monopoly?"), and that *absolute* power monopoly is actually not more, but less qualified than totalitarianism. In fact, both terms give a somewhat ironic twist to a study that describes how very relative all eight absolute power monopolies may become unless they are protected against the corrosive acid of democratic pluralism by foreign intervention. In order to frighten the Czechs and the Slovaks back into an absolute power monopoly, the Soviet Union had to use 29 divisions, 7,500 tanks, and 1,000 planes.

The author's analysis of the forces that set out to liberalize Czechoslovakian communism from within reveals that they were either naively or boldly oblivious of the Soviet security interests in the sensitive area west of Germany. However we may deplore the fact, the Soviet leaders rightly dreaded the contagious effects of the Czechoslovak "democratism" upon other East European Communist systems as well as the ultimate possibility that, in a true democracy, not only domestic but also foreign policy may be subject to discussion and revision. In the context of Soviet worries, the fall of Alexander Dubcek seems "irresistible" indeed—as was convincingly argued by Pavel Tigrid in his admirable study *La chute irrésistible de Dubcek* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1969).

As a country study, Jancar's book has many merits. The author's familiarity with the Czech and Slovak scene and its changes in the 1960s is evident. Most of her data have been collected in the field. Professor Jancar also displays a commendable sensitivity to Slovak nationalism and discontent directed at Prague centralism which had favored the Czech portion of the country for a very long time; while in 1968 the Czech intellectuals called for socialism with a human face (or, in Evzen Loebl's terms, "anthropocracy"), the Slovaks emphasized socialism with a human *and* a Slovak face. The result was a short-lived attempt at true Czecho-Slovak federalism.

This book also has some blemishes. The chapter on Czechoslovakia's history contains several debatable generalizations: the period of semi-federal Czechoslovakia between Munich (1938) and the Nazi occupation (March 15, 1939), for instance, seems to be telescoped into one event. As is often the case in volumes presenting area studies, many Czech and Slovak names are not adequately identified. On the other hand, this study merits serious attention because of its novel analysis of the intimate connection between the ups and downs of socialist economy and the cycles of liberalization and repression. Professor Jancar usefully challenges one wishful thought born in the Khrushchev era, namely, that "goulash" or "fat" communism (that is, a successful communist consumerism) would lead to political liberalization, if not to true socialist democracy. The Czechoslovak experience indicates that political liberalization, both promoted and circumscribed by the Party, resulted from a serious economic crisis and consumer discontent.

However depressing this may sound, the study also demonstrates how modern authoritarian socialism by the 1960s had perfected its controls over individual and group behavior: mass obedience and conformity are shown to result more effectively from the party monopoly over socialized economy and the access to jobs and privileges than from terror à la Stalin or à la Hitler. In such a context, those who want to stay in their country and *live* tend to conclude that it is indeed better "to be red rather than dead," or, in more pragmatic terms, to be superficially red rather than to be deprived for the rest of their lives of better jobs, better salaries, weekend cottages (now prefabricated), cars, TV sets, or trips to a people's democratic sea resort. The all-permeating party control over jobs and privileges—and therefore over life itself—is based on a devastatingly simple assumption that among mortal men, on the whole, heroes and martyrs have always been less numerous than bons vivants—especially if they have to live in the proximity of the Soviet superpower. Jancar's study of the Prague Spring and the following Russian Winter is a valuable contribution to the growing field of comparative studies of communist systems; it is also an invitation to a further search for an analytical framework which would incorporate the penetrative radiation of a regional superpower into the inner-working of adjacent national systems.

IVO D. DUCHACEK
The City College of New York

The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900–1920. By G. Wesley Johnson, Jr. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 260. $8.75.)

With this study Mr. Johnson, professor of History at Stanford University, expands our knowledge of African politics and society in two directions. First, he adds most importantly to our understanding of pre-World War II "nationalist" movements, work comparable to that done by James Coleman in Nigeria, David Kimble in the Gold Coast, Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham in Kenya. Second, he contributes to the already impressive cross-disciplinary monograph literature on Senegal by Nigerians, Senegalese, French, and young American scholars dealing with the Islamic Brotherhoods, traditional social structure and caste, cooperative organizations, community development, pre-nineteenth century Wolof Kingdoms, Toucouleur conquerors, French assimilation policies, local government, etc.—a literature that cries out for synthesis and has added considerably to our knowledge of change in a "developing" country.

In the four "communes" of Senegal, France's oldest African holdings, Western politics first took root in the 18th century. By the time of the French Revolution, Saint Louis and Gorée had African mayors, and in 1848 the four communes elected a deputy to the French National Assembly. By 1879 with the addition of a General Council (colonial assembly), Professor Johnson claims the four communes possessed "effective institutions of local government controlled by the urban inhabitants" (p. vii). But this system remained undemocratic for decades because the great majority of the electorate, the indigenous black Africans, was dominated by "a small clique of French and Creole politicians until 1900" (p. vii). How these urban black Africans obtained political rights before 1900 and expanded them by 1920 is the subject of Johnson's study.

After the turn of the century, a suddenly toughened colonial policy of retrenchment that sought to take away indigenous political rights at the very moment of growing African involvement, precipitated a complex struggle between colonial officials, French Colonialists, Creoles and indigenous Senegalese. Under the leadership of Blaise Diagne (the first black African elected a deputy to Paris), Africans won a series of elections replacing the French and Creole elite as arbiters of local politics. Johnson demonstrates particularly effectively how Blaise Diagne's victory represented more than an isolated or personal conquest. Diagne brought with him into office a host of Africans at the local and municipal levels. His advent into the French National Assembly marked the coming into power of a local indigenous establishment that thenceforth dominated Senegalese politics. In describing this process Johnson fills a gap left by French and African scholars. He pushes the advent of black politics back several decades prior to 1945, "the generally accepted date for the beginning of African nationalistic movements" (p. viii). After highlighting and documenting the significance of this first African political awakening in 1900–1920, the author goes on to suggest that nationalism, however, was not necessarily the key factor in Senegal's political history and that other factors, such as "assimilation, urbanism, elitism, and religion" were equally important.

Mr. Johnson does not feel himself bound by the conventional categories of political scientists and Africanists, having thought of this study as a political history, rather than as an investigation into nationalism or Senegalese resistance to the French. By thus refusing to bring predetermined conclusions into this analytic apparatus, Mr. Johnson hopes to have the facts better speak for themselves. In this effort he succeeds partially. He would judge early Senegalese leaders in terms of the times, not the standards of the 1970s, and finds these leaders "effective, audacious and ambitious" (p. ix). Johnson's clarity in exposition is impressive—whether it be a capsule history of Senegal as essential background or a description of the "traite" (the peanut trade involving multiple middlemen and complicated credit arrangements). His scholarship rests on an admirable perusal of the records in the archives of Senegal and the French Ministry of colonies as well as painstakingly collected interviews with Senegalese personalities and their descendants.

Johnson promises a second volume on the consolidation of African politics from 1920 to 1945. Possibly as a result, one major gap in this study is a curiously incomplete portrait of Diagne (especially Diagne's speeches in the French National Assembly) and hence of politics during this period. There is almost nothing of Diagne's counterplay with Garvey or Du Bois; little about his becoming a spokesman for the Bordeaux commercial interests that, Johnson points out, ran Senegal; and only a hint of Diagne's becoming an apologist for colonialism to the extent of an incredible defense of forced labor—shocking even in the context of the times.

Johnson also does not dwell on Diagne's connections with the traditional and religious leaders. From his statement that it isn't his *purpose* to establish a direct link between traditional politics and the politics of the communes, Johnson goes on to assert that "it is doubtful that traditional politics provided an adequate training ground for urban politics: traditional political roles were ascribed, whereas those of the urban area were achieved by personal merit" (p. 7). This conclusion is not based on a factual assessment but on a logical inference using Western "ideal type" constructs. Traditional rulers of the great caste-based Western Sudanic Empires always knew how to use men of ability. If instead of hypothesizing two distinct types of society we pictured a single society with a variety of competing and interacting interests, we might be led to ask different questions and come to different conclusions. For example, Johnson mentions only briefly that the leaders of the Mouride brotherhood donated funds and made possible much of Diagne's campaign for election, and that the first people Diagne visited on arrival in Senegal were Lebou elders. In fact, was not Diagne the traditional leaders' French connection?

What Johnson describes as resistance by the urban political elite to French administrative domination and economic exploitation by Bordeaux commerce and the Creole oligarchy may also be viewed in historical perspective as the beginning of a "new class" of black bourgeoisie. The spread of political action into the countryside may also be viewed as incorporating the elite of provincial cities and traditional notables by this black bourgeoisie—not the advent of mass politics.

In this respect Johnson's study provides essential background for an understanding of contemporary Senegal, where independence did not come as a result of actual or threatened mass struggle and where politics is still essentially an elite affair.

IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ
Queens College; The City University of New York

The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. (New York: The Free Press, 1971. Pp. 376. $9.95.)

In *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* Roger Kanet has placed under a single cover thirteen papers on Communist political elites, policy implementation and bureaucracy, and Soviet foreign policy which illustrate some of the steps that area specialists on Communist systems are taking to relate their research to that of their colleagues in the empirical social sciences. These steps stress the need to make research on Communist systems genuinely comparative by adapting and applying approaches, concepts, and techniques of analysis derived from research on non-Communist systems. The articles may be grouped into two categories: quantitative analyses and middle-range theorizing.

The quantitative analyses in the section on political elites include a study by Michael Gehlen and Michael McBride who have generated data on a number of background variables of members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee (*APSR,* 62 [1968], 1232–1247). Gehlen and McBride have constructed frequency distributions of the variables and employed a correlation matrix to determine patterns of interrelationships between pairs of variables. In the only article which employs East European data, Carl Beck, Gerard Johnson, and Thomas McKechnie examine changes in the composition of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the time of the eighth Party Congress in November, 1962. They explore differences among those who were recruited, dismissed, and held over in terms of their careers within the Communist party by presenting statistics on discrete party positions and then using factor analysis to locate systematic relationships among positions. The final quantitative piece in the section on elites is a study by Milton Lodge (*APSR,* 62 [1968], 827–839), who does content analyses of representative periodicals from 1952–1966 for five Soviet elites to determine trends in elite participatory attitudes in the post-Stalin period.

The findings of these three articles are of dubious value because of the authors' failure to deal successfully with a number of obstacles encountered when quantitative techniques are applied to the analysis of Communist systems. Because of the nature of the data available, assumptions are made which seriously distort reality (for example, Lodge's assumption of the group consciousness and solidarity of Soviet elites). Often the significance of the hypotheses tested is not dealt with adequately (for example, Gehlen and McBride's hypothesis that candidate members of the Central Committee are co-opted to provide a communications input into higher decision-making centers of the CPSU).

Another major obstacle to the application of quantitative techniques to Communist studies is pointed out in the conceptually oriented contribution of Joel Schwartz and William Keech (an expanded version of their earlier article which appeared in the *APSR,* 62 (1968), 840–851). On the basis of a case study of Khrushchev's educational reform of 1958, Schwartz and Keech conclude that "if one quantifies the number of articles which appeared during the debate, the oppositional point of view is clearly a minority. It is quite possible that a 'war of memoranda' may have been raging behind the scenes and that during this exchange the minority position was in fact the majority point of view" (p. 160).

A second conceptually oriented article in the section of elites is an attempt by Rita Mae Kelly and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. to develop an approach to the long-standing question of the relationship between the official ideology and the actions and decisions of political leaders in Communist systems, by placing the question in the broader context of the motivational role of ideology (*Soviet Studies,* 21 [1970], 297–313). In another attempt to develop conceptual tools for the analysis of Communist systems which have cross-national significance Fleron sets up a classification of leadership systems and applies it to the Soviet Union (*Polity,* 2 [1969], 176–201). He hypothesizes that the co-optation process has been used by the political elite as an organizational response to legitimize its rule by providing a mechanism for articulation and aggregation of various interests and by bringing capable, talented individuals into the political elite.

The three essays in the section on policy implementation and bureaucracy are attempts to adapt organizational theory, role theory, and development theory to Communist (and, in one case, Russian) studies. Each of these studies is concerned less with presenting substantive findings than it is with showing how a particular set of middle-range concepts can be adapted and applied to the study of Communist systems. Don Karl Rowney provides a research design for the study of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1904 to 1916 by drawing on the theoretical formulations of structural-functional analysis of formal organizations. Erik Hoffman's contribution shows how concepts developed in role theory can be used to study and understand the nature of role conflict and ambiguity in Soviet administration under Khrushchev; the regime's attempts to reduce role conflict and ambiguity under Brezhnev and Kosygin; and the way the regime has used the central press as an instrument for communicating role expectations to various audiences. Robert Sharlet focuses on the question of the role of law in political development. Using examples of Soviet economic, criminal, and family law, Sharlet demonstrates the proposition that various types of Soviet law can be viewed as performing a number of functions at different stages of development. On the basis of his overview he suggests a number of regulative hypotheses which can be used to orient research and narrowguage predictive hypotheses which can be operationalized and verified.

All the conceptually oriented studies lay the basis for potential contributions to Communist studies and help to bridge the gap between area specialists and political scientists by generating empirically verifiable hypotheses about the nature and operation of Communist systems derived from middle-range theory which has built upon the Western experience. An assessment of their actual contribution must await the time when the hypotheses are tested more fully against empirical data.

The final section of the book consists of three attempts to apply quantitative techniques of analysis to the study of the Soviet Union in the international arena. Charles Gati employs content analysis and correlation analysis of the foreign news items in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* in order to ascertain "the relative weight the Soviet foreign policy elite assigns to various geographic regions or sub-systems of the world" (p. 282). P. Terrence Hopmann employs a model of group processes derived from social psychology and communications and uses techniques of computer content analysis to measure the degree of cohesion within the Communist system during four major events of the postwar period. Finally, Dan C. Heldman presents a tentative and exploratory study of Soviet-African (developing nation) interaction with the aid of input-output models and correlation analysis. The utility of these three papers is placed in question because of their failure to generate relevant hypotheses and because of the glaring misuse of statistical analysis (for example, Gati's use of correlation analysis to determine "statistical causality" and Hopmann's measuring of intrasystem cohesion according to Communist states' perceptions of the West on the basis of content analysis of English language translations of single documents for each nation).

It is disappointing that the editor does not himself draw any conclusions about the potential contribution or obstacles in the use of behavioral approaches and techniques on the basis of the material he has chosen to include. In his introductory essay and in his introductions to each major section of the book, Professor Kanet does not indicate his criteria for selecting material, nor does he attempt to assess the utility or point to the pitfalls of the approaches and techniques used. He fails to suggest which are most appropriate in light of the data and types of political system under examination. And he fails to make any proposals about how the methods and concepts presented can be better adapted to the study of Communist political systems.

This failure of the editor to deal with his subject matter critically is partially compensated by Paul Shoup's introductory essay (*APSR,* 62 [1968], 185–204). The thrust of Shoup's argument is that there is no *a priori* reason why many comparative approaches cannot be applied successfully to Communist systems. However, on the basis of a survey of the literature on comparative Communism, he comes to two very sensible conclusions about the limits of behavioralism in Communist studies—limits which I find reflected in the contributions to this book. Regarding methodology, he suggests as a guideline for research that we focus our efforts on middle-range comparative studies at the subsystem level. Second, regarding methods of analysis, he concludes that "the field of comparative Communist studies is not yet in a position to become a quantitative discipline, in the sense that hypotheses will be routinely generated and then confirmed by methods of statistical probability, rank ordering, or other counting techniques" (p. 29).

Unfortunately, many of the contributors to this volume, especially those who have employed quantitative techniques, have not heeded Shoup's advice. One is left with the impression after reading most of the articles that very little has yet been added to our knowledge of the Soviet political system by applying "behavioral" techniques.

Donald V. Schwartz
University of Toronto

Conflict in the Congo. By Thomas Kanza. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. Pp. 346. $3.25.)

It seems scarcely credible that a mere two decades ago the author of this intriguing *témoignage* of the 1960 Zaire (then Congo) crisis created a small crisis of his own by seeking to attend a university in Belgium—the first publicized application. That such a banal event could have become a cause célèbre tells us much about why independence became a global trauma a few years later.

Thus set apart by destiny, Kanza has been at once deeply involved in the turbulent politics of his country, yet also strangely apart from them. Except for brief periods—the longest being a frustrating and unsuccessful year in 1957 following completion of his university degree at Louvain—he has lived outside his native land, in Belgium until 1960, mainly in London since that time. As a quondam ambassador of both official and dissident regimes, he has sat in the councils of world diplomacy, and came to know personally many of the key actors in global politics. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he never entered politics directly; he sought no elected office in 1960, and did not acquire a domestic power base in Zaire, although he was widely known among the new elite. His own assessment of his place in the Zaire firmament is poignant:

> My fight against Belgian colonialism had been a subtle, bitter, and merciless torture. Since 1952 I had been completely alone, and understood by none of my compatriots. . . . This sense of isolation and solitude was something I continued to feel even after independence . . . I had no choice. Would I ever have? (p. 93).

The book unravels the tangled skein of Zaire's political history from the 1958 Brussels World Fair, which provided the first occasion for a large number of Zairians to visit Belgium, and the death of Patrice Lumumba in January 1961. It is a very personal account; autobiography blends with analysis. Yet it is much more than just another *apologia pro vita sua*; Kanza was at once deeply involved, yet curiously detached. He is sufficiently Zairian to perceive the crisis of independence from within, yet far enough into the international diplomatic network to fully seize the image of the crisis as seen from overseas. He was dedicated to Lumumba, or more precisely to "Lumumbism"—the vision of Zaire as a strong, united nation totally in control of its own political, economic, and cultural destiny; yet he was painfully aware that Lumumba did not fully trust him, and gives us a candid assessment of the flawed aspects of his character, as well as what Kanza sees as his outstanding virtues.

The coals of the 1960 crisis have been so vigorously raked over by so many hands that it seems implausible that anything of note remained to be said. Not so; Kanza illuminates many events, and offers sensitive and informative vignettes of the main actors. In the fluidity of 1960, some of the personal relationships between key figures were quite pivotal—perhaps none more so than the incompatibility of Lumumba and Dag Hammarskjold, which destroyed both men.

Kanza offers valuable detail on the tortuous dealings leading to the establishment of the Lumumba government in June 1960. To cite but one example, Lumumba's simultaneous promises of support for the presidency to Joseph Kasavubu and Jean Bolikango are elaborated in revealing fashion. Reneging on the Bolikango commitment created a bitter and costly enemy for Lumumba.

Lumumba emerges as a man wholly obsessed with the struggle against imperialism, affected by a prescient vision that he might not last long, failing to appreciate the fragility of his jerry-built government. Kanza captures the essence of the drama of independence in a single sentence: "Though we sat so comfortably in our sumptuous official cars, driven by uniformed military chauffeurs, and looked as though we were ruling this large and beautiful country, we were in fact ruling nothing and a prey to whatever might happen" (p. 151).

For this very reason, international participants soon assumed a key role; Kanza is deft at identifying the external linkages of many leading figures. Communist cultivation of Zaire nationalists, he argues, was less intense than was generally believed. In Kanza's words, the Soviets sought out a few whose nationalism was anticapitalist and above all anti-American.

> But when it came to financial aid, they were not very generous; they were quite willing to abandon financial corruption for the corruption of minds.

The few Congolese in whom they were interested were paid; but the payments were chicken feed, except to one or two—and these only got more as a result of fierce bargaining. The Belgian communist party acted as a liaison between the communist world and the Congolese nationalists; this was a grave mistake on our part, for the Belgian communist party was larded with double agents . . . (p. 141).

There are, of course, debatable points and noteworthy omissions in Kanza's account. For perhaps understandable reasons, he is careful to avoid critical commentary on Mobutu's role in the 1960 crisis. The animosity between the entire Kanza family and Kasavubu is a well-known theme of Zairian politics; this animus is apparent in the very negative assessment of the first president. Kanza clearly exaggerates the capacity of the national army to have carried through its abortive invasion of Katanga in August 1960; he is inexplicably silent on the atrocious massacres of Baluba civil populations when this disorderly force was unleashed in hostile territory, an event which Hammarskjold emotionally stigmatized as "genocide," and one of the several immediate precipitants of the September coup. And Kanza's own analysis of Lumumba's increasingly erratic and impulsive responses to a deteriorating situation in August 1960, demonstrates why the author's efforts at the time to persuade Western powers and the UN Secretariat to have confidence in Lumumba's leadership were doomed to failure.

Just possibly the course of history in Zaire might have been different had Lumumba taken greater advantage of the wisdom, prudence, and insight of this faithful follower, who fully shared his vision of the future. As it is, Kanza adds an important contribution to the historical record of the crisis of independence in Zaire.

M. Crawford Young
University of Wisconsin, Madison

The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry. By Stefan Kieniewicz. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 285. $11.75.)

Here one of Poland's most distinguished historians of the nineteenth century in the Polish lands has undertaken a narrative account of one of the century's most critical issues. The book is an elaboration of lectures Kieniewicz delivered at Chicago in 1968, written in response to the intelligent encouragement of his colleagues and the university press. It constitutes the most adequate treatment of this particular complex of peasant emancipation processes now available in any language. As such it could serve almost as an advertisement for the value of East-West cultural exchange.

Because their task is to construct narrative, historians face special difficulties, even when they deal with single issues. The history of these lands renders the difficulties all but insuperable. Northeast Central Europe was and is a region of great ethnic diversity, and between 1795 and 1918 these peoples, at disparate levels of social and economic development and national consciousness, were under the disparate sovereignties of Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Habsburg. The subject matter is thus exceedingly complex.

Kieniewicz has sought to do scrupulous justice both to this complexity and to the inadequacies of the very substantial data on peasant emancipation developed over the past generation by Polish research.There is synthetic treatment of the beginning (the Enlightenment period in Old Poland), the progress of agriculture and democratic propaganda (in the first half of the nineteenth century), and the end (the agrarian problem which faced New Poland in 1918), and there are comparisons throughout. Nonetheless, most chapters deal only with one sovereignty. In Old Poland, despite considerable variety in situation according to quality of soil, distance from markets, and even legal status, most peasants had been personally unfree and tenants at will. In general, emancipation began with the grant of personal freedom, continued with the strengthening of tenancy rights, and ended with the grant of freehold. But this process took different forms, had different timing, and followed different political imperatives in each sovereignty. At each stage, in other words, the particular mix of pressure from above (reforming landowners and harassed governments) and pressure from below (actual or potential peasant revolts) was unique.

The results were also unique. At the conclusion of reforms marked at start and finish by revolts, almost all peasants in Austrian Poland had land, but too little, and peasant life there was characterized by poverty, parceling, wild land speculation, and emigration. The more gradual Prussian reform created a substantial yeomanry alongside the large estates, at the cost of driving many peasants off the land into industry. The Russian reform, also gradual but punctuated more by upheaval like the Austrian, kept the peasantry on the land like the Austrian but in better conditions, since the state supervised land parceling and had less interest than the Austrian state in conciliating Polish nobles. Further distinctions among the three partition zones involved state and private estates, forest and common field rights, landholders and landless, compensation arrangements, rights to distill and sell alcohol, local and central political prerogatives, and scope for peasant political action. The impression is almost inescapable that the historic task of the New Poland established in 1918 has been nation building.

Conceptually, there are only a few ways of imposing unity of vision on so much diversity. Polish historiography has traditionally concentrated on the struggle to recover state sovereignty. Kieniewicz has chosen to focus his narrative elsewhere, on peasant emancipation. Even here, however, one must choose.

The most comparable English-language work, Jerome Blum's *Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria 1815–1848* (Baltimore, 1948), managed the problem of political multiplicity by dealing with only one monarchy and the problem of ethnic diversity by framing the analysis in terms of class struggle, seen monarchy-wide. Blum concluded that "the landowners" had espoused emancipation for efficiency and profit and for fear of peasant revolt, but on terms advantageous to them, and that this "program" had been adopted in 1848. Postwar Polish research has analyzed new mountains of data and emphasized pressure from below, but it has commonly achieved narrative coherence by the same method: omitting non-Polish populations, engaging in class struggle, and confining analysis to one partition.

Kieniewicz has adopted some of these practices, notably by defining away non-Poles in his terms of reference and by extensive use of the class struggle concept. But because he wishes to describe the emancipation of Polish peasants everywhere, he must find a concept which comprehends them all, whatever the actual disparities in experience, situation, and national consciousness. This can only be the concept of potential Polish nationality. And in fact the theme of the book is that peasant emancipation was the necessary precursor of national liberation because it was the essential precondition to the growth of Polish national consciousness among the peasant majority. In this way the concept of Polish nationality is at once the cause of this narrative's unevenness and the cornerstone of its unity, and Kieniewicz rejoins the mainstream of Polish historiography.

The book will be of interest not only to students of Polish history in general but to political scientists concerned with developing societies, for the relation of social change and national consciousness in backward (and nonself-governing) polities is as topical in most of the world today as it was in East Europe a century ago.

THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR.
Department of State

Communism in Japan: A Case of Political Naturalization. By Paul F. Langer. Hoover Institution Studies 30. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. Pp. 112. $5.95.)

Hadaka no Nihon Kyōsantō [The Japanese Communist Party Bared]. By Kōtarō Tawara. (Tokyo: Nisshin Hōdō Shuppanbu, 1972. Pp. 330. ¥550.)

The survival and growth of an organization depends both on the nature of its environment and on its own ability to adapt creatively to that environment. This is the implicit thesis of a concise, though broadly focused, study of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) by Paul Langer, one of the foremost specialists on the subject, based at the RAND Corporation. Now in its fiftieth year, the party came into existence as an illegal organization because of the lack of freedom in prewar Japan and was only liberated from that status by Japan's defeat in 1945. In the mid-1920s, however, it did play a more important role in the labor, agrarian, and proletarian party movements than Langer gives it credit for. But by 1935 severe state repression and rising ultranationalism had almost completely obliterated it. It revived and grew rapidly during the first five years of the American occupation until the Korean War, when the occupation officials severely crippled it, and it responded with some attempt at guerrilla tactics. Since 1955 it has gradually readapted itself to the parliamentary path to power internally and to independence from external interference by the powerful ruling parties of the Soviet Union and China. This process of "naturalization" (p. 97), according to Langer, has assured it a place as "part of the Japanese political scene" (p. 36).

That the JCP no longer poses a "security" but rather a "political" question (Tawara, p. 2) is the basis for the longer, more journalistic but nonetheless competent book by Tawara Kōtarō, a free lance commentator and former editorial writer for the *Sankei* newspaper. The first of the four parts into which Tawara's book is divided attempts an "objective" survey of the party at present; the second, a more subjective evaluation of the prospects of the party's goal of a "democratic coalition government" (seen as slim for the next decade or two); the third, a detailed account of the JCP's relations with the Chinese, and, by way of contrast, the Russian Communists (decisively bound up with the rise of the present JCP Secretary General Miyamoto Kenji, who had not been abroad or beholden to them before the war); and the last, an analysis of Miyamoto's extraordinary control over the party apparatus through mobilizing older factions and through expulsions (the most interesting section). Tawara's book is less integrated than Langer's, which moves logically from pre- to postwar, and from the party's national to its international environment. Also, Tawara's volume does not contain even the minuscule bibliography and chronology, or the name index and minimum footnotes that Langer's does, though it has an ample and convenient table of contents.

Tawara's book does, however, provide an interesting supplement to Langer's for those who read Japanese. Not only does Tawara include more detailed and slightly newer material (to March 1972) but also he sheds light on perhaps the one important weakness in Langer's analysis, namely, Langer's neglect of why, except for his vague "naturalization" thesis, the JCP is today the "largest non-ruling Communist party outside Western Europe" (Langer, p. 16) with a membership of some 300,000—far outstripping any other opposition party in Japan. The Buddhist-inspired Kōmeitō has less than half the membership of the JCP, and the Socialists (JSP) and the Democratic Socialists (DSP) each have only about one-tenth. Of course, election votes are not proportional to party size. Tawara attributes the large JCP membership mostly to the managerial abilities of Miyamoto who does not run for the Diet but concentrates on party building. Through a cluster of "new young bureaucrats," he directs a vast organization and publishing operation. The Sunday *Akahata* has reached mass proportions (more than one and one-half million readers). Another reason the party has grown is that it provides an active party life and creates a "community" (Tawara, pp. 205 ff.) for the people left behind in the economic dash or alienated by the emphasis on "materialistic" values as well as by the waste, pollution, and indifference of the "affluent society." Consequently, outside of the violence-prone radical "New Left," the JCP retains the greatest appeal for youth as seen in the composition of party membership (Langer, p. 28). It also successfully appeals to women, whose voting rate is higher than men's.

From reading neither of the books, however, would one anticipate the remarkable JCP achievements of the December 10, 1972, House of Representatives elections in which the party executed a "great leap forward" from 14 to 38 (plus 2 pro-JCP) seats and capturing 11 per cent of the vote. This catapulted it over the Kōmeitō and DSP to become the second largest opposition in the Lower House. Both authors agree, however, that the independence from the Chinese and Soviet parties is an aid to wider acceptance in Japan. They also conclude that the JCP has an edge over the JSP in appealing to Japanese nationalism in that the JCP designates the main enemy of the Japanese people as the *foreign* "imperialism" of the United States, whereas the JSP considers the villain as *domestic,* Japan's own "monopoly capitalism." Langer appears more sanguine about the conservative government's ability to solve internal social and economic questions (p. 95). Both consider the leadership skills of the other opposition parties extremely important in determining the JCP's future growth, since at present it appears that it would be mainly at their expense (Tawara, p. 166; Langer, p. 97). The JCP's great hope, then, in the next two decades actually lies in its becoming the main spokesman for the opposition to the conservative ruling party or coalition. Tawara convincingly argues that this will be an increasingly responsible opposition, however, operating within the context of the democratic system and yet mobilizing the people at the grass-roots level (Tawara, pp. 324–27). Despite its lack of sufficient explanation for JCP successes, Langer's well-rounded survey will be welcomed by the comparative government specialists for personal updating and for classroom use. The area specialists with Japanese language competence will find that Tawara's popularized account complements Langer's in providing background color, personalized sketches, and more speculation on the Japanese Communists' future.

GEORGE O. TOTTEN, III
University of Southern California

Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914–1933. By Herman Lebovics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 248. $8.50.)

The fourteen years of the Weimar Republic exposed the Germans and in particular their middle class to three severe social, economic and psychological adjustments: first, the military defeat after four years of illusion about a victorious peace; second the "rationalization" of the economy plus the experience of inflation; and finally, the collapse of the political system which destroyed the emotional and social security the non-socialist groups had enjoyed under the monarchy. This, coupled with the impact of the anti-western trend of the war propaganda, led among the bourgeois intelligentsia to a general anti-democratic and pseudo-philosophical grouping, generally known under the label of Conservative Revolution or National Bolshevism.

Many scholarly books have been written on the groups that identified themselves with this trend, including *Linke Leute von Rechts* by

Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* by Kurt Sontheimer, *Germany's New Conservatism* by Klemens von Klemperer, *Oswald Spengler* by H. Stuart Hughes, and one wonders why they did not receive more credit in this volume. Granted that Lebovics purposely restricted his topic to the problems of the middle class and the economic and sociopolitical views propounded by Werner Sombart, Edgar Salin, Othmar Spann, Oswald Spengler, Ernst Niekisch, and Ferdinand Fried. Since their ideas, however overlapped with the other psychological problems mentioned above, one cannot really separate them from each other, and Lebovics, in fact, does not do this either. When discussing the ideology of those men, he is going far beyond his stated topic, the plight of the middle class and the suggested solutions to their problems.

Werner Sombart, called "the Red professor" in his youth, was converted by World War I and then discovered what he called "German Socialism" in contrast to the proletarian socialism of Karl Marx. Spengler saw salvation in "Prussian socialism," defining it as a return to the barracks of Prussia and good Prussian virtues such as "authoritarianism," "obedience," "discipline" and "self-sacrifice." Edgar Salin is less easy to identify because, under the spell of the poet Stefan George, he tried nothing less than to attempt to institutionalize George's "the beautiful life." The Viennese Othmar Spann possibly came the closest to reality with his (not very original) concept of "corporatism," as opposed to parliamentarism, but being a professor, he also tried to develop a theory which entailed what Lebovics wittily called "*packln* turned into metaphysics," *packln*—an Austrian term—being loosely translated by Lebovics as "wheeling and dealing." Ernst Niekisch looked toward "National Bolshevism" and "the East" for salvation, being full of contempt for Stresemanns's efforts to smooth things over at Locarno. Finally, Ferdinand Fried and the *Tatkreis* tried to create a "Third Front," which would offer an alternative to democratic socialism on the one hand, and the vulgar nationalism of the Nazis on the other.

There appears little need to further discuss their ideologies. What is striking about this group is that they included many gifted men, and this may explain the fascination this topic has, and why it keeps attracting young scholars again and again, though one might hope that this chapter can now be closed. Dependencies with regard to National Socialism is not a worthwhile approach to the problem of explaining the latter. I also believe that one does those "thinkers" and their literature too much honor to put so much solid and profound scholarship into the effort to make sense out of something that was partially, at least, nonsensical. In connection with this, one wonders therefore, why Zehrer, the editor of *Die Tat,* and Fried were "compelled" to leave the university (p. 182). Was it purely for economic reasons, or were they rebels who felt no need to subject themselves to the rigid discipline and the hardships of academic life because of their "intellectual superiority" over university professors? Having personally known some of them, I feel inclined to suspect the latter. There was a great deal of arrogance surrounding this group, who were neither able to adjust to life and its normal requirements nor to ordinary language, creating their own terms and giving them an exclusive "German" meaning. There was genuine idealism in them, but on the whole they were "aristocrats of the mind," "elitists" as well as political romanticists and thus very far removed from the mentality and the life of the middle classes and their immediate needs. This dichotomy between theory and practice is also evident in Lebovics's volume and the book falls somewhat apart between the introductory and concluding chapters, in which he discusses the plight of the middle classes, and the heart of the book in which he is analyzing the various theories. The question here arises: Who were the people who read the books and pamphlets of these men? Certainly *not* the white collar workers, the shopkeepers and the peasants who constituted the middle class in Weimar Germany. One may assume therefore that they wrote for their own self satisfaction and that they were their best subscribers to their "new" ideology.

Lebovics's book is well written, and one is grateful that he has condensed the basic theories of these people, while at the same time providing enough quotations to give the reader an accurate impression of them. I do not agree, however, with his emphasis on the "failures" of the Weimar politicians which have so often been repeated (and which certainly did exist) while neglecting the problems which the politicians had to deal with; above all, by neglecting the antidemocratic trend of that period, Lebovics unconsciously appears to prove correct those who called for a "savior" or great man. But in a democracy, one has to deal with ordinary people, and not with charismatic leaders; in this sense, a leader such as Stresemann achieved much, as even Hitler later admitted. To Niekisch, however, this was not enough. For him, "humanity" and "internationalism" were embraced only by those Germans who lacked true "Germanness." In his view, a true German nationalist would "smash the whole world to pieces rather than be guilty of an act of disloyalty to his own German self" (p. 150), whatever this was supposed to mean.

Though it is considered to be the historian's task mainly to understand and to analyze, I feel that the people Mr. Lebovics is dealing with require more criticism than understanding because they belong to that category of academicians of whom Hans Heigert says "that for more than 150 years they failed to do what would have been their profession to do: to think rationally and logically, use human reason as judgment, and look with critical reason towards the future."

ANNELISE THIMME

University of Alberta

The Politics of Culture. Edited by Antonín J. Liehm. Translated by Peter Kussi, with an introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 412. $10.00.)

With the benefit of hindsight, Liehm's anthology of interviews with Czech writers, during 1967 and 1968, appears in a different perspective, as if the "most cruel goddess of history" (Engels) would like to use its irony not only on the silenced Czech intellectuals but on the two comments by Liehm and Sartre as well. Further, a very different and more balanced view of Czech culture might have been presented with another selection of authors. *The Politics of Culture* presents 15 names of reformist Communist writers around the journal *Literární listy* (Laco Novomeský, Milan Kundera, Ludvík Vaculík, Jaroslav Putík, Dominik Tatarka, Eduard Goldstücker, Lumír Čivrný, Peter Karvaš, Ivan Klíma and Karel Kosík), with only four non-Communists (Jiří Mucha, Ester Krumbachová, Josef Škvorecký and Václav Havel). A second unwritten volume of *Politics of Culture* would have to include the equally or more important names of 11 ignored non-Communist intellectuals (such as Jaroslav Seifert, Jan Werich, Václav Černý, Vratislav Effenberger, Jiří Suchý, Jiří Kolář, Josef Hiršal, Valdimír Holan, Jindřich Chaloupecký, Jiří Němec and Jan Grossman) to which it would be a pleasure to add four orthodox Communists (for example Jan Drda, Ladislav Štoll, Jan Procházka and Pavel Kohout) to show the real abysses between the two decisive orientations which Liehm tends to overlook. However, the anthology belongs among the most important source books about the Czech Spring '68, precisely because it reveals the authentic origins of the Czech catastrophe.

The Czech culture of the 'sixties, as reflected in Liehm's book, can be regarded as an integral part of the persistent, increasingly vigorous, and open protest against the repressive regimentation of art—a development which was inaugurated by a philosophical discussion (1956), by the so-called "poetry of everyday life," and later by J. Škvorecký's *The Cowards* and new literary criticism. It continued with the rebellion of abstractivists in the visual arts, in the experimental theatres, music and film, and culminated in the new novel, in television commentaries, and in an open revolt of the intellectuals against the cultural policy of the Communist party. The Czech culture of the 'sixties brushed aside the original antagonism between dogmatism and revisionism, and in its best works was represented by the non-Communists. A continuous flow of open protests increasingly involved broader strata of the general public. While the artists' associations as the transmission belts of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were the principal centers of party policy, the artists as a social layer of the intelligentsia could no longer be tamed merely by the advantages ensuing from membership in the Association, trips abroad, and so-called literary loans as the transmission levers of corruption. The intellectuals were ready for a revolt.

When the revolt really came (1968), the fundamental differences within the Czech culture could not be openly stated, because they would have undermined the common course of action against the party control. The group around *Literární listy* (with Liehm as a leading spirit) and its exponents in the Association of Writers completely dominated the leadership of democratization campaigns in the area of cultural policy. Although most of them were reformist Communists, they suddenly, de facto and overnight, became the representatives of that non-Communist trend which in a small-scale cultural guerrilla war had defended the fundamental humanistic values and cultural freedom for more than ten years. This was a bizarre turn indeed. It may appear puzzling that it was the Communist intellectuals who became the foremost reformers without feeling the discrepancy between their former and present attitudes, without questioning their own class consciousness, without realizing the transformation of their roles and the differences in the principles employed in 1948 and in 1968.

What conclusions can be drawn from Liehm's book?

(1) With due respect and occasional admiration for the works of Milan Kundera, Antonín Liehm, Jaroslav Putík, Ludvík Vaculík and other literary representatives of reformist communism, I believe that the Czech literature of the 'sixties did not reflect the idea of reformist communism, but a democratic opposition to the totalitarian dictatorship by independent groups. The true intellectual leaders—not mentioned by Liehm—were members of the non-Communist intelligentsia and were the most powerful personalities: Vratislav Effenberger in literary criticism; Václav Havel and Jan Werich in drama; Jiří Kolář, Jaroslav Seifert, Vladimír Holan in poetry; and Josef Škvorecký in the novel. Independent intellectuals (not the temporarily reforming Communists) made the Czech culture great in the 'sixties by promoting that organic growth of values which a totalitarian dictatorship always and everywhere hinders, no matter whether it happens to be momentarily conciliatory or aggressive.

(2) The cultural policy of "socialism with a human face" was romanticism of the Communist intellectuals which was incompatible with the real world of tank divisions. The employment of tank divisions against cultural works is not rational, but it is effective. Forms of political behavior must always be adequate to the subjects over whom the political infuence is to be exercised. The Czechoslovak Communist intellectuals failed to give guidance at the decisive moment, and no matter how we appreciate their art production, the Prague Spring means their defeat. It also means that the tremendously growing social weight of the non-Communist intelligentsia and of the middle classes might give birth to political leaders in the future. Will they master the technology of politics at least to such an extent that they will not lose the decisive battle next time?

(3) Romanticism in politics is a sure way to defeat. Hölderlin, a romantic poet of the last century, once yearned for the banner under which he could shed his blood honorably, even in a hopeless battle like Thermopylae: "Ah, if I only had a banner . . . and Thermopylae where I could shed my blood honorably. . . ." The reformist communists from the literary clubs hoisted the banner, and the Soviet tanks provided Thermopylae. The blood that was shed, however, was not the blood of the reformists. Who are the romantics who are not willing to shed *their own* blood for their own illusions?

Ivan Sviták

California State University, Chico

Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. Origins of the Civil War. By Edward E. Malefakis. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. xxx, 469. $15.00.)

Professor Malefakis's monograph, which won the American Historical Association's Adams Prize for the best book in European history, is essentially concerned with the reasons for the complete failure of the agrarian reform of the Second Spanish Republic, a failure which the author seeks primarily in politics. The book's first four chapters are dedicated to a detailed study of land tenture and social structure in rural Spain, especially in the southern latifundia regions. In the following ten chapters, the author studies the debates and political maneuvers which led to the passage of the agrarian reform bill, analyzes the legislation which was approved, and discusses the subsequent developments in the countryside and in the Cortes which prevented its implementation. In view of the ground-breaking character of this book, which is the first serious study of one of the most crucial problems in the modern history of Spain, it may be well to summarize some of its most important findings.

The author's introductory study of rural society lays to rest many venerable myths. He demonstrates, for example, that the existence of latifundia in Andalusia cannot be explained in purely geographic or economic terms but must be traced to historical patterns originating in the reconquest and resettlement of the land in the Middle Ages. Similarly he tells us that by the 1930s the Church owned less than one per cent of the land area of Spain and that noble holdings accounted for only about eight per cent of the cultivated land in the six key latifundia provinces and no more than six per cent in the country as a whole. This implied that, contrary to the belief of many contemporaries, no significant reform could be carried out by merely seizing the lands of the Church and the nobility without attacking the interests of other social groups. The author is to be especially commended for the combination of energy, ingenuity, and judgment which has enabled him to overcome the notorious deficiencies of Spanish statistical material and present in the early chapters a detailed, accurate picture without overstating the strength of his conclusions. This part, which the author modestly describes as introductory, constitutes in itself a major contribution to our knowledge.

In the second part, the author presents an account of the Second Republic's efforts at land reform. The government formed by the Republican Action leader Manuel Azaña was supported by the Socialists and by a coalition of four Left Republican parties. Malefakis points out that Azaña and his supporters outside the Socialist party were essentially urban-oriented, with little understanding of or commitment to agrarian reform. A tiny Agrarian minority in the Cortes was consequently able to prevent the passage of any significant legislation for over a year, until the abortive Sanjurjo coup in August, 1932, finally galvanized the majority into action. The legislation which was approved in September, 1932 was poorly conceived. It unnecessarily affected many medium landowners, the author charges, largely because of the Socialists' insistence on extending it to the entire country rather than limiting its application to the latifundia provinces. Once the legislation was passed, the government lapsed again into inactivity. During the first year only 45,000 hectares changed hands to the benefit of a mere 6,000 or 7,000 peasants.

In September, 1933, when the breakup of the Left Republican-Socialist alliance led to new elections, the Right and Center emerged much strengthened. The Catholic CEDA party alone returned 110 deputies, more than the combined total of the Left, while the Radicals won close to 100 seats. The Center-Right governments which followed Azaña were even less committed than their predecessor to serious agrarian reform, and it is commonplace to charge them with the responsibility for its failure. Malefakis's account of their record certainly does not rehabilitate them, but it does show some patches of light—particularly the efforts of the CEDA Minister of Agriculture Jiménez Fernández—which relieve the panorama of black reaction.

More important, the author argues that the prospect of peaceful change in the Spanish countryside had already been lost by the time Azaña fell. During the first two years of the Republic the Socialists had followed a policy of moderation. Their progressive radicalization under the leadership of Largo Caballero was due, he tells us, to Azaña's failure to offer them concrete achievements in the area of agrarian reform. It meant, he believes, that an essential condition for nonrevolutionary agrarian reform had been lost, even if Azaña had retained power, and explains that "what might have been the birth pangs of a new social order proved instead part of the death throes of the Republic" (p. 316).

The chief theoretical question raised by this book is the possibility of peaceful democratic agrarian reform. Although Malefakis does not discuss the point at any length, it seems clear to the reviewer that an *economically* successful reform that would have raised the standard of living significantly could not have been carried out in Spain by peaceful nor by revolutionary means until the country had achieved a higher degree of industrialization. As Stanley Payne has noted, Spain lacked in the 1930s the technical and financial resources necessary to improve greatly the lot of the peasants. (*World Politics,* 25 [October, 1972], p. 165).

On the *political* level, which is the main focus of the author's concern, the abundant evidence he presents suggests to this reviewer that the prospects for success were negligible. On this score there seems to be a certain unresolved tension in Malefakis's mind. The introduction and conclusions make it clear he is aware that the peasants' demands "'fundamentally threatened the politically powerful large owners" (p. 6). The fact that the stakes for both landholders and peasants were too great to allow them to wait patiently suggests to him that "'the Western model of peaceful, constitutional change is not feasible for large-scale land re-distribution" (p. 395), and that "'the Republic would probably have failed even under the best leadership because the circumstances under which it functioned were so unpropitious and the problems it faced so complex" (p. 339).

Throughout the text, however, he lays stress on delays in drafting and applying the reform legislation (e.g., p. 249, 268, 283, 397) and on the tactical and personal failings of the Republican leaders (e.g., p. 252–253). This stress on the incidents of the political struggle tends to suggest to the reader that the author is convinced that had the persons who made up the government and the attitudes that influenced them been different, "the agrarian reform might have prospered and the progressive Republican regime might have established itself as the enduring form of government in Spain" (p. 399).

The complexity of this problem of counterfactual history suggests the need for further study of the conditions under which peaceful democratic land reform can take place, but in no way detracts from the merits of this excellent book. It is the best monograph on Spain in the 1930s and represents a highly significant contribution to the literature on agrarian reform.

John F. Coverdale

Princeton University

Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution. By Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson. (Indiana University Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 434. $17.50.)

Unlike the Soviet regime, the reign of the last tsar has been the subject of few first-rate analyses by Western scholars probing into the staggering tasks confronting the government. Until the present work we have not even had a study of the crisis of 1905–06 from the perspective of the man whom Nicholas II reluctantly chose to stave off a genuine revolution, Sergei Witte. Sponsor of the October Manifesto and Prime Minister of sorts for six months after its promulgation, he guided the tsarist regime from its threatened collapse at the time of the General Strike to its consolidation in the spring of 1906 under a new set of institutions and policies destined to see it through another decade. Dismissed before the meeting of the First Duma, he bequeathed the subsequent fulfillment—and the glory—of his work to Stolypin, a simpler and more likable personality, but obviously of lesser caliber.

This admirably thorough and well-documented study, illuminated occasionally by a cautious pursuit of might-have-beens, greatly advances our knowledge of the events in these months and of the basic issues before the tsarist regime: public participation in the governance of Russia, the form of its constitution, the conduct of elections, the rights of citizens; the peasant question; the loyalty of the army and the preservation of order; the financing of the state, and Russia's financial dependence on foreign countries. It also provides new insight into the crushing quandaries facing a statesman of unusual scope bent upon broadening the political base of the government while being forced to restore law and order in a vast, largely illiterate polity, rent by century-old tensions, and polarized beyond repair. Because of its realism, this study for the first time permits sound comparison between the pseudorevolution of 1905 and the real one of 1917, between the six months of the Witte regime and the eight months of the Provisional Government. In its largest perspectives, it invites comparison with similar troubles in other developing countries.

The key dilemma confronting Witte lay in the necessity of restoring order as a precondition for transforming the tsarist autocracy into a regime based on law and allowing a controlled measure of public participation. Order meant repression, and repression forestalled the growth of consensus and legality in preparation for rallying public support. The condition of Russia at the time left no alternative: Stolypin soon proved the (limited and temporary) validity of a policy of order and reform combined. Yet in the half year after the General Strike, the inherent contradiction was obvious: Repression strengthened the reactionaries, and in turn prompted the continued radicalism of the opposition. The flaw rubbed off on Witte, who never succeeded in maintaining a clear course between his deeply ingrained loyalty to autocracy and his westernized, liberalizing vision; he meandered unpredictably between one and the other, to the dismay of his friends and the contemptuous delight of his enemies. Arrogant as a result of early success, he had even less chance than the much humbler Prince Lvov in 1917 to establish a political base of his own. Sociologically and psychologically oriented scholars might have made even more of the disorientation in the Russian polity and the mind of its leaders which was so essential an aspect of the Russian passage through the age of revolution. Is it not true of all revolutions that with the analytic tools available no one perceives the deeper meaning in the press of events?

A final delight in this book is the successful collaboration of the two authors. Each contributed, at the start, his own research interest; conjointly, they produced a seamless text of fine scholarly quality.

Theodore H. Von Laue

Clark University

Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia's Problems and Prospects. By Richard R. Nelson, T. Paul Schultz, and Robert L. Slighton. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 322. $12.50.)

This book represents an interesting and unusual effort, based on background research of a team including economists and political scientists, to integrate economic and political aspects of the post–World War II development process in Colombia, with a clear attempt at relevance to a broader range of developing countries. While the framework is broad, specific focus is limited to three major themes: the relationship between economic development, rapid population growth, and internal migration; development as a process of structural change in a technologically dualistic economy; and policy making as a behavioral response by the government to the shifting preferences of the governed.

The book is well written, clear, and interesting, and—more impressive—it pulls together into a rather well-integrated whole, discussions of what are inevitably only a subset of the relevant aspects of a growing economy. The analysis is solid, given the data and the analytical frameworks used. At a number of points, including the unconventional discussion of manufacturing development, it is important to interpret the book for what it is—an attempt to cut into the system from a few selected angles, for whatever new understanding this provides; there is no attempt to cover the waterfront. Given this, the only real weakness in the economic portion of the book lies in the data used; unfortunately, the ubiquitous statistical pitfalls of economic analysis in a country like Colombia sabotage some of the more interesting and central conclusions.

Among the basic contentions of the book, two deserve special comment:

(1) Growth (here the discussion focuses on manufacturing) is in considerable degree the result of technological diffusion, i.e., the spread of better ways of producing; in general, the modern firms which lead the way, technologically speaking, are the large ones. Growth proceeds as modern firms expand relative to traditional ones and some traditional firms become modern. This "structural transformation" framework for the discussion of internal growth is a refreshing variant from the usual one, where capital accumulation and automatic, generalized, technological change account for factor productivity increases. The study takes into account, as rather few have, the great heterogeneity of technologies in the production of a given good. As a description of what happens in the long run, this is clearly a useful approach, although the implication—sometimes strongly drawn—that modernity is almost assuredly beneficial is open to some question.

(2) "The introduction of a modern sector on top of the traditional craft sector, and the widening of the productivity gap between the two, present the potential for a growing inequality of the distribution of urban income" (p. 129). It is argued that the major beneficiaries of this change are likely to be the middle and lower-middle classes and that the income share of the lower half of the labor force will be reduced. The conclusion that "productivity growth in the large (greater than 100 employees) and medium size (50–100) firms tended to be significantly greater than in the small firms; indeed, productivity in the smallest firms would appear to have declined over the period" (p. 126) has subsequently been shown probably to be incorrect, a result of quirks in the data used. And the conclusion (p. 142) that urban income distribution worsened between 1953 and 1965, based on information for Bogotá, is doubtful, because of a misinterpretation of the 1953 data; subsequent work by Miguel Urrutia and others has generally concluded that the distribution in question either improved or remained constant over this period. In short, the most recent data pertinent to this second contention lend it only limited support.

The focus on demographic issues distinguishes this book from most country analyses; in my view it is a healthy emphasis. The interesting contribution to the discussion of migration in Colombia (Chapter 3) reveals that interregional migration responds strongly to market forces, drawing rural labor to the cities from regions where the returns to labor are relatively low and the supply is growing relatively rapidly. It is argued that the wave of rural-urban migration has been heightened by the increase in the rate of population growth that followed improved sanitation, nutrition, and health practices after the 1940s.

The discussion of the functioning of a system in which the government formulates policies with an eye to maximizing electoral rewards is of interest. The authors highlight the tendency toward piecemeal policy and special purpose policy instruments; the high inertia with respect to reconsideration of policies whose effects on real income distribution are blurred and diffuse; espousal of policies which appear to redistribute from the rich to the poor. The detailed discussion of the political decision-making process is framed in the context of foreign exchange policy, which the authors feel was badly handled in the early 'sixties when a somewhat extreme version of the "disequilibrium system" involving an overvalued currency, quantitative controls, and administrative pricing was chosen rather than an exchange rate closer to equilibrium, which would have allowed the market to function more effectively. It is argued that this disequilibrium system is, in fact, the policy which maximizes the electoral support of the government, given the electorate's perceptions of the effects of foreign exchange policy.

By force of circumstance, the discussion of policy making is not supported with quantitative or other information which would help the reader appraise the various contentions as against alternative hypotheses. While this omission makes it hard to assess the validity of some of the contentions, this section should be read by anyone who feels that the decision maker can for a moment restrict himself to the economic aspects of the issues at hand. It will, one hopes, provide grist for future researchers on these important issues. For the moment, it provides a useful framework within which to conceive the functioning of the system.

In summary, the economic side of the book is provocative. Clear framing of interesting hypotheses is stronger than empirical evaluation; in several cases, more recent data and interpretations tend to contradict the conclusions. The eternal dilemma of "how far to interpret weak data" is well illustrated here. One of the book's strong points is the neatly reasoned integration of disparate pieces of evidence; yet, when some of the pieces turn out to have been misleading, the reader may be at something of a loss as to how to "adjust" the results.

All in all, the book warrants wide readership: Economists can benefit from the clear discussion of policymaking and politics in a framework of issues familiar to them; political scientists can symmetrically benefit from the clear discussion of economic issues in a framework they understand.

R. A. BERRY

University of Western Ontario, Canada

Politics in Newfoundland. By S. J. R. Noel. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Pp. 328. $13.50.)

Newfoundland politics has received scant attention in the literature of political science. Most people associate Canada's easternmost province with its airport at Gander, and few are aware of its distinctive political history or style of politics; from 1855 to 1933, Newfoundland enjoyed responsible government, first as a self-governing colony and later as a dominion in the British Commonwealth. Politics hardly resembled party government, British or Canadian style. Instead, Newfoundland was governed by a succession of fluid factions and parties of St. John's merchants and lawyers who gained support from the sparsely populated periphery through liberal application of patronage and spoils. Faced with bankruptcy as a result of the depression and continuing mismanagement, Newfoundland surrendered its sovereignty in 1933 and consented to be ruled by a commission of British civil servants. In 1949, Newfoundland became Canada's tenth province, governed by Joseph R. Smallwood, the only living father of Canadian confederation and a self-styled Huey Long of the north. Under the Smallwood administration, the earlier patterns of patronage and spoils continued alongside massive (and usually unsuccessful) efforts to develop the island's economy. Employing his own populistic skills as well as the material benefits of confederation (Newfoundland was plugged into the Canadian welfare system), Smallwood dominated the island's politics, ruling as a virtual dictator, until his defeat in 1972.

S. J. R. Noel's *Politics in Newfoundland* purports "to analyse the forces shaping the politics of the island during its decline from independent dominion status to bureaucratic dictatorship and its subsequent conversion into a province of Canada" (p. vii). In clearly written prose, Noel, an historian, examines the major events and intrigues of Newfoundland's political history, focusing on the rise and fall of political leaders, shifting alliances, deals and scandals, foreign relations, and the island's economy. In doing so, the author provides us with a sketch of a centralized political system in which cabals of politicians governed an island dotted with remote and destitutely poor fishing villages strung out along 6,000 miles of coastline. Isolated from each other and from the capital at St. John's, but at the same time dependent on the St. John's "fishocracy" for credit and supplies, the outports elected St. John's merchants and lawyers to represent them. Parachuted into their constituencies, elected representatives served as the main link between center and periphery, channeling some patronage and benefits to their districts while engaging in a struggle for wealth and power in St. John's.

Because Noel is preoccupied with the development of a lucid historical narrative, we never learn as much as we should about "the forces shaping politics." Why, for example, did such a system persist? Throughout the book, Noel places a great deal of emphasis on animosities between Catholics and Protestants. Although these tensions were minimized early on by a proportional allocation of spoils, Noel claims that "sectarian" or "denominational" questions were used to swing several elections (but he provides no tables or charts enabling the reader to see just how Protestant, Catholic, or mixed districts voted) and that religious tensions prevented the growth of class consciousness. While this is probably true, it does not completely explain the general absence of protest movements or mass-based political parties. Early on, Noel suggests that the remoteness of the outports and their economic dependence on St. John's were inimical to political organization. But later in the book, he describes the rise of the Fisherman's Protective Union (the exception to the rule) on the northeast coast. In this instance, Noel claims that relative poverty, communal ties among villages, and participation in the dangerous Labrador fishery facilitated the spread of the union movement. But if conditions were so favorable, why did the union movement disintegrate when its leader abandoned it some years later, and why didn't the movement spread further? Noel tells us nothing about the former problem, and attributes failure of the movement to religious differences (the F.P.U. was predominantly Protestant) and differences in social and economic structure between the northeast coast and other parts of the island. But were the differences indeed that great?

What is missing in the book is an analysis of the political culture and social structure of Newfoundland. In commenting on the continuity of political style and practices in Newfoundland, Noel alludes to a persistent political culture which has survived despite changes in regime and constitutional status. Nowhere in the book, however, does he tell us what the elements of this political culture are or how they contributed the kind of politics which Noel describes. Yet surely some analysis of the level of social trust, cynicism, and fatalism in Newfoundland outports, coupled with an analysis of social structure, particularly relationships between fisherman and local notables—merchants, ministers, and priests—would go a long way toward explaining the absence and failure of protest movements and the persistence of the system.

From the point of view of political science, one of the greatest shortcomings of the book is failure to develop a comparative context that could tell us what Newfoundland exemplifies. Reflecting on the decision of the British government and Canadian bankers to place the island under Commission rule rather than allow it to default on interest payments, Noel argues that the patronage-dominated politics of Newfoundland may not have been all that different from the politics of Quebec or New Brunswick or other remote, less developed parts of Canada. True enough. However, the author fails to make the point that the politics of Newfoundland, past or present, are not all that different from the politics of many underdeveloped or partially developed regions or nations: the marginal position of the average voter eking out his existence in a semifeudal relationship to a local notable provides a ready-made base for patron-client relationships. Dependency on distant outside forces provides opportunities for brokers and intermediaries. Party alignments are fluid because voters become attached to particular patrons and not party labels or doctrines.

It is perhaps unfair to berate an historian for not answering a political scientist's questions. Noel's book is eminently readable and provides an excellent background for anyone interested in either current Newfoundland politics or Canadian provincial politics. Moreover, by tracing the machinations of Newfoundland politicians, Noel provides us with the historical description which must be a prelude to systematic analysis.

STEVEN B. WOLINETZ
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Russia Enters the 20th Century. Edited by Erwin Oberländer. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971. Pp. 352. $12.50.)

This series of cameos reveals how, in many respects, the Soviet regime represents a reversion to the traditional Russian pattern of political centralism and territorial expansion. They offer something of a contrast with the consistent and accelerated western involvement in the forces of nationalism, liberalism, humanitarianism, and industrialization. The essays reflect a general dynamism in all aspects of Russian life, but retarded by archaic attitudes of the "ruling spheres," and the inertia of the lumbering bureaucracy.

There is relatively little new information or interpretation in these studies except in specialized investigations like the analysis by Professor Dahm (of the State Institute of Oriental and International Studies at Cologne) of Russian philosophical writings and the investigation into the Moslem intellectual revival by Professor Bräker (of the same Institute). The essays are, of necessity condensed and often sketchy, yet interpretations are sufficiently lucid. Professors Katkov (Oxford) and Futrell (University of British Columbia) in their consideration of foreign policies observe the moderation of expansive and centralist currents by the turn of the century and argue that continued international instability, as reflected by world conflict, plus Bolshevik ideology brought a resurgence of statist autocracy and territorial expansion. The reader would appreciate an elaboration of the promise of investigating the process of decision making and implementation. For example, Witte's independent initiative would seem to imply incomplete control by autocracy over influential figures.

The article by Professor Schultz (Göttingen) on constitutional law performs a distinct service in focusing on the positive legislative activities of the Provisional Government in the areas of civil liberties and judicial safeguards. This offers some antidote to the unrelieved impression of its complete flaccidity. The movement away from centralized, aristocratic control is adequately determined. But the extent of the exclusion of the nobility from the zemstvos would seem to be overstated. The conservative nobility was able to block the establishment of the "small zemstvos" in the post-1905 period. And the reader might find the term "bourgeois" cavalierly handled. The Octobrists included all important bourgeois elements, but they are dominated by the moderately liberal landowning nobility in the spirit of the reform tradition of the 1860s. The Kadets were intellectuals, and their "bourgeois" character has to be carefully qualified in terms of Marx's "cash nexus."

In his statement on political parties Professor Oberländer (Institute for Oriental Studies, Cologne) properly focuses on the question of the course of the revolution. The Soviet position on the inevitability of a Bolshevik victory is clear. But in the United States the center of controversy focuses on the inevitability of revolution —with or without world war. In this connection the progressive isolation of the regime from its loyal support is significant and is related to its obvious inadequacy during the war. The cursory treatment of the Duma gives no real indication of the impact of parliamentary experience; even the "constitutionalist" Stolypin resigned in the face of parliamentary opposition.

Both Professors Thalheim (Berlin) on industry and Willets (Oxford) on Agriculture stress weak agrarian technological development as a key element in conditioning the slow emergence of Russia from an underdeveloped status. Willets particularly notes the refusal of the intellectual opposition to recognize the existence of the factor of a low technological level in its antagonism to enclosure. Thalheim's comprehensive study of the Russian industrial revolution stresses the traditional military goals and their negative effect on a balanced economy and living standards. Professor Poppe's (Leningrad and Berlin) related discussion of Siberian migration leaves a generally positive impression. The improved economy of the settlers would be more meaningful if compared with the rest of the empire, and analysis of returnee activity is skimpy.

The discussion by Dr. Connolly, the British expert on ethnic minorities, reveals still another facet of the regime's tendency to violate its own rules and develop a stimulant for minority nationalism. Miss Connolly correctly stresses the essentially autonomist nature of the effective minority leadership. Because of its peculiarities the reader might wonder about the omission of the "Jewish Question." In a study of a special minority, Professor Bräker's enlightening account tells us that the rise of Moslem nationalisms in the nineteenth century reflects features not uncommon in the West and is related to the impact of faith and positivism on the Russian intellectual scene.

Professor Simon (Cologne), turning to the Orthodox Church, competently argues for the dynamic nature of Church activity at the turn of the century; and for reasons resembling those of the seventeenth century—competition with dynamic "sects."

Professors Dahm, discussing philosophy, and Stenbok-Fermor (Stanford) analyzing the Silver Age of Russian literature, project trends away from idealism toward natural morality and positivism. And Professor Anweiler (Ruhr University) recounts the realistic effort of educational reformers to promote stability in Russian society through vocational training. On the whole the collection offers an updated perspective on continuity and change in Russia at the turn of the century.

Alfred Levin

Kent State University

The Army in Papua-New Guinea. By Robert J. O'Neill. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971. Pp. 31. $1.95.)

As Papua New Guinea (PNG) approaches independence, a question often asked is, "What will be the role of the army after independence?" Knowledge about the army in PNG has been limited, largely because it is part of the Australian army and therefore answerable to the Australian parliament, not to Papuan New Guineans. Writings about it have thus been either intellectually biased or, more usually, based on army press releases. O'Neill has the advantage of being both an ex-insider (formerly a career officer in the Australian army) and also a scholar of some repute. It is therefore disappointing to find that his monograph is more descriptive than analytical, more suited to a journalist than an academician. But it does at least correct some of the inaccurate and misleading reports of the calling out of the army in aid to the civil power in 1970 (pp. 14–15), and it does discuss some of the possible conflicts and difficulties which face the future PNG army.

O'Neill's use of words is surprising at times. Regarding the maintenance of internal law and order, he says that "after the recent disturbances . . . the PIR [Pacific Islands Regiment] has been given this *additional* role" (p. 11) (emphasis added). But armies usually have this role, and certainly one early Commanding Officer of PIR was aware of it: The difference in 1970 was that the role was publicly stated and there was a possibility of having to carry it out. O'Neill points out that the administration overreacted in this situation (p. 13), which belies his contention that there is "close consultation and cooperation" between the army and the administration (p. 4). The 1970 situation pointed to a lack of understanding about the army's capabilities and functions on the administration's part and possibly also to the army's failure to adequately inform the administration on these matters. O'Neill notes that the PI (Pacific Islands) soldiers "have little real idea what it takes to lead a political organisation or to run a government" (p. 17) without also pointing out the implications of this if the soldiery become dissatisfied with the way in which the country is being run.

O'Neill's perspective on Australian military relations with an independent PNG is unconsciously revealing. He believes that Australia should provide financial and logistic support, but that a tied grant would be necessary, although this would imply "some limitation on sovereignty" (p. 28). He admits that this logistical dependence "places a ready tool in Canberra's hand which could cripple the power of the military in a short space of time" (p. 26), but implies that it is desirable that Australia "can still exercise some degree of control in a New Guinea crisis," although this could be "embarrassing" (p. 30). A natural Australian view, but a chilling thought for a newly independent government.

PETA COLEBATCH
University of Sussex, England

Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944. By Nissan Oren. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 293. $12.50.)

Those of us who consulted Nissan Oren's history of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1934–1944 when it was still in doctoral dissertation form found it a supremely authoritative narrative and analysis that would worthily complement Joseph Rothschild's "The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883–1936." With the works of these two scholars, the history of the Bulgarian Communist movement has been covered more thoroughly than any Eastern European Communist movement.

Actually, Oren's book is even better and fuller than his dissertation. For since 1960 (when his dissertation was presented) he has done further research on the subject, including study in archives in Sofia and personal interviews with veteran Bulgarian Communists who played a part in the events he describes.

The main theme of Oren's work is the interaction between the BCP in Bulgaria (outlawed during the period covered) and the Bulgarian Communists who had emigrated to the Soviet Union. These latter included not only Dimitrov and Kolarov but also Vulko Chervenkov, who was later to become Bulgaria's Stalinist dictator and the most influential figure in postwar Bulgarian Communism. Dimitrov, of course, became world-famous as early as 1933, but a point which Oren documents very clearly is the relatively small influence he had on the Party in Bulgaria, and even on many BCP members in Moscow, for several years in the 'thirties. Only when the Comintern endorsed the Popular Front tactic and Stalin moved decisively against his own "leftist sectarians" was the authority of Dimitrov secured. (His victory resulted in the death or imprisonment of many Bulgarians in the Soviet Union. Dimitrov himself, though hardly emerging with great credit from this bloody episode, comes off considerably better than the vengeful Kolarov.)

The most exciting part of the book is the chapters covering the BCP at war. Here, the problems facing the Communists in mounting a real resistance campaign, their isolation from a population relatively prosperous and fully satisfied over the (temporary) return of Bulgaria's lost territories, the BCP's uneasy relations with Tito, the significance of Macedonia, the real heroism of many Bulgarian Communists toward the end of the war, and, finally, the maze of negotiation and intrigue leading up to September 9, 1944—all this is handled by Oren with enviable clarity and a complete mastery of his sources. In fact, Oren's knowledge and control of his sources is perhaps the outstanding aspect of the whole book. What Oren gives us is the essence of what seems to be a practically inexhaustible reservoir of knowledge on the subject.

Criticisms? An occasional brief character sketch of prominent BCP leaders would have lent flesh and color to the book. More seriously, Oren's conclusion is tantalizingly short. It contains enough WISDOM and flashes of insight to convince the reader that he could have had a magisterial summary of the place and the problems of Bulgarian Communism in the context of Bulgarian history as a whole. Perhaps in his forthcoming study on the sovietization of Bulgaria after 1944, Oren will satisfy the appetite he has whetted in those last few pages.

J. F. Brown

Radio Free Europe, Munich

Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960–1968. By J. Gregory Oswald. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970. Pp. xvi, 365. $15.00.)

This formidable volume is a compilation of translated Soviet Russian writings on the current Latin-American scene. The work presents a cross-section of official and academic viewpoints. In general, the latter reflect a fairly well-established division of labor among Soviet scholars concerned with Latin America. Some of the materials, on the one hand, were produced by the Latin-American Institute of the Academy of Sciences. This institute, established in 1961, is concerned primarily with the contemporary economic and political problems of the Americas. There is also represented, on the other hand, some of the work of the Latin-American Sector of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences; that sector's work here is historical rather than contemporary in emphasis and deals with a somewhat wider range of Latin-American themes.

While some readers might be impressed by the range of analyses and opinions developed by the Soviet writers included in this enterprise, their work—whether official or academic, contemporary or historical—falls basically within a fairly rigid framework of Marxist-Leninist interpretation. The selected materials cover such matters as the Castro Revolution in Cuba, national liberation movements in Latin America, reform programs, the role of the Catholic Church, labor and trade unionism, and problems of the rural-urban dichotomy.

Essentially, the Cuban materials pursue two fundamental theses. The first does what it can to portray the missile crisis of 1962 as a victory for Soviet diplomacy. The second reflects a post-1962 decline in Soviet interest in, and knowledge of, developments in Cuba. "Research into the development of the revolutionary process in Cuba is an extremely complex problem," M. S. Al'perovich wrote after the middle 1960s in *Sovetskaia istoriografiia stran Latinskoi Ameriki*. "Thus it is not surprising that Soviet specialists have not yet supplied clear and exhaustive answers to many of the problems connected with the revolutionary events in Cuba, and that in a number of instances their opinions diverge considerably" (p. 309).

Two basic propositions are espoused in the included Soviet writing on national liberation movements in Latin America. It is argued, in the first place, that the Cuban experience is not applicable to the bulk of these movements. There is, second, a somewhat subtle but nonetheless clear anti-Chinese Communist line in the Soviet writing about national liberation in Latin America. The Soviet writers are almost uniformly negatively critical of the programs developed by such non-Communist reform movements as the *Apristas* of Perú, *Acción Democrática* of Venezuela, and the leftist regimes led in Costa Rica by José Figueres. In the view of A. F. Shul'govskii, the main Soviet writer in this field, the chief aim of such reformers is to "subordinate the national-liberation movement to their influence and to distort its true aims and purposes" (p. 69). The sections on the Catholic Church strike this reviewer as being the least original, and the least peculiarly Soviet, portions of the book. Little more is said here than that the political infuence of the Church has been in decline for some time. This observation has been made so long by so many writers in so many languages that it seems superfluous to translate it from the Russian.

On the labor front, the quoted writers express concern about the divisive schisms in Latin-American trade unionism represented by the emergence of such anti- and non-Communist labor organizations as the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), the Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalizados (ATLAS), and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Here the Soviet writers express the hope for eventual reunification of the Latin-American labor movement under the ægis of the more Marxist Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL). Soviet views, both official and academic, on rural-uban problems are represented weakly in Oswald's collection. The excerpts printed here are concerned chiefly with attacks on the program of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) in Bolivia, and against rural reforms reflecting Chinese-type Communist approaches.

The compilation thus documents a Soviet view of Latin America not only filtered through a Marxist-Leninist analytical structure but also colored by policy positions on a number of contemporary problems of the American republics. These positions include a standoffish and tentative posture toward the Cuban experience, coupled with a warning that it not be taken as a model for revolutionary movements in other countries. The Soviet writers also express hostility toward Chinese Communist influences in the Americas, on the one hand, and, on the other, toward such indigenous Latin-American anti- and non-Communist reform movements as APRA, *Acción Democrática,* and the Christian Democratic movement.

Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America is an impressive volume, the result of a seven-year project. Moreover, a number of hands contributed to the venture. The central task of compiling and translating the Russian-language materials was done by Oswald. The book was edited by Robert G. Carlton, and varied types of assistance were provided by the Conference on Latin-American History. The foreword was written by the late Howard F. Cline of the Hispanic Foundation and the introduction by Herbert S. Dinerstein of the School of Advanced International Studies. A result is the somewhat ironic sense of top-heavy bureaucracy among the Americans producing a book about bureaucracy in Soviet scholarship. A further disturbing element is the reiterated "Watch-out,-you-are-reading-Communist-propaganda" warning, given judiciously by Oswald himself but repeatedly hammered at by the various supporters, aides, and well-wishers of the study as well. The reader thus comes to feel that he is being treated as though he were a youngster watching a motion picture he should not be permitted to see without parental guidance. Nevertheless, the work emerges, on balance, as a major and admirable piece of well-documented scholarship, likely to stand for some time as an authoritative source of information on Soviet views of Latin America during the 1960s.

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN
Northwestern University

Hispanismo, 1898–1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America. By Fredrick B. Pike. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xx, 486. $15.00.)

The *hispanismo* about which History Professor Pike, of the University of Notre Dame, tells us here is a Spanish-led movement (also at times called *hispanoamericanismo,* Pan-Hispanism, or *hispanidad*) that has long sought to strengthen ties between Spain and the countries that once were her colonies in America. Prior to Pike's book, little scholarly research on the movement had been published in English, and even the voluminous materials printed in Spanish consisted mostly of what are in effect primary sources written by Spanish and Spanish American advocates or foes of the movement rather than studies aimed at objectively portraying and analyzing the history of *hispanismo.* In the *Political Science Quarterly* of September, 1922 (pp. 389–414) J. Fred Rippy published an article entitled "Pan-Hispanic Propaganda in Hispanic America," treating the history of the subject up to that date; it later appeared in nearly the same form in Rippy's *Latin America in World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928). In 1959 the University of California Press issued Mark Van Aken's modest-sized book, *Pan-Hispanism: Its Origin and Development to 1866.* To this slim output is now added Pike's substantial volume on the period from 1898 to 1936, going much beyond Professor Rippy's article in extent and depth of treatment and in the terminal date of the study. It should be noted, however, that Pike deals mainly with the Spanish advocates and supporters of the movement, giving only limited space to its reception by the Americans.

Van Aken, Rippy, and I (in introductory parts of my doctoral thesis entitled *Hispanidad in South America, 1936–1945,* available only on microfilm as Publication No. 2321 of University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1951) pictured *hispanismo* prior to 1936 as seeking cultural, economic, and political rapprochement and solidarity between Spain and Spanish America largely to defend the Hispanic race and civilization (often particularly from the United States) and to promote the international influence, prestige, and trade of Spain. While presenting considerable evidence of these features of the movement, Pike stresses in *hispanismo*'s defensive posture what his predecessors mostly overlooked—the frequent aim of preventing social revolution and preserving elite rule throughout the Hispanic world. Because he sees this purpose as an outgrowth of Spaniards' concern about threats to the existing order at home, a little more than a third of his book is devoted to social and political problems in Spain alone and particularly to the ideas expounded there for coping with them. Most of the rest of the volume deals directly with Spaniards' thoughts about their Spanish American ties and with their specific efforts to promote those ties through cultural, commercial, and other channels. In addition to describing such efforts and their limited results, Pike also analyzes and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of *hispanismo* as a whole up to 1936.

Although I saw Spain's *hispanidad* of 1936–1945 as seeking to promote in Spanish

America a philosophy in tune with the fascism and strong Catholicism of the Franco regime, I did not view the pre-1936 *hispanismo* of Spain (except in so far as it involved immediate precursors of the Franquistas) as embodying a strong social conservatism. Pike maintains, however, that both the liberal and the conservative promoters of the movement in the mother country for decades prior to 1936 were in agreement in their deep concern about warding off revolution at home, the main difference between them being the strong Catholicism of the conservatives as contrasted with the anticlericalism and laicism of the liberals. According to him, these Spanish advocates of *hispanismo* believed they could receive needed strength to check revolution through coöperation with like-minded Spanish Americans in defense of the traditional and still existing hierarchical social order, regarded as essential in the value structure of the Hispanic world. Pike has gone much more thoroughly into the sources for the 1898–1936 period than his predecessors did, and he has buttressed his work as a whole with very extensive and impressive documentation. The 138 pages of footnotes that follow his 331 pages of text are mostly devoted to indicating and sometimes briefly discussing his sources, which are nearly all published items and largely, for his purposes, primary materials, a great many of them books and periodicals that he used during a year's research in the National Library in Madrid. One might possibly ask if the overall evidence warrants quite as much emphasis as Pike places on the antirevolutionary goal of Spanish *hispanismo,* but that would come close to cavilling. In its painstaking treatment of Spanish thought and action regarding Spanish America during the period covered, his book goes far to fill a virtual void on a subject that is important to students of Spain, Latin America, and international relations.

William B. Bristol

Union College

Politics in Independent Poland, 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government. By Antony Polonsky. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 572, $24.00.)

Almost without exception, studies of "developing lands" or "emerging nations" have focused on Asia, Africa, or Latin America as the geographical regions in which the patterns of evolution from colonial possession to sovereign political status are available for examination. Those scholars treating East Europe after 1918 have tended to concern themselves with traditional discussions of foreign policy, economics, or political history within the narrow framework of a given country or time period. Yet in many ways this part of the world should be considered as containing a form of "developing nation." It had lived under an imperial rule and colonial exploitation for a long time; it was ruled forcefully by powerful, alien powers, either directly or through loyal natives; and it spawned a powerful drive for national independence that intensified as the economics became more sophisticated in response to the demands of the industrial era.

The leaders and spokesmen for these East European liberation movements gave force and legitimacy to their causes by drawing upon the past achievements of their nations for proof that they were merely the latest heirs to the "state consciousness" of the medieval or early modern empires that had played important roles in the international affairs of their day. Accordingly, when World War I brought them their independence, all of these countries faced the economic, social, and cultural problems of industrialization and modernization—not to mention that of survival in the hostile environment of contemporary Europe—under the strong influence of their political past. When examined within this perspective, East Europe between world wars not only becomes more intelligible to the Western scholar, but also provides a new model of development that in many ways is close to the historical experiences of the American or West European observer.

Antony Polonsky's study of interwar Polish politics, despite several tantalizing hints, fails to take full advantage of this approach to contemporary history and politics. Although he overlooked many basic and easily accessible archival materials both inside and outside of Poland, nonetheless the author amassed a considerable body of facts and statistics concerning the economic and political life of the Second Republic. However, the absence of a viable methodological framework within which to present and analyze his material leaves it simply a mass of unrelated information and data from which the reader must draw his own conclusions on the interwar Polish experience. The book is divided into chronological chapters that concentrate on three basic topics: purely internal political developments, economic and, to a lesser extent, social trends; and Polish foreign policy. While each section in itself is a good if superficial study, the lack of a broad perspective prevents the author from utilizing the full potential of the problem at hand. The net result is a frustrating lack of coherence that deprives the work of any true scholarly significance.

The above remarks should not obscure the relative merits of Polonsky's work. The author does present, for the first time in English, the fruits of both memoir and scholarly publication in Poland covering the period treated, and he has included a good amount of statistical data that should aid future researchers who are interested in problems of development and cannot read the original Polish sources. But these strengths are countered, and sometimes nullified, by the negative aspects of the book. Its research base, and hence its factual material, is perceptibly unbalanced in favor of the 1920s, with relatively little emphasis on the crucial final years of the Republic. Moreover, much of the potential impact of the work is lost through careless editing and occasional factual errors; for example, Gen. Edward Smigly-Rydz was not the Minister of Defense in the "People's Government" of Jedrzej Moraczewski, but in the short-lived cabinet of Socialist leader Ignacy Daszyński, a fact that played an important role in Polish politics after 1935. Finally, the laborious and stilted style, laced with occasional cliches, makes reading the book a major chore, although the faulty editing of the publisher is chiefly to blame for this flaw. In short, Polonsky has provided a useful introductory survey of interwar Poland's transition from a liberal parliamentary democracy through a traditional military-bureaucratic dictatorship to what was emerging as a quasi-Fascist regime by 1939, but the shortcomings of the work prevent it from contributing any meaningful analysis to the study of development politics.

EDWARD D. WYNOT, JR.
Florida State University

Institutions of Economic Growth: A Theory of Conflict Management in Developing Countries. By John P. Powelson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 281. $10.00.)

Institutions of Economic Growth is a welcome contribution to the growing literature on change and development for three main reasons: First, Professor Powelson is an experienced economist who maintains that "'Economics has run its course in the explanation of growth . . . the next step is to merge sociological and economic models" (p. 197). Second, the chief thesis of the book relates to a central topic in development theory: "Why, in some countries is economic growth stopped by internal quarrels and mistrust? Why, in others, do competitors not only control but use them to promote growth?" (p. ix). Third, the author devotes considerable attention to policy implications and recommendations.

On the basis of a succinct but critical evaluation of models of economic development, Powelson suggests that a nation's capacity to produce institutions to manage conflicts determines whether a sustained growth will follow the take-off stage. Since not all institutions are conducive to conflict management, the criterion of "institutional effectiveness" is postulated. Essentially, institutional effectiveness is a measurement of an institution's capacity to identify conflicts within its jurisdiction so that all contestants understand them, to institutionalize well-defined norms of resolution, and to command the consensus of concerned people that the institution is more appropriate than other feasible alternatives.

Conceptualizing of institutional effectiveness in terms of conflict-resolving power, places Powelson's theory in a nonideological domain. Thus, regardles of the normative or existential rationalization given to a particular institution in a political system, its value is assessed only in relation to its institutional effectiveness. An extended family system, or a one-party rule might be as adequate to development as a nuclear family or a multi-party system given the institutional effectiveness criterion.

That different institutions may perform similar functions is an established observation in the literature. The contribution of *Institutions,* however, is in advancing a micro- and a macrotheory of institution building which if empirically tested may permit predictions on the types of institutions that power groups in various nations establish as well as on the replacement rates of institutions.

Utilizing a cost-benefit framework Powelson suggests that "If the benefits of an institution exceed its cost, and if the beneficiaries are either able to compensate those who pay the cost or force them to yield with adequate or no compensation, then the new institution will be formed" (p. 116). Although intuitively appealing, the asymmetry between demand and supply prices in the market of institutions, poses a serious problem to operationalization and hence the testability of the proposition. Moreover, in spite of the suggested heuristic design to measure costs, benefits, and institutional effectiveness, the problem of *how much* benefits must exceed costs before a new institution emerges, is not treated carefully enough.

Another limitation relates to the criterion for the selection of institutions. The theory states that growth-sensitive groups select those institutions whose effectiveness rating is perceived to be high enough to increase the gross national product at an annual rate which is believed to have a value at least equal to the cost of acquiring the institution (p. 120). But, if the cost of changing an institution equals the perceived rating, why bother with a new institution? Further, the perceptions of growth-sensitive groups about the effectiveness of institutions may not coincide with reality. This may lead to the selection of malfunctioning institutions. A correction option is explicated in the theory. Yet establishing a malfunctioning institution even for a short run is too costly for a developing nation.

Whereas at the micro level Powelson emphasizes the choice between single institutions ruling out value change as a cost, at the macro level the focus shifts to institutional types and their relations to national values. In the long run, institutional types are to conform to national consensus on economic and political ideology. Consensus is achieved either through successive institution formation, or direct pursuit of ideology, or a mixture of the two. Successive institution formation leads to selection of an ideology because each chosen type of institution makes easier a subsequent choice of the same kind of institution. To justify all choices, an ideology is necessary. On the other hand, in the case of direct pursuit, power groups select an ideology and form economic and political theories to support it.

This last point explains, according to the author, the American failure in Latin America. The U.S. policy has two goals: One is to promote economic growth in these countries. The other is to persuade power groups to adopt an ideology and institutions similar to those of the U.S. These two goals are in direct conflict. The American ideology is not the one by which consensus will be achieved at least cost. Indeed, the effect of the U.S. policy has been to deepen and intensify ideological conflicts and to hinder the emergence of authentic but effective institutions.

In conclusion, this should be a stimulating book for anyone concerned about the process by which institutions are built, maintained and transformed. Correspondingly, it should be useful in advanced courses focusing on either political development or political economy.

David Nachmias

Tel Aviv University

Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union. Edited, translated and with commentary by Peter Reddaway. (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972. Pp. 499. $10.00.)

This is a most informative compilation of material, with insightful commentary, on a subject of great and increasing importance. Reddaway has faithfully translated, meticulously edited, and skillfully presented the first eleven issues of the unauthorized (hence, from the Kremlin's viewpoint, nonlegal) *samizdat* (self-published) journal, *Chronicle of Current Events,* containing authentic information on the dissenting Soviet "Democratic Movement." The issues assembled here were distributed every two months from April 1968 through December 1969 by anonymous Soviet citizens. By June 1972, twenty-five issues of the *Chronicle* had appeared, but its basic continuity of viewpoint, focus, and style makes these issues representative of the whole. The usefulness of *Uncensored Russia* is enhanced by Mr. Reddaway's perceptive commentaries.

Since, as Reddaway notes (pp. 15, 20) the *Chronicle* is the semi-formal organ of the underground Soviet "Democratic," or "human rights" movement, one finds in it reflections of most of the currents of dissent voiced in the USSR since it began "publication" (in typewritten, sometimes in photocopy form) in 1968. Scholars will find here indispensable source material on the activities of a small but determined and energetic set of men and women who have, as individuals and as members of loosely organized groups, in recent years contested, protested, resisted, criticized, and exposed Kremlin policies, decisions, administrative and court actions, and laws that they regarded as unjust. The reader will also learn how the Soviet regime treats dissenters. Its tactics include blandishments, threats, and harassments of KGB (political police) interrogators, and the accusations and pronouncements of journalists, prosecutors and judges, followed by sentencing to prisons, forced labor camps, and special "psychiatric hospitals" of citizens the authorities find "socially dangerous." Sometimes they include the brutal, sadistic behavior of prison, camp, and mental hospital personnel.

The duel between the exponents of the official political culture and the dissenting counterculture, or, in Reddaway's words between "Enormous physical strength on the one side, tremendous moral strength on the other" (p. 438) is grim, tense, and dynamic: The odds of course are, at least for the present, heavily on the side of the regime, but the dissenters have won moral victories, have probably prevented repression from being more severe than it might have been, and even at times have forced the authorities to retreat—as in the cases of the arbitrary commitment to mental institutions, and subsequent release, of the mathematician and poet Esenin-Volpin and the biologist Zhores

Medvedev; Esenin-Volpin, in a dramatic reversal of official policy was allowed with a number of other leading dissidents of Jewish or partly Jewish ancestry, to leave the USSR in June 1972.

The illuminating introduction (pp. 15–42) and the fascinating "'Foreword of an Eyewitness," by the mathematician Julius Telesin, who emigrated to Israel in 1970, add much to the book's value, as do the extraordinary photographs, some smuggled out of labor camps, and the map (p. 204) of the Mordovian labor colonies.

Uncensored Russia's twenty chapters are classified thematically, and to a degree geographically, in terms of: a first chapter on "The *Chronicle* about Itself"; eight on "'mainstream" dissent, beginning with events connected with the trial of the writers Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel, in February 1966 and ending with the "Case of the Baltic Fleet Officers," in 1969; three chapters on camps, prisons, and mental hospitals, five on "individual streams" (The Crimean Tatars, The Meskhetians, The Ukrainians, The Jews, and The Churches); two on "mainstream publications" (mostly on Alexander Solzhenitsyn and on writings by or about Andrei Amalrik, Andrei Sakharov, and Valeri Chalidze, as well as expressions of anti-regime opinion on the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia); and two final, miscellaneous chapters entitled, respectively, "Tributaries," and "Dams," dealing, in turn, with "Leningrad and the Provinces" and with "Stalin, Stalinists, Fascists and Censors." In this last chapter one finds the *Chronicle*'s limited references to "right wing" dissent—this material is briefly supplemented in a footnote (pp. 430–433, and footnote 45, p. 485), referring to issue No. 17, published in December, 1970.

In the introduction, and in brief, perceptive comments elsewhere Reddaway seeks to explain the behavior of Soviet dissenters and the response thereto of the authorities. He highlights Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin, which, he writes (p. 22), transformed well-known information about Stalin's "torture and execution of millions and the deportation of whole nations" into "legitimate subjects for reflection, discussion, written analysis." However, since Khrushchev's fall "reformism within the system has become increasingly difficult, and the birth of the Democratic Movement is one of the results" (p. 23). As for the regime's policy toward dissent, Reddaway describes it as one of "hesitant repression" (p. 27). He appears to share the view of Andrei Amalrik, expressed, however, before Amalrik's current sentence to three years in a strict regime labor camp in Magadan, that the regime is too weak to resort to mass arrests of critics. The course of events since *Uncensored Russia* went to press has, on the whole, confirmed the soundness of this view. To be sure, in January 1972 Vladimir Bukovski, probably because he had done so much to expose the KGB's practice of imprisoning regime critics in "special psychiatric hospitals," received an exceptionally severe sentence for having allegedly "defamed" the Soviet system, but in March and June of the same year the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth issues of the *Chronicle* appeared. Prominent dissenters such as Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, though subjected to harassment or ostracism, remained at liberty. In January 1972, however, prominent Ukrainian intellectuals, including Vyacheslav Chornovil, who had already served a three-year term in a camp, were detained, and charges were brought against some of them; and in June a number of Lithuanians were arrested for alleged antiregime protests. Also in June, 1972, the historian Peter Yakir, who had hitherto stayed out of jail, despite years of persistent—but scrupulously legal—activity in the struggle for civil rights, was arrested for "anticonstitutional" behavior. Previously Yakir had been spared, probably because the leadership wished to avoid to appear to be persecuting the son of one of Stalin's most celebrated victims. Yakir's father, Iona, was a Marshal of the Soviet Union; Khrushchev had expressed public indignation about his fate and friendly interest in his son.

It seems safe to say that all serious students of dissent in the USSR will hail Professor Reddaway's valuable contribution. Many, doubtless including Mr. Reddaway, will wish for greater elaboration of analysis as we steadily deepen and widen our factual knowledge—to which the dedicated labors of Reddaway, Abraham Brumberg, Karel van het Reve, Max Hayward, Leopold Labedz, Albert Boiter, and others have indispensably contributed. The historical perspectives and insights offered by Professor Reddaway are fundamental to understanding the complex and contradictory phenomena of Soviet dissent, which bears, as he points out, many resemblances to pre-Soviet Russian protest movements, but also differs substantially from them—particularly in its "respect for law," and its "'remarkable mutual tolerance and lack of dogmatism" (p. 24).

This reviewer suggests that understanding could also be enhanced by judicious application of such social science concepts as alienation, frustration, political culture and socialization, interest groups, and social structure, among others—perhaps somewhat along the lines of

Robert Dahl's remarkable work, *Polyarchy*—though it must be acknowledged that the opacity of the data available to the student of this, like other aspects of Soviet politics, interposes formidable obstacles.

Even on the basis of our general knowledge of Soviet politics, amplified by analysis of *samizdat* sources, the development of conflict between the established elite of party and government functionaries, on the one hand, and members of the "creative intelligentsia" of scientists and writers, on the other, is not surprising—though of course we now benefit handsomely from hindsight. Party rule, as presently practiced, both frustrates professionals, as professionals (for example by interfering with access to information they regard as essential to performance of their work) and constitutes an affront to their self-esteem. Of course, a poet like Évtushenko is still permitted, or assigned, to travel abroad—but only, it would seem, at the cost of moral compromise intolerable to a Solzhenitsyn.

To some degree the variations in the personal responses of individuals to alienation and frustration may be related to failures of socialization—this may be applicable in the cases of Alexander Ginzburg, the late Yuri Galanskov, who died in a labor camp in 1972 after an operation for ulcers, Vladimir Bukovski, and other still relatively young dissenters, whose families were affected by the traumas of Stalin's purges.

To be sure, one line of speculation about Soviet dissent would view it as a relatively short-run phenomenon, reflecting the delayed impact of World War II, and relative Soviet economic backwardness, now being overcome. This may seem farfetched, but it is striking that there seem to be few if any new recruits, of the caliber of Peter Grigorenko, Yakir or Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for example, in the "Democratic Movement," which is also being weakened by the emigration of its leading Jewish members. The Kremlin may calculate that departure of Jewish dissenters, combined with containment of the resistance of remaining dissidents, by intimidation and selective terror, plus satisfaction of mass cravings for more and better consumer goods and services, and the enhanced effectiveness of the political socialization effort, will cause dissent gradually to subside. However, the data in this book, and events since its publication indicate that the Soviet regime will need great skill to control and contain a society characterized by a growing diversity of aspirations and interests.

Whatever may be the outcome of the struggle between the guardians of an increasingly irrelevant official political culture, and exponents of a democratic ethos, struggling to be born, the moral drama that unfolds in *Uncensored Russia* is, as Leonard Schapiro reminds us in the epigraph, one that "no student of Soviet society, or indeed anyone who follows the survival of the human spirit in diversity, can now ignore."

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

Yale University

West German Politics. By G. K. Roberts. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. 206. $10.95, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

This "concise guide to the West German political system" by a lecturer in Politics at the University of Technology, Loughborough, (p. vii) combines four different approaches to the politics of the Federal Republic. Part One briefly surveys German political history from 1848 to 1969 in order to expose the historical roots of current politics. Part Two covers the traditional subject of political institutions; Roberts bases his exposition here on the systems models of Easton and Deutsch, but properly does not allow these models to lead him into glossing over persistent tensions and conflict within the political order. Part Three, "The Political Culture," treats in rapid succession political socialization, political participation, "ideologies" (including, prelates take note, Christianity), and the nature of the political elite and of political leadership. Part Four concentrates on current issues of economic, social, and foreign policy; this section concludes with an assessment of developmental trends in West German politics and a positive verdict on the democratic character of the regime. The chronological coverage of the work extends roughly to mid-1971; comments on the Brandt government are necessarily rather sparse and inconclusive.

In several respects the book represents a promising break with many standard treatments of comparative politics. First, Roberts insists upon the importance of historical background, though his account is rather more brief and simple than one might wish; no four-page account (pp. 14–17) of the decline of the Weimar Republic is likely to be intellectually satisfying. Second, Roberts seeks to understand the evolutionary tendencies of the system; on the whole he anticipates more of the same: greater political stability, greater governmental "administration" of the society, and an increasingly less "ideological" politics—but he does hold open the possibility of a public repudiation of technocracy and concomitant demands for greater popular participation in decision making. Third, Roberts raises the question, "Is this system democratic? He devotes only two pages to this absolutely fundamental issue and fails to specify his criteria for democratic government, but at least the problem of the moral quality of the government has been broached. One can only regret that Roberts did not deviate still further from the standard format to raise such issues as the quality of the social services that the *Bundesrepublik* offers its citizens, the degree to which "technocracy" *presently* prevails in West Germany, and the impact of geography and international alliances on West German policy. On all of these matters Roberts makes a promising start, but falls short of the more detailed treatment that these critical issues deserve. The result is a generally solid but not strikingly original volume.

The tone of the book is comfortably centrist. There is no treatment of the youthful opposition other than a brief (and correct) statement that the SPD's adoption of the *Jusos*' policies would lead to electoral losses. "Radicalism" of the left and right are lumped together and dismissed as reflections of an annoying personality trait (pp. 134–5); the author recognizes no basis for radical or even strongly reformist criticism of German society.

On occasion the author makes highly dubious claims ("The Christian Democratic programme [sic] has . . . [maintained] its Christian ethical orientation . . ." [p. 53]) or excessively general ones ("The Second *Reich* collapsed as a result of a combination of environmental stresses [!] and the withdrawal of support by important sections of the political public" [p. 45]). On the whole, however, the book is well executed; there is, for example, an excellent brief discussion of the armed forces. In short, while *West German Politics* does not make significant original contributions to scholarship, as a textbook it is more satisfactory than many of those currently available and merits consideration by teachers of comparative politics and German government.

TIMOTHY A. TILTON

Indiana University

Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development. Edited by H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 460. $20.00.)

The nineteen original essays in this volume provide "a detailed and often technical discussion of a significant development issue or problem which has confronted Brazil during the past ten years" (p. v). Since almost a decade has elapsed since the Brazilian military overthrew the leftist civilian regime of João Goulart on April 1, 1964, the collection allows us to evaluate political and economic development under the auspices of the military government.

Approximately half the essays deal with political aspects of the military regime. There appears to be some consensus among the contributors that the military's goal is the establishment of a development-oriented authoritarian regime. As outlined by editors H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler in their "Introduction," the current political system is characterized by greater centralization of authority than in the past, a depoliticized or apathetic population (in part, the result of military repression), and an elite "mentality" oriented toward national security, with increasing stress on nationalist themes. Although the editors concede that the level of institutionalization of the regime is still low, thus causing it to be dependent on a continually improving economic performance, they conclude that "institutions eventually will be created as a basis for long-term military rule" (p. 26). Rosenbaum and Tyler do not, however, furnish sufficient evidence to support their conclusion.

Most of the essays which focus on politics confirm the editors' contention that political institutionalization is weak. The two political parties organized and sustained by the regime, the "official" government party (ARENA) and the "official" opposition party (the MDB) are, according to Paulo Roberto Motta, elitist organizations which "lack effective links with the people and are not prepared to adjust themselves to a situation of increasing social mobilization" (p. 226). The new bureaucracy, created in an attempt to bypass the "anti-performance" bureaucracy which was a legacy of the pre-1964 system, has, according to Robert Daland, begun to assume many of the characteristics which undermined earlier planning efforts (p. 43). Thomas Bruneau's article on the Catholic Church indicates that the military has yet to demobilize the progressive elements within that institution which are actively opposed to military rule. On the other hand, a more ideologically acceptable Church-affiliated organization such as the Catholic Labor Movement, described by Howard Wiarda, lacks the mass support which would make it useful to the regime. Finally, Robert Myhr argues that the students also have not been incorporated, and have indeed been so repressed that some are turning increasingly to terrorist tactics to vent their frustration.

The only important organized sector of the population which appears to be relatively integrated into the regime and under its control are the labor unions. In a thoughtful essay, Kenneth Erickson illustrates how the military has recognized the utility of tradition in the modernization process by resurrecting the paternalistic, corporate structures characteristic of labor-government relations during the authoritarian regime of Getulio Vargas (1930–1945). A parallel essay on the relationship between the private sector (business) associations and the government, which would have been a useful contribution to the volume, unfortunately has not been included.

That the current regime does not represent a total break with the past is evident not only from the Erickson article but also from the various detailed essays on the economy. Many of the economic policies of the military government were conceived under civilian regimes by technocrats who have continued to serve as key economic decision makers in the present regime. The policies they advocate are often the same ones they supported prior to 1964; only now, the political obstacles which they confronted as civilian decision makers have been reduced or eliminated. Tax reform is a good example. As Harley H. Hinrichs and Dennis J. Mahar note, after 1964 "Brazil achieved in less than a decade tax reforms unparalleled in the nation's eight decades as a federal republic" (p. 191). Other politically unpopular economic policies which the military has implemented include opening Brazil to foreign trade on a scale which, according to Joel Bergsman, is unprecedented since the end of World War II (p. 76), and returning to dependence on export expansion in order to repay a huge external debt incurred in the course of what John Donnelly describes as a successful import substitution effort. In agrarian matters, discussed by Marta Cehelsky, the military has favored the more traditionally acceptable goal of increasing agricultural production under the present land tenure system and encouraging colonization of virgin lands, rather than a wholesale redistribution of land.

Few books to date assemble the kind and quantity of information regarding the current Brazilian regime as does *Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development.* The volume thus helps fill a significant gap in the literature. From another perspective, however, the book's strength may be considered a weakness, in that it is not very concerned with elaborating or testing generalizations about civil-military relations, political change, or other topics of interest to students of comparative politics. I would therefore recommend the volume mainly to persons specifically interested in the politics and economic development of post-1964 Brazil.

SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL
University of California, Los Angeles

The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture. By Robert C. Stuart. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. Pp. xx, 254. $12.50.)

Stuart describes his monograph aptly as "an in-depth analysis of the structural and operational characteristics of the Soviet collective farm as a mechanism for the organization of economic activity in the countryside" (p. 9). Although he elsewhere alludes to the development role of the kolkhoz (pp. 4–5), the fact that his study focuses upon the period since 1950 deprives it of significance on this controversial question. Rather, Stuart's study throws light upon the attempts of Stalin's heirs to convert the kolkhoz into a viable organization for the production and expansion of agricultural output. This involves examination of the general institutional and operational characteristics of the kolkhoz and an appraisal of the various structural and other reforms of the last two decades. Soviet leadership will find little comfort in the conclusions so obtained, but Stuart's careful sifting of organizational facts and features does go a long way toward explaining why the economic performance of the kolkhoz continues to disappoint reformers.

Chapters 2–4 are devoted to a consideration of the main changes that have taken place in the structure of the kolkhoz itself and in the administrative units with which it has contact. The amalgamation campaign of the early 1950s greatly expanded the duties of the kolkhoz chairman. Internal subunits, particularly the brigade, grew commensurately. The increase in size, coupled with abolition of the Machine Tractor Station system in 1958, led to a qualitative transformation of the production brigade, which has gradually become a permanent and multiproduct farm in its own right. Consequently, the production brigade of today is essentially comparable to the pre-amalgamation kolkhoz, and contemporary reports on the improved educational and other attainments of kolkhoz chairmen are therefore almost completely beside the point. Moreover, the increased degree of centralization of decision making implied by amalgamation has apparently offset the effect of decentralization elsewhere in the system.

All of this is, of course, well known, but it sets the stage for what Stuart has to contribute that is both new and significant in Chapters 5–7. Despite substantial improvements since 1950, the managerial incentive system for farm chairmen remains sadly inadequate. Although generally consistent with the goals set for farm managers, the incentive system has been undermined by excessive complexity and by the relatively small magnitude and the infrequent and inappropriate forms of premia payments.

Interestingly enough, however, Stuart goes on to demonstrate in Chapter 6 that "the kolkhoz manager has typically had very little effective control over production decisions" (p. 135). Inputs and outputs have ordinarily been planned from above with little regard for any expertise the chairman may have and with little room for modification at the farm level. Thus the ineffectiveness of the system of managerial incentives would not appear to matter very much, unless this kind of petty tutelage is expected to diminish, and Stuart considers this an unlikely outcome in the near future.

The introduction of *khozraschet,* i.e., cost and income accounting and planning, in the kolkhoz sector in the late 1950s, and the general upward revision of state agricultural procurement prices are considered in Chapter 7. Laudable as these changes may have been, the contemporary system still does not provide a suitable framework within which the chairman might be allowed to exercise economic discretion over the composition of inputs and outputs. Costing methods are too primitive, and relative prices are not consistent with the proportions specified for planned deliveries. Stuart quite rightly seeks to disabuse Western specialists of the notion that these reforms foreshadow the development of a variant of market socialism in Soviet agriculture.

Chapter 8, describing the characteristics of the contemporary kolkhoz chairman, is something of a digression. Stuart sees in the recent past a "continuing effort to create a 'professional' kolkhoz manager—a rural counterpart of the industrial plant manager" (p. 186). But how does this square with the preceding chapters? Why the emphasis upon the recruitment of professional managers when the incentive system is known to be too inadequate to ensure appropriate decision making and when the price and costing systems are too irrational to serve as appropriate guides to managerial discretion anyway? And, to top it off, the kolkhoz manager in any case apparently has little actual discretion to exercise.

Presumably, however, the good, "professional" manager is one who follows the plan as formulated by higher agencies, whether or not he finds it to his, or the farm's, pecuniary interest. The conversion from physical-volume targets and costing methods to ruble-value magnitudes has been, it would seem, for the benefit of the planning bureaucracy, and is not preliminary to an expansion of managerial authority.

Stuart's study is, then, quite useful in helping us to understand why the seemingly thoroughgoing reforms of the post-Stalin period have proved so disappointing in practice. The reforms have been neither sufficiently substantial nor sufficiently consistent to produce results. Unfortunately, Stuart fails, even in his concluding chapter, to put all the pieces together for the reader, and he consistently hedges his conclusions. A great deal that is presented is indeed new and interesting, but much is not. The book is full of superfluous tables, and non-economists will find an excess of economic jargon. Stuart's persistent and frequent use of the term monetization as a synonym for pecuniarization will irritate some economists as well. In short, the book would have benefited greatly from better general editorship.

JAMES R. MILLAR

University of Illinois

The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. By Tamás Szentes. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971. Pp. 328. No price indicated.)

This publication of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is best viewed in two contexts: as a contribution to the global literature on "underdevelopment," its cause and cure; and as an explicit effort to devise a new and more sophisticated Communist propaganda approach to the developing nations.

Part One reviews the Western literature on development under six headings: the classification of nations on the basis of statistical indexes of GNP per capita and other indicators of degree of progress; the definition of underdevelopment in terms of specific characteristics of backwardness vis-à-vis more industrialized societies; models of underdevelopment as vicious circles or low-level equilibrium traps; sociological and psychological explanations of underdevelopment, including, especially, the problem of dualism; stages of growth analysis; and external inhibitions on development. Mr. Szentes has obviously read this literature and enjoyed it, and he does battle against its believed inadequacies with respect and relish in its subtleties.

His analytic argument is that: (1) the statistics conceal "qualitative" differences, related to the position of the underdeveloped countries in the world economy; (2) the characteristics of relative backwardness are symptoms or consequences of deeper forces at work; (3) arguments in terms of vicious circles and low-level traps lack historical perspective and explanation, as do the sociological and psychological explanations; (4) stages of growth analysis lacks an explanation for the first case (Britain), underestimates the problems imposed on latecomers, and, because capitalist countries initially experienced high mass-consumption, tends to "idealize capitalism"; (5) analyses of the negative effects of the international environment are "the most valuable part" of the literature on underdevelopment, but they suffer because they regard these effects as "relative and transitory" or the result of "internal deficiencies."

At last (p. 127) the ground is cleared for Mr. Szentes' positive contribution to the debate, entitled "The Causes, Substance, and Laws of Motion of Underdevelopment. A Historical-Analytical Approach." In the following hundred and fifty pages the author argues that the essence of the plight of the underdeveloped countries is that they entered the world economy as suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials to more advanced nations; that this relationship was economically disadvantageous as compared to a more "natural" path of development (presumably via industrialization); that it led to economies and societies that were dualistic as well as dependent; and that this dependence has continued after their political independence was gained.

Viewed as a piece of historical analysis, this important section of Mr. Szentes' book seemed to me quite unoriginal and incomplete. After all, it was Alexander Hamilton in 1791, in a postcolonial nation, who first said: "Not only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures." And a century earlier, the British were just emerging from a sense of quasi-colonial dependence on the Dutch. The pre-1914 story of nations as different as Sweden and post-Meiji Japan (initially forbidden protective tariffs), post-1815 Germany and Czarist Russia after 1861, Canada and the Mexico that exploded into revolution in 1910, is shot through with the struggle to build an industrial, financial, and trading base which would substitute for unequal dependencies new relations of dignified interdependence with an external world dominated by those who had achieved earlier take-offs.

Mr. Szentes' analysis of the contemporary world has a similar static cast and a certain parochialism as well. He has spent some time teaching at the University College, Dar es Salaam. Many of his specific references are to Tanzania; and many of his observations about the contemporary developing world relate to African situations. On the other hand, he lapses over easily into sweeping generalizations about the third world as a whole, and his language tends to become both opaque and liturgically Marxist (e.g., pp. 142–7). One would never know from these passages of the extent to which overcoming the initial distortions that go with excessive dependence on the export of foodstuffs and raw materials has, for a generation and more, been an explicit object of regional and international policy in Latin America; of the successes in diversification and industrialization achieved in, say, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil; of the purposeful efforts to use resources derived from oil exports to mount a wide-based industrialization program (and a successful land reform) in Iran; of the rapid movement towards diversified industrial exports in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.

Thus, Mr. Szentes' desire to assert one proposition renders his analysis of the contemporary developing nations excessively unvariegated, and, quite often, misleading. His central proposition is that their key problem is not their own incomplete domestic modernization but the patterns imposed on their economic, social, and political life by their quasi-colonial relations with the external world.

This is the proposition Mr. Szentes believes he needs for the doctrine contained in his concluding section: "Prospects for the Overcoming of Underdevelopment. Summary and Conclusions." He first considers the prospects for world revolution and the overthrow of capitalism or for a collapse of capitalism. He judges these possibilities sufficiently unlikely to commend national efforts to overcome underdevelopment. His recommendations are: "to break the monopolistic position of foreign capital"; and "to transform the distorted structure of the economy and society." To achieve these ends, his sovereign remedy is: increase the power of the state to intervene in the economy. Here the author confronts the fact that the powers of the state in contemporary developing nations are generally large, and already directed to many objectives he commended in the previous portion of his book. In fact, his central problem becomes: What will be the fate of the "state capitalism" already endemic in the nations of the developing world. He cites, in particular, India, Egypt, and Brazil. Mr. Szentes' formal bias is that they convert themselves into fully fledged socialist states; but his analysis of the prospects for this conversion is not particularly sanguine, and his final plea is for the liquidation of underdevelopment "in the shortest possible time," rather than a call for Communist revolution.

Behind this argument is the author's conviction that Communist analysis and propaganda (p. 19) "simplified the critique of colonialism by investigating it from a one-sided point of view and evaluated the problem of colonial liberation merely from the aspect of the 'reserves' of the socialist revolution. Moreover, it took proletarian revolutions as *direct* preconditions for the liberation of the colonies and regarded their further post-colonial development as the natural and necessary repetition (i.e., imitation) of the pattern of development of the first socialist countries in all details." His creed in this volume is (p. 21): "The criticism of colonialism must . . . be made more dialectical and realistic, thereby becoming more effective and more faithful to the Marxist-Leninist concept." His operational conclusion in this domain is: the most realistic (but not certain) route to communism in the developing world is through state capitalism.

Mr. Szentes' book is interesting as the product of a period when the osmotic communications between East and West greatly increased and the fate of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America moved to the center of world politics. I do not believe this study adds anything of substance to our knowledge of the development problems and prospects in these regions. It does tell us a good deal about an intelligent Hungarian's struggle to link his study of development problems and his insights into East Africa to the structure and objectives of Marxist-Leninist thought and to the purposes of Communist propaganda.

W. W. ROSTOW

The University of Texas at Austin

The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia. By Goh Cheng Teik. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 76. $2.50.)

As a basis for his discussion the author cites Carl J. Friedrich's notion of democracy that *the people* is the only source of legitimate authority (p. 1) and then establishes that a state is democratic when it satisfies two requirements: (1) its authority is derived from *the people* and (2) its power is exercised with restraint (p. 2). The author then states categorically at the opening of Chapter 2 that "for six years [he does not say which six years] democracy was a living reality in the Malaysia Federation" (p. 9). In this same chapter the author reviews Malaysia's political history from 1955 to 1969 and concludes with the observation that the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.) was disenchanted not merely about the outcome of the 1969 election but with democracy itself (p. 17).

Chapter 3 gives an account of the events leading to the 1969 racial riots; the twelve pages of Chapter 4, the largest of the six chapters, deal with unrest within the Alliance, the National Operations Council (N.O.C.) emergency government, the resumption of the elections in Sabah and Sarawak, the results of these elections and the conditions under which the federal parliament would be reopened.

In Chapters 5 and 6, entitled "Democracy and Political Stability I and II," and consisting of slightly more than six pages, one would expect an exposition of democracy in Malaysia. But apart from a spattering of references to democracy, they seem to be no more than a summary, with conclusions, of the foregoing chapters. The author speaks of the 1957 racial pact, the disturbance of the 1957 democratic equilibrium in May 1969, and the call for voluntary restraints on the part of the non-Malays (but not of the Malays), the possibility of change in the power structure in Kuala Lumpur, and the risk of a social revolution in the absence of serious party competition.

The author draws a forced parallel between the Malays and the non-Malays of Malaysia on one hand and the Javanese and the non-Javanese of Indonesia on the other; he claims (without any authority) that Sukarno had remarked "that the first three presidents of Indonesia should be Javanese so that the Javanese can have sufficient time to mature politically and to become fully Indonesian and to accept the non-Javanese minorities as equals" (pp. 40–41). In making this claim, the author seems to have overlooked the facts that (1) the Javanese and the non-Javanese of Indonesia belong to the Malay race, whereas the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians of Malaysia belong to three different races which make the problems of the two countries basically different; and (2) the Javanese had always been at the forefront of Indonesian national and political movements. Therefore, to speak of the necessity of the first three Indonesian Presidents being Javanese so that the Javanese could fully become Indonesians is a rather pathetic attempt to project onto Indonesia one of Malaysia's basic problems, i.e., the reluctance of Malaysia's Malays, Chinese, and Indians to become fully Malaysians. Malaysia is in the unfortunate position of never having known a public act of commitment comparable to Indonesia's *Sumpah Pemuda* (Vow of Youth) of October, 1928 in Djakarta, at which Javanese and non-Javanese alike declared that there was one nation: *Bangsa* Indonesia, one language: *Bahasa* Indonesia, and one country: *Negara* Indonesia.

More remarkable, however, is the author's failure to define who constituted or constitute "the people" as the source of authority which in turn would determine the kind of democracy in Malaysia. The author makes no mention of the fact that the Malaysia Constitution looks differently at the three major racial communities of Malaysia (Malaysia Constitution, Part III) for the purpose of citizenship as the prerequisite to authority. He also speaks of a "check-and-balance mechanism" within the Alliance Party in the exercise of power (p. 4) without ever saying what this check-and-balance mechanism is. The truth is that the Alliance is a Malay-dominated party and that the U.M.N.O. is determined to see to it that "political power in the country would remain in the hands of the Malays as sure as the sun and moon would rise" (Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister of Malaysia in *Straits Times,* May 21, 1969).

The remaining 30 pages of the book are devoted to valuable data on Malaysia's political parties, major Malaysian party personalities, and some results of the 1969 election.

The book is useful as a reading on the national disaster of May 13, 1969, but as a discourse on democracy in Malaysia it is a disappointment.

B. SIMANDJUNTAK
University of Sydney, Australia

The Greek Tragedy. By Constantine Tsoucalas. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. Pp. 208. $1.45, paper.)

Greece Under Military Rule. Edited by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. (New York: Basic Books, 1972. Pp. 272. $8.95.)

Most writing on modern Greece since the coup falls into three catagories—analyses of antecedent conditions, accounts by disenchanted public figures, and policy evaluations. Of the books reviewed here, *The Greek Tragedy* remains a good example of the first category and the essays in *Greece Under Military Rule* range across all three.

Explanations for the breakdown of Greek democracy abound, and three views are represented here. George Zaharopoulos in *Greece Under Military Rule* argues that cultural deficiencies inhibiting the development of modern parties left a vacuum eventually filled by a highly organized military. C. H. Woodhouse, in another essay in the same volume, blames the ragged temperament of George Papandreou and the imprudence of the King. Constantine Tsoucalas, in *The Greek Tragedy,* examining events through the lenses of class conflict, suggests that vested interests linked to the United States were mainly responsible. These vested interests, sometimes called the ruling class, sometimes the oligarchy, are given key roles without evidence of boundary or cohesion. The place of the military in this lexicon is obscure. Fortunately, obvious lapses from the class model are explained in terms of personality clashes or concepts such as clientelism.

Despite conceptual flaws, *The Greek Tragedy* is an important book. First, the analysis of the collapse of the parliamentary regime presented by Professor Tsoucalas is widely accepted in Greece and elsewhere. Second, this is the first adequate Marxist interpretation of modern Greek history readily available to the American reader.

The earliest chapters are informative, but the best section traces the complexities, both domestic and international, of the resistance, liberation, and civil war and analyzes their postwar consequences. The last chapters are more troublesome. Postwar economic policy is criticized on a variety of grounds, along with a tacit admission that available policy instruments limited most alternatives. Although Tsoucalas provides an acceptable version of the dual authority—the competition between the military and civilians—his arguments that a secret society was the directing force in the military and acted as a surrogate for the Americans lack plausibility. Moreover, the claims that peasants, workers, and the new middle class were responsible for the electoral successes of the Papandreous would be more convincing with empirical support.

The remaining essays in *Greece Under Military Rule* are primarily concerned with policy evaluation—the essays cover a wide range of foreign and domestic policies. Despite the underlying assumption that the major goal of the regime is self-perpetuation, readers will join the editors in lamenting the lack of an essay on the institutionalization of power. Because of this lack, the chapters on ideology and regime opposition seem strangely incomplete.

The chapters on domestic policy conclude that the regime is retrogressive. The policy changes and variations are not judged against the same benchmarks: Instead the criteria used are the Karamanlis period or part of it, the Papandreou government, the 1965–67 interlude, and the conditions that might have existed had the colonels not acted. Sometimes the comparison is with other military regimes, developed western countries, or ideal types. To compound the problem, time dimensions are muddled, and often policy pronouncements are taken as equivalent to action.

John Pesmazoglu, the distinguished economist, contributes the most balanced chapter. He notes that national income and the standard of living has risen but at a slower rate and with a widening gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged. This growth, he says, is the result of prior economic policy—monetary stabilization and various developmental mechanisms. To the extent that the colonels have an economic policy, it seems ad hoc. Although some alterations in tax rates and in budget allocations can be attributed to the necessity of gaining the support of the business community or retaining that of the military, other populist measures such as free textbooks or debt cancellations had been planned long before, and the emphasis on small local public works may simply indicate the lack of resources for larger ones.

In a chapter on labor, Yannopoulos notes that wage increases have lagged despite higher productivity. He attributes this to government control of trade unions. The regime is undoubtedly hostile to organizations generally, but unions and cooperatives have usually been viewed as political instruments in Greece. Many citations of "repressive" regulations suggest little knowledge of other economic or industrial relations systems. Curiously, Yannopoulos notes that government plans for changes in the social security system, working hours, and job tenure, have been stymied by pressures from interested parties, but he and other essayists still conclude that the government is essentially unrestrained.

The writer on education (who apparently insisted on remaining anonymous) suggests that past practices are continued. That is, there is still little in the way of a comprehensive and coherent national educational policy. Changes in funding, enrollment requirements, the consolidation of local systems, the level of direct involvement in the university, or in curriculum —including the return to *katharevousa* (the conflict between this purist form based on classic Greek and the demotic or popularly spoken Greek has been endemic in modern Greek history)—seem to be automatic reactions to policies of past regimes or the elaboration of decisions "in the pipeline" prior to the coup. In either case, decisions are hardly immutable. Increased enrollment at all levels is apparently simply a function of demographic change.

An essay on culture notes that domestic literature directly attacking the regime has a precarious existence—the rest, including freely circulating foreign publications is ignored. Intellectuals, because of their elitist attitudes (unintentionally demonstrated by the author, Rodios Roufos in his caustic comments on popular television programming and the emphasis on sports) are unlikely to attract a popular following.

A. G. Xydis outlines the diplomatic isolation of the regime on the one hand and the flourishing commercial and tourist activities on the other. Ultranationalism at home is not manifested in aggressive foreign policies; indeed, the reverse seems to be the case, especially with Turkey and Albania. Maurice Goldbloom argues that recent American policy has been guided by decisions made prior to the coup or altered because of changes in the conditions underlying the original decisions rather than by the character of the regime itself. The colonels, by initiating the coup and eliminating their rivals, left the United States with a dilemma—what to do about a state whose government was distasteful but which nonetheless performed as a loyal NATO partner.

Richard Clogg in his discussion of ideology supports the general conclusions of the policy chapters—that the regime operates without benefit of any coherent ideology despite an early populist stance. Unfortunately, Clogg and his associates miss an opportunity to integrate their own observations. Much of their analysis suggests parallels to authoritarian regimes elsewhere: a populist flavor which does not require the elimination of privilege—only the presumption of equal access, anti-intellectualism with emphasis on primordial values of church and nation, as well as a general depoliticization.

Despite the claims of regressive policies and heavy-handed implementation, George Yannopoulos finds little active opposition to the regime, and he attributes this to the ideological crisis of the opposition. Clientelist parties have disintegrated, the communists are severely fragmented, and the population, discounting the traditionally passive peasantry, is exhausted from prior years of political mobilization. The resistance reflects this fragmentation and popular exhaustion and faces a regime supported by the army, economic oligarchs, and the United States.

Regardless of the preferences and intentions of the authors, these volumes suggest that the present regime in Greece is likely to persist. It follows that the present renewed interest by political scientists in the nature of authoritarian regimes is well timed.

KEITH R. LEGG

University of Florida

Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Noncommunal Political Parties in West Malaysia. By R. K. Vasil. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. xii, 338. $13.50.)

As the contents of R. K. Vasil's book amply display, the subtitle describing this study as one of noncommunal parties may be rather inaccurate. No political organization in postindependence Malaysia has long been able to maintain a noncommunal character. The pressures of communalism have been such that no party entering the electoral lists has been able to co-opt large numbers of voters from all three major racial groups—Malay, Chinese and Indian—with the exception of the dominant Alliance organization. While parties such as the Independence of Malaya Party and Labour Party may have been born with high hopes of gaining adherents from more than one community, their membership soon became almost exclusively Chinese or Malay. In addition, their programs and goals appealed more and more to the needs and demands of their communal clientele.

In this interesting and detailed political history the author has described the birth, development, and, all too often, demise of the Independence of Malaya Party, Party Negara, Labour Party, Party Raayat, People's Progressive Party, and United Democratic Party along with what are described as "non-communal parties of personage," such as Abdul Aziz Ishak's National Convention Party. In each case he details the origins, policies, electoral programs and results, leadership, membership, and organizational structure of the party. It should be noted that the field research for this study was carried out primarily in 1964 and 1965 and the body of the work was completed by 1967. Thus, the analyses and descriptions are generally applicable to the middle 1960s. A postscript assesses developments to mid-1969. While the author's analyses and conclusions as of the completion of his initial writing in 1967 have not been seriously challenged by later events, it would have been more desirable if he had incorporated the post-1967 data into the body of the text, which would have given more coherence to individual chapters.

As a rule the author is objective and nonpartisan in his analyses, although he does have a tendency toward overstatement, as, for example, in his comments that the rout of the Labour Party in the 1964 general elections "was entirely due to its stand on Malaysia and Indonesian confrontation" (p. 151), and that the voting of 1964 "was clear evidence of the complete lack of confidence on the part of the non-Malay communities in their communal organization, the MCA and the MIC" (p. 309). As a final minor note of criticism, additional comparative analysis with other communally-oriented political systems would have been welcomed. Thus, comparisons with countries such as India, Lebanon, and Nigeria might have provided useful insights.

There can be no quarrel with Vasil's central conclusion that in Western Malaysia noncommunal parties have been fated to develop into spokesmen for one of the two major communities, the Malays or the Chinese. The UMNO has been successful in characterizing itself to the Malay community as the defender of Malay rights, and anti-Alliance Malays who have joined with representatives of other communal groups have been politically ostracized as traitors to their people. This has meant that organizations such as the Labour Party, which began with hopes of uniting the Chinese and Malays, ultimately became Chinese in membership, goals, and policies. At the same time ideologically oriented Malay parties such as the Party Raayat were unable to expand their membership against the UMNO. Only the regionally based Islamic extremist Pan Malayan Islamic Party, not described in this book for obvious reasons, has been able to effectively challenge the UMNO by promoting highly communal Malay-Moslem programs.

Overall, this is a solid piece of political history. The author has incorporated material from newspapers, government and party documents, interviews with party leaders and members, and visits to party meetings. Despite the gaps occurring because of the period in which field research was completed and despite the occasional tendency to overstate conclusions, this book is a useful addition to both the study of party systems and Malaysian studies.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

Rice University

Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. By Jean-Claude Willame. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 223. $8.50.)

Eight years ago in his *Politics in the Congo* Crawford Young identified the "primary challenge" then facing the student of Congolese politics as involving "the basic task of providing a conceptual framework adequate to order the mass of disparate data available" (p. 607). Willame's work is the first serious attempt to pick up the gauntlet. Armed with a conceptual apparatus borrowed from Max Weber the author manages to achieve what most other students of Zairian politics have thus far consistently (and prudently) declined to try—that is, to impart coherence and intelligibility to the seeming chaos and confusion of Congolese politics.

To the all-too-prevalent views of Zairian politics as a game without rules *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* offers an important corrective. "Patrimonialism" is the name of the game. The rules, as specified by Weber, are essentially three: (1) the appropriation of public office by the elite, (2) the privatization of political relationships, in turn leading to political and territorial fragmentation, and (3) the utilization of private armies and mercenaries by patrimonial rulers. Analysis of these processes of change is skillfully combined with a series of diachronic perspectives to demonstrate the inherent frailty of patrimonial rule. The author shows in considerable detail how the massive absorption of economic and financial resources accompanying the appropriation of bureaucratic sinecures by petty functionaries led to a "wholesale waste" of human energies and economic wealth; how the privatization of political relationships tended to generate powerful centrifugal pressures, and how, with the emergence of private militias, territorial fragmentation reached an unprecedented scale, in time causing a breakdown of patrimonialism and a shift in the direction of a "Caesarist bureaucracy" (p. 129). Patrimonial politics, Willame concludes, "exacerbated personal antagonisms and centrifugal tendencies that neither governmental institutions nor the existing social structures could contain" (p. 160). Furthermore, by excluding from the spoils of appropriation specific social categories, patrimonialism sowed the seeds not only of its own destruction but of an alternative political system. What has come into existence is neither a praetorian nor a patrimonial polity but a Caesarist regime built on a tacit alliance among army men, students, technocrats, petty businessmen, and middlemen.

As anyone familiar with Willame's previous work on provincial politics in Zaire might have expected, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* bears all the hallmarks of careful scholarship. The author's argument is, on the whole, convincing; his handling of the data brought to bear on his analysis is appropriately selective and imaginative; the qualifiers he introduces are pertinent. The main question in this reviewer's mind is whether the projection of the Weberian concept of patrimonialism into the context of Zairian politics does not require more elaboration and adaptation than the author is willing to make. Without in any way denying the relevance of the patrimonial model to the phenomena discussed in the book, one nonetheless wonders whether its utility goes very far beyond that of a mere device for ordering data.

The limitations of the patrimonial model stem in part from the extreme vagueness of its conceptual referents. This is nowhere more painfully evident than in Willame's valiant efforts to distinguish among the different types of "patrimonial and cliental relations" in existence at the provincial level between 1962 and 1965, an effort which in retrospect seems to amount to little more than a taxonomic exercise. What does the notion of "appropriation of public office" tells us about Zairian politics that could not be conveyed through terms like "corruption," "interpersonal relations," or "clientelism"? What specific forms does the "privatization of political relationships" take in the provincial arenas, and how do they differ from the "privatization" observable at the center? The answers are anything but clear. Strange as it may seem in view of the author's first-hand acquaintance with provincial politics, the weakest part of his analysis is that which deals with patterns of patrimonial relationships at the local and provincial levels. Nowhere does one get a clear picture of the types of relationships involved in "direct suzerainty," "indirect suzerainty," and "factional comradeship," let alone of the linkages operating provincially and nationally.

Omission of the specific types of resources associated with evolving patterns of patrimonialism accounts for yet another limitation in Williame's model. If the appropriation of public office is undoubtedly an important aspect of patrimonialism, one is left to wonder what resources generate public office and what resources are in turn generated by it. Ethnicity, authority, wealth, coercion have all been instrumental in one way or another in generating political exchange, either as political currencies through which public office is acquired, or as political rewards for remaining in office. Yet relatively little effort is spent explaining when, where, and how these political resources were utilized by Zairian elites. Willame's neglect of political resources as an intervening variable also helps to explain his tendency to overstress the difference between the Mobutu regime and its patrimonial predecessor. Appropriation of public office, the personalization of political relationships, the setting up of private militias are still very much part of Zairian politics. Where the Mobutu regime would seem to diverge most sharply from the previous one is in the overwhelming importance accorded to wealth, expertise and information, in this order, for acquiring, retaining and distributing authority. Mobutu's Ceasarist bureaucracy is not so different in style from the patrimonial polity it has abolished. The critical difference lies in the manner in which political resources are handled, and in the sectors to which they are allocated.

In spite of these reservations, Willame's book deserves to be widely read by political scientists. Even though it promises more than it actually delivers, its contribution to our understanding of Zairian politics is a major one. Better than anyone else so far the author has managed to reduce to a rational framework much of the irrationality involved in Zairian politics. If, as the author modestly claims, this book is nothing more than "an unfinished product," one can only look forward to the promise of his completed work.

René Lemarchand

University of Florida

The Long March: The Epic of Chinese Communism's Survival, 1935. By Dick Wilson. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971. Pp. xx, 331. $8.95.)

The Long March during which the Chinese Communists moved from their old Soviet stronghold in southeast Kiangsi to the Shen-kan-ning Border Region was one of the great military feats of this century. Those who survived have ruled the Chinese Communist Party from 1935 until the present—thirty-seven long, tumultuous years. If any one event was responsible for the deep rift between the Chinese and Russian Communist Parties, the Long March was that event. Only three months after the March began in October 1934, Mao's supporters eliminated Otto Braun, the German Comintern advisor, and his Chinese supporters from their political and military positions in the leadership. At the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, Mao himself took over as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and Chairman of the Politburo.

The author, Dick Wilson, has been the director of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and is now the financial editor of the *Straits Times* in Singapore. He summarizes in this book everything that is known about the March. Using Chinese, English, and a scattering of German, Russian, French, and Japanese sources, he has put together the very best account of the Long March in English, and probably the best in any language. In Wilson's chronicle, the March is not only an epic of courage, idealism, and perseverance, but also the story of how the Maoist faction first gained control of the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party. Almost everything that he records deals with the main force of the Red Army lead by Mao and Chu Teh. The epic of the other Red armies under the leadership of Hsü Hai-tung, Ho Lung and Chang Kao-t'ao are neglected here as they are in all Chinese sources. According to Wilson, the chief legacies of the Long March have been a stringent political and military discipline, a "guerrilla ethic" that links revolutionary ardor with reliance on the peasant masses, an independence from Russia based on a profound distrust of Comintern and Soviet advice, and, eventually, the consolidation of Mao's power within the CCP.

None of these outcomes, Wilson tells us, was planned; they grew out of the experience of those who survived the Long March. The survivors continued to build on that experience, first expanding their guerrilla bases behind Japanese lines, and then driving the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland. Of the 100,000 Chinese who began the retreat from Kiangsi, only 5,000 arrived at the base in North Shensi (p. 227). By the early 1960s, only 800 of that number were still active members of the CCP. Those who rule the CCP to this day were members of that select elite. They are the men who have guided China into the modern world.

For China scholars one of the most valuable bits of new information recorded in the book is Dr. Jerome Ch'en's list of all the twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the young, Russian-trained, proteges of Stalin who led the CCP from 1931 to 1935 (Fn. 15, p. 296). In any book using so many Chinese names, American proofreaders fight a losing battle trying to get every Chinese name correct. One error that struck my eye occurs in p. xi: The *kuo-yü* spelling of Chiang Kai-shek is not Chiang Chung-cheng, but Chiang Chieh-shih. More important to me, the Tsunyi Conference was not the point at which "Chu Teh's superb generaliship and Mao Tse-tung's political acumen united to turn victory into defeat" (as I am quoted as saying on p. 109). In my original sentence, defeat was turned into victory. Fortunately such errors are relatively infrequent.

This book will be read for a long time by those who need a well-written summary of the significant military and political events that occurred on the Long March. Dick Wilson provides us with that, and with much more. This is a story of courage and endurance rarely matched since Xenophon wrote his account of the retreat of the Greeks from Persia to the Black Sea. When the Chinese Communists finally emerged from the wild grasslands of Chinghai and came upon genuine *Chinese* houses in Kansu, their joy can be likened to that of the Greeks when their vanguard saw the Black Sea and shouted, "Thalassa, thalassa" [The sea, the sea]. The remnants of the Red Army emerged from the Tibetan wilderness with a passionate attachment to the symbols of their homeland. They have made their experience a legend in their own lifetime. They have used the story of their ordeal as the prime inspiration for binding the Chinese people together in an attempt to achieve the good things offered by modern technology without sacrificing the idealism and cohesiveness that they once discovered in themselves, and that they attribute selectively to the best representatives of their Chinese and Marxist traditions.

JOHN E. RUE

Oakland University

Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918–1932. By Eugene Zaleski. Translated from the French and edited by Marie-Christine MacAndrew and G. Warren Nutter. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971. Pp. 454. $15.75.)

This is a very useful book. It presents a detailed analysis of the formative period in which Soviet economic planning methods took shape. As a revised and amplified translation of the original 1962 French text, the present treatise involves two forewords, two prefaces, and seven chapters, followed by a substantial statistical appendix, a thorough bibliography, and a good index.

The central chapters describe the formation of the planning system and the adjustments that developed during the hectic years after 1928 when the targets of the first Soviet Five-Year Plan were being raised, lowered, or abandoned. Chapters 6 and 7 offer a thoughtful evaluation of Soviet planning and reflective conclusions on the implications of this experience for planning theory in general.

Political scientists as well as economists will find that this study makes a major contribution to the recent literature on a fundamental aspect of Soviet development. It should be consulted along with the two-volume 1969 treatise of E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926–1929*, Moshe Lewin's *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (1968), Alec Nove's *An Economic History of the USSR* (1969), and Naum Jasny's *Soviet Economists of the Twenties* (1972). These works together provide a new and more thorough basis for understanding Soviet experience than has been available from earlier writers like Maurice Dobb.

The central politicoeconomic issue raised by early Soviet economic planning concerns the forces that led to its excessive ambitiousness. Cautious economists were swept aside by fiery party leaders, and a style of planning took shape that has, in somewhat milder form, persisted ever since. A mystique of plan precision is associated in practice with ad hoc adjustments and widely divergent results.

During this first period, as shown in detail by Zaleski, the wildly excessive targets led to near chaos by 1932. (The forces at work in the background are the subject of an interdisciplinary debate in the June, 1973 issue of the *Slavic Review*.) During the second and later plan periods, the discrepancies between target and fulfillment decreased, but even now, during the ninth Five-Year-Plan period, revisions and infeasibilities are making their appearance.

Although more than 40 years have passed since this initial tumultuous era, its legacies are still evident in the USSR. The campaigns unleashed during the first Soviet Five-Year Plan period led to a sullen peasantry, a crippled agricultural sector, a long period of domestic terror, and a permanent setback for the idealistic international influence of communism. Moreover the approach to national economic planning that took institutional form under the first plan is still being used in spite of its defects. Thus the keys to current Soviet difficulties lie in the forces that were at work even during the 1920s. Hence the relevance of this volume.

Zaleski's treatise is useful in at least three ways. He provides a great deal of statistical detail in tables and graphs compiled from primary Soviet sources whose yellowed pages are fast crumbling away. He offers an objective review of the intricate administrative developments that were involved in the evolution of Soviet planning practice. In addition, he enlivens the discussion with the pungent insights of a thoughtful political economist.

One can quibble here and there with the English translation, but in only two places is the meaning of the original obscured. In discussing Lenin's April Theses at page 29, Zaleski is not saying that the theses contained elaborate projects, but that these projects were worked out later to meet specific needs. In footnote 122 at page 190, he is warning the reader that "putting into operation" does not signify full utilization of capacity. The whole volume is impressive, however, for the general accuracy of the translation and the precision with which the immense tasks of data transcription, bibliographic referencing, transliteration, and proofreading have been handled.

HOLLAND HUNTER

Haverford College

The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management. By Coral Bell. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 131. $3.75, paper.)

Professor Coral Bell has written a very useful and insightful (though not pathbreaking or revolutionary) essay on the occurrence and meaning of crises and techniques of crisis management in the current international system.

In the methodological terms of the present era her volume is an example of traditionalism *par excellence;* as the author herself remarks, "The results of a piece of crisis management can only be observed in history, not established by theory" (p. 6). Professor Bell both divorces herself from recent American scholarship and establishes her own implicit claim to a distinctive position in the study of crises. Most recent analyses of crises have centered on bureaucracy, but Professor Bell's principal interest is in output and outcome rather than input or process, and she therefore provides a different perspective: systemic in origin, comprehensive in scope. Though her methods are quite distinct, her approach is in many ways similar to that of Oran Young and even Charles McClelland.

A critical problem however lies in Professor Bell's definition of crisis—a definition which is consciously broad:

> To my mind the essence of true crisis in any given relationship is that the conflicts within it rise to a level which threatens to transform the nature of the relationship. In adversary crisis, the potential transformation is from peace to war; in intramural crisis it is from alliance to rupture (p. 9).

This notion of a "breaking strain" in a relationship is an intriguing one, but since a good deal of international politics is about near-misses and relations almost but not quite broken, the author tends to treat most major events as crises. Characteristically, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are discussed as areas of "crisis and potential crisis," which is very different from specific incidents like those that have occurred in Berlin and Cuba, which she also considers (chapter 6). Because the author talks of "slow-motion or cumulative crisis" (p. 95), the reader begins to feel what is being analyzed are transformations of international conventions rather than established techniques of crisis management. It is indeed the dual existence of these two critical issues—"turning points" and "boiling points" and Professor Bell's attempt to identify them—which stands as the singular weakness of her approach to the subject. A crisis in a relationship which comes close to war may be quite different from an experience which substantially alters attitudes and perceptions of participants toward each other. In the Cuban missile crisis the two seem to have coexisted, but this is not the case in such disparate crises as Berlin (1958–1961) and the Congo; the Bay of Pigs and the Pueblo crisis; Cyprus and Czechoslovakia—1968.

Despite some difficulty with the meaning of crisis, Professor Bell's distinction between intramural and adversary crises and their effects on international relations are both useful and generally applicable—as her later analysis amply demonstrates. Moreover, the notion of a "crisis slide" (pp. 14–15, i.e., a series of episodes which result ultimately in a deterioration of relations and finally war), though it is not entirely new, is functional and enables her to make an excellent comparison of the interwar and present periods. The author's major conclusion that the "*early* recognition of an adversary relationship is the most important single political difference between the postwar and interwar periods" (p. 21) seems both apt and accurate. Her Coser-like belief that the cold war represented "a learning curve in crisis management" (p. 24) sheds light not only on the dynamics of post-1945 international politics but on the reasons for breakdown in the earlier period as well.

The comparison between the interwar and postwar periods also reasserts the ongoing paradox of this volume; though it is a book about crises, its author places greater stress in her analysis on patterns of relations and attitudes and prevailing perceptions than on specific events themselves. The difference in her message from both bureaucratic and systems theorists is to stress the tentative nature of patterns. We are thereby led to the old Aristotelian imperative of prudence: "The assumption of rational behaviour is a condition for the growth of the system of conventions: it can be established only by communication between the dominant powers" (p. 124). Professor Bell is then both diplomatically and methodologically traditional. Removed as she is from the political and theoretical debates in this country, she provides in this essay a helpful reminder that crises can be viewed as part of overall processes in international politics rather than only as dynamics of the domestic scene. It is unfortunate, however, that Professor Bell fails to take her major themes beyond the timid conclusion that ". . . if the society of states can learn to manage the crises, it may learn to live with the conflicts, even perhaps finding in them a source of moral and political development" (p. 124). This book therefore provides students of world politics with an example of the significance of comprehensive historical analysis in the understanding of the techniques and instruments for the control of international instability; but it fails to move beyond this level to suggest specifically the future role of crises, the means of dominant power communication, and the types of world order which might be achieved as a consequence of the author's analysis.

STEVEN L. SPIEGEL
University of California, Los Angeles

After Imperialism. By Michael Barratt Brown. Revised edition. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Pp. lviii, 535. $13.50.)

The early 1960s brought not only the liquidation of much of the British Empire but also, as a last brief and brilliant afterglow, the publication of a number of superior books analyzing the Empire's causes and consequences. Works by Rupert Emerson, John Strachey, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, D. K. Fieldhouse, and E. J. Hobsbawm are the most familiar, but there are others. Together, they form a distinguished literature analyzing one of the most important institutions in the international relations of the past century.

It was, however, an institution of the *past* century, and in more normal times one would have expected these accounts of the British Empire to assume a sedate position on quiet library shelves, respected but unread, like those other splendid books on the causes and consequences of the Byzantine Empire.

That they did not is in part due to John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. For at the time that the British Empire came to an end and the books analyzing it came into print, the American military intervention in Indochina and the lesser interventions elsewhere were getting under way. It was not long before indirect rule through petty princes, imperial garrisons on remote frontiers, and corporate investments in underdeveloped countries seemed much more relevant for comparative purposes than the alliances and diplomacy of even so recent a period as World War II, and books about the old British Empire made their appearance in new American college courses in international politics.

One such book was Michael Barratt Brown's *After Imperialism*. Originally published in Britain in 1963, it was less familiar than the works by the authors mentioned above, but in the course of the 1960s it enjoyed a growing and favorable reputation among scholars and students taking an economic approach or following a radical persuasion. It has now been reissued, with the addition of a new, lengthy, and informative preface, in which the author answers some of his critics and amends and updates some of his arguments.

Aside from the new preface and an introduction, the book is divided into three parts: "Imperialism As It Was," "Imperialism Today," and "Towards an International Economy." Because these sections were written in 1962 for a British public concerned with the issue of Britain's relations with the Commonwealth and with the Common Market, it is not surprising that the three parts will be of unequal interest to American political scientists reading it more than a decade later.

The first part, "Imperialism As It Was," is by far the most important. Brown's basic approach is a Marxian one, and his emphasis is on the economic causes and consequences of British imperialism, both in Britain and in the colonies. His account is unusually balanced, subtle, and informed. Included is a critique of the earlier economic analyses of Hobson and Lenin. As such, Brown offers an important interpretation of British imperialism to place alongside several different economic analyses as well as those analyses which stress strategic or bureaucratic causes.

The second part, "Imperialism Today," primarily offers an account of the foreign trade, finance, and investment patterns of Britain in the postwar period, especially in the 1950s. The emphasis is on the role of the major British corporations and is similar to Harry Magdoff's later analysis of the international role of American corporations. Not surprisingly, the details of this part are of little interest to a reader concerned with the British role today, but those who have an historical interest in this important transition period will find the section useful, especially if they balance it with more conventional analyses. The book also contains several pages of useful statistics on the foreign trade and investments of Britain and other industrial powers.

In the third part, "Toward an International Economy," dealing with the issue of Britain's economic relations with other countries, Brown urges Britain not to enter the Common Market but to develop a socialist economic group based on the Commonwealth. In 1963, the choice between Common Market and Commonwealth, between capitalist and socialist paths, was an engaging topic of debate, made all the more interesting perhaps by de Gaulle's veto in January of that year. But a decade later, with Britain's entry into the Common Market at last accomplished, and with its ties to the Commonwealth almost extinguished, few debates are more dated. Even the Labour Party declined to follow a program such as Brown's when it had the chance and the choice from 1964 to 1970; it is unlikely to do so when it again gets into office. One weakness in Brown's book is that he never gave an account of how his program would come about, given the structure of British capitalism as he analyzed it.

And now, in 1973, the great recessional of the British Empire seems to have divided in two, part going down the dingy alleys of Belfast, part down the shiny corridors of Brussels. It is hardly a splendid spectacle. Once, however, long ago and far away, it was otherwise. It is true, as Brown says, that the British Empire at its height exploited its peoples. So has every empire. Perhaps the factor that distinguishes one empire from another is not economics but esthetics. The British Empire may have impoverished some of its subjects. But the passing of a political institution that celebrated its power, not with PXs, USOMs, and B-52s, but with Georgian mansions, public parks, military bands, and dignified courts of law has impoverished some of us too.

JAMES R. KURTH

Swarthmore College

World Communication: Threat or Promise? A Socio-technical Approach. By Colin Cherry. (London: Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 1971. Pp. 229. $9.50.)

If a student were going to read only one book on the subject of communication to learn what that field is all about, this would not be a bad choice.

The first part of the book analyzes the process of human communication, and then describes the communication revolution of the past two centuries, comparing ancient and modern modes of communication and documenting the explosive growth of means of communication in the modern world. There follows an excellent treatment of the present network of international communications, and in particular the growth of telecommunication facilities. Among the social problems dealt with, in a communications context, are the gap between the advanced and developing countries, the formation of international and intercultural attitudes, and trends toward supranational organization.

The author is an engineer and student of linguistics, not a social scientist. His subject, the social impact of the communications revolution, requires him to command all of those fields and he does so well. A social scientist may have some parochial inclination to carp occasionally at deviations from the stigmata of social science professionalism. But probably no social scientist around could handle the technical material of this interdisciplinary area well enough to maintain Cherry's across-the-board level.

Such a comprehensive treatment is possible only in a book addressed to laymen, for attempts to be more technical in any one of the disciplines that go into this book would make it incomprehensible to practitioners of the other fields. What results is a readable, well-written statement for the nonspecialist (including, for example, a page explaining the use of the correlation coefficient).

It is an old saw that specialized disciplines learn more and more about less and less, and so it should be. If one contemplates the books and articles on communication by the most important recent social science practitioners of the field, such as Lazarsfeld, Hovland, Schramm, Klapper, Lerner, or even perhaps, Lasswell, one has to recognize that they have not made their main contributions when they treated communication as a total system. Rather they have clarified how some pieces of the process work; that is how science functions. The scholars whose writings have dealt with the communications process as a social whole, such as George Herbert Mead, Cooley, Innes, or Lippmann are in a more essayistic tradition. Cherry's book is of this latter genre, though it draws heavily on what science has learned.

World Communication is an erudite book. One learns a good deal here and there in it about the history of postal service, the etymology of various political words, and the development of the international organizations in the communication field.

It is also a sensible book that documents carefully the dramatic social and political changes which the communications revolution has brought about in both developed and developing countries. It avoids flights of futuristic fantasy about where this revolution is leading. Cherry is hard on cliches about "a shrinking world" or about communication producing understanding.

Inevitably, however, in a book as comprehensive as this one, a few errors creep in. Cherry slips slightly in interpreting the Soviet distinction between agitation and propaganda. He also errs on Soviet jamming. He notes the inefficiency and costliness of jamming of foreign short wave broadcasts, and says it was dropped in 1963 and "not resumed" since. In fact, it was resumed during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and has continued ever since.

A few such slips do not prevent this book from being an excellent compilation of basic facts about the world communication system, with the facts set in a context of generally wise and humane judgments.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties. By Hungdah Chiu. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 178. $10.00.)

This study of China's doctrines and practice regarding the law of treaties is of great value to all concerned with the universality of international law beyond the current ideological divisions of the world. Focusing on Chinese treaty practice, Dr. Chiu sets out to examine to what extent the People's Republic of China (PRC) differs from, or agrees with, states in the West and in the Socialist camp. He also attempts to relate his findings to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the PRC is not a party.

Chiu has made profuse use of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including texts of treaties and agreements, other official documents, and writings by PRC jurists. The six chapters broadly cover most of the procedures and technicalities concerning treaty making, entry into force, validity, interpretation, suspension and termination, and the position of treaties in international and municipal law.

The PRC's treaty law and practices are not widely different from those of the West, Chiu concludes; but, "where differences do exist, they are profound" (p. 119). One such example is the Chinese attitudes toward "unequal treaties," which hold that inequality created consequent upon a treaty vitiates the document's validity. Another example, Chiu adds, is the perceived effect of revolutionary change of government upon the state's treaty obligations. He attributes these and other differences to China's past frustrating experience more than to its present ideology. More critical scholars might question whether Soviet influence, at least on the two questions just cited, is as insignificant as the book appears to suggest (p. 119). Others might also wish that the author had compared Peking's stand on "unequal treaties" with what the 1969 Vienna Convention has stipulated regarding the invalidity of treaties concluded under duress (Art. 51) and of treaties in conflict with a "new peremptory norm" that has since emerged in general international law (Art. 64)—such as, presumptively, the principle of sovereign equality codified in the Charter of the United Nations.

A better example in which Peking's current attitudes are traceable to those held by previous Chinese governments would be the PRC's stand on the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* (vital changes in circumstances). While the book devotes considerable length to the topic, it bears noting that China in 1926, then under a different government, had invoked changed circumstances in an attempt to abrogate an 1865 treaty with Belgium. The final settlement, however, was by the conclusion of a new treaty. The instance seems to have anticipated the present PRC position that whereas changed circumstances do not *ipso facto* obliterate a treaty, they provide legitimate grounds for renegotiation.

This particular position differs from that of the Soviet Union to the extent that the latter considers *rebus sic stantibus* a capitalist ploy to beg out of unpalatable treaty obligations. Nor is the PRC stand the same as the more predominant view in the West adopted in the 1969 Vienna Convention (Arts. 62, 65, and 66, and Annex), which relate changed circumstances to treaty termination, suspension, and withdrawal, as distinct from treaty revision. In its pronouncements on *rebus sic stantibus*, Peking has quite consistently maintained a distinction between treaty revision and treaty termination, between what is repudiable and what is repudiated, more especially in regard to treaties of cession and boundary delimitation (hence, the Sino-Soviet border talks). There seems to be some confusion on this point (pp. 102–103).

The newness of the field offers opportunity and challenge. But Dr. Chiu's work will stand on its merits, which are legion, and will take its proud place in the inchoate literature on China and international law. One might demur about his interpretations, such as whether the PRC considers treaties "an important source" (p. 3) or "the most important source" (p. 5) of international law. But no one can deny the value of this timely monograph on a subject of growing importance. The book does not purport to be definitive nor to go beyond the legal dimension to a consideration of policy behind and underscoring treaty making. Hence, some of the omissions are quite understandable: among these is the lack of any extensive discussion of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are embodied in many of Peking's more important political treaties and held by its jurists as among the peremptory norms (*jus cogens*) of general international law.

The book is a well-researched and well-documented product of many years of intellectual drudgery, and it will add to the laurels of the Harvard Studies in East Asian Law directed by Jerome A. Cohen. The footnote section, the extensive bibliography, the Chinese-English glossary, and the appendices containing texts of selected treaties, are just as valuable as the main text, all executed with a meticulousness essential for serious scholarship.

James C. Hsiung

New York University

The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe. Edited by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 224. $14.00.)

This is a collection of very brief, often superficial, often repetitious accounts of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The ten contributors, all academicians, for the most part attempt to discover the impact of the occupation on its several environments—Czechoslovakia itself (Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, Hana Benesova and Ivan Sviták); USSR (Roger E. Kanet); Hungary (Rudolph L. Tokes); Hungary and Poland (George Gomori); Romania (E. Bennett Warnstrom); Yugoslavia (Werner Sichel); and East European theater and drama (E. J. Czerwinski); in addition, Ivan Volgyes compares the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 with the 1968 Prague Spring. We are thus confronted with a *potpourri,* more suggestive of ready availability than of systematic insight, or even another catch-as-catch-can treatment of a hot topic.

But this may be too harsh a criticism. Why include other East European countries, for example, if their cases are less interesting than those discussed? Or why treat the topic on several levels of analysis, or for East Europe as a whole, for that matter, if a significant key is provided via the chapter on East European theater and drama? In their introduction, the editors point out that the contributors "represent various ideologies and points of view," . . . "uniformity of opinion is notably absent," . . . and . . . "this is as it should be" (p. x).

Whether it should or should not, it is not the case in this compilation. Here various ideologies do not necessarily mean various points of view. Ivan Sviták, for example, member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party since World War II, lost his good standing only lately when his point of view became similar to those now contributing to the volume. And if uniformity of opinion means that all the authors agree that the Soviet invasion was a bad thing, then the book is certainly uniform.

As to quality, insight, and innovation, the contributions vary. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz's chapter on surveys of public opinion in Czechoslovakia before and after the invasion provides solid evidence that there was no counterrevolution there. Far-reaching reform, yes; revolution, no. The Communist party under Dubček would have won in a free and democratic election because it would have been the popular —not an elitist—organization. Hana Benesova contributed a useful description of the important influence of Czechoslovak writers on the sequence of events. Ivan Sviták, in two chapters, spins his customary grandiloquent and decisive views on the cosmic consequences of the occupation, ready as always to digress on all kinds of significant though not necessarily related topics at the faintest suggestion. Reading him is getting tedious—he has said many of these things before, and equally vehemently and in an equally grand style. Without new research, I fear, he may get bogged down in banalities. Roger Kanet's chapter on Soviet foreign policy is informative, though not as profound as his other writings. George Gomori's comparison of Hungarian and Polish attitudes is insightful and well-researched. Ivan Volgyes offers a useful comparison of the similarities and differences between 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia. But how important are the similarities and differences for the dynamic process and its outcome? What we need are tight, parsimonious assessments, rank orderings and causal correlations: We have by now too many "first steps" in the right direction but few follow-ups. Rudolf L. Tokes's essay on the reactions of Hungarian intellectuals is refreshing and careful. E. Bennett Warnstrom's otherwise perceptive study of Romanian reaction is incomplete and even obsolete because there is no evaluation of post-1969 developments. Werner Sichel's chapter on the effects on Yugoslavia is solid, systematic, and revealing. And E. J.

Czerwinski's evaluation of the effects on theater and drama in Eastern Europe is both articulate and professional. Professor Czerwinski convincingly shows how important are the insights that can be gathered from an East European intellectual mainstream such as theater and drama.

Taken as a whole, the volume is inadequate for two principal reasons: one, lack of intellectual direction by the editors; and two, the brevity of the individual contributions. The editors, in my opinion, fail to make the book a coherent whole. Apparently their instructions to the contributors were minimal, and this shows throughout the book. Moreover, the reader looks in vain for a chapter bringing the scattered observations of the several authors together in an overall, meaningful analysis of the "effects on Eastern Europe." What does it all, indeed, amount to? And the excessive brevity of most of the contributions results in superficial treatment of the respective subjects (exceptions are Piekalkiewicz and Sichel).

Still, the effort should not be discarded as wasteful. I, for one, find it useful to have several postinvasion cuts across the several environments discussed here. The principal value of this heterogeneous volume is indeed historical. The several country profiles, changed or changing since they were frozen in the individual chapters, may be fruitfully compared with the subsequent developments for a longer-range analysis. And here, I submit, rests the heuristic saving grace of the book. I would like to return to it five years from now.

JAN F. TRISKA

Stanford University

International Law, National Tribunals, and the Rights of Aliens. By Frank Dawson and Ivan L. Head with the collaboration of Peter E. Herzog. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971. Pp. xviii, 334. $11.75.)

In his foreword to this timely and informative book, Professor Richard Lillich suggests (p. vii) that no published work to date has attempted to do what this volume sets out to accomplish. The book is the product of fieldwork in twenty-five countries, funded by a Ford Foundation grant. One of the authors, formerly a practicing lawyer in New York and Caracas, is an investment banker in London; the other is a professor of law at Syracuse University. They acknowledge in their preface the assistance of practitioners, government officials, businessmen and scholars in the countries visited.

An introductory chapter examines the idea of injuring a state through its nationals, submitting (p. 23) that foreign offices have been more important than national or international tribunals.

A chapter on "The Challenge of New Perspectives After 1945" notes that the European Commission on Human Rights is an indirect means by which a private party's grievance can be brought to the attention of an international body (p. 30). Powerful states are regarded as less able to intervene in the affairs of weaker states to secure compliance with international law, and the concept of sovereign equality takes on a "new vitality" as a result of the nuclear stalemate (p. 44).

Developing practice in the Commonwealth receives particular attention. Despite the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's ceasing to be the final court of appeal for many Commonwealth countries, the authors discern a common measure of attitude toward aliens (pp. 62–63), and British forms are said to be used in thirty-one countries (p. 73). The study notes that extraordinary judicial remedies are available in Commonwealth states which have a common-law heritage (p. 90), and that constitutions in Western Europe "quite generally provide that the judiciary shall be . . . subject only to law" (p. 101). The authors advocate that alien investors in developing countries pursue their claims against both governments and individuals through legal channels (p. 105).

An instructive chapter notes that most nations allow aliens access to tribunals on a basis of equality, mentions theories that are applicable (p. 109), and points out some historical variance that has evolved over centuries (p. 157). A following chapter notes that, if one party in litigation is from a civil-law country and the other from a state in which the common law is basic, some rules may seriously affect the conduct of the litigation (pp. 159ff). The authors maintain that even in the United States there are problems about delayed litigation, and they refer (p. 175) to the United States policy of not espousing claims against other states unless there is claimed violation of international law.

Assistance requested between the courts of two sovereign states normally presents problems that may be treated differently in applicable treaties and legislation. Summarizing, the authors submit that "the structural procedural problems discussed in this Chapter and in its predecessors . . . may become increasingly complicated when an alien seeks to bring suit against his host government . . ." (p. 192).

As to the theoretical capacity of nationals and aliens to sue, the authors note, in a chapter on "Protection against Governmental Action," that this recourse has been hindered by the concept of sovereign immunity; United States statutes permit an alien to sue if he can show that United States citizens are permitted to sue in the courts of the alien's country (p. 215). All the countries whose practices were examined are said to permit suits against the governments in contract, in tort, and for violation of fundamental rights—if there is a showing of reciprocity (pp. 230–231). In Austria the rule of international law requiring compensation to aliens for expropriation is part of Austrian law; and in this matter aliens may be in better positions than Austrians (p. 243). The United States and West Germany provide by treaty that nationals of a party state may not be deprived by the other party state of property without just compensation; the German Supreme Court has held that nationals so deprived would be entitled to full compensation (pp. 244, 244n).

In 1965 the Executive Directors of the World Bank submitted to its member governments the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. It is "posited on the theory that arbitration and conciliation are alternatives generally more preferable to alien investors than either exclusive reliance on the tribunals of host States or on the uncertainty of diplomatic representations" (p. 245).

The final chapter on "Techniques for Achieving Minimum Standards of Procedural Justice in National Tribunals" refers to the Latin American states' suspicion of "international attempts which they believe somehow might weaken whatever protection is afforded them by the Calvo Doctrine against overreaching alien investors" (p. 300). The Local Remedies Rule "would be of little relevance if States did not accept the obligation to open their courts and tribunals to alien litigants on a nondiscriminatory basis with nationals" (p. 311). Private practitioners, the authors conclude, "must learn to regard themselves as agents or officers of the international legal order. . . ."

Students and practitioners of international law, as well as individuals and firms doing business in foreign countries, will find in this volume an instructive and welcome addition to the literature on the legal rights of aliens and alien companies.

ROBERT R. WILSON

Duke University

The Communist International: 1919–1943, 3 vols. Selected and edited by Jane Degras, (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., by arrangement with Oxford University Press, 1971. Vol. I (1919–1922): 1956, 463 pages, $22.50; Vol. II (1923–1928): 1960, 584 pages, $30.00; Vol. III (1929–1943): 1965, 494 pages, $22.50.)

The 1971 reissue of the three volumes of Comintern documents selected and edited by Jane Degras, and originally published in 1956, 1960, and 1965 respectively, is another indication of renewed interest in the activities of the international Communist movement in the period between the two World Wars. We have witnessed the publication of excellent studies on early Soviet foreign policy, biographies of key Communists (for example, Karl Radek and Antonio Gramsci), and newly uncovered documents and correspondence relating to the Communist International. Important work on the Comintern is currently being published, especially by scholars at the Hoover Institution. This material supplements but does not supersede Mrs. Degras's pioneering work and reinforces the judgment that her selections were judiciously made.

The Degras volumes hold up very well. The commentaries on the documents are informative and historically sound. The translations are uniformly excellent, models of care and clarity.

By far the most interesting years of Comintern activity are the 1920s, and the volumes are strongest here. Communists in Germany, France, and Italy were in the thick of political life. The Communist International was not yet the subservient tool of Soviet foreign policy that it was to become after its Stalinization in 1929–1930, and its internecine intrigues provide additional insights into the rivalries then existing within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and even into the nature of international Communist relationships today.

The volumes concentrate on European communism; they are relatively weak on the Third World, whose parties, with the exception of the Chinese Communist Party, were marginalist movements. They are admirably organized and are valuable sources for scholars working on generalized treatments of Soviet and international Communist policies of the period, as well as for students being introduced to the language of intra-Communist discourse and communication. However, for specialists working on particular aspects of the 1919–1943 period, a detailed examination of all the original materials will still be essential.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform. By

I. M. Destler. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 329. $10.00.)

There seems to be a small band of scholars, journalists, and practitioners who find a continuing fascination with the foreign policy and national security machinery of the United States. They are well served by Mr. Destler's book, which, it should be said, deserves a wider audience. He has written perceptively and thoughtfully about the foreign policy organization, carrying the story of its trials and tribulations through the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson and most of Mr. Nixon's first term. Mr. Destler has read the relevant literature carefully and critically, and apparently talked to many knowledgeable insiders with equal skill.

His analysis is clearly strengthened by the "bureaucratic politics" perspective he brings to bear on the subject. He has not adopted the specific framework of any one writer but freely admits his intellectual debt to the work of such scholars of foreign policy making as Graham Allison, Richard Neustadt, Roger Hilsman and Morton Halperin, among others. While there are strong differences of opinion about the explanatory weight of bureaucratic-political factors, it is true that most of us who have written in this field have tended to overemphasize rational explanation and formal organizational structure and function while ignoring organizational processes and politics.

Wherever an appropriate balance may lie in the study of particular policies or crises (e.g., Allison on the Cuban missile crisis, Neustadt on the Skybolt and Suez decisions), the bureaucratic politics perspective is ideal for Destler's purposes, that is, the question of organizational effectiveness in the making and carrying out of American foreign policy or, as he puts it, "the central question of how organizational reform is to affect governmental practice" (p. 40). Destler defines bureaucratic politics as "the process by which people inside government bargain with one another on complex public policy questions" (p. 52). He goes on to explain the pervasiveness of the process as arising from two inescapable conditions: shared power and differing views concerning these questions. Thus, bureaucratic politics is viewed as a normal dimension of governmental decision making, to be taken into account in any efforts to improve the latter rather than to be circumvented or transcended by proposed reforms.

Armed with this critical stance, Destler has some shrewd and sensible things to say about the many reform efforts and proposals directed to the foreign policy organization over the past twenty-five years, and the doubtful assumptions underlying most of them. His chapters on White House and State Department foreign policy making are excellent. Indeed, his description and analysis of foreign policy making patterns and procedures in the White House during this ten-year period are the best that I have seen in print. He makes clear the strengths of the Nixon-Kissinger arrangements while at the same time illuminating the more fundamental shortcomings that make them in his view an undesirable model for the long-term. He echoes the critical analysis of the State Department and the Foreign Service that has become almost standard in the postwar period, but more persuasively than most.

In characterizing the "general substantive staffs" that have in his view been most successful in meeting presidential needs in foreign policy, he cites the National Security Council staffs since Kennedy, and the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) in the Defense Department in the 1960s. Given his strong emphasis on politico-military affairs and the generally low marks he gives to the performance of the State Department, I was a bit surprised that he did not give more attention to the role of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Nixon-Kissinger period, as well as its earlier role as a staff in the 1960s. But this is a minor cavil (perhaps arising from my own service with that staff).

To raise serious critical questions about Mr. Destler's book, one must turn to his basic assumptions. If one asks why the foreign policy organization should be more effective, Mr. Destler's answers are the conventional ones: the overseas influence of the United States should be "exercised by coordinated government actions which support conscious, central United States policy purposes" (p. ix); the aim is "*purposive* and *coherent* foreign policy" (p. 4; italics the author's). Around whom is this strength and sense of direction to be built in the American government? Again the answer is the expected one: the president.

Mr. Destler is well aware that the conventional wisdom no longer goes unquestioned. He makes clear his own awareness that presidential will and wisdom are limited and that coordinated and coherent policies and programs are not necessarily good ones. He recognizes that his proposal for strengthening of State Department staffs at various levels of that organization is no guarantee of improved policy, while at the same time arguing that "the more that good people close to key officials are commissioned to raise hard questions, the more likely these questions are to be heard" (p. 291).

Clearly, none of this will satisfy those critics who insist that the concern to strengthen central, presidential control and direction is fundamentally misplaced. In their view, our direst problems have not come from lack of coherent, centrally directed and coordinated policies and programs but from too much presidential and national capacity to become involved and to project tremendous national energy and resources overseas. Before we further strengthen the system's effectiveness and its responsiveness to the will and purposes of the president, we had better concentrate, say the critics, on altering the values, attitudes, and perceptions of those who run our government, or the broader goals and purposes of the society, or indeed something even more radical, like fundamental change in its institutions.

Mr. Destler does not tackle these questions in any extended fashion, and there is no reason why he should, given the tasks he has set himself. He argues, as I have indicated, that the changes he proposes make sense in bureaucratic-political terms and that they should increase the system's capacity to think critically as well as to move more effectively. He will not satisfy the more radical contemporary critics of American foreign policy, whose questions do require serious pondering by students of the process as well as the substance of American foreign policy.

BURTON M. SAPIN
George Washington University

Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing The United Nations for Peacekeeping. By Larry L. Fabian. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. Pp. 315. $7.50.)

This is a very good study indeed of the "peacekeeping alternative to collective security" by a Research Associate in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. In the author's words: "This study attempts to provide a basic history of preparedness for UN peacekeeping, to isolate the factors most instrumental in shaping preparedness institutions and diplomacy, and to suggest some desiderata for analysts and policy makers thinking about the future of UN preparedness" (p. 9).

Chapters 1–6 consider past and current experience in planning and organizing international military forces. The first true peacekeeping actions are thought to be the League of Nations' efforts to insure peaceful plebiscites in Vilna (never carried out) and the Saar (completed, principally under British direction). They differed significantly from subsequent UN experience, however, in that major powers directed the planning and execution and even participated in the operations with only the aid of soldiers and civilians from smaller countries. In contrast, UN arrangements have depended on initiatives by the Secretariat and smaller powers. The sum total of this experience has given rise to principles of action that dominate current thinking: consent, noncoercion and impartiality. Fabian takes note of a paradox in the UN experience. As peacekeeping activity increased, governments, in general, exhibited a marked reluctance to *prepare* for future contingencies. "Yet preparedness did make advances —and notable ones. What happened was that while peacekeeping services became more visible, peacekeeping preparedness went underground" (p. 79). Later in the work (p. 191) Fabian concludes that "tacit understandings about peacekeeping are more permissive than explicit consensus ever could be under present circumstances." A particular merit of the work is that planning is seen as a three-way struggle among diplomats, secretariat officials, and peacekeeping technicians. The reasonable demands of the latter two groups often cannot be met by the diplomats who have been unable to agree on the basics—how to authorize and direct an international force and how to supply it. This framework tells much more of the story than would an analysis limited to the national positions formally taken in formal bodies.

What advances have been made? A number of countries responded to political initiatives taken by the Secretary General or took initiatives themselves in concert with that official. While the Charter provides a shadowy model for this sort of thing, it is faint compared with the big-power initiative and control prescribed for enforcement forces. The newer model required, first of all, secretariat initiative and responsive "middle powers" such as Canada and the Nordic countries—not so large as to threaten and not so small as to lack influence. These powers have been persuaded of the need to prepare, and prepare *for,* the use of "standby forces." They have been joined for practical purposes by a "wider fellowship" of countries "that supply forces without setting up standby systems." Both in practice have depended on at least big-power acquiescence and crucial logistical and technical support principally by the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. It is difficult, of course, to qualify as a peacekeeping power. The U.S. is too big to be noncoercive or impartial, although her logistic and financial support has been essential. The Netherlands has so far been largely unable to put her preparedness measures into practice because she has been compromised by her colonial past. While several countries—Ireland, India, Brazil and Yugoslavia—refuse to designate standby forces, they are nonetheless "prepared" by virtue of their participation in at least two of the UN's three big peacekeeping operations in Egypt, the Congo, and Cyprus. Their balking at designating forces in advance preserves their freedom of action in a future perceived dimly at best.

In the two final chapters, dealing with the perspectives and the future shape of preparedness, Fabian sets forth a rationale and a plan of action to maintain the slight momentum that has been gained. Drawing on both the experience of past and current operations and the record of the Committee of Thirty-Three (UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), he posits a ten-point strategy looking toward a "parity of super-power noncontrol over the preparedness system" (p. 226). Concomitantly, an increase in political responsibility and resource planning is required of medium-sized and small powers. This is neither new nor earth-shaking. More impressive is the evidence Fabian adduces that this sort of thing has been and will be tolerated informally by the major powers despite *pro forma* disagreement. Although there is no possibility of enforcement schemes under the "original Article 43 punitive model," Fabian concludes that the framework provided by this article plus the existing but unused Military Staff Committee might be used to prepare for peacekeeping contingencies. He suggests the Russians might go part way to meet American views on the operational responsibilities of the Secretary General since he is required as the UN chief administrative officer to execute the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

Although there is a long way to go before the world is prepared properly for peacekeeping, Fabian points the way. This policy study merits the influence it is doubtless having already on decision makers at the UN and in national capitals.

DANIEL S. CHEEVER
University of Pittsburgh

History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917–1950; From the Korean War to the Present. By André Fontaine. Vol. I translated by D. D. Paige; Vol. II translated by Renaud Bruce. (New York: Random House, Vol. I: 1968, Pp. 432, $12.50; Vol. II: 1969, pp. 523, $10.00.)

André Fontaine, a distinguished journalist from *Le Monde,* has produced a work of distinguished journalism; it is certainly not the best kind of history, although better history than many professional historians produce. Essentially, what Mr. Fontaine has written is an informed narrative with occasional analytical comments, in two volumes each divided into two parts. In the first volume, he discusses "Socialism in One Country," which takes the story from 1917 to 1945, then "The Duel," which looks at the years 1945 to 1950. In the second volume, "Learning the Facts of Coexistence" moves from Korea on to Hungary and Suez, and "China Takes up the Torch" starts with the launching of the first sputnik and ends with the deaths of Pope John XXIII and President John F. Kennedy. The style of presentation is lucid and for the most part congenial, although not everybody will care for such chapter headings as "Just a Moment, Mr. Executioner . . ." and "His Majesty Sputnik," or for some of the thumbnail portraits which seem to come from the school of *Time* rather than from that of *Le Monde.*

Already widely praised for its fairness of approach, the work does indeed present its account honestly. Moreover, Mr. Fontaine draws on his own working experience to give useful descriptions of Hungary and Suez and the other critical moments of the Cold War. Examining the first "week of truth," as he calls it, he draws an interesting picture of the predicament of Janos Kadar and convincingly describes the right-wing turn that the Hungarian government would probably have taken if Imre Nagy had not been removed. Turning to the second "week of truth," he exposes the conduct of Anthony Eden in a merciless manner which may well have given Lord Avon cause to regret his own praise for the "objectivity and sense of purpose" of the first volume, and rightly points out how the whole adventure marked the effective end of the pretensions of the United Kingdom to act as a great power in special relationship with the United States, whether to the east or west of Suez.

While Mr. Fontaine's two volumes are among the worthiest of the many produced on the subject during the last decade or so, they still fall short of the highest academic level, for his viewpoint is, surely if unwittingly, circumscribed by his background. In the first place, his outlook is very much that of a Western European. He talks of the "barbaric name" of the Azerbaijan (I, 280), which would not please the Azerbaijanis, and of the Berlin Wall as "most sinister symbol" of the Cold War (II, 3), which would bring howls of righteous indignation from Southeast Asia. The Chinese could not be happy that the section entitled "China Takes up the Torch," starts and finishes with events taking place outside their borders, as described above. Second, the sources used are overwhelmingly of Western origin. Although Soviet sources (mostly in translation) are cited more often than in some self-styled "impartial" Cold War histories, there is little or no mention of such standard Soviet works as *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny* [*International Relations after the Second World War*], edited by N. N. Inozemtsev and his colleagues. If such works are to be ignored for willful perversions of the truth, then a large number of Western interpretations, not to mention official government pronouncements, could be rejected on the same ground.

More seriously, the longer historical perspective presented in the work of the two major protagonists in the Cold War suffers from a severe imbalance. This is particularly noticeable in the first part and is indicated by the title, "Socialism in One Country." Considerable emphasis is given to the Russian Revolution of 1917, its aftermath and implications for international affairs. There is also the suggestion that the attitudes and policies of prerevolutionary tsarist governments were by no means completely dissimilar to those of their Soviet successors. Like George Kennan, Mr. Fontaine considers that many of the observations made by the Marquis de Custine on the Russia of Nicholas I have a strange applicability to the Russia of Joseph Stalin. He makes several references to the Byzantine and Muscovite origins of the "Soviet Empire" in a neo-Slavophile manner which posits a strong continuity from the past to the present. On the other hand, he does not seriously contemplate the possibility of comparing, say, the United States of James K. Polk to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt, nor does he even devote much attention to the foreign policy imperatives of the New Deal's "Capitalism in One Country," if that it can be called. There is little reference to "Manifest Destiny" or to the American variation of imperialism.

Exceptionally, the author does tell us something of the origins of the Monroe Doctrine as well as of its later extended application, while not following up the full background to Ivan Maisky's reported remark that "Russia, too, has its Monroe Doctrine." Although he cites an appropriate passage from the London *Times*, he fails to point out with sufficient force the purblindness of Truman's decision to take action against Soviet interest in the Dardanelles on the grounds that "we might as well find out whether the Russians were bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years" (I, 217, 290), even if he goes on to call the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine a move with "all the brutality of a declaration of war" (I, 293). He gives nothing like sufficient weight to the impact on the Soviet Union of the Second World War (for example, its loss of about twenty million people as opposed to the loss of well under half a million by the United States) and to the fever pitch consequently reached by the traditional mania for security.

The severe imbalance in his longer historical perspective hampers Mr. Fontaine when he comes in his "Epilogue" to consider the years since 1963 and the direction that might be taken in the future. On the one hand, he fears that the partition of Europe will be consolidated "as long as the peoples of the Russian Empire have not succeeded in overthrowing the bureaucracy which has brought a world revolution to a path of the most selfish conservatism" (II, 490). This view is consistent with the neo-Slavophile picture previously presented of Soviet autocracy. On the other hand, he writes:

> For a while it looked as if the triumphant wind blew, rather, from America—the new Rome. But soon, from the dollar crisis to the murders of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, in the midst of the profound division created in the public mind by the Vietnam drama, it became apparent that the country suffered from a major internal crisis, perhaps the gravest since the Civil War, and that anything, including the advent of some kind of fascism, was henceforth possible in America (II, 483).

Here, the references to Rome and fascism are introduced without much possibility of referring the reader back to preceding argument, which has not prepared him for such allusions.

Although the work suffers from deficiencies in its handling of the fourth dimension of history and of the three dimensions of the contemporary world, it is to be recommended as a worthy attempt to write an impartial account of the Cold War.

PAUL DUKES

University of Aberdeen, Scotland

Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. By Ross Gregory. (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971. Pp. 157. $6.95.)

Ross Gregory has written an exemplary essay on the American entry into World War I. Designed as supplementary reading in college courses, this work also repays careful reading by specialists. The author's background as a recent biographer of Walter Hines Page serves him well. He properly stresses the course of

Anglo-American relations against the general background of European conflict during 1914–1917. This analysis is truly synthetic, drawing upon all the extant schools of interpretation. Gregory gives careful attention to the economic entanglements with the Allies that developed after 1914 but correctly decides that these do not account for the act of April 2, 1917. He emphasizes but does not distort the roles of important figures such as Colonel House and Secretary Lansing. Like others in the mainstream of contemporary scholarship on World War I, he recognizes the president's realistic and practical bent, even as he points up Wilson's indisputable idealism. Wilson had no alternative to war in 1917, that is, if he wished to avoid an "unthinkable abandonment of rights and interests" (p. 130). Only a policy of complete isolation could have kept us out of war, and Wilson was in accord with popular feeling in refusing to retire entirely from international politics. The author wisely notes that considerations of national honor also played an important part, simply because of the nation's strength. "The more powerful the nation, the more the world expects of it and the more the nation expects of itself" (p. 135). American policy was "less a case of the man guiding affairs of the nation than the nation, and belligerent nations, guiding the affairs of the man" (p. 136). Wilson was free neither from domestic nor international pressures in reaching his decision.

I agree that Wilson was perfectly capable of staying out of the war, had he chosen that path. I would demur only in giving somewhat greater stress to the extraordinarily intense commitment Wilson made to bringing about a just and lasting peace. The failure of attempts to mediate the European struggle during 1915–1917 accompanied the president's growing obsession with controlling the postwar settlement as a means of disciplining not only the Central Powers but the Allied nations as well. As much as he hated war, he gave in to a stronger emotion, the desire to make a peace, and he finally came to believe that only by waging war could he force a peace of his own design. He fought so that, if necessary, he could dictate the terms of the treaties, and he succeeded. It cannot be said that he failed because of the way things went during the 1920s and after. The settlement that he imposed was never tried. The failure of the United States to participate in the treaty provisions fundamentally altered the character of the system that eventually materialized, so much so that it bore little resemblance to the one that Wilson had envisioned, even in the imperfect form that he negotiated in Paris before the American defalcation.

Gregory offers a book that is judicious in scholarship and charmingly written as well. No one else need attempt to duplicate this essay for a considerable time to come. It is hoped Gregory will now turn to the course of events during 1917–1918, when the war was waged by the United States, a subject that still requires up-to-date synthesis.

DAVID F. TRASK
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Latin American Economic Integration and U.S. Policy. By Joseph Grunwald, Miguel S. Wionczek, and Martin Carnoy. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1972. Pp. 216. $6.95.)

Industrialization in a Latin American Common Market. By Martin Carnoy. (an ECIEL Study, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1972. Pp. 267. $8.95.)

These companion studies represent a cogent plea to governing elites throughout Latin America as well as the United States to get on with the job of Latin American economic integration. Yet one cannot read them without wondering if even the authors themselves hold out much hope for significant progress toward the construction of a Latin American common market over the next decade.

In the first place, the authors are well aware that during the latter half of the 1960s the process of economic integration in Latin America was slowed almost to a halt. They trace this process, noting that only the subregional integration efforts within Central America and the Andean countries made any significant progress, and that the Central American Common Market itself entered a period of crisis and disintegration in 1968 which continues to the present moment. They conclude that "the road to a Latin American common market may well lead through such subregional arrangements as the Andean Group whose size and homogeneity make their integration easier than that of the highly diverse LAFTA membership" (*Latin American Economic Integration*, p. 61).

In the second place, the authors recognize the magnitude of the obstacles to the formation of a Latin American common market. Their awareness of difficulties which face further moves toward integration is revealed in their brief analysis of several major problems—including differing levels of industrial development; vested political and economic interests;

the attitudes toward integration of the military regimes in Brazil and Argentina; the relative indifference toward integration efforts on the part of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in consequence of the size of their domestic markets; a general fear of the potential predominance of U.S. multinational firms in a Latin American common market; and a significant, if ambivalent, desire among most Latin American countries to continue their independent bilateral relationships with the United States.

Against this admittedly pessimistic background both books seek to engage renewed support for the flagging integration effort. The ECIEL study does so by attempting to measure potential economic gains to be derived by Latin America from further integration. Specifically it tries to determine the optimum location and size of plants in six selected industry groups within a regional common market in the target year 1975, and to measure the benefits to be gained from the integration of these industries. While stressing the uncertainties of the measurements attempted, the study concludes that the market expansion and product specialization accompanying the formation of a common market would offer significant opportunities for making Latin American producers of manufactured goods competitive in world markets, would free from 3 to 4 per cent of GDP each year to be used for further investment, and could benefit many Latin American countries which do not as yet possess large industrial sectors. One of the more interesting conclusions is that "whenever output moves to levels where economies of scale operate, as it would for many commodities in a Latin American common market, and transportation costs are significant, production costs would permit competition with developed countries even without tariff protection" (pp. 69–70).

While the message of the ECIEL study would seem to be directed at a Latin American audience, the message of *Latin American Integration and U.S. Policy* is clearly directed at Washington, D.C. The book begins by reviewing the now familiar history of Latin American economic development since the turn of the century, up to and including the moves toward regional integration in the 1960s. It then examines the U.S. view of integration efforts, a view which moved from initial indifference—if not hostility—to a gradual, though formalistic, embrace of the goal of Latin American integration by the middle and late 1960s.

The greater part of the book is devoted to a series of propositions which run approximately as follows:

(1) It is (or should be) a matter of significant U.S. national interest that Latin America experience rapid and "sound" economic growth;

(2) Such growth can be significantly aided by the formation of a Latin American common market;

(3) The initial costs of integration are too great for the less developed countries of the region to bear; and

(4) The United States should therefore support the integration effort by paying those costs which will otherwise seriously, if not fatally, affect further progress.

In elaborating the fourth proposition the authors call on the United States to reorient its Latin American foreign aid effort away from bilateral programs toward the support of regional projects and institutions which will entice Latin American governments into further integration. Such programs would include balance-of-payments support for countries experiencing difficulties during the transition to a common market, and adjustment assistance support for local industries hurt by the integration process. In all, the authors present a rather detailed blueprint for U.S. actions to reinvigorate the presently moribund Latin American commitment to the establishment of Common Market by 1980.

One suspects, however, that their blueprint, like so many others for Latin American unity, will never get beyond the drawing boards. In the first place, any relationship between the U.S. national interest and growth patterns in Latin America is at best highly tenuous. The decline in official U.S. aid to Latin America at least in part reflects that judgment, and the judgment is likely to become more pronounced as the concept of "U.S. national interest" is reconsidered in the post–Cold War international setting. In the 1970s more than ever, appeals such as the authors are making will stand or fall on humanitarian—not "interest"—grounds; and since the relationship between foreign aid and the development process is generally difficult to illustrate, even humanitarian appeals are likely to fall upon deaf ears.

In the second place, the proposition that Latin American integration can succeed if the United States pays all the insurance premiums is highly debatable. The authors explicitly recognize that the effort, in the long run, will depend upon the degree of Latin American commitment to integration, but that recognition often tends to disappear as the arguments concerning U.S. policy orientations are developed. A proper balance is struck in the conclusion that

> Latin American nations must choose whether to make some sacrifices for more serious regional cooperation or, following the line of least resistance, to continue the autarchic policies that limit their development and deepen their dependence on developed countries. The United States can help in making a positive Latin American choice more feasible. Its offer of integration assistance, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, will bring into the open Latin American development alternatives (p. 161).

For a host of reasons, some covered by the authors themselves and others developed in more theoretical approaches to the phenomena of regional integration, one suspects that at the LAFTA level, the Latin American choice will continue to be "the line of least resistance" for quite some time even if the authors' U.S. policy prescriptions were to be adopted.

Roger D. Hansen
Georgetown University

Studies in War and Peace. By Michael Howard. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971. Pp. 262. $8.95.)

In an introduction to this collection, the author apologizes for reprinting essays and lectures that were produced originally as occasional pieces. The apology is entirely unnecessary. The book would be justified if it did no more than illustrate the development and broadening scope of Professor Howard's interest in military studies during the past fifteen years, which it does exceedingly well. But even the oldest of the pieces assembled here deserve to be reprinted for their own rather than their contextual merits, demonstrating as they do Mr. Howard's grasp of military theory and, when dealing with operational questions, his descriptive talents.

No one will complain, for instance, about the inclusion here of "Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought," a brilliant essay which appeared first in a *Festschrift* for Basil Liddell Hart. Here the great Swiss theorist's characteristic contributions to strategical thought are laid forth with clarity and economy, and those modern theorists who have fallen too completely under the influence of the German school are reminded that "in practice the influence of Jomini has been no less than that of Clausewitz, for it is in Jominian rather than in Clausewitzian terms that soldiers are taught to think" (p. 30). The essay on Waterloo which follows was written for the 150th anniversary of that decisive encounter; it remains the best brief account of the battle that this reviewer has ever read. As for three essays dealing with the evolution of military establishments in the nineteenth century—on the decline of the Wellington system, on the reforms that gave European hegemony to Prussia in the wars of 1866 and 1870, and on Lord Haldane's institution of the Territorial Army on the eve of the first World War—they should be required reading for all military historians who aspire to be more than button-collectors or experts on forgotten battles.

Howard's interests in recent years, thanks in part to his association with the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, have turned increasingly to the study of international relations in the light of nuclear and missile technology, and this emphasis is reflected in the essays that fill the second half of this volume. The political and technological revolutions of our century have forced contemporary students of military affairs to grapple with problems unknown to their predecessors. "Strategic thinkers," Howard writes,

> from the pioneers of the eighteenth century to Liddell Hart in his earlier writings, were able to assume a fairly simple model of international relations within which armed conflict might occur, as well as a basically stable technological environment. Neither assumption can now be made. No thinking about deterrence is likely to be of value unless it is based on a thorough understanding of 'the state of the art' in weapons technology. Any thinking about limited war, revolutionary war or indirect strategy must take as its starting point an understanding of the political—including the social and economic—context out of which these conflicts arise or are likely to arise (p. 183).

Howard pays tribute to American academic intellectuals of the 1950s—scholars like Bernard Brodie, Klaus Knorr, William W. Kaufmann, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Henry Kissinger—for having been pioneers in the new approaches to strategy. "Between them," he says, "they have done what Clausewitz and Mahan did in the last century, during times of no less bewildering political and technological change; laid down clear principles to guide the men who have to take decisions" (pp. 174f.).

But they have not, of course, answered all of the questions that trouble reflective men. "In most of the societies known to history," Howard writes, "war has been an established and usually rather enjoyable social rite" (p. 204). In the nuclear age, it is difficult to think of it in those terms. Even the persuasive argument that force is an inescapable factor in international relations and that one must therefore learn its forms so that it may be used, effectively and with restraint, for legitimate purposes leaves the awkward questions dangling: *Whose* legitimate purposes? Does the legitimacy of authority legitimize the force it uses, or must we apply other criteria? Are there ethical considerations that should limit the use of violence, as many men throughout history have believed, without knowing how to define them?

These issues Mr. Howard discusses in a study called "Morality and Force in International Politics" in which he concludes, in effect, that it would be nice if we could assume that, if only statesmen were conscientious enough, they would always find ways to make moral and pragmatic considerations parallel each other rather than conflicting; but that neither history nor the Scriptures give us any reason to do so. The responsible statesman, as Bismarck once remarked to a censorious clergyman, does not have to be reminded about sin. "Anyone who reproaches me for being a politician without conscience . . . should sometime try out his own conscience on *this* battlefield."

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Hiroshi Kitamura. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1971. Pp. 46. $1.75, paper.)

This short monograph, containing a number of provocative insights but remarkably uneven in quality, may be seen as something of a watershed in studies of Japanese-American relations. Written in the months immediately prior to the announcement by President Nixon of his impending visit to Peking and the end of the post-1945 international monetary system, it embodies the narrowly bilateral focus and rather pollyanna-like assumptions that characterized the bulk of the American and much of the Japanese scholarship in this field in the postwar era. Moreover, the "area specialist" approach employed, discursive, highly factual, and analytically loose, succeeds in illuminating important aspects of the subject but lacks the rigor and clarity to which social science scholarship aspires. The sudden uncertainties and expanded importance of Japan has already led the more aggressive policy-oriented scholars (without special knowledge of the country) into the field, and it is certain that monographs like this one will in the future compete with more "professional" but not necessarily more insightful works.

Kitamura's monograph makes two main contributions: (1) an emphasis on the fundamental cultural differences between the two countries, as manifested in the Japanese perception of the international system and (2) an inventory of relations since 1945 from this "psychological" perspective. Because of its remarkable cultural homogeneity, Japan is one of the few nations in which a "national character" study of this sort is useful. As a corrective to works focusing exclusively on the economic, political, or strategic dimensions of relations between the two countries, the book has considerable merit, for the cultural-psychological dimension of interaction is of unique importance in Japanese-American relations.

Unfortunately, the impact of the argument is substantially diluted by fuzzy conceptualization and a tendency to overgeneralize. Although it is assumed that there is a basic compatibility between Japanese and American "interests" and that harmonious relations will result simply from proper communication, "interests" are left undefined, and no consistent distinction is made between real and perceived interests. The term "psychological factors" is not carefully defined, and in the end the author ends up psychologizing politics (e.g., on pp. 6–7, bilateral economic conflicts are essentially seen as the result of "psychological factors"). In dealing with Japanese opinion, no effort is made to distinguish between "elite" and mass opinion and even to confront how these opinions are distilled into policy through the political process. Finally, evidence ranging from sweeping historical generalizations to data from opinion polls and casual observations of literati is cited without any real discrimination. The result is a kind of smorgasbord of unconnected comments which baffles as much as clarifies.

The monograph deals with an important subject from a fresh perspective. While it has intrinsic merit and the author is obviously sensitive and knowledgeable about Japanese foreign affairs, it is rather surprising that a greater effort was not made to incorporate more fully into this work theories and concepts from psychology and politics.

DONALD C. HELLMANN
University of Washington

Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920. By Walter F. Kuehl. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969. Pp. 385. $8.95.)

A work primarily of interest to specialists, Professor Kuehl's book traces the development of ideas about international organization in the United States up to 1920, concluding with an assessment of the role played by the American "internationalists" and publicists in the debate over the League of Nations. As intellectual rather than political history, the book exhibits the weaknesses and strengths of this genre. On the plus side, Kuehl records the wide diversity of ideas, opinions, and organizations which worked for the cause. The result is a clear picture of the confusion of aims, commitment to over-rationalistic and legalistic conceptions of the problems involved, as well as the role the publicists had in creating a somewhat auspicious climate for Wilson's Covenant while eventually helping to doom it to defeat because of their disagreements with Wilson and among themselves.

On the negative side, the book's organization makes the reader's job quite tedious. The strict emphasis on chronology has the disconcerting effect of intruding descriptions of minor publicists of little importance into the narrative, apparently solely to insure comprehensiveness and chronological neatness. Since the book deals mainly with ideas, there is little attempt to assess carefully the influence of various groups and individuals. No careful distinction is made between their impact on the general public as opposed to that on policy-influencing elites. Nor is there any useful discussion of the social and political groups involved or how they relate to each other. All we have is a bare-bones account of the organizations and brief biographies of individuals. Admittedly the author set out to chronicle ideas, not politics, but without some more careful attempt at analyzing impact—admittedly difficult without survey data—we are left in a welter of confusion and profusion of names, dates, and concepts. The book comes to life only in the all too rare excursions into the political dynamics of the period.

Yet even here the result is curious. For example, Kuehl concludes that one reason for Wilson's failure to sell the League was his ignorance of and inattention to the work of these internationalists in developing ideas about international organization. Thus he presents a paradoxical criticism of Wilson as unrealistic because he did not take sufficient notice of these people's work despite his implicit—and explicit in a couple of instances—assessment of these forces as being without significant political influence. Perhaps it is the overemphasis on the ideas and arguments of the publicists that leads Kuehl to give greater weight to the effects of Wilson's disdain for this group than is merited. This leads to a more general point; this kind of intellectual history is to some degree dysfunctional because it makes for poor political history.

James S. Magee

Eastern Michigan University

Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Pacific War: A Soviet View. By Leonid N. Kutakov. (Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 241. $15.00.)

Dr. Kutakov is a distinguished diplomatic historian as well as one of the Soviet Union's most experienced senior diplomats in the Asian region. He served in China during 1955–57, certainly a crucial period in Sino-Russian relations, and in Japan during 1959–60. After serving as a senior member of the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations, he joined the UN Secretariat as Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. Dr. Kutakov brings both academic expertise and professional experience (though more of the former) to his analysis. Both he and George A. Lensen, who edited the translated manuscript, are to be congratulated for making available a Russian perspective on the policies of Japan in the latter half of the 'thirties and first half of the 'forties.

Dr. Kutakov divides his study into four substantive chapters and one retrospective epilogue. In the first, he delineates the policies that led Japan into an alliance with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. It is, in broad outline, the familiar story of the background and negotiations leading up to the Japanese-German "Anti-Comintern Pact" and, ultimately, the Tripartite Axis Alliance. Most of the details, at least according to the footnotes, are taken from documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E., i.e., the Tokyo "War Crimes" trials) which Soviet scholars refer to as collection 436b of the Foreign Policy Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Because it is Japanese archives which were brought to light by the I.M.T.F.E. it is extremely difficult to determine how Russian foreign policy makers in the 1930s were perceiving Japanese foreign policy. One can only regret the absence of any reference to Soviet Foreign Ministry archives of the 1930s.

In the second chapter, on Japan and England, the primary source is *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939,* published by the British Foreign Office in 1955. Much of this section is devoted to the proposition that the British were intent upon appeasing the Japanese with a Far Eastern version of the concessions made at Munich for Europe. This interpretation hinges on the Arita-Craigie Agreement of July 23, 1939, by which Britain acquiesced in Japan's territorial seizures from China. "The events cited above show that the Arita-Craigie agreement had not been forced on the British government by the aggravated situation in Europe in the summer of 1939 as asserted by bourgeois historians [the footnote cites Professor E. L. Woodward], but was a manifestation of the time-honored strategy of directing German and Japanese aggression against Russia" (p. 126).

For the third, which focuses on Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, the author does refer to some of the material available in the archives of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of it relates to the endless friction over fishing rights. There is regrettably all too little discussion of the origins (from the Soviet perspective) of the Neutrality Pact negotiated by Foreign Ministers Matsuoka and Molotov in the spring of 1941. By contrast with the motivations behind the Arita-Craigie Agreement, "the Soviet Union signed the Neutrality Pact in an attempt to preserve peace in the Far East . . ." (p. 193).

The fourth chapter, which concerns the collision between Japan and the United States, emphasizes "the long-standing rivalry of the imperialist powers [i.e., the U.S. and Japan, which] had grown ever more acute" (pp. 200–201). This judgment is followed by a kind of classic, if unfootnoted, set of assertions concerning the motivations behind American foreign policy.

> American capitalists could not reconcile themselves to the gradual subordination by Japan of China, a potentially vast market for the United States, nor could they agree to Japanese seizure of Southeast Asia, a major source of strategic raw materials. But while some American leaders realized that war with Japan was inevitable, others linked with business concerns that had lucrative dealings with Japan, tried to avoid a collision by appeasing Japan (p. 201).

This volume is probably far more valuable to American readers for the insight into Russian research that it provides than as an analysis of how Japanese-American relations of that era ended in the explosion of Pearl Harbor.

In the epilogue, Dr. Kutakov sets forth the lessons that are to be learned from a study of Japanese foreign policy. Basically it "shows the cost and futility of resorting to force in international relations" (p. 230). Additionally, a brief summary of the war years is recounted. Interestingly enough, the only reference to the Soviet Union's denunciation of its Neutrality Pact with Japan in April 1945 is that it was a "heavy blow for Japanese diplomacy, which had hoped to take advantage of the contradictions existing among the allied powers to secure a peace which would leave Japan in possession of some of the territories she had conquered" (p. 224–225). Possibly so, but what about the Soviet Union's leaders' motivations? Nothing is written.

Withal, this book does make for interesting reading, and not only as a Russian view of Japanese foreign policy. It also provides a different set of hypotheses on the origins of what the Japanese call "the Pacific War." Finally, by indirection, it gives some clues to the well-springs of the foreign policy of the USSR.

HANS H. BAERWALD
University of California, Los Angeles

Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army. By Joyce C. Lebra. (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971. Pp. 255. $8.00.)

This book adds another segment to the gradually unfolding story of Japan's wartime relations with Asian nationalist movements. There are certain unique elements in the case of the Indian National Army, the subject at hand. India was peripheral to Japanese concerns and its conquest and inclusion within the Co-prosperity Sphere were not part of Japanese overall strategy. Moreover, there was no Japanese occupation of Indian territory (one can hardly count the Andaman and Nicobar Islands). Consequently, as Dr. Lebra points out, there tended to be fewer direct confrontations between the Japanese and the nationalist leadership.

At the same time, certain general characteristics of the relationships in occupied areas do occur in this instance as well. For the Japanese, the requirements of the war had to take precedence; their interest in Indian independence was primarily for propaganda purposes. For the Indian, as for other nationalists, independence came first. The difference in priorities inevitably gave rise to misunderstanding, tension, and occasional conflict. Dr. Lebra's contention that Japanese policy granted the form but not the substance of independence (the Andaman and Nicobar Islands remained under Japanese Navy administration even after a formal transfer of sovereignty) is one that is valid for occupied areas as well.

In this, as in respect to other nationalist movements, the Japanese were able to secure the cooperation of a nationalist leadership with some stature. True, they were slow to recognize the potential value of Subhas Chandra Bose and to bring him back from Berlin. Prior to his return, their attempt to work through Rash Behari Bose, a long-time resident of Japan, was not particularly successful. To the Indians he was too much the spokesman for Japanese interests and too removed from current nationalist concerns. S. C. Bose, on the other hand, was someone who fitted readily into the leadership role, who could inspire confidence and unite divergent interests. The force of his personality affected Japanese as well as Indians. In Dr. Lebra's view Bose's impact on Tōjō unquestionably gave INA interests a better hearing in Tokyo, for prior to their meeting, Tōjō had been generally unimpressed with the INA and its potentialities. It was a tribute to Bose's abilities that he was able to bargain as effectively as he did from what was an inherently weak position.

Among the most interesting parts of this book are the glimpses provided of the personal views of several of the participants. It is abundantly clear that there was no such thing as the Japanese "military point of view" in respect to the INA. (Nor was there one on the general question of the role of nationalist movements.) The variation in views was not just a matter of where one stood in the chain of command or of whether one's perspective was that of Tokyo or of the field of operations; individual differences existed. The change in Tōjō's evaluation of the INA after his encounter with Bose was mentioned above. General Kawabe, Burma army commander, became emotionally involved with the INA. On the other hand, Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding the Southern Area Army, was less sympathetic and reflected the imperious attitudes associated with the stereotyped Japanese officer.

The most appealing figure, on the Japanese side, and the person who dominates the early part of this story is Major (later Lieutenant General) Fujiwara Iwaichi, the head of the *F Kikan*, an intelligence unit operating in the Malay and Chinese as well as Indian communities in Southeast Asia. Highly idealistic, perhaps even a bit naïve, imbued with the idea that the cause of Japan was also the cause of Indian independence, and firmly believing that to inspire trust one had to demonstrate it, Fujiwara played a key role in the inauguration of the INA. The bond of personal trust between Mohan Singh and himself lent a touch of romantic idealism to the initial period before the inevitable rush of events overtook both of them and brought significant changes in the relationships on both the Japanese and Indian sides. Had there been more Fujiwaras in the Japanese military, the ultimate fate of the INA and other nationalist movements would doubtless have been little different. The image of Japan in postwar Asia, however, might have some softer tones.

In respect to this last point, Fujiwara was surprised at the scarcity of information about India available in Japan, inside or outside the military. In spite of talk of the common tie of Buddhism, in spite of Tagore and Okakura Kakuzō, a wide gap separated India and Japan. In the postwar world, the quantity of information is greater, but the gap would not appear to have narrowed appreciably.

Dr. Lebra has produced a very fine book. Well written, with a generally good balance between the broad scope of events and personal viewpoints, it is eminently readable. Her wide-ranging research in a variety of sources, including interviews, affords the sort of multidimensional approach which this story requires.

WILLARD H. ELSBREE

Ohio University

Khrushchev and Kennedy in Retrospect. By James E. McSherry. (Palo Alto, Calif.: The Open Door Press, 1971. Pp. 233. $8.95.)

The Kennedy Doctrine. By Louise Fitzsimons. (New York: Random House, 1972. Pp. 275. $7.95.)

"Why Suffer for Saigon—or Die for Danzig?" The phrase alone (the title of Mr. McSherry's concluding chapter) should be enough to keep the best intentioned reader away from his book. Its author—a former intelligence officer—still lives in the unquestioned age of brinksmanship: the future of world peace, in his view, remains determined by the balance of America's account in "the Bank of Soviet Respect." As examples of substantial deposits which forced Soviet leaders to revise their judgments of America's will are Truman's decision on Korea, Eisenhower's dispatch of troops to Lebanon in 1958, the U-2 incident when Washington said in effect "Yes, they're ours. And just what are you going to do about it?" (pp. 53–4), down to Vietnam where Johnson's action in sending combat units is seen as being directly responsible for Khrushchev's downfall and his successor's restraint (p. 199). It is a strange reading of history to which we are submitted, one which continues to make the old Cold-War distinction between the Russian people and the Soviet regime, and a no less disturbing reading of the future as well, for which "liberal sheepish politicians" who persist in bleating their appeasing slogans within earshot of the Soviet wolves are in advance held responsible for the extinction of "the Common Man" (p. 201).

"Extensive, unilateral concessions on the part of Washington," the author writes, "will inevitably put the United States in the position in which France found herself in August 1939"

(p. 193). A reading of Mr. McSherry's book, and a review of the postwar period which is dealt with in this book, leave one unimpressed by America's "extensive" and "unilateral concessions." Nor is this notion of inevitability in the recurrence of historical situations easily acceptable either. Indeed, how much longer will allegedly serious men continue to live the present in the light of a misconstrued and misused past? Understandably, the guidelines which security policies follow are bound to be anchored in the past. But whether for the statesman who defines those guidelines, or for the observer who "explains" them, it is still useful to comprehend that past first and apply it correctly next. Thus there was not as much continuity in the appeasement of Hitler as Mr. McSherry appears to assume. The show of force by the Czech government in May 1938 is a case in point. To be sure, such action forced Hitler's diplomatic retreat. But it also prompted him to cancel a previous order that had ruled out any kind of military action against the embattled democracy. Coercive diplomacy and appeasement come together, and between May and September 1938 the roles were reversed. Of course, the other protagonists, namely the Western democracies, did preserve an appeasing attitude throughout. But the case against such a policy rests essentially on the subsequent discovery that Germany was not prepared for war in the fall of 1938 and that Hitler's ambitions were unlimited. Unfortunately, such information was not recorded at the time.

Furthermore, the application of this particular historical episode to the postwar situation leads the author to assumptions which are quite debatable. For one, it assumes that the objectives of the Soviet leaders too were unlimited—a notion which most scholars now reject as unfounded, on the basis of a research which goes far beyond Mr. McSherry's preferred sources, namely, the *Pravda* and *The New York Times*. Nor can postwar Soviet weakness be seriously compared to prewar German insufficiency. Nor, again, did the U.S. appease all that much. From Truman to Nixon one wonders, in fact, how much more we could have coerced, "For its part" writes McSherry, "the United States should respect legitimate Russian (not necessarily Soviet) national interests" (p. 193). One wonders how such recognition of Russian interests (however minimal) is reconciled with the author's recommendation that Washington maintain an "unbending attitude" toward the Soviet regime.

Much more commendable is Louise Fitzsimons' book, *The Kennedy Doctrine*. The theme here is simple and, by now, is gaining increasing recognition. "Kennedy's policies were as dominated by cold-war thinking as were those of his predecessors" (p. 8); even more so in fact, since "American foreign policy before 1961 was essentially a reactive effort" (p. 7), whereas it became an aggressive one in the sixties. To Fitzsimons, as to so many of Kennedy's critics, the admission of the President's failure is a sad one. He failed, we are told somewhat regretfully, to understand and use "his own potential for leadership and accomplishment" (p. 243). He should have done and could have done more. As it was, his was "a counterrevolutionary and counterinsurgency policy" (p. 8) which failed to deliver on the many promises pledged by an otherwise brilliant rhetoric.

Thus the account of Kennedy's foreign policy takes us through a familiar journey: the Bay of Pigs, regarded by the author as Kennedy's "greatest mistake"—a "colossal error" from which "consciously or unconsciously (he) spent the rest of his administration and his life trying to recover" (pp. 18, 70); Khrushchev's manhandling of Kennedy at Vienna, and Kennedy's "extravagant" response and subsequent determination to reassert America's "role of leader in freedom's cause" (p. 81); the Cuban missile crisis when the American president "risked the destruction of all life on earth," a crisis which could have been avoided, Fitzsimons suggests, had Kennedy shown a greater willingness to pursue a diplomatic route at a time when the "survival of the republic" was not directly threatened (pp. 126, 170–2); and, finally, the "fatal illusion" of counterinsurgency war, especially as it was applied in Southeast Asia, and the escalation of the nuclear arms race at a time when "in the opinion of many knowledgeable observers, within the government and without, there was in early 1961 an opportunity to halt" it (p. 215).

However appealing, and in part true it is, the author's thesis appears to be confined essentially to a time period which starts too late and ends too early. It starts too late because it does not take sufficiently into account the legacy of the Eisenhower administration. Thus, by January 1961, an impressive number of key problems had been accumulated by the retiring president for the incoming one; a credibility gap in the U.S.-Soviet relations, following the U-2 incident; the Laos affair for which an invasion involving U.S. troops had been planned; the invasion of Cuba; postponement of a decision on the question of ABM deployment; relations with the Atlantic Alliance and, more specifically, relations with de Gaulle, whose September 1958 memorandum had remained unanswered—to cite but a few. Most of these issues matured in the spring of 1961. To be sure, as the author reminds us, "the Presidency of the United States provides little room for on-the-job training" and we should expect from the president "a mature and balanced judgment from the day he enters into office" (p. 69). Still, in the spring of 1961, whose foreign policy was it, Eisenhower's or Kennedy's? Can any one man "change" foreign policy single-handed in a matter of a few weeks? If he cannot, given the circumstances which prevailed at the time, is one justified in alluding disdainfully to Kennedy's cold war policy, or even to such a thing as a Kennedy doctrine? For that matter, assuming that there is such a doctrine, can one retrace it, uninterrupted, during the full Thousand Days? I, for one, doubt it. Occasionally, the author recognizes a "capacity for growth" in the late president (p. 69). It is this capacity which made him ultimately understand the true nature of his own potential for leadership. One may agree that much that happened before and during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 was unfortunate, to say the least. But one may at the same time recognize that following the crisis, Kennedy did look for new options as he began at last to think in terms of a new perspective, less imperial and more conciliatory. The evidence appears here and there—in the Test Ban Treaty, in the American University Speech of June 1963, in some of his latest statements on China, Vietnam, and the rest of Asia. It is not just a matter of iffy history either. Kennedy's presidency was just too short to warrant passing much judgment on it.

Simon Serfaty

The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728. By Mark Mancall. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 396. $12.00.)

Together with Clifford Foust's monograph on Russo-Chinese trade relations from 1725 to 1800 (*Muscovite and Mandarin* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969]), Mancall's book on the beginnings of diplomatic relations between the two countries provides for the first time a sound scholarly analysis of the initial stages of such relations.

The background of the two crucial treaties, Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727), is explored from the time of the first officially authorized mission, Petlin's (1618), to the Golovin mission which negotiated the Nerchinsk treaty and finally that of Sava Raguzinskii-Vladislavich which concluded the Kyakhta treaty. The initiative was the Russians' throughout, resulting from the conquest of Siberia and the penetration of the Amur region by outlaw, unofficial, and official Russians in turn. Both Chinese and Russian materials have been investigated to produce a close study of the purposes and results of each successive mission.

Mancall's interpretative passages are interesting. He compares the Chinese "tribute system" (inherited by the Manchus) with "new ideas introduced into the traditional East Asian world by the Russians" (p. 8). His explanation of the difference between how the Ch'ing government treated the nomadic northwest and how it treated the agricultural southeast is clear and helpful, though the ease with which Russia was assimilated to the nomadic northwest in Chinese diplomacy might have warranted comment. Moscow, we are told, represented a European tradition not yet "universalized through imperialism and colonialism," a tradition which "insisted on the equality of nation-states and sovereigns" while the Ch'ing system "recognized the existence of only one civilization . . ." (p. 65). Actually European countries had since the outset of the Age of Discovery dealt with many petty chiefs and principalities the world over, by no means as equals, whereas China's exclusiveness and rhetorical pretensions to be the whole world had not prevented intercourse with foreigners. Mancall's painstaking account of events does not in fact seem to suggest that differing world views impeded early Sino-Russian relations very much. Unauthorized or inept moves were made by both sides; but rational adjustments of conflicts and arrangements for trade and diplomacy were worked out with remarkably little fuss. The author is quite right to contrast the post-1840 shock to earlier Chinese ways of conducting foreign relations with the period of his inquiry. What seems worthy of note, as his book shows, is how well the pre-1840 system worked.

The author has striven for precision. In fact, he overdoes it a bit; for example, he translates Sava Raguzinskii-Vladislavich's name in the text of the Treaty of Kyakhta fifteen times as "the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich" to avoid rendering "Raguzinskii" as a surname, and he refuses to use "Spathary" (Spafary) as the name of Milescu, because "Raguzinskii" means "Ragusan" and "Spathary" means a "spatar"—an official title; but the ordinary reference book lists the two men under "R" and "S" respectively. The notion of "surname" was not a fixed one in seventeenth-century Russia anyway, and one is reminded of those cataloguers who cross out "Lenin" and write "Ulianov" on book cards. There are a few minor errors: Križanić was a Croat not a Serb; Nurhaci was not in fact an "early Ch'ing emperor"; in 1689 Peter the Great was only technically "on the throne," with the actual rule in other hands; *deti boiarskie* were not "boyar sons" but lesser boyars; there is no such place as "Vyatsk" (Vyatka?) or "Yarench" (Yarensk); either "Buchholz" or "Bukhgolts" (if soft sign is omitted) will do for a Russianized German name but "Bukhholts" will not. The K'ang-hsi emperor's remark that Peter I exposed himself too frequently to ocean voyages is called "not surprising" coming from a continental monarch, but it is indeed surprising because Peter was also a continental monarch who never took any ocean voyages at all. Paisios Ligarides was scarcely a "representative of the Greeks in Russia," but a renegade cleric looking out for his own interests who was titular metropolitan of Gaza while he was in Russia. Milescu's report that the Peking Jesuit Verbiest was more loyal to the Russian tsar than to the Ch'ing emperor deserves a skeptical comment. Russian transliteration is something of a problem to the author. He uses neither the standard British, the standard American, nor the so-called international system; what he does use is not open to serious question except for "sch" (instead of "shch") which is German, not Russian. But within his system there are too many mistakes, at least some of which an editor ought to have caught. There are also errors in French and German, though romanizations from Chinese seem almost perfect, and there is an admirable glossary of characters. There were formidable linguistic problems in the preparation of the manuscript, but three errors in three languages on p. 361, for example, are not what one expects of a major press.

Despite such minor faults, the book reflects commendable documentary research and objective, critical analysis throughout. Even if all questions regarding the inception of Sino-Russian relations are not disposed of, they have received a thorough and fair examination. Few people anywhere in the world can bring absolutely all of the desirable skills and knowledge to the study of such a topic.

Donald W. Treadgold

University of Washington

The Asian Engineering Brain Drain. John R. Niland. (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1970. Pp. 182. $12.50.)

Concern over the international "brain drain" from European countries became intense during the mid-1960s, but subsided after 1968. Recently, however, another current in the problem has surfaced, namely the brain drain from the less developed countries to the more developed ones.

This kind of drain has been widely regarded as hampering economic development in the countries of emigration, and with amounting to "exploitation" of the latter by the receiving countries, and more specifically with imposing "reverse foreign aid" which offsets the direct aid contributions. These new problems are not so susceptible as before to resolution by the theory of international comparative advantage and re-equilibrating movements in a worldwide free market. Then the Soviet Union in 1972 gave traumatic expression to the issue by imposing an exit tax on a sliding scale according to the extent of education received.

These new concerns have produced another spate of publications and debates. Currently the National Science Foundation is conducting a large questionnaire study on foreign scientists and engineers in the U.S. At the United Nations, two major studies have been launched: one by UNITAR on the *causes* of the migration from the less to the more developed countries; the other by the Social Development Division, under the direction of this reviewer, on the economic *effects* of the migration upon the countries at both ends.

Professor Niland's book falls in the new area of concern, but his title is too broad: he actually deals only with the drain of Asian engineering students who enroll in U.S. graduate schools and then postpone or avoid returning home. He makes only passing references to the persons immigrating into the U.S. as already trained professionals—although according to his own estimates they comprised 40 per cent of the engineers and scientists draining from the less developed countries, 80 per cent of the physicians, and nearly the whole of the brain drain from the more developed nations (and more since 1967, Niland's base).

The core of his book consists of the replies obtained from a questionnaire which Niland circulated among a sample of the Asian graduate students in engineering already mentioned. What he obtained is a description of their present traits (e.g., skills, previous education, sources of support, work experience, etc.) and their locational intentions, but not the record of their actual movements.

From the outset, Niland assumes that nonreturning students are a serious drain on their home country; but he never really demonstrates this main point. First, he strains to establish extremely high percentages of "nonreturn"; but to accomplish this he must narrow the base from "all foreign students" to just those students who in any year are "in position to seek conversion of their visas" from student status to immigrant status. Second, when Niland deals with the direct costs of the foreign students to their home countries, he finds only the rather small costs of overseas transportation and of the first six months of U.S. residence—since the replies to his questionnaire showed that most of the foreign students quickly attached themselves to U.S. sources of support!

Trying to cast a wider net, Niland then proposes a kind of opportunity cost: the losses to the home country from early return, owing to the fact that younger professionals earn less, and bring home less accumulated savings, than if they had stayed abroad longer. On this basis he even advocates deferred return! But this feature can hardly be taken as the principal "cost of emigration," as compared with lost contributions to the national product. And Niland concedes that those who stay abroad a long time may indeed never return.

The book does provide some new and useful figures on the sources of support for these engineering students, and on their accumulation of savings. It is regrettable that Niland did not publish the replies on remittances and some other important items on his questionnaire.

Niland barely recognizes the dimension of loss from nonreturn in terms of the ratio to the home stock of professional manpower and the extent of home vacancies—although clearly the "loss" will be small or nil for a country like the Philippines, which already shows a surplus in certain professions. Finally, the author never compares the losses ascribed to nonreturning students with the losses associated with emigrants previously trained in the home country. It is the latter category which poses the urgent problem for the countries involved in the professional migration at both ends. Studies now in progress indicate the likelihood of a "negative-sum game" here: relatively heavy costs to some weak and poor countries of emigration, in direct outlays lost and occasionally production foregone, and on the other hand, only relatively small gains accruing to the large and rich economies of most of the receiving nations.

EDWIN P. REUBENS

The City College of the City University of New York

The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast. By Riordan Roett. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972. Pp. 202. $8.95.)

Roett's *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast* describes how the emergence of political forces challenging the traditional oligarchies in the Northeast during the 1950s and early 1960s and the energy and genius of Celso Furtado led to the creation of the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), a new federal agency to plan, coordinate and supervise the development of the region. The author argues that the SUDENE's concern with economic and social injustices, independence from the traditional power structure, and promise of rational planning and honest project implementation offered the United States an ideal opportunity to support a movement consistent with the objectives and promises of the Alliance for Progress. Professor Roett demonstrates, however, that despite the pronouncements from the highest levels of the United States government supporting social, political and economic reform and the SUDENE as a promising institution for effecting such reform, the implementation of the foreign aid program between 1962 and 1964 actually served to undermine the SUDENE's position and support the traditional oligarchies opposed to reform.

This book provides a valuable description of the political factors surrounding the creation of the SUDENE and the United States role in the Northeast from 1962 to 1964. Unfortunately, the rather narrow focus on political reform has led to conclusions which overstate both the SUDENE's internal mandate and capabilities for reform and the reactionary impact of the U.S. AID program.

While the weaknesses of the SUDENE are given little weight in the conclusions, they do emerge from the book. The SUDENE appears as an agency which never had a mandate for effective reform, avoided the areas most essential to major reform, lacked the power to discipline or force compliance with its program, and had no proven ability to plan and implement programs that could successfully utilize foreign capital or personnel. Dr. Roett never reconciles SUDENE's internal weaknesses with his conclusions that the SUDENE was a radical reform effort that was undermined primarily because of the lack of U.S. AID cooperation, or that the U.S. AID's by-passing of the SUDENE was motivated by and designed to prevent the spread of communism. For example, it seems as plausible that the U.S. AID by-passed the SUDENE because of a belief that it was unwise to base an entire program on one technically and politically weak agency or that the SUDENE Master Plan was not the best approach to reform and development in the region. It might be argued that the U.S. AID's emphasis on education and health, areas which the author explains were outside the expertise and influence of the SUDENE (p. 47), are as important to long-run economic and social reform in the Northeast as the emphasis of the SUDENE program. It is not clear when or how the illiterate, malnourished, disease-ridden masses were to benefit from the SUDENE's emphasis on infrastructure, basic industry, and colonization projects that would never affect more than a tiny fraction of the people. The author's implication that the AID should have cooperated fully by turning over all funds to the SUDENE with virtually no strings attached appears warranted only if the AID's sole objective were to promote political reform.

The lesson I see from the SUDENE experience is that real reform in the Northeast will come only after there is a much stronger, long-term commitment for such reform at the highest level of Brazil's government. And when that date comes, Brazilian nationalism ensures that the United States' role, either as a deterrent or a catalyst for reform, will be marginal at best.

My downplaying of the role of the United States in the SUDENE experiment should not be interpreted as a whitewashing of the U.S. AID program in Brazil, which throughout the 1960s belied any serious commitment to the reform objectives of the Alliance for Progress. A central question raised by this book is how to explain the gap between the goals of the Alliance for Progress and the actual implementation of the United States foreign assistance program. The author's discussion of the time pressures imposed on the Northeast mission to produce a program with short-term results touches on a major cuase of this gap. Roett implies that these pressures derived primarily from the desire to launch a highly visible program to stem the growing Communist influence in the northeast. The pressure to demonstrate immediate results, however, and the tendency of the AID program to support the traditional economic, political, and social forces within Brazil remained long after the 1964 military coup eliminated any serious Communist threat. In fact, as long as foreign assistance must be justified annually and bureaucrats rewarded on the basis of the funds moved, the U.S. AID programs will probably continue to reflect these characteristics.

Programs sensitive to economic, political or social reform generally require putting resources into channels where the risks are higher and the results longer-range and more difficult to quantify. The U.S. AID has placed a high priority on minimizing the complications and risks of transferring resources. Problems tend to be viewed in such terms as crop yields and the number of agronomists, while issues such as income distribution, land tenure, and social and political reform have received only occasional lip service. Economists have been valued for justifying decisions already made by mission executives; other social scientists have been conspicuously absent from mission staffs.

Dr. Roett's book should enhance our understanding and awareness of the political implications of United States foreign assistance. Unfortunately, analyses such as Dr. Roett's, which question the simplistic, conservative approach of the U.S. AID, are likely to be ignored in the absence of a major restructuring of the entire foreign assistance program.

Kenneth D. Frederick
Resources for the Future, Inc.

A History of O.P.E.C. By Fuad Rouhani. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 281. $17.50.)

In 1960 five major petroleum exporting states—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.). Fuad Rouhani, the Organization's first Secretary General, gives a circumspect but clear description of O.P.E.C. in the last part of his book, and an excessively lengthy general discussion of the international petroleum industry in the opening hundred and fifty pages. He does not try to specify how much O.P.E.C., as opposed to other factors, has affected the bargaining power of the producing states.

For Rouhani ". . . the greatest value of the Organization to its members lies in its being a meeting place for regular consultations" (157). Despite a proclivity of the press and even members of the petroleum industry to talk about O.P.E.C. as if it were a genuine supranational entity Rouhani's position is correct. The Organization has a modest budget, which amounted in 1971 to only $1.2 million. Its substantive actions are resolutions requiring unanimous consent addressed to its members or the operating companies. There are no provisions for sanctions against members that ignore resolutions. Any significance the Organization has must be attributed to facilitating the exchange of information and coordinating expectations.

O.P.E.C. has played an explicit role in two important developments since its founding:

halting a drop in posted prices and changing the tax treatment of royalties. In the late 1950s the major petroleum companies began to reduce the posted price used to calculate payments to producing countries. The prospect of falling per-barrel earnings led to the creation of O.P.E.C. In the mid-1960s the companies agreed to hold posted prices above levels prevailing at the end of the previous decade. Before 1966 Middle East countries allowed companies to write off royalty payments against their income taxes. In 1962 O.P.E.C. passed a resolution recommending that royalties be treated as a business expense deducted from earnings and not subtracted from tax payments. By 1971 the companies were operating in accordance with this resolution.

What is not clear from Rouhani's treatment is whether the existence of O.P.E.C. affected these developments. He notes that structural changes benefiting the producing states such as greater technical knowledge, increased capital resources, and the entrance of new firms into the market, have taken place in recent years. Raymond Vernon has maintained that such shifts typify raw materials industries and enable producing states to secure greater revenues over time. Rouhani sees market conditions as the principle explanation for the huge revenue increases secured by the producing states in 1970 and 1971. Economic arguments of this nature imply that O.P.E.C. at most affected only questions of timing.

Rouhani points out, although not with enough emphasis, that the greatest potential problem for the producing countries is the erosion of oligopoly market control now provided by the major oil companies. While O.P.E.C. has passed resolutions calling for production regulation by producing states, absolutely no joint action has been taken. The companies continue to set the overall level of production and to allocate it among producing areas. This allows O.P.E.C. members to bargain against the concessionaires and not among themselves. If nationalizations or resistance from consuming states erode the oligopoly O.P.E.C., the energy crisis, and the existing price structure will all disappear.

Stephen D. Krasner

Harvard University

India's Use of Force in Goa. By Arthur G. Rubinoff. (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971. Distr., New York: Humanities Press. Pp. x, 134. $6.00.)

Rubinoff's study is an objective and empirically based analysis of the issue of Indian military takeover of Goa in late 1961. The author has quite rigorously examined the Goa problem in the context of India's commitment to what are seen as two directly conflicting roles or self-images: a professed desire to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and leadership of the anticolonial struggle along with championship of the newly emerged nations. Professor Rubinoff has surveyed the fourteen-year period during which India attempted to settle the problem peacefully, and he has analyzed the external pressure from the more militant Afro-Asian nations which, in his view, finally persuaded India to opt for the more forceful image preferred by these states. He deals with what he calls "misunderstandings" in the West regarding India's commitment to peaceful methods, and clarifies the dilemma for Nehru in choosing between the available alternatives to rid India of the last foothold of colonialism.

Having outlined the basic arguments in the brief introductory chapter, the author (somewhat formalistically) explicates the "nature" and "principles" of Indian foreign policy in the second chapter. Chapters III-V deal with the more substantive aspects of the Goa issue, India's efforts at peaceful resolution of the dispute, and Nehru's ultimate decision to use force. The concluding chapter recapitulates the main arguments and provides more narrative dealing with additional factors impinging upon the decision to use force: V. K. Krishna Menon's upcoming election in North Bombay, India's (retrospectively unjustified) fear of NATO's reaction, and calculations *vis-à-vis* China and Pakistan. A sizable bibliography and an index are included.

The thesis that emerges from the book is that although Nehru's India had cultivated the image of world's foremost advocate of peaceful settlement of international disputes, in practice, it had sought to rely upon "minimum use of force—not complete non-violence" (p. 23) in achieving its foreign policy goals. India's commitment to resolve the Goa issue peacefully was exploited by the Portuguese (p. 110). Nehru maintained this commitment until 1961 despite widespread domestic sentiment for a more militant posture toward Portugal, and despite Portuguese firings which resulted in twenty *satyagrahis* killed and two hundred injured in August 1955. Although Nehru had initiated a shift in India's policy toward *possible* use of force in Goa in mid-August, 1961, it was the pressure from militant Afro-Asian states at the Belgrade Conference of nonaligned nations, and particularly from the African states at the subsequent seminar under the Indian Council of Africa in New Delhi, that brought about a "profound change" in Nehru's policy toward Goa (p. 84). Thereafter, Nehru talked of "other methods" (p. 83) to solve the problem, and the Indian press (with the government's complicity) embarked on a "clumsy" campaign to make it appear that Portugal was provoking India (p. 85). Menon's impatience, urgings by the Praja Socialist and the Communist Party for immediate invasion, and electoral considerations for the Congress Party in the approaching third general elections also contributed to Nehru's eventual decision to use force. The Western nations, particularly the United States and Great Britain, and the press joined the criticism against Nehru's India, clothing the issue in moral and personal terms rather than considering the merits of the case.

The conclusions in the book are, on balance, favorable to India's decision to use force in Goa. The author is critical of India's poor timing of the decision—which made it appear that India was simultaneously the peacemaker in the Congo and the aggressor in Goa. He maintains that although India had a great many legitimate claims to Goa, it discredited itself by fabricating alleged Portuguese atrocities before the invasion. Nehru's characteristic indecisiveness and failure to gather around him trustworthy men resulted in distortions and delays in the execution of his decision to use force. Ironically, the author observes, India's annexation of Goa neither served to stem its declining influence among some Afro-Asian countries, nor did it directly assist the struggles for freedom in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique. It did, however, prove that India had not unconditionally forsworn the use of force; and that its policy had never been rigidly tied to peaceful methods. After Goa, India could no longer claim a special status with respect to peaceful methods.

My main criticism of this book relates to the discussion of nonalignment in Chapter II, which could have been more rigorous—thus avoiding the occasional confusion between the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment (pp. 18, 76, and 77). The study, as a whole, could also have benefited from a more systematic analysis of various factors affecting India's decision to use force. There are some minor errors/oversights in the work, such as references to Kerala (rather than Junagadh) as an instance of India's use of force (pp. 2 and 113) and depiction of Indians as a "race" (pp. 25 and 32). The book is a competent analysis of the Goa issue, and a notable contribution to the literature on Indian foreign policy as well as international relations in general.

Mukund G. Untawale
University of California, Berkeley

International Law and Order. By Georg Schwarzenberger. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 298. $17.50.)

This collection of essays by the distinguished British jurist, Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, examines various facets of international legal development in an era, as the author sees it, of increasing international lawlessness. Some of these facets reveal substantive problems such as the growth of terrorism, the revival of sovereignty, and the development of nuclear weapons. Others indicate procedural questions of intest to political scientists and students of legal philosophy. Among these are the second chapter on "Law, Order and Legitimation" and the closing chapter on "International Images and Models." The latter chapter is particularly stimulating in harnessing to legal analysis such wisdom and perspective as scholarship owes to Merleau-Ponty and R. D. Laing.

Professor Schwarzenberger, despite [or possibly because] of his interest in phenomenology and the sociology of law is scarcely a trendy legal authority. At times his views verge on the English curmudgeonly as when he speaks of "flower children, drug addicts and other exuberances of an indulgent society" and of "the part played by a liberal or lax application of law in hastening the decay of civilization." Moreover, he insists on a strictly formal distinction between "order" and "law," which is inevitably at variance with the prevailing trend of social research in the U.S. legal community. Fair enough. But, of course, while this preference for structured categories makes for clarity, it also makes inevitable his conclusion that international law is on the wane. In the international community, international law in the Austinian sense, or even in the Rousseauean, is of relatively minor importance. On the other hand, there *is* a great deal of structured, orderly behavior in relations between states which depends on shared reciprocal expectations and systems analysis. This systemic or, in Schwarzenberger's phrase, "consensual type of legitimation" of orderly behavior brings about a synthetic condition in international relations which is neither purely law nor purely order. Perhaps the international community reflects not chaos and the breakdown of law so much as a shrewd rejection of rules-for-their-own-sake. Sovereign immunity, for example, is a "law" whose time has gone past, as has much "law" on expropriation of alien property; but the net standing of the legal system cannot really be measured by formal, uniform adherence to such time-honored precepts. The real question is whether the world legal culture (a term Professor Schwarzenberger would not, I suspect, willingly embrace) can provide those it serves—the political and business cultures—with adequate tools to achieve those levels of cooperation and mutual adjustment to which they aspire. The post–World War II era by this standard has perhaps not done so badly, at least in comparison with the period after World War I.

The author's impatience with what he considers soft legal thinking, especially his warnings against such self-inflating concepts as *jus cogens* reflect the British view that public policy is an unruly horse. Professor Schwarzenberger is quite right to warn us that "in any system of power politics in disguise, apparent 'progressiveness' can readily be made to serve hidden sectional interests." Yet the history of the World Court during the past two decades would suggest that it is dying of rigid legalism and narrow interpretation rather than of a surfeit of broad and flexible lawmaking. Apt, too, is the author's warning that proposals *de lege ferenda* concerning terrorism and guerrillas might be disguises for the disintegration of international law. However, the chapter on terrorists, etc., while emphasizing that the growth of random or revolutionary violence endangers the future of law, order, and civilization itself, does not point the way out of the conundrum of increasing confrontation between the violence practiced in the name of law and the violence practiced against the law. The author urges that we "should think less in terms of ideological commitments and temptations to be fashionable than in helping human beings in need of assistance" (p. 233). But if we walk with him along this path it leads us only to his rather modest recommendation:

> . . . raising the international status and immunities of the delegates of the International Red Cross; securing for such delegates greater freedom of access to privileged and unprivileged prisoners anywhere; extending the freedom of communication between the regional and Geneva headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and providing long-term financial assistance on a more commensurate scale. Such a policy would probably yield better dividends in terms of diminishing human misery and cruelty than, on the surface, more grandiose schemes and humanitarian rhetoric (p. 234).

But the author, whose excellent chapter on hidden agendas, values, motives, models, and images qualifies everything else he says, certainly appreciates that the Red Cross is not about to be accepted as a substitute for a fundamental reordering of human priorities and of the institutional instruments by which both law and order are achieved. Thus the Schwarzenberger model of international order, and of the role of law in order creation, assumes that the existing, status quo-oriented legal culture can develop a capacity for systematic internal change and reform, which the author's empirical evidence denies.

In short, disorder may be better than bad order, lawlessness may be preferable to stultified law. Professor Schwarzenberger acknowledges this. He does not, however, appear ready to accept that lawlessness and disorder may be the law and order of rapid, transitional change, subject to its own internal reciprocal code of conduct and ameliorating norms worthy of study as "law."

International Law and Order is the sort of book which I absorbed while moving my lips, not because I am a handicapped reader but because I found myself discussing, arguing, and not infrequently, emphatically agreeing with this brilliant, provocative, and witty author.

Thomas M. Franck

New York University

The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. By Bernard Semmel. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. 250. $11.00.)

In this book, his third on British imperialism, Professor Semmel traces the intellectual origins of late nineteenth-century British imperialism to the theories which supported the two "forms" of the mid-Victorian British "Empire of Free Trade" (p. 8). The first of these "theories . . . of capitalist imperialism" (p. 211) viewed England as "the Workshop of the World," the wielder of an "informal dominion by virtue of her industrial monopoly. . . ." The second, represented most fully by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and supported by the Radical Colonial Reformers, stressed Britain's more "formal" Colonial empire (p. 8). For Wakefield, free trade was necessary but not sufficient. He thought that only a "program of systematic colonialization" could alleviate the "glut of goods, of capital and of men" (p. 76) which plagued the capitalist industrial order. Semmel makes a convincing case that Wakefield had a "theory of capitalist imperialism" (p. 212) that anticipated in some respects that of the neo-Marxists such as Luxemburg and Lenin.

At the other extreme of Radical opinion were those who became, after 1850, the leading spokesmen of Radicalism, the pacifistic, cosmopolitan Cobdenites who, in spite of their nationalistic and mercantilistic lapses, were not, Semmel apparently concludes, especially imperialistic. To establish that there was, strictly speaking, a Free Trade Imperialism during this period, Semmel must show that the "orthodox" (p. 11) Radical Free Traders who rejected both colonization and Cobdenite cosmopolitanism, men like Joseph Hume and Lord Brougham, were supporters of a Free Trade Empire.

Although the author displays great knowledge of the economic thought and controversies of the period and considerable ability to distinguish clearly the various schools of Radical Free Trade opinion, he does not make a fully convincing case that the commitment of this middle school of Radical opinion to free trade was in itself also a commitment to empire. Professor Semmel fails to make his case largely because his book, despite its impressive scholarship, is not ordered by a precise, well-argued view of what constitutes imperialism. He seems to reject the view that a free trade policy is necessarily imperialistic, or that it was imperialistic due to the great disparity between the industrial development of England and that of her trading partners. The basic, but largely unexamined assumption of his argument is that the anti-colonial Free Traders were imperialistic because they desired to preserve and extend the "industrial predominance" (p. 149) of England, to strengthen her position as the "Workshop of the World." But since he does not argue that a strict free trade policy necessarily, or as its leading proponents understood it, involved control over, exploitation of, or large capital exports to foreign nations, it is not clear why such an economic policy is imperialistic.

Some of the evidence cited, but not adequately discussed, in this book indicates that many Free Traders combined an economic policy of expansive free trade with a political commitment to empire, i.e., to making Britain predominant in power and prestige. By essentially confining himself to a history of economic thought and policy, Professor Semmel has been prevented from giving us a full account of the instances of mid-Victorian imperialism which he has uncovered.

In his perceptive final chapter it becomes clear that, although he disagrees with Hobson's and Schumpeter's view that "imperialism was thoroughly out of line with the temper of capitalism in its classic period," (p. 217) Professor Semmel basically agrees with them that capitalism is not inevitably imperialistic. If the Free Traders had understood, as Hobson did, that a more "equitable distribution of national income" provides an internal solution to the problem of capitalist glut they could have combined a modest free trade policy with one of income redistribution. The equalitarian welfare state has ended the need for capitalist imperialism.

Kirk R. Emmert

Bowdoin College

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917 to 1930. By Antony C. Sutton. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Publications, 1968. P. 381.)

This is a delightful book for those who like anachronistic museum pieces breathing the fiery spirit of the Cold War of the 1950s. Sutton's basic hypothesis is "that Soviet economic development for 1917–1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid" (p. 283). Chapters 2 through 15 of the book are long and tedious discussions of each major industry designed to convince the reader that this is so. Chapter 2 asserts that the Caucasus oil fields were totally dependent on Western technological aid for development in the 1920s.

The same assertion is made for the coal and anthracite mining industries (Chapter 3), the metallurgical industries (Chapter 4), the nonferrous metal mining and smelting industries (Chapter 5), gold mining, platinum, and asbestos (Chapter 6), agriculture (Chapter 7), fishing, hunting, and canning (Chapter 8), lumbering (Chapter 9), machine building (Chapter 10), electricity and electrical equipment (Chapter 11), chemical, gas, and dye industries (Chapter 12), food, clothing, and housing industries (Chapter 13), transportation and transport equipment (Chapter 14), and military production (Chapter 15).

There is very little pretense of objectivity in this polemic. Although a great deal of "evidence" is presented, none of it is comprehensive, and all of it falls into the category of casual empiricism. Sutton's main sources of data are the U.S. State Department, the German Foreign Ministry, and Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (and an "economic analysis" by Scotland Yard!—p. 295). Thus, even the "facts" are suspect since the natural bias of the official U.S. and German Archives would certainly be toward overemphasis on the degree of their contributions to Soviet development.

It must also be noted that Sutton's is a peculiar use of the "aid" concept, since the capitalist governments all did their best to prevent any trade of any sort with the Soviet Union in the early years—and only the greed of individual capitalists broke through that barrier. This "aid," therefore, was not gifts to the Soviet Union, but very carefully drawn commercial agreements, paid for by precious foreign currency.

Of course, the Soviet Union was a backward country before the revolution, and did borrow much technology from the West, mostly bought and paid for through the nose. But Sutton goes much further, pushing the point in an exaggerated rhetoric: "The Western contribution to Soviet production between 1917 and 1930 was total. No important process has been isolated which was not a West-to-East transfer" (p. 340). Of course, where else would they have found the technology in those days? The trouble is that Sutton implies from that truism that the main efforts to rebuild and expand the Soviet economy came from Western capitalists rather than the Soviet people. One should rather emphasize that their sacrifices were bitter and hard to take, beginning with the vast amount of agricultural produce that had to be exported to pay for Western machinery and technology (and ending with the Stalinist dictatorship that enforced these sacrifices).

In order to show that the Bolsheviks and the Soviet people did nothing, and foreigners did everything, Sutton totally rewrites history in several other respects. First, he argues that Tsarist Russia wasn't so bad, that it was really quite developed economically (p. 345). Yet this was a country that had almost all the characteristics we currently associate with underdeveloped countries: more than 80 per cent of the population was rural and agricultural and illiterate, most of the small amount of modern industry was owned and run by foreigners, and the transportation network was tiny and inefficient.

Second, Sutton admits that most experts have always thought that the collapse of Russian industry in 1917–1922 was due to World War I, the effect of two revolutions, many peasant uprisings, the anti-Bolshevik military intervention by 14 foreign capitalist powers including the United States, and the Civil War fought by all the forces of the counter-revolution. (See, e.g., Howard Sherman, *The Soviet Economy* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1969], chapter 3.) But he airily dismisses these minor dislocations. Instead, he claims: "The basic cause for the collapse was the economic illiteracy of an ideology which had neglected to think out its economic counterpart and drove a viable growing economy into a shambles" (p. 310). Thus, he finds that socialism caused the catastrophic decline, while foreign capitalists produced the recovery. One might wonder, though, just what kind of "viable growing economy" could exist in the midst of a world war, two revolutions, Civil War, and foreign intervention—even assuming the best possible economic ideology?

In emphasizing the importance of Western benevolence, he does modestly admit that technology is not the "only factor in economic development. Political, social, and psychological factors play their respective roles. This interplay is particularly interesting in the Soviet example but is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this study" (p. 4). Since he doesn't hesitate to make broad generalizations about many political events, this is a strange modesty. It simply gives him an out from considering the main trouble with his thesis. Soviet industrialization involved not only the importation of a minor amount of foreign machinery and technology; it also involved a major change of the society from capitalism to socialism and planning.

Many other underdeveloped countries have received large amounts of foreign investment and large amounts of free aid in the half-century since the Soviet Union began its industrialization. Why have none of these been successful? Why are India and Pakistan and Africa and Latin America still at abysmally low levels, while the Soviet Union is the world's second industrial power? Does this have something to do with the difference between capitalism and socialism? How did this one underdeveloped country achieve success with only minor foreign imports whereas others have so far failed with major foreign imports including free aid? Not only was the Soviet Union socialist economically, but there is also the fact (which Sutton clearly doesn't like) that it confiscated foreign capital, whereas all the others allowed continued imperialist domination.

In addition to the major thesis of the book, several other aspects reveal the author's bias. At several points in the book, Sutton seems to imply that it is a bad thing that the United States ever decided to allow any trade with the Soviet Union, and he hints at support for U.S. government restrictions on Soviet trade. Second, and closely related, he slanders all the American capitalists who participated in early trade agreements with the USSR. Thus, it turns out (on the sole basis of State Department files) that Charles H. Smith was "more or less" a Soviet agent (p. 284) as was Julius Hammer, and Ludwig Martens, and several others who wanted trade with the Soviet Union. It sounds more like a CIA fairy tale than a scholarly study.

Finally, based again mainly on "unbiased"

State Department files, he convicts most of the Soviet leaders of personal corruption in relation to the foreign concessions, including here slanderous attacks on Trotsky, Zinoviev, Chicherin, and Dzerzhinsky (p. 308). Moreover, just to show no bias against Trotsky, he also tosses in an attack (on the basis of no evidence whatsoever) on the personal corruption of Stalin and all the Soviet leadership of the later period as well (p. 309).

Howard J. Sherman
University of California, Riverside

Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy. By Francis O. Wilcox. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Pp. 179. $5.95.)

Francis Wilcox has produced the fair-minded study of the American foreign-policy process that one might have expected from an able scholar with substantial experience on both the legislative and the executive sides of that process. His treatment is pragmatic and constructive, with a dash of wit and much of that wisdom which derives from mature appreciation of the complexities of the process and tolerant understanding of the foibles and frailties of those involved in it.

Wilcox refrains from invoking abstract principles, simplistic slogans, or legalistic formulas pertaining to executive-legislative relations in the foreign-policy field. He offers several much-needed reminders: that debates concerning the legal competence of the two branches more often reflect substantive disagreement than differences in constitutional interpretation; that congressional inclinations regarding foreign policy are not uniformly or consistently more (or less) moderate, constructive, or "liberal" than those of the executive branch; that making policy conform to the "people's will" is not a simple matter of honoring the wishes of Congress, following the judgment of the president, acceding to the demands of articulate groups, or interpreting the results of elections or public opinion polls; and that somewhere between the extremes of tying the hands of the president and giving him a free hand lies our chance to secure essential presidential leadership.

Though the author insists, and this reviewer agrees, that the breakdown of consensus about the American role in the world is more the cause than the effect of controversy about the proper place of Congress in the making of foreign policy, he attaches great importance to the development of more meaningful consultation between executive and legislative branches and to the cultivation of a congressional involvement that can provide both independent criticism of and helpful support for executive ventures in world affairs. He is even-handed in apportioning blame for the present unfortunate state of interbranch relationships: the executive too often treats the Congress as a nuisance or an object of salesmanship, while legislators are frequently less disposed to consult about the making of policy than to interfere in its execution, unreliable in respecting legitimate needs for secrecy, and unwilling to share responsibility, when things go wrong, for policies that they have previously supported. The take-off/forced landing syndrome looms large in the current unpleasantness. The president is more interested in involving Congress in the potential forced landing than in the take-off, the Congress wishes to participate in the take-off but to remain aloof from any possible forced landing, and neither is likely to concede to the one-sided preference of the other. Wilcox is wisely concerned with *what* as well as *whom* to blame for the recurrent failure of the two branches to collaborate effectively. He treats inherent features of our governmental system and of international politics along with the failings of presidents, bureaucrats, congressmen, and representatives of the media as sources of difficulty in the conduct of foreign relations.

Consensus is essential for effective foreign policy, but the right to dissent and the right to change one's mind are also high values in a democratic society. The most thorough consultation may not produce consensus, and the consensual foundations of policy may dissolve at critical moments. What should be done when consensus cannot be reached, or when it falls apart? The duty of statesmen to act in accordance with what they regard as the state's basic necessities, and their obligation to perform responsibly even when the going gets rough are no less fundamental than the rights to withhold and to withdraw support from policy. The urgency of rebuilding consensus should be recognized, but so should the necessity of carrying on American foreign relations when consensus does not exist. If the peculiar merit of Congress is responsiveness to the popular will, that of the president is willingness to bear responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. The ideal must be to blend responsiveness and responsibility. Wilcox has obviously given deep thought, and his book stimulates the reader to give deep thought, to the perplexing problems of achieving that ideal.

Inis L. Claude, Jr.
University of Virginia

NEW

1973

APSA Biographical Directory

The sixth edition of the APSA Biographical Directory has been published and copies may now be ordered for immediate delivery. The Directory includes complete, up-to-date names and addresses of approximately 12,500 individual APSA members as well as biographical information on over 7,000 political scientists. The Directory also includes appendices classifying members by geographical location and fields of interest.

ORDER FORM

NAME: ____

ADDRESS: ______________________________________

______________________________ ZIP ____________

PRICE LIST

APSA MEMBERS:	☐ Hardback,	$10.00
	☐ Paperback,	$7.50
NON-MEMBER:	☐ Hardback,	$15.00
	☐ Paperback,	$12.50

Send form with payment (prepaid) to:

1973 APSA Biographical Directory
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance
- $15,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50.
- Optional Dependent Life Coverage.

Accidental Death and Specific Loss
- Worldwide Coverage.
- Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

Hospital Cash Plan
- $20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized.
- Payable for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement.
- Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization.
- Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer.

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?

If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 5th of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.

Name ______________________

OLD ADDRESS ______________ NEW ADDRESS ______________

______________________ ______________________

______________________ ______________________

__________ (Zip) __________ __________ (Zip) __________

For students of politics and government of all fields of interest

Midwest Political Science Association

The Midwest Political Science Association is devoted to scholarly and professional interchange, has a national membership and is oriented to the entire discipline.

Membership includes:

- The MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, a respected scholarly quarterly, which publishes the latest research on a wide variety of subjects and reviews outstanding books.
- Annual Meetings, with stimulating programs of current interest. 1973 Annual Meeting May 3-5, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.
- Professional placement service at the Annual Meeting at no additional charge.

Annual Dues:

Professional $10.00 ☐ Student $6.00 ☐ Family $14.00 ☐
Retired $7.50 ☐

Name____________________________

Mailing Address______________________

______________Zip Code______________

Affiliation__________________________

Fields of Interest______________________

____

Send with remittance to:

Jean M. Driscoll
Secretary-Treasurer
Midwest Political Science
Association
North Park College
5125 N. Spaulding
Chicago, Illinois 60624

Checks payable to Midwest Political Science Association

Registry of Retired Professors

The Association has established a Registry of Retired Professors. The Registry serves as an information exchange for those retired professors who are willing to teach one or more courses on a one-semester or one-year basis, and those institutions desiring to make such appointments. Any retired professor wishing to be listed in the Registry should contact the Association to receive an application form. Departmental chairmen wishing to inquire about the availability of retired professors in a certain specialty or geographic area should write specifying their requirements.

Director, Registry of Retired Professors
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

JUST PUBLISHED BY APSA

A GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
1973

The 2nd edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science, containing information on admissions policies, costs and financial aid, and fields of specialization.

$2.50 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

JOIN APSA

membership includes:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science, and

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 4-8, 1973, New Orleans.

Name ______________________________

Mailing Address ______________________________

______________________________ (Zip) __________

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and PS.

Student	$10	☐
Annual if your annual income is under $12,000	$20	☐
$12-15,000	$25	☐
over $15,000	$30	☐

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Add $1 for foreign postage.

APSA HOSPITAL CASH PLAN

The American Political Science Association announces its new low cost group Hospital Cash Plan designed to provide participants with a cash payment of $20.00 or $40.00 a day depending upon the program selected. The Plan, underwritten by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., pays for every hospitalized day for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement. Benefits are doubled if the participant is hospitalized for cancer.

For further information on the APSA Group Hospital Cash Plan write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

PERSONNEL SERVICE

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a clearinghouse, bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to members of the Association and to Political Science Departments. Membership in the Service, which includes a subscription to the monthly Newsletter, is $6.00 per year. Membership in the Credential Referral Service of the Personnel Service is an additional $8.00.

NEWSLETTER

A Newsletter, listing openings for political scientists including teaching, administrative and research openings, is mailed monthly to all Personnel Service members. Positions are listed by institution with a brief description of each opening.

CREDENTIAL REFERRAL SERVICE

A file will be maintained at the Association office for all members of the Credential Referral Service. This file will include a résumé, a dissertation abstract and/or a list of publications, and up to three letters of reference for each member. Referrals are made upon the request of a member or of an institution.

EMPLOYERS USING THE SERVICE

The Association's Council has adopted a policy that it is a professional obligation of all political science departments to list publicly all vacancies in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter for which they are recruiting except those vacancies at the association and full professor levels which departments expect to fill from among people known to them. There is no cost to the institution listing its vacancies with the Service. Forms for listing openings in the Newsletter are available from the Personnel Service.

For further information concerning the Personnel Service write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The International Political Science Association Invitation to Membership—1973

The International Political Science Association welcomes political scientists as members. The Association, founded in 1949, is composed of three categories of members: individuals, institutions and national associations.

Membership in the Association of $4.00 a year entitles members to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to purchase material published under ISPA auspices—including the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, published annually by Stevens in London and sets of papers submitted at IPSA meetings at reduced cost; and to register at IPSA meetings at lower rates.

Individual members who pay a higher membership fee of $12.00 a year are, in addition, entitled to receive either the *International Political Science Abstracts* published bi-monthly by the Association itself or the *International Social Science Journal*, the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO. To join the Association send your name and check to the International Political Science Association, 27 rue Saint Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.

FROM THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE

Available Fall 1973

Issues of Electoral Reform, Edited by Richard J. Carlson. Ten original essays on voting rights, voter registration and the administration of elections.

1. VOTING AND DEMOCRACY
   Gerald M. Pomper
   Livingston College, Rutgers University
2. THE SUPREME COURT AND VOTING RIGHTS
   James F. Blumstein
   Vanderbilt University
3. THE FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS ACTS
   Richard Claude
   University of Maryland, College Park
4. VOTING UNDER THE TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT
   Charlotte Rose, Frontlash, Inc.
   Henry Maurer, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers
5. BLACK VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE SOUTH
   John Lewis
   The Voter Education Project, Inc.
6. PROFESSIONALIZING THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS
   Richard G. Smolka
   The American University
7. COMPUTERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
   W. Edward Weems, Jr.
   National Scientific Corporation
8. THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL VOTER ENROLLMENT
   Penn Kimball
   The Graduate School of Journalism Columbia University
9. ELECTION REFORM: THE PERSPECTIVE OF 40 YEARS
   Joseph P. Harris
10. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA
    Richard Scammon, Elections Research Center
    Jeanne Richman, National Municipal League

Approx. $3.50

Also Available

A Model Election System. Recommendations for basic reform of state voter registration procedures and the administration of elections. Approx. $2.50

The Cost of Administering American Elections, Richard G. Smolka, The American University. An analysis of the administrative costs of elections. Approx. $3.50

National Municipal League
Carl H. Pforzheimer Building
47 East 68th Street, New York, New York 10021

New from BALLINGER

LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF POWER: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FORECASTING
Oskar Morgenstern, *New York University,* **Klaus Knorr,** *Princeton University* and
Klaus Heiss, *Princeton University*
Offers projections of the future, to approximately the year 2000, and examines how these projections may be relevant for guiding research and development in technology for the future environment.
0-88410-008-1 192 pp. October $9.50

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM
John Fayerweather, *editor, New York University*
Leading international businessmen and academics offer a comprehensive analysis of current thinking about the varied facets of relations between multinational firms and governments.
0-88410-256-4 144 pp. November $12.50

MINORITY ENTERPRISE AND THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL
Anne Huff & Samuel I. Doctors, *Northwestern University*
One component for increased minority participation in the American economy is the President's Advisory Council for Minority Business Enterprise. Doctors and Huff consider the need for PACMBE, outline a detailed plan for minority participation, and look at PACMBE as an example of the presidential advisory process.
0-8410-002-2 192 pp. October $12.50

FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING AND THE CITIES
Ray D. Whitman, *University of Maryland*
The first full length economic analysis of revenue sharing, offering a history of the revenue sharing proposal, an analysis of the theoretical framework of the proposal, an interpretation of the fiscal and socio-economic data which bear on the need for and distribution of funds, and studies the effect of revenue sharing on federal, state and local governments. 0-88410-250-5 285 pp. December $15.00

POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF RURAL POVERTY IN THE SOUTH
Arthur M. Ford, *S. Illinois University,* Introduction by **Robert L. Heilbroner**
An approach to the study of poverty which rejects the traditional socio-economic views of poverty that hold "cultural deviation" as its cause. Concludes that a new method is needed to understand the phenomenon, one which comes to grips with the nature and use of power. 0-88410-005-7 128 pp. September $10.00

CLEARING THE AIR: FEDERAL POLICY ON AUTOMOTIVE EMISSIONS CONTROL
Henry D. Jacoby, *MIT,* **John Steinbruner,** *Harvard University*
A policy analysis focusing on the series of decisions that now face the government in carrying out its policy on emissions control. Considers the major dimensions of the decisions, develops alternatives to the current policy, and compares the options in terms of their cost and effect on the pollution problem.
0-88410-301-3 288 pp. October $15.00

ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Gary S. Posz, *U.S. Department of State,* **Jong S. Jun,** *California State University of Hayward,* and
William B. Storm, *University of Southern California*
Based on extensive interviews with overseas technical personnel of the U.S. Agency for International Development and review of the pertinent literature the authors draw specific conclusions about the effectiveness of AID and offer an application of contemporary organization theory to the problem of constructing a new strategy for world development. 0-88410-004-9 128 pp. September $10.00

OIL AND THE OUTER COASTAL SHELF: THE GEORGES BANK CASE
Foreword by **Richard Neustadt**
William R. Ahern, *Harvard University*
Deals with the need for more oil and the possibility of off-shore drilling on the Georges Bank. Compares the risks to the environment of drilling as opposed to the uses of tankers and deep-water ports, the costs to consumers, and the technological and geological problems of off-shore drilling.
0-88410-303-x December $10.00

THE DYNAMICS OF POPULATION POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
edited by **Terry L. McCoy,** *Ohio State University*
A comprehensive analysis of contemporary population policies and programs dealing with fertility and growth. The contributors examine the factors that shape governmental and societal responses to the population challenge and study the actual policies of Columbia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. 0-88410-350-1 320 pp. October $15.00

PSRO: ORGANIZATION FOR REGIONAL PEER REVIEW
Barry Decker, M.D. & Paul Bonner, *Arthur D. Little, Inc.*
Develops conceptual models for the structure and function of prototype Professional Standards Review Organizations as described in the Social Security Amendments of 1972. Review of the pertinent literature and analyzes existing approaches to medical care appraisal. Includes a restatement in non-legal terms of the PSRO legislation. 0-88410-105-3 384 pp. September $15.00

write for a complete list of Ballinger titles

Ballinger Publishing Company
17 Dunster Street (Box APR), Harvard Square
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Aldine Fall Synopsis

Political Alienation and Political Behavior. *David Schwartz (Rutgers).* This work presents the causes for political alienation and the results of alienation in bevarioral patterns. He challenges accepted theories of social status and economic difficulties and develops a completely new three-variable psychological theory explaining alienation based on the following observations: threat from value conflict, perceived personal inefficacy, and perceived systemic inefficacy. His theory includes a process model for predicting political behavior. 368pp. $9.95

Housing Urban America. *Jon Pynoos, Chester Hartman, Robert Schafer. (Pynoos and Schafer: Joint Center For Urban Studies, Cambridge, Mass. Hartman: Institute For Urban And Regional Development, University of California.)* This interdisciplinary reader of over fifty articles focuses on the analysis of the multidimensional aspects of housing. These three experts in the field of urban planning have edited articles from the 1960's and 1970's, several of which were written specifically for this volume, with interest in the economic, social, and political factors that account for poor housing and provide policies and strategies that may be brought to bear to improve conditions in these areas. Discoveries for better understanding are provided in housing markets, the production of housing, and the distribution of its services over the population. A balanced housing analysis is supplied between theory, empirical verification and policy. The five sections of the book are: politics, social aspects, economics, production, and policies and programs. The bibliography contains a selective list of post 1960 articles and books plus important earlier works. 682pp. $25.00

Mathematics Of Collective Action. James Coleman (Johns Hopkins University). Besides discussing the general behavioral perspectives of the causal process and that of purpose, the author provides new developments in mathematical sociology. He introduces the formal study of collective decisions to social scientists with new theoretical principles on collective decisions. 204pp. $9.75

The Unesco International Bibliography of Political Science 1971. This annual work is now available and provides information on all important aspects of international political science literature. It's a vital element for a national reference library. Prepared by the complete Committee for Social Sciences International Documentation. $15.00 Cloth.

Rules And Law In Sociology. Robert Brown (Australian National University). Four main elements in sociological investigation are discussed: definitions, properties, generalizations, explanations and conclusions. Every social scientist and some philosophers must cope with the problems which these topics raise. He attempts to clarify the consequences, for both sociological generalizations and explanation, of the adoption of certain kinds of definitions or of utilizing certain sorts of properties. 192pp. $7.95

Aldine Publishing Company
529 South Wabash Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60605

Title(s) ________

☐ Payment enclosed
☐ BankAmericard # ________
☐ American Express # ________

Any book may be returned within 10 days for a prompt and full refund or cancellation of charges.

Name ________
Address ________
City ________ State ________ Zip ________

Cornell
University
Press

KEEP UP TO DATE
IN THE POLITICAL WORLD...

BILL OF RIGHTS READER
5th Edition—1973, Revised

Edited by MILTON R. KONVITZ. Revised once again, this well-known book remains a comprehensive, up-to-date survey of the ways in which the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights have been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Forty-eight new cases are included on such currently pertinent topics as the Pentagon papers, the death penalty, the so-called parochaid legislation, the rights of prisoners and of the poor, and some affirmative action aspects of school desegregation.
$19.50

THE POLITICS OF CEYLON (SRI LANKA) by ROBERT N. KEARNEY



Focusing on institutional change and adaptation to modernization, this book offers a systematic analysis of the political system of Ceylon (recently renamed the Republic of Sri Lanka) as it has evolved since 1948. Professor Kearney examines the structure and functioning of the legislature, cabinet, and bureaucracy, as well as the nature of the party and electoral systems, election campaigns, and voting. Of particular interest are extended discussions of the 1971 insurrection and the new constitution adopted in 1972.
(South Asian Political Systems series) $13.50

JAPANESE POLITICS—AN INSIDE VIEW
Readings from Japan

Translated and edited by HIROSHI ITOH. Some of Japan's most eminent political commentators and scholars are represented in this collection of nine empirical studies on Japanese policymaking at the local, national, and international levels. Together with the editor's introductions and cogent comments, the essays provide insights into the unique and effective Japanese political system. $3.95, paper; $15.00, cloth

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON dorsey **Poli Sci**

BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS

RALPH M. GOLDMAN, *California State University, San Francisco*

Analyzes the major institutions of American national government from the perspectives suggested by a number of behavioral science concepts, such as linguistics, organization theory, communication, decision making, yet presents traditional American politics material. *$5.95 / Paperback*

AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL SCIENCE

DAVID H. EVERSON, *Sangamon State University,* and JOANN P. PAINE, *Southern Illinois University*

Introduces students to the basic concepts of political science at the introductory level, rather than waiting until upper division courses. Focuses on how to *think* about politics. *$5.95 / Paperback*

PUBLIC OPINION: MICRO AND MACRO

JAMES J. BEST, *University of Washington*

Examines public opinion from an individual perspective as well as a societal phenomenon. A comprehensive review and critique of the relevant literature in the field. *$4.95 / Paperback*

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Response to a Sense of Threat

HENRY T. NASH, *Hollins College*

America's military response to the threat of Communism since World War II has determined foreign policy since that time. Analyzes this response, and examines policy changes through the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. *$4.95 / Paperback*

CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Political Roles of the Supreme Court

VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Northwestern University,* and A. DIDRICK CASTBERG, *California State University, Los Angeles*

Covers the political relationships between the Supreme Court and other branches of government, as well as the people and state and local government. Cases preserve as much of the original decision as possible. *$12.00*

For examination copies write:

THE DORSEY PRESS
Homewood, Illinois 60430

REFORM RULE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Dubcek Era 1968-1969

GALIA GOLAN

"Dr. Golan weaves together an impressive amount of relevant information from Czechoslovak sources in an illuminating, in-depth account of the political and intellectual drama, and provides a scholarly, sensitive interpretation of the Czechoslovak experiment in reform politics." —*Perspective*. A sequel to Dr. Golan's *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (1971). $18.50

THE SCOTTISH POLITICAL SYSTEM

JAMES G. KELLAS

"This book fulfills a longstanding need. It challenges the conventional view of Britain as a unitary, homogeneous polity by convincingly demonstrating the existence of a distinct Scottish political system. This has important implications for the study of British government generally." —*Library Journal* Cloth $12.50 Paper $4.45

THE DYNAMICS OF INDIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS

A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra

MARY C. CARRAS

An analysis of factionalism in two rival groups within the dominant Congress Party. The study suggests that the factional behavior of some 160 councillors interviewed corresponds with national (or calculable) economic interests, thus challenging a common assumption that Indian political alignments are determined by factors such as personal, family or caste loyalties. $19.50

THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria

KENNETH W. J. POST and GEORGE D. JENKINS

An account of decolonialization in Nigeria which is in part a biography of Adegoke Adelabu, describing both his public personality and the behind-the-scenes political operations. "Gives the reader a fine and vibrant sense of the rough and tumble of Nigerian politics."—*Perspective* $27.50

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

BALFOUR: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

SYDNEY H. ZEBEL

Professor Zebel examines the two distinct periods in Balfour's political career: the first covering his service as Chief Secretary for Ireland, Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister; the second as First Lord of the Admiralty, Foreign Secretary and Lord President of the Council. "A fine work of scholarship . . . it greatly enhances our understanding of an important British politician."—*Library Journal*

$14.95

TURGOT ON PROGRESS, SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Translated and edited by RONALD L. MEEK

New translations of *The Successive Advances of the Human Mind, Reflections on the Formation and the Distribution of Wealth,* and *On Universal History.* Professor Meek's introduction analyzes the interrelationship of Turgot's political, economic and sociological theories.

Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics $12.50

JEAN BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY

JULIAN H. FRANKLIN

"A major contribution to an understanding of Bodin's political ideas."—*Library Journal.* In this new study, Professor Franklin traces the development of Bodin's thought from the tentatively constitutionalist position expressed in his *Methodus* to the absolutist stand of the *Republique,* placing in perspective his influence on 17th-century absolutist doctrine. $8.95

TEACHERS' UNIONS AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

DAVID COATES

A study of the teachers' unions of England and Wales from 1915 to the 1960's. The author differentiates between questions of "behavior" and "influence" and relates the behavior of organized teachers to that of other interest groups. Cloth $10.95 Paper $4.50

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Community Life Publications

CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES ON GOALS FOR GEORGIA by Dr. Tim C. Ryles marks the advent of an exciting new series of publications examining community life in all its aspects. *COMMUNITY LIFE PUBLICATIONS* is the title of the series being published under the auspices of the School of Urban Life at Georgia State University in Atlanta. The monographs of the series will come from the research of the School of Urban Life as its faculty and students apply academic theory to the urban community laboratory.

In this first volume Dr. Ryles, a political scientist, reports the results of a citizen attitude survey conducted through the Goals for Georgia Program. Dr. Ryles analyzes citizen attitudes toward public health, public education, economic development, social development, protection of persons and property, transportation, natural environment, and taxes and spending. The final two chapters have the provocative titles: "Political Efficacy: Do People Really Matter in Georgia Politics?" and "Followers' Perceptions of Leaders: Political Trust." The author includes the full text of the interview questionnaire in the appendices—as well as explanatory narrative and analysis of the data. The results provide a microcosm of citizen attitudes in the South if not in the nation.

Future volumes in the *Community Life Publications* series will continue to explore the citizen attitude theme as well as themes in such areas as land use and planning, public finance, urban history, and criminal justice systems.

Order this first volume (PRICE: $5.00) and future volumes from:

COMMUNITY LIFE PUBLICATIONS
SCHOOL OF URBAN LIFE, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
33 GILMER STREET, S. E. ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

new policies new politics new viewpoints

AN END TO HIERARCHY!
AN END TO COMPETITION!
Organizing the Politics and Economics of Survival
Frederick C. Thayer,
University of Pittsburgh

Professor Thayer demonstrates that hierarchy and competition are the fundamental causes of alienation in America today, and that an organizational revolution which will sweep them away is now taking place:

"Professor Thayer has a truly original mind–well worth reading." *The Washington Monthly*
$2.95 paperback (05552-3)
$9.95 cloth (05351-2)

FINANCING ELECTIONS
The Politics of an American Ruling Class
David Nichols

No book in American political science has so incisively related the question of the class structure in American society to the electoral process and, of timely interest, to the way in which national elections are financed.
$3.95 paperback (05553-1)
$9.95 cloth (05352-0)

THE GREAT NIXON TURNAROUND:
America's New Foreign Policy in the Post-Liberal Era
Edited by Lloyd Gardner,
Rutgers University

Linking the sudden thaw in America's anti-communist policy to the troubled economic situation, Professor Gardner concludes that the Cold War was simply no longer capable of sustaining either America's power or her prosperity. He traces the softening of Nixon's anti-communist rhetoric, and shows why he was the right man to end a Cold War liberals began.
$3.95 paperback (05551-5)

NEW VIEWPOINTS, A Division of Franklin Watts, Inc., 730 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10019

New from Columbia

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM

William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling, Editors

A collection of essays prepared for an Institute of War and Peace Studies project on problems of European security, particularly as they relate to the progress made by the North Atlantic countries in the field of arms control.

Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University $10.00

AMERICAN ARMS AND A CHANGING EUROPE
Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament

Warner R. Schilling, William T. R. Fox, Catherine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala

A companion volume to *European Security and the Atlantic System,* this book analyzes the problems and choices the United States will face in the decade ahead in the pursuit of three goals: European security, strategic security, and arms control.

Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
$12.00 cloth; $3.95 paper

AID TO RUSSIA 1941-1946
Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War

George C. Herring, Jr.

A re-examination of the evolution of American policies for lend-lease and aid to Russian reconstruction within the context of the formation, development, and subsequent breakdown of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Contemporary American History Series $15.00

SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS
Volume One: Soviet-Middle East Relations

Charles B. McLane

A comprehensive and detailed survey of the Soviet Union's political, economic, and cultural relations with the countries of the Middle East since 1955. This is the first of a three-volume series sponsored by the Central Asian Research Centre in London. $15.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

New from Columbia

THE PRESIDENCY IN FLUX

George E. Reedy

An extraordinarily timely new book by the author of *The Twilight of the Presidency.*

"[*The Presidency in Flux*] is rich in relevance and right on target in its prognostications."—John Barkham, *Barkham Reviews*

"This thoughtful discussion of the modern presidency, its isolation, its arrogance, its designation of all but one as servants, could be a diagnosis of the malignancy that is Watergate. It should be 'must' reading for those truly concerned with the future of the nation—if it is to be one possessing integrity."—William Flynn, *San Francisco Examiner*

$5.95

PEARL HARBOR AS HISTORY

Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941

Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, Editors

Papers prepared by Japanese and American scholars, examining the part played by government and non-governmental institutions in the making of foreign policy in Japan and the United States during a crucial decade.

Studies of the East Asian Institute $25.00

Now available in paperback:

THE LATIN AMERICAN TRADITION

Essays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin American Culture

Charles Wagley

Aiming at the removal of barriers to understanding, the essays in this volume explain the Latin American culture and its regional/internal subcultures for Anglo-Americans.

$3.95

AFRICAN ELITE

The Big Men of a Small Town

Joan Vincent

Based on field work in Teso, Uganda, this book is invaluable for its distinction of method in capturing processes of change in a rural community presently made up of 19 different ethnic groups. $4.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

THE GOOD FIGHT

By Shirley Chisholm. What it was like to be the first black and first woman to run for President: her feelings about party factionalism, black and white conservatism, changing the status quo—and President Nixon. "An idealistic yet hard-headed testament mixing inside stories with hard-won human and political wisdom."—*Publishers Weekly*. Illustrated. $6.95

THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Some Personal Observations

By John D. Rockefeller 3rd. "One of the most penetrating studies on the American society and one of the most courageous."—*U Thant* "A marvelous job of looking at the many sides of a very complex problem and analyzing them with admirable balance and encouraging optimism."—*Edwin O. Reischauer*. $6.50

LETTERS FROM PRISON BY ANTONIO GRAMSCI

Selected, translated, and introduced by Lynne Lawner. In English for the first time, these letters written during Gramsci's ten years in Fascist jails are "a magnificent introduction to the mind of the twentieth century's greatest Marxist thinker. They teach us how to live and—what comes to the same thing—how to die."—*Eugene Genovese*. Illustrated. $10.00

JOHN STRACHEY

By Hugh Thomas. A powerful biography of the brilliant, mercurial British politician and leftist spokesman who died in 1963. Mr. Thomas probes every aspect of his long and varied career, its reflections of leftwing politics in the war and depression-torn 1930s and 1940s, and of postwar British-American relations in the 1950s. Just published, $8.50

EUROPE: THE RADICAL CHALLENGE

By Hugh Thomas. With uncommon good sense a major political writer looks hopefully toward a united Europe, exploring the problems of Britain's entry into the Common Market, the chances of federalism, the desirability of a unified defense policy, and possible relations with the United States and the Third World. "Wide-ranging and tersely written."—*Roy Jenkins, British Labour Party*. $8.50

At bookstores
Harper & Row
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022
1817

From THE FREE PRESS

HANDBOOK OF SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA

Edited by Ellen Mickiewicz, Michigan State University

For the first time, the Western scholar can use Soviet data with confidence in its accuracy and exhaustiveness. This pioneering volume brings together massive amounts of data on demography, agriculture, production, health, housing, education, communication, and international interaction in Soviet Society. It is "a fundamentally important work of a kind and quality that has not been available before in the field of Soviet studies . . . a major step toward the possibility of true comparative and political analysis."—Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University, from the Foreword

1973 225 pages $14.95

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: A Comparative Handbook

Edited by Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (with 14 contributors)

This indispensable reference book provides a systematic description and analysis of the relation between social structure, party systems and electoral behavior in major Western nations: the United States, Canada, Ireland, Britain, Germany, Italy, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

1973 765 pages $25.00

INTERNATIONAL THEORY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By Charles Pentland, Queens University, Ontario

This book is a sophisticated and thorough analysis of both theory at the international level and development at the level of European integration. Pluralist, functionalist, neofunctionalist, and federalist approaches are each examined in depth. The author determines not only the areas of compatibility but also the points of difference among these major approaches to integration theory.

1973 288 pages $10.95

THE FREE PRESS
A DIVISION OF MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.
100D Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

New Books for a New Political Science

ARK II

Social Response to Environmental Imperatives

DENNIS PIRAGES, University of California, San Diego, and PAUL R. EHRLICH, Stanford University

Written by a social scientist and a biologist, this book is intended to put the environmental crisis into social and political perspective and to make the subject of limits to growth understandable to students in the social sciences. The book is unique in its focus on the future and on possible social (as opposed to technological) solutions. Provocative supplementary reading for introductory courses in political science, sociology, economics, environmental studies, social ecology, and other areas.

Publication date: Winter 1973 Paperbound.

Power and Community in World Politics

BRUCE M. RUSSETT, Yale University

A collection of articles by one of the world's foremost authorities on macro-analysis of international affairs. Among the topics discussed are the changing nature of international politics, strategic and military policy, and efforts to develop a peaceful world. Excellent supplementary reading for all courses in international relations and for advanced courses in methodology.

Publication date: Winter 1973 Paper and cloth.

Strategy for a Living Revolution

GEORGE LAKEY

Here is the book that those who are interested in nonviolent social change have been searching for. Lakey, a prominent Quaker activist, is specific and concise and offers detailed suggestions for organized action.

"This book gives a clear understanding of nonviolence as an effective means for developing a mass movement for change and leaves no doubt about the hard work required to bring it about." —Cesar Chavez

1973, 234 pages, paperbound, $2.95

ARMS CONTROL

Readings from SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

With Introductions by HERBERT F. YORK, University of California, San Diego

Compiled and introduced by one of the most respected authorities in the field of arms control and disarmament, this collection of articles offers a broad introduction to arms control questions that have arisen since the second world war.

1973, 427 pages, 232 illustrations,
cloth $12.00, paper $5.95

Now available as a paperback:

BEYOND THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY

Operant Conditioning: Social and Political Aspects

Edited by HARVEY WHEELER, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

A collection of diverse perspectives on the work of B. F. Skinner and its far-reaching political implications.

"We must decide how much credence to give Skinner's theories. I can imagine no better way to do this than to read the thoughtful evaluations from some of today's leading minds that are gathered together in *Beyond the Punitive Society*." —Clifton Fadiman

1973, 274 pages, cloth $8.95, paper $3.95

THE BELEAGUERED MINORITIES

Cultural Politics in America

S. J. MAKIELSKI, JR., Loyola University

While the old minorities and the political system have been able to accommodate one another during this century, discontent within the "beleaguered" groups of which the author speaks (blacks, Indians, Mexican-Americans, students, and women) is becoming increasingly obvious. This book is a lucid analysis of the dilemmas these minorities face in seeking political remedies. Important reading for any course in minority and urban studies and for introductory courses in American government and politics.

Publication date: Fall 1973 Paper and cloth.

PEACE AND WAR

Edited by CHARLES R. BEITZ and THEODORE HERMAN

With a Foreword by Alan Geyer, Colgate University

This stimulating anthology of essays results from the Colgate University Peace Studies program. Many of the readings are by former prominent policy makers and leaders (including Henry A. Kissinger, Robert S. McNamara, Che Guevara, and John Kenneth Galbraith). The collection's special focus on war and its prevention makes it especially appealing to today's students, who are interested in moral issues as well as the analytical approach to the study of war and conflict.

1973, 435 pages, cloth $11.95, paper $4.95

REGIONAL POLITICS AND WORLD ORDER

Edited by RICHARD A. FALK, Princeton University, and SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ, Rutgers University

This important collection of essays and original material by specialists on various aspects of international relations attempts to provide a basis for full-scale appraisal of the relevance of regional developments to the future of world order. Contributors include Roger Masters, Joseph S. Nye, Ernst B. Haas, and Bruce M. Russett.

1973, 486 pages, 7 illustrations,
cloth $12.00, paper $5.95

Write to Department H
W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY
660 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94104
58 Kings Road, Reading, England RG 1 3AA

New books on important subjects:

BEGINNINGS

PARTY AND FACTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1801 ***by Rudolph M. Bell.*** Vast new strata of information are uncovered, and unsuspected coalitions revealed. This quantitative analysis of actual voting records will revise simplistic views of our government's formative years. ***$13.95***

ANGLOPHOBIA

AMERICA FOR AMERICANS: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND ANGLOPHOBIA IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY ***by Edward P. Crapol.*** A strident economic nationalism called for commercial independence and for trade domination in this hemisphere. It intensified animosity for England throughout America. "An important contribution. . ." *–Library Journal* ***$12.50***

INFORMATION

LIBRARIES IN THE POLITICAL SCENE: GEORG LEYH AND GERMAN LIBRARIANSHIP, 1933-1953 ***by Marta L. Dosa.*** Political oppression, total war, and reconstruction brought crises to individuals and institutions. Original resources from Berlin's archives and Georg Leyh's family have provided insights new in English. ***$12.50***

COMMUNES

THE UNBOUNDED FRAME: FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN UTOPIANISM ***by Michael Fellman.*** Intellectuals of many persuasions sought to invent perfect communities, then disagreed on basic concepts. Analyzes utopian thought from Brisbane through Howells. "An important contribution to American intellectual history."

—Merle Curti ***$10.00***

RADICALS

ART AND POLITICS: CARTOONISTS OF THE *MASSES* AND *LIBERATOR* ***by Richard Fitzgerald.*** The period from 1911 to 1924 was an uneasy time. Radical publishing flourished in America. Fitzgerald examines five cartoonists and their work, for this study-in-depth: art in service of ideology. 60 illustrations. ***$14.50***

EXPEDIENCE

FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN: FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN BLACKS, 1861-1865 ***by Louis S. Gerteis.*** Slaves enveloped by Union lines served Federal purposes as a labor pool, regulated to forestall racial agitation. Expedient "emancipation" of blacks brought no real social reform. "A worthwhile addition. . ."*–Library Journal* ***$11.50***

DIPLOMACY

AMERICAN GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE OLD NAVY, 1877-1889 ***by Kenneth J. Hagan.*** What were the purposes of policing the world with old wooden warships: expansionism, ideology, commerce–or all of those? This well-rounded study is of value in comprehending the period. "The author has succeeded notably. . . .Scholarly history at its best!"

–Library Journal ***$11.50***

KNOWLEDGE

HUMAN MEMORY AND KNOWLEDGE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH ***by Glynn Harmon.*** Man's structures for the organization of knowledge follow a design constricted by his capacity for short-term memory. This analysis points toward means of predicting specific advances in knowledge. ***$9.50***

UNIONS

SAMUEL GOMPERS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1848-1896 ***by Stuart Bruce Kaufman.*** Analysis of writings by Gompers and those nearest him reveals Gompers' true intent was to modify Karl Marx's European design to suit the American circumstance. Will enliven a continuing debate. ***$11.50***

MILITARY

THE IMAGE OF THE ARMY OFFICER IN AMERICA: BACKGROUND FOR CURRENT VIEWS ***by C. Robert Kemble.*** This book surveys changes in America's attitudes toward its military careerists. Opinions from Washington's and Jefferson's to Mumford's and Mailer's are cited. "Unique and valuable contribution to the literature on the subject."

–Library Journal ***$10.75***

UNEMPLOYMENT

TRAMPS AND REFORMERS, 1873-1916: THE DISCOVERY OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK ***by Paul T. Ringenbach.*** Since Plymouth Rock, the vagrant had been thought to be a willful social threat. Not until the panics of 1893 and 1907 did reformers see correlation between the prevalence of tramps and the scarcity of jobs. ***$10.50***

MARYLANDERS

ROOTS OF MARYLAND DEMOCRACY, 1753-1776 ***by David Curtis Skaggs.*** A widespread poor tenantry, denied vote or office, surged in democratic revolution against the gentry leadership. Skaggs' conclusion is clear: many Marylanders fought the War of the Revolution primarily to change prevailing structures within the colony. ***$12.00***

TARIFFS

THE TARIFF, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1874-1901 ***by Tom E. Terrill.*** With neither one dominant, both major parties spotlighted tariff levels. Republicans aimed high, Democrats low. Then, boom and bust convinced both parties that prosperity hinged on foreign trade, and required an expansionist consensus. ***$12.00***

RACIAL PRIDE

EBONY KINSHIP: AFRICA, AFRICANS, AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN ***by Robert G. Weisbord.*** Black nationalism in America grows out of a 150-year search for black dignity, identity, prosperity. This book documents that search. Foreword by Floyd B. McKissick. "Worthwhile reading, especially since material on . . . the topic is so rare." *–Library Journal* ***$10.95***

Available from **GREENWOOD PRESS**

a division of Williamhouse-Regency Inc.

51 Riverside Avenue, Westport, Connecticut 06880 political science

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Third Edition

FELIX A. NIGRO & LLOYD G. NIGRO

The Third Edition of this comprehensive introduction to public administration has been thoroughly updated to include recent developments in the field. All chapters have been significantly revised, and a new chapter on values and public administration has been added. Written in nontechnical language, the book covers both theory and practice and relates administration to the social and other environments of government and to politics and the policy-making process. 468 pp.; $9.95. October, 1973.

TRADITION AND IDENTITY IN CHANGING AFRICA

MARK A. TESSLER, WILLIAM M. O'BARR, & DAVID H. SPAIN

This unique volume discusses the broad issues confronting three different African peoples experiencing rapid social change. The resulting identity crises are viewed from all levels of the social system through an integrated set of field studies. Each comparative account is presented in a common format and with a common theoretical focus. Empirical data which goes beyond the case study material introduce generalizations relevant to a broad range of issues. Tentative: 368 pp.; $4.95: paper. October, 1973.

New/Recent Volumes in
HARPER'S COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES
Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor

IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics

JOHN BRYAN STARR

Using principles of both western and Chinese political thought, this book provides a balanced introduction to contemporary Chinese government and politics. Political life in China at the local, regional, and national levels is described and interpreted. Similarities to other political systems are fully discussed. 320 pp.; $3.50: paper. July, 1973.

NIGERIAN POLITICS

JOHN M. OSTHEIMER

202 pp.; $2.95: paper. January, 1973.

FRENCH POLITICS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, Second Edition

ROY PIERCE

368 pp.; $3.50: paper. May, 1973.

PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: Political Democracy and Social Equality

SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE

428 pp.; $10.00. 1972.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study

HELIO JAGUARIBE

603 pp.; $11.95. January, 1973.

from harper & row

10 East 53d Street, New York 10022
1817

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

India's Revolution

Gandhi and the Quit India Movement

Francis G. Hutchins

Gandhi's Quit India movement of 1942 climaxed a nationalist revolutionary movement which sought independence on India's own terms. The author maintains that independence was attained through revolution, not through the benevolence of the British Imperial regime, and he uses the Indian case to develop a general theory of the revolutionary nature of colonial nationalism. $14.00

Politics in War

The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam

Allan E. Goodman

Politics in War deals mainly with the years 1967–1970, but bears on the problems South Vietnam faces now that American forces are no longer active. Mr. Goodman has based his analysis of how the Vietnamese saw the period of deepest American involvement on firsthand research, including over three hundred interviews with Vietnamese political leaders and government officials. $12.50

Revolutionary Politics in the Long Parliament

John R. MacCormack

The author provides a fresh and coherent interpretation of the events chronicled in the first volume of S. R. Gardiner's monumental *History of the Great Civil War*. This is the first systematic study of the politics of five crucial years of the Puritan Revolution, the period between John Pym's death in December, 1643, and the execution of Charles I in January, 1649. $14.00

Minorities Under Communism

Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States

Robert R. King

The author explores the impact of major national minorities in southeastern Europe from 1945 to the present. Included are discussions of post-World War II conflicts over borders, methods employed to reduce the appearance of national minorities, and use of historical controversies to advance claims to adjacent territories and populations. $14.00

HARVARD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 79 GARDEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

AMERICA'S ARMY IN CRISIS

A Study in
Civil-Military Relations

WILLIAM L. HAUSER
Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army

Faced with an unwon war, plagued by internal dissension, drug abuse, charges of racism, and recruitment problems — can America's Army survive? Will it adapt?

In this thoughtful and objective approach to the Army's problems, Lt. Colonel Hauser, a career Army officer, identifies the social forces with which the Army must come to terms if it is to survive as a vital organization in a democratic society. His controversial solution — two armies, one a specialized fighting force with spartan standards for barracks life, physical fitness, and military preparedness; the other a support army with many of the opportunities and incentives of a civilian organization.

" . . . a unique effort to comprehend and resolve the problems of an institution in transition."—**ROBERT E. OSGOOD**

"William Hauser has avoided the quagmire of polemics by keeping his study clearly focused on relevant policy. An important book on an important topic."—**CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR., Northwestern University**

$8.50

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS

National Support—
Experience and Prospects

DAVID W. WAINHOUSE

With the assistance of
Frederick P. Bohannon, James E.
Knott, and Anne P. Simons

In this comprehensive examination of how nations have participated in peacekeeping operations over the past 25 years, the authors stress manpower, financial, and logistical support. They analyze the nature and scope of national support for several United Nations peacekeeping operations, and also assess the importance of regional organizations in peacekeeping. They conclude with a summary of costing problems, logistical management, and planning for peacekeeping.

656 pages. $22.50

INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION

A History and Forecast

DAVID W. WAINHOUSE
and Associates

"The first comprehensive historical study of the successes and failures in 70 peace-observation attempts during the last 45 years by the League of Nations, the Organization of American States and the United Nations."—**The New York Times**

681 pages. (1966). $15.00

JOHNS HOPKINS
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Liberal Arts Fellowships in Law

For the academic year 1974–1975 Harvard Law School offers four or five Liberal Arts Fellowships to college and university teachers in the arts and sciences for a year at the Law School. Holders of these Fellowships will have the title of Fellow in Law and . . . (History, Sociology, Political Science, Economics, Philosophy, etc., depending upon their particular discipline).

The purpose of the fellowships is to enable teachers in the social sciences or humanities to study fundamental techniques, concepts, and aims of law, so that, in their teaching and research, they will be better able to use legal materials and legal insights which are relevant to their own disciplines.

Fellowship holders will presumably take at least two first-year courses in law, in addition to more advanced courses, and will participate in a joint seminar. The year of study will not count toward a degree.

The fellowship grant is sufficient to cover tuition and fees. The Chairman of the Liberal Arts Fellowship Committee will be glad to write a letter to any funding agency to which the applicant has applied describing the Program and indicating the extent of the Committee's interest in inviting the applicant to be a Fellow.

Applications should include a biographical résumé (including academic record and list of publications), a statement explaining what the applicant hopes to achieve through his year of study, and two letters of recommendation.

Applications for 1974–1975 should be submitted before January 15, 1974, to the Chairman, Committee on Liberal Arts Fellowships, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Awards will be announced before February 15, 1974.


Second Edition
Politics and the International System
edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.


Contending Theories of International Relations
James E. Dougherty / Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

WORTH LOOKING INTO

POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Second Edition

Edited by **Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,** *Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University*

Ten new selections reflecting the impact of current international tensions, recent technological progress and research are included in this revised edition. The selections—forty-two in all—include some of the most important writings on the nature and scope of international relations as a discipline, and on the study of international phenomena.

614 pages/1972/paperbound, $6.50

CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

James E. Dougherty, *St. Joseph's College (Pa.),* and **Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,** *Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University*

This highly useful book is both an overview and a synthesis of international relations theory. Theories of conflict, war and revolution are thoroughly discussed. Pacifism, imperialism, balance of power, realist theory, man-milieu relationships, international systems theory, theories of international integration, decision making, theories of conflict and deterrence, disarmament and arms control, are all presented in their historical context.

". . . exhibits a remarkable scope and range. But most importantly, through it all the book remains provocative and readable." —*World Affairs*

". . . provides a comprehensive and reliable guide to the study of international relations as a whole." —*International Affairs*

416 pages/1971/clothbound, $9.95/paperbound, $6.25

Lippincott

J. B. Lippincott Company
Division of Higher Education
East Washington Square
Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

The 4-Dollar. 5-Minute. Whole-Earth. Political Scientist's Computerized Dream:

An Individually Tailored Research Source List.

Learning — awakening, epiphany, insight — is rewarding in itself as few other endeavors can be. But the time-consuming task of finding out where to begin is only tedious: hours, even days, spent in the unenlightening company of 3x5 cards and journal indexes to sort out those few nuggets from the vast lodes of scholarship that will pan out to your benefit. We've developed a way to speed up that first step so you can devote your time to the heart of the matter—the reading, thinking and writing involved in preparing your thesis, dissertation, monograph or research paper. We've collected and put on computer the title and author of every article that's ever appeared in any of 183 political science journals published the world over, since the journals began— more than 115,000 articles covering theory, public administration, international relations and urban studies.



On demand, we'll search the file by computer for any topic or author you select, furnishing a bibliography individually tailored to your needs — up to 25 citations for only $4, or 50 for $5, and more at the same rate until the sources are exhausted. The computer searches with enlightening speed; by far the largest portion of your time can then be spent in productive research. Your time becomes truly yours.

The rest, of course, is up to you. We can't tell you what conclusions to draw. We can't tell you how to write your paper, or live your life (though we can help you find time to do those things yourself). We can tell you where the information you want is. Now. When you need it. Send for free details, or call us with your order.

(By phone, $6 for 25 citations, $7 for 50, plus C.O.D. postage.) Call toll free to place an order:

800-854-3379 In California, call area 714, 557-6308 collect.

NEXUS™
INFORMATION SERVICES
Department 601,
Bldg. 3, Suite 201, 3001 Red Hill Ave.,
Costa Mesa, California 92626
THE NEXUS CORPORATION

Rush details of computer reference service.

NAME (Please Print)

STREET ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

© Copyright September 1973, Nexus Corp.

USE THIS PROOF FOR REPRODUCTION

American Political Science Review *September 1973* *March 1974*

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES

Testing Theory and Evaluating Policy

edited by James A. Caporaso and Leslie L. Roos, Jr.

These nine interrelated essays explore the use of quasi-experiments with short- and long-time-series data. General essays and specific case studies compare quasi-experimental and more traditional approaches. The examples are drawn from a number of fields, including comparative politics, international relations, organizational behavior, and environmental studies.

325 pages cloth: $15.00 paper: $3.95

THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF URBAN SQUATTERS

by Marc Howard Ross

The booming urban centers in the developing areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America represent both the promise and the frustration of rapid social change. Drawing on national and international theories of political integration, Professor Ross outlines the process by which a squatter settlement in Nairobi, Kenya, led by former Mau Mau freedom fighters, developed into a politically integrated community where most observers would expect to find disorganization.

265 pages $8.50

SURVEY RESEARCH IN AFRICA

Its Applications and Limits

edited by William M. O'Barr, David H. Spain, and Mark A. Tessler

At a time when Western researchers working in Africa have been charged with insensitivity to African problems and with distorted and ethnocentric research priorities, the problems involved in crossing cultural lines to conduct social research are many and varied. After an introductory essay discussing the history of survey research and the recent turmoil surrounding it in Africa, the papers explore the ethical, epistemological, and methodological implications of applying Western techniques to African research problems.

336 pages cloth: $15.00 paper: $4.95

ELITE AND SPECIALIZED INTERVIEWING

by Lewis Anthony Dexter

From his virtually unique experience in the field of elite interviewing, the author has distilled a number of recommendations about the mechanics of the interview process: how to approach a prospective subject, how to conduct the interview, and how to record it. Working toward a "transactional" theory of interviewing, Dexter investigates the effects that the interviewer himself has on the person being interviewed and on his responses.

205 pages cloth: $7.50 paper: $3.25

1735 BENSON AVENUE EVANSTON, ILLINOIS 60201

OXFORD

The Liberal Theory of Justice

A Critical Examination of the Principle Doctrines in "A Theory of Justice" by John Rawls

BRIAN M. BARRY. ☐ A critical exposition of John Rawls' "A Theory of Justice," this volume sets Rawls' theory in its intellectual context and provides a systematic account of its basic features. Dr. Barry examines Rawls' claim to have formulated a logical deduction of two principles of justice, and discusses Rawls' most important economic and political deductions.
1973 cloth $9.75 paper $3.50

Documents on International Affairs 1963

Edited by D. C. WATT, JAMES MAYALL and CORNELIA NAVARI. ☐ Major developments in international affairs during 1963 are covered in this volume, including: Berlin's role in East/West German relations; the Soviet Union's conflict with Communist China; the war in Yemen; the United States' involvement in Viet Nam; the Federation of Malaysia; and the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. (Royal Institute for International Affairs)
1973 624 pp. $32.00

The Bases of International Order

Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning

Edited by ALAN JAMES. ☐ In this extensive and systematic inquiry various aspects of the interaction of states within a basic international order are examined. Among the topics discussed are the relationship between order and change at the international level; the question of whether war is a threat to or a support of international order, or both; and the contribution of contemporary theorists to our understanding of the bases of international order.
1973 224 pp. $11.25

Pakistan's Foreign Policy

An Historical Analysis

S. M. BURKE. ☐ "Professor Burke has written a better defence of Pakistan's foreign policy than any Pakistani has ever achieved. He has pace, lucidity, a mastery of his material. He uses innumerable quotations, and always effectively.... Professor Burke should be read." —The Economist
1973 450 pp. $20.25

Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945

A Study in Ideology and Social Classes

J. AYODELE LANGLEY. ☐ Using much previously unpublished material, the author analyzes the origins of Pan-African politics in western Africa and investigates nationalist ideology and social classes in the area. He also examines the reception of black American ideologies and the ways in which they were modified by the economics of nationalism and by the conservative leadership of the lawyer-merchant class. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs)
1973 416 pp. $21.00

Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya

A Study of Minorities and Decolonization

DONALD ROTHCHILD, University of California, Davis. ☐ In a study of race relations in modern Kenya, the author focuses on the dynamic processes of interracial bargaining and conflict resolution among the three main racial communities during the pre- and post-independence periods. (Institute of Race Relations)
1973 496 pp. $22.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Editors

J. O. Wisdom, John O'Neill, Harold Kaplan, I. C. Jarvie, J. N. Hattiangadi

Volume 3, Number 1, March 1973

Ernest Gellner — Scale and Nation

A. D. Smith — 'Ideas' and 'Structure' in the Formation of Independent Ideals

John King-Farlow — Pronouns, Primacy and Falsification in Linguistics

Michael Ruse — The Nature of Scientific Models: Formal versus Material Analogy

John W. Yolton — Action Theory as the Foundation for the Science of Man

Subscriptions to: Aberdeen University Press, Farmers Hall, Aberdeen, Scotland AB9 2XT

Manuscripts to: Editorial Secretary, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, Ontario, Canada.

New Penguins in
POLITICAL SCIENCE

HOW THE GOVERNMENT BREAKS THE LAW. *Jethro K. Lieberman.* A documented, non-partisan report on crime at all levels of the American government. **$1.95**

ROOTS OF WAR. *Richard J. Barnet.* The first comprehensive survey of the men and institutions behind U.S. foreign policy. **$1.65**

C.I.A.: The Myth and the Madness. *Patrick J. McGarvey.* An insider's view of the world of American intelligence operations. **$1.65**

IN SEARCH OF NIXON. *Bruce Mazlish.* This psychohistorical inquiry uncovers the deepest levels of President Nixon's personality to explain why he feels, thinks, and behaves as he does. **$1.50**

COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVOLUTION. *Richard J. Walton.* A radical re-evaluation of President John F. Kennedy's foreign policy. **$1.45**

For a complete list of Penguin books in political science, write:

PENGUIN BOOKS INC
7110 Ambassador Rd. Baltimore, Md. 21207
Overseas readers write: Penguin Education, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England.

OXFORD

The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions
Empirical Studies
Second Edition

Edited by THEODORE L. BECKER, University of Hawaii, and MALCOLM M. FEELEY, New York University. ☐ "An excellent supplement to texts with a traditional case orientation. Students can use the book to understand that law is not necessarily what Justices say it is."—Anthony Champagne, Rutgers University, Livingston College. "Again—a splendid collection." —Richard J. Richardson, University of North Carolina

1973 256 pp. paper $2.95

The New Federalism

MICHAEL D. REAGAN, University of California, Riverside. ☐ "This is a well written book, consistent in its logic, and both realistic and optimistic in its suggestions."—Daniel Barbee, Georgia State University. "An excellent book to serve as the focal point stimulus for one of America's present day problems—Federalism."—John M. Nickerson, University of Maine

1972 (paper, 1973) 192 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $1.50

Freedom and the Court
Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States
Second Edition

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, University of Virginia. ☐ "This is one of the best books available in the area of comparative courts and judicial institutions." —Michael J. Horan, University of Wyoming. "As expected, Professor Abraham has again produced the best book on civil liberties. His new material makes the book all the more interesting."—David M. Atkinson, University of Maryland

1972 416 pp. cloth $12.50 paper $3.95

Word Politics
Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers

THOMAS M. FRANCK, New York University, and EDWARD WEISBAND, State University of New York, Binghamton. ☐ "Putting it quite simply, *Word Politics* is a very good book. It is brief, well written, interesting, and worthwhile. . . . The authors have harmoniously blended case studies, logical analysis, theoretical analysis, and policy prescription. Moreover, the context of superpower relationships makes the book quite relevant."—Richard B. Finnegan, *The American Political Science Review*

1971 (paper, 1972) 192 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $1.95

Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States

JOSEPH FRANKEL, University of Southampton. ☐ The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to theoretical ways of thinking about international relations; it concerns itself with what theory is for and about, not what it actually is. The volume concentrates heavily upon the behavioral approaches and, within them, upon the role of values and the concept of "national interest."

1973 144 pp. cloth $4.00 paper $1.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

New Paperbacks from Praeger

URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The City in Crisis
Edited by **Stephen M. David**, Fordham University, and **Paul E. Peterson**, University of Chicago

This imaginative new reader illustrates how deficiencies common to most urban political systems affect the formulation of public policy in our cities. The book is divided into three sections. The first defines and analyzes three of the most glaring of these inadequacies—the autonomy of urban bureaucracies, the existence of multiple governments, and limited access to political processes given groups with little power. The second section examines the effects of these deficiencies on four key policy areas—land use, law enforcement, education, and transportation. Section three presents a series of proposals for solving the problems defined and illustrated in the first two sections of this collection.

1973 354 pp. $3.95 paper

THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
Walter A. Rosenbaum, University of Florida

This book draws together the basic elements of environmental politics: the nature and gravity of the ecological threat; the roles played in pollution politics by politicians, government agencies, businessmen, and public interest groups; conflicting ideologies and resulting concerns; and current administrative practices and legislative developments at the federal, state, and local levels. The contributions and boon-doggling of HEW, Interior, and Agriculture departments, and the Council on Environment Quality; the tenuous position of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the conflicts among ecologists and the public are weighed throughout. The book concludes with an assessment of what needs to be done—and what action may be possible.

1973 306 pp. $3.95 paper

BOTH YOUR HOUSES
The Truth About Congress
Warren Weaver, Jr.

"The Capitol is a hall of illusions, peopled by the myths that the legislative branch remains proudly coequal, that Congress continues to serve the nation well, that the old ways are sufficient to the tasks of the new day. None of this is true," writes Warren Weaver, Jr. This book tells the story of the deterioration of Congress. The author uncovers the weaknesses that have brought both houses to their current parlous condition, and he proposes some practical remedies. He discusses such topics as the shortcomings of the committee system, the importance of rules and customs in both houses, the role of the conference committee, congressional ethics, and how Congress handles its financial and foreign policy responsibilities. Warren Weaver, Jr., is a congressional and national correspondent of *The New York Times*.

September, 1973 318 pp. $2.95 paper

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA
Leslie Rubin, and **Brian Weinstein**, Howard University

This work adopts a unified approach to the complexities of the contemporary African political scene. The authors first examine pre-colonial and colonial social and political institutions. They look at colonialism's effects on traditional systems, the different forms of opposition that emerged, and the relatively swift and peaceful return to autonomy. After discussing the areas still under European control, the authors turn to the major tasks confronting independent Africa in an analysis of problems of economic development and political growth. Finally, there is discussion of the independent states' efforts to achieve African unity and the continent's role in world affairs.

January, 1974 ca. 320 pp. $4.95 paper

THE MIDDLE EAST
Nations, Super-powers and Wars
Yair Evron

This realistic analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict provides a reasoned discussion of the deeper courses of the confrontation, its mechanisms and motivations, and the policies and strategies of the two sides. The Author concentrates on the actions and tangible interests of the adversaries rather than on their ideologies or moral claims. Part I gives a brief historical view of the conflict from 1948 to 1971. Part II describes the role of the super-powers and the structure of the relations between the nations of the Middle East. The Author is attached to the Van Leer Institute of Jerusalem, where he is director of its project examining the future of the Arab-Israeli relations.

August, 1973 244 pp. $3.50 paper

College Department Praeger Publishers, 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

praeger

Princeton announces a major new series to encourage the application of mathematical methods to historical analysis

Sponsored by the History Advisory Committee of the Mathematical Social Sciences Board

Now Available

THE DIMENSIONS OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN HISTORY
Edited by William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, Robert William Fogel

14 authorities discuss the uses of mathematical methods in historical research. Ranging through social, economic and political history in England, France and the United States, their essays present the freshest and technically most promising work now being done. Each offers a concrete demonstration of the advantages and limitations of this new approach.
436 pages. $13.50

ESSAYS ON A MATURE ECONOMY
Britain after 1840
Edited by Donald N. McCloskey

Seventeen essays apply modern economic theory and statistical methods to Britain's economy from the peak of her industrial dominance to 1920, showing that "the new economic history...is now a recognized and exciting part of modern social science."—*Choice*. "Valuable for its...insights into the nature of the problems involved in the growth process."—*The Times Literary Supplement*
439 pages. $12.50

Forthcoming

Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere

The History of Legislative Behavior

The New Urban History

International Comparison of Social Mobility in Past Societies

International Trade and Internal Growth

Quantitative Studies of Popular Voting Behavior

Government and Education: Policies, Expenditures and Consequences

Studies of Political Elites

New from Princeton:

AN INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR HISTORIANS
by Roderick Floud 220 pages. $7.50

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Around the world

The United Nations and the Superpowers

U.S.-SOVIET INTERACTION AT THE U.N.

THIRD EDITION

John Stoessinger
City University of New York

A NEW EDITION JUST PUBLISHED!

Concluding that no single nation or group of nations controls the U.N., but that all use it to pursue their own national interests, Professor Stoessinger maintains:

"The key to a rejuvenation of the U.N. . . . must be sought at the political level in a commitment by the member states, especially the two superpowers and China, to use the U.N. rather than to by-pass it and let it atrophy."

The text focuses on how China's entrance into the U.N., the controversies between have and have-not states, and the emergence of new nations have affected the position and usefulness of the U.N.

Random House August, 1973
256 pages $3.50 paperbound

Politics Among Nations

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE FIFTH EDITION

Hans J. Morgenthau

HONORED AUTHOR.
DISTINGUISHED CLASSIC.

Professor Morgenthau has updated this work with an eye to the changes in the balance of power and influence. The theoretical section has been enlarged to differentiate between usable and unusable power and between power and influence. The growing world concern over nuclear power and environmental problems is also examined.

Knopf, 1972 615 pages $9.95

The Might of Nations

WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME FOURTH EDITION

John Stoessinger
City University of New York

The winner of the 1963 Bancroft Prize in International Relations on first publication, **The Might of Nations** continues to be an objective authority on world politics. The case studies covering Bangladesh, the Mid-East, and Indo-China, and the discussion of such issues as the world ecological crisis update the text. This edition maintains that as China emerges, the post-war era of bi-lateral confrontation is being replaced by one of **tri**-angular oppositions.

There are chapter bibliographies.

Random House January, 1973
480 pages $6.95 paperbound

Patterns of Government

THE MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE

THIRD EDITION

Samuel Beer, Adam Ulam, Guido Goldman, all of Harvard University, and **Suzanne Berger** of Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ANNOUNCING—Five paperbound volumes available this Spring!

Retains the same in-depth treatment found in the hardcover edition*, but offers you greater teaching flexibility and more teaching alternatives.

There is one volume for each of the five sections (entirely new on France, Germany, and England, and updated on the U.S.S.R.) in the recent third edition. The paperbacks reprint each of these in full, and those dealing with Britain, France, and Germany have been expanded.

Beer—**Modern Political Development**
$2.95 paperbound

Ulam—**The Russian Political System**
$2.95 paperbound

Beer—**The British Political System**
$2.95 paperbound

Berger—**The French Political System**
$2.95 paperbound

Goldman—**The German Political System**
$3.95 paperbound

Select only the volumes covering the material **you** cover!

*Available if you prefer the single-volume structure.

Macropolitics in a Global Society

Richard W. Sterling
Dartmouth University

COMING THIS WINTER!

Aimed at the first course in international relations, this new text studies the international system from a global point of view.

Maintains that:

. . . although national and regional interests are legitimate they must be measured in terms of how well they meet the growing needs of the world as a whole.

. . . *there must be a redistribution of* power, wealth, status and education if a reasonably peaceful world society is to be maintained.

Includes:

. . . an entire chapter on global ecology

. . . data and analysis relevant to 1970-2000 (utilizing data and research from 1965-1973)

. . . comprehensive treatment of such phenomena as multinational corporations, contemporary international monetary problems, and the current status of armament and arms control

. . . *analysis of both sociological and* ideological developments (e.g., population pressures are studied as carefully as major power rivalries)

. . . detailed appendices

Knopf February, 1973
500 pages $10.00

RANDOM HOUSE
ALFRED A. KNOPF

THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT 457 HAHN ROAD, WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND 21157

Courts, Judges and Politics

Walter Murphy, Princeton University and **Herman Pritchett,** University of California at Santa Barbara

COMING THIS SPRING!

The second edition of a pioneering volume in the field of American judicial politics. Combining analytic essays by the editors with readings drawn from sources such as Supreme Court cases, historical documents, and personal letters of statesmen, this text explores the political significance of the judiciary's activities. There is also an entire section on judicial ethics.

Each chapter includes an introduction summarizing the important principles and issues around which the following readings are grouped, and headnotes precede each selection.

Random House February, 1974
768 pages $10.95

America's Political System
FEDERAL

Peter Woll and **Robert Binstock**
both of Brandeis University

ADOPTED IN OVER 200 SCHOOLS

This successful American government text was written with the student in mind. It examines the American political system by utilizing both extensive textual material and readings drawn from outside sources.

Includes:

. . . case studies drawn from various sources
. . . annotated bibliographies
. . . essay and discussion questions
. . . illustrations and diagrams

Random House 1972
628 pages $6.95 paperbound

RANDOM HOUSE
ALFRED A. KNOPF

THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT 457 HAHN ROAD, WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND 21157

American Politics and Public Policy

Edited by **Michael P. Smith**
Boston University

An anthology focusing on the tension in American politics between pluralism and populism. Selections range from Norman Mailer's "The Siege of Chicago" to an excerpt from Joe McGinness's **The Selling of the President, 1968.**

Random House 1973
448 pages $4.95 paperbound

Civil Rights

Richard Pious, York University

Racism. Poverty. Sexism. Gay Lib. Corrections. Surveillance—Are all examined in this anthology of court cases and articles. The focus is the struggle for identity by both demographic and clientele groups against an often manipulative and dehumanizing beauracracy.

Random House February, 1973
256 pages $3.50 paperbound

The Modern Presidency

Nelson W. Polsby, University of California at Berkeley

Covering the last six administrations, this reader provides a realistic sense of the Presidency, showing how the office is shaped by the man. The selections, written by politicians and journalists such as Joseph Kraft, R. W. Apple, and Eric Sevareid, provide the flavor of each administration.

Random House 1973
256 pages $3.95 paperbound

RANDOM HOUSE
ALFRED A. KNOPF
THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT 457 HAHN ROAD, WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND 21157

PRINCETON · UNIVERSITY · PRESS

A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, 1918-1948

Edited by VICTOR S. MAMATEY and RADOMÍR LUŽA

The fourteen authors of this volume have examined every facet of the Czechoslovak Republic: its establishment; the nature of Czechoslovak democracy; the role of minorities; economic development, foreign policy; the Second Republic, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; the government in exile; resistance movements in World War II; and Czechoslovakia's postwar position between East and West. Cloth, $22.50

Limited paperback, $9.75

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1943-1945

Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics

EDWARD WEISBAND

"It presents a detailed and absorbing account of what went on in Turkey during World War II on the political and economic fronts, and of the delicate diplomacy by which Ismet Inonu succeeded in keeping his country out of the hostilities. The author has used every kind of written source, as well as interviewing many of the people who played a part in the story." —Geoffrey Lewis $14.50

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE

PETER C. FISHBURN

Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. "The most thorough and rigorous treatment of social choice functions yet produced." —Alex C. Michalos $13.50

THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

"The first important comparative study of European bureaucracies to appear in recent decades. It contains invaluable data on the political socialization and culture of European administrators, and is informed by a vigorous and sophisticated use of social science theory."—Gabriel Almond

Cloth, $20.00

Limited paperback, $9.75

Now in paperback . . .

VICTORS' JUSTICE

The Tokyo War Crimes Trial

RICHARD H. MINEAR

"The logic that guided the Tokyo war crimes tribunal . . . is closely related, Minear suggests, to the logic that led the United States into Vietnam. For this reason alone, *Victors' Justice* deserves a careful, thoughtful reading."—Erwin Knoll, *Washington Post*

Cloth, $7.95; paper, $2.45

INTEREST GROUPS IN SOVIET POLITICS

Edited by H. GORDON SKILLING and FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS

"This kind of study has been long overdue. It is a contribution not only to substance but also in the careful restraint of its approach."—David B. Truman

Published for the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto

Cloth, $15.00; paper, $3.95

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1956-1967

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN

"An outstanding book on several levels. . . . Students of Soviet affairs, international relations, and the workings of the Soviet mind have much to learn from this work."—*Choice*

Published under the auspices of the Russian Institute and the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University Cloth, $13.50; paper, $3.45

new from RIKA

The Research Institute on Korean Affairs
8555 16th Street, Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

JOURNAL OF KOREAN AFFAIRS

Editor	Young Hoon Kang
Editorial Assistant	Jae Eun Lee
Administrative Assistant	Sherrill Malloy

Consulting Editors

Soon Sung Cho
Joseph S. Chung
Ilpyong J. Kim
Byung Chul Koh
Chong Sik Lee
Pong S. Lee
Benjamin H. Min
Rinn Sup Shinn
Dae Sook Suh

Journal of Korean Affairs is published quarterly by the Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 8555 16th Street, Silver Spring, Maryland 20910. The Institute, established in the fall of 1970 as a non-profit corporation with federal tax exemption status, has as its purpose: (1) Objective research and analysis in the field of Korean affairs for use by academic communities and educational institutions; (2) dissemination of authoritative information on Korean affairs to non-specialist individuals and organizations; and (3) establishment of a forum for professional discussion on Korean affairs. $6.00 per year.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF KOREA

Introductory Readings and Essays

Edited by
Se-Jin Kim and Chang-Hyun Cho

Historical Perspective on Korean Politics	*Harold Sunoo and Se-Jin Kim*
Political Ideology and Korean Politics	*Sung-Chul Yang*
Political Dissent in South Korea, 1948-61	*Sung-Joo Han*
National Government and Politics in South Korea	*Se-Jin Kim*
Bureaucracy and Local Government in South Korea	*Chang-Hyun Cho*
Political Parties and Elections in South Korea	*Y. C. Han*
Economic Development of South Korea	*Seung-Hee Kim*
The Government and Power Structure of North Korea	*Chin-O. Chung*
The System of Local Government in North Korea	*Chang-Hyun Cho*
Economic Development of North Korea, 1945-70	*Joseph Sang-Hoon Chung*
North Korea's Foreign Policy	*Benjamin H. Min*
North Korea's Unification Strategy: An Assessment	*Byung-Chul Koh*
The Korean Reunification Issue in the United Nations	*Chong-Han Kim*

BIBLIOGRAPHY
$4.90

MAJOR POWERS AND KOREA

Edited by Young C. Kim

Korea in Russia's East Asian Policy, *Charles McLane*
Chinese Policy Toward Korea, *Harold C. Hinton*
Comments by *William Spahr, Ilpyong Kim, Soon Sung Cho, Nathan White, Chong Ik Kim,* and *Dae Sook Suh.*
Korean in the Changing East Asian Policy of the United States, *Bernard K. Gordon*
Japanese Policy Toward Korea, *Young C. Kim*
North Korean Policy Toward South Korea, *Rinn-Sup Shinn*
South Korean Policy Toward North Korea, *Han-Kyo Kim*
Korean Response to Major Power Rapprochement, *Young Whan Kihl*
$2.95

DECENTRALIZATION
AND SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS
A Case Study of the 1969
Decentralization Law in New York City

MELVIN ZIMET

Foreword by David Rogers

Through a study of the decentralization process in one community school district in the South Bronx, the author views the effects it has had in terms on restructured authority and power relationships and of educational output. He explains how the failure of the Decentralization Law to reconcile the great differences between decentralization and community control planted the seeds of future conflict between the Community Board and the Central Board.

1973/186 pp./Cloth, $8.50/Paper, $4.95

Also from Teachers College Press

THE STUDENT/THE COLLEGE/THE LAW
William T. O'Hara/John G. Hill, Jr.
1972/220 pp./Cloth, $8.50/Paper, $4.50

EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS
Concepts and Controversies
George R. LaNoue, Editor
1972/176 pp./Cloth, $8.50/Paper, $3.50

EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT IN AN URBAN SOCIETY
Costs, Benefits, and Public Policy
Melvin R. Levin/Alan Shank, Editors
1970/425 pp./Cloth, $12.50/Paper, $9.95

EDUCATION AND STATE POLITICS
The Developing Relationship Between
Elementary-Secondary and Higher Education
Michael D. Usdan/David M. Minar/Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr.
1969/190 pp./Cloth, $7.50

teachers college press

1234 Amsterdam Avenue New York, N.Y. 10027

NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN

Why a Federal Program Failed

Martha Derthick

"The book tells why the President who could send half a million men to war and drop all the bombs he wanted could *not* get a few creative, hopeful pilot housing projects built."
—The Washington Monthly

". . . a short course in the failure of the program in particular and the federal bureaucracy in general."
—The New Republic

". . . a lucid but deeply disturbing insight into the workings and idle motions of our governmental machinery. Her little book conveys the depressing fascination of a Kafka novel."
—Wolf von Eckardt,
The Washington Post

$2.95 paper

THE URBAN INSTITUTE 2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Congress and Higher Education in the Nineteenth Century

by George N. Rainsford

"Using the tools and methods of the historian, he eschews abstract principles and moves chronologically through his century explaining and relating congressional initiatives in terms of the needs of a new and expanding nation....an important contribution to the growing body of literature in the hybrid field of government and higher education."
—College and University Bulletin
1972, 168 pp., $6.95

The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt

by Otis H. Stephens, Jr.

"This is a most timely book, dealing with a subject in which there is great current interest."
—David Fellman, Vilas Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison

"...depicts lucidly the expanding role of the Supreme Court in seeking a more humane and just balance between freedom and order."
—William M. Beaney, from the Foreword
September, 248 pp., $9.50

From your bookstore, or THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE PRESS Knoxville, Tennessee

Send for our catalogues, available free of charge:

- Sales Catalogue 1973
- Check List of Books in Print 1945-1972
- Standing Order Service Guide
- United Nations Official Records 1962-1970
  Supplement 1970-1972


the united nations and disarmament
1945-1970
UNITED NATIONS
UN Monthly Chronicle
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION of HUMAN RIGHTS
CHARTER of the UNITED NATIONS and STATUTE of the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEARBOOK UNITED NATIONS
everyman's united nations
A SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 1966-1970
A FIVE-YEAR SUPPLEMENT
UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

Room LX-2300, New York, N.Y. 10017 or Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Yenchi
Vladivostok
CHINA
U.S.S.R.
KIRIN (CHILIN)
Tuman River
HAMGYŎNG
Paektu Mountain
Ch'ŏngjin
Fushun
Shenyang (Mukden)
T'unghua
Hyesan
PUKTO
YANGGANG-DO
Kilchu
LIAONING
CHINA
KOREA
Kanggye
Yalu River (Amnok River)
Tanch'ŏn
CHAGANG-DO
HAMGYŎNG-NAMDO
Antung
Sinŭiju
Puk
P'YŎNGAN-PUKTO
Hamhŭng
Hŭngnam
P'YŎNGAN-NAMDO
P'yŏngyang
Wŏnsan
Sariwŏn
KANGWŎN-DO
HWANGHAE-PUKTO
HWANGHAE-NAMDO
KANGWŎN-DO
Haeju
Kaesŏng
Ch'unch'ŏn
KYŎNGGI-DO
Seoul
Wŏnju
Suwŏn
CH'UNG-CH'ŎNG-PUKTO
CH'UNG-CH'ŎNG-NAMDO
Ch'ŏngju
Andong
Taejŏn
KYŎNGSANG-PUKTO
Chŏnju
Taegu
Kamp'o
CHŎLLA-PUKTO
KYŎNGSANG-NAMDO
Masan
Kwangju
Chinju
CHŎLLA-NAMDO
Posŏng

COMMUNISM IN KOREA

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

&

CHONG-SIK LEE

A pioneering work, both in substance and in methodology. It is the first in-depth study of the origins and evolution of Korean Communism down to the present. It is also the first book to combine two basic approaches in its treatment of a Communist movement: an historical, developmental treatment and a topical, social-science-oriented analysis.

Part I, The Movement $25.00
Part II, The Society $30.00

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley • Los Angeles • New York

POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM *Kentucky*

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A CHANGING WORLD

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN

". . . presents a framework to assess our national interests in the 1970's; the basic concerns—defense, economy, and world order—are supplemented within this framework by transitory interests ranging in value from peripheral through major, vital, and survival. . . . The book makes careful use of the Pentagon Papers and other late sources. . . . well written, perceptive, and informative." —*Library Journal*
$8.00

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value

EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.

Winner of the 1972 Frederick Jackson Turner Award. "In this remarkable book, Purcell scrupulously records the long and continuing debate between ethical idealists and scientific naturalists over the status of democratic theory. . . . The scope of this work is immense. . . . it is remarkable that such far-reaching and complex material has been reduced to clear, readable prose." —*Library Journal*
$11.50

DAMS, PARKS & POLITICS

Resource Development & Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era

ELMO RICHARDSON

A chronicle of the myopia and gamesmanship that dominated Americans' understanding of their environment on the eve of the nation's ecology crisis. The author of *The Politics of Conservation* here examines the national park system, the development projects for the Columbia and Upper Colorado River Valleys, and the controversies over Hells Canyon, CVA, Olympic, Dinosaur, and Everglades national parks. / $11.25.

THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933

SUSAN ESTABROOK KENNEDY

Of special interest in this study is the author's examination of relations between Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Here is the first complete account of the events leading to and stemming from the nationwide banking "holiday" of March 1933. / (October) $13.25

THE POLITICS OF MOTION

The World of Thomas Hobbes

THOMAS A SPRAGENS, JR. (Foreword by Anthony Flew)

A penetrating analysis of the relationship between Hobbes' natural and civil philosophies. "The author's learning is both deep and broad, and his insights into many matters startlingly penetrating. This appears to me to be a permanent contribution to the analysis of political theory."—Russell Kirk / $7.75

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY
LEXINGTON 40506

Now in paperback...

the monumental best seller about the tragic collision between the Americans and the Vietnamese

The most highly praised book of the year, this won the Pulitzer Prize, the National Book Award, the Bancroft Prize for history, and the Sidney Hillman Award.

FIRE IN THE LAKE:

The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam

by FRANCES FITZGERALD $2.25

Other important new Vintage paperbacks of current interest

The Politics of a Guaranteed Income:

The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan

by DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN. "The most candid and intelligent account ever written by a high official of the decision-making process of this or any other government."—Edward C. Banfield, *New Leader*. "The book's richness of insight into the politics and psychology of governance, its capacity for making complex issues clear, its basic humaneness, its graceful and compelling style—these qualities give an *uncommon luminosity to the complex and too often sullen world of* modern policy making."

—Stephen K. Bailey, *Political Science Quarterly*. $2.95

World Without Borders

by LESTER R. BROWN. The author of *Seeds of Change* proposes practical strategies for coping with crucial 20th century problems. "Just about the most important, relevant, and 'true' book on international affairs one could imagine appearing at this time."

—*Washington Post* $2.95

VINTAGE BOOKS
a division of Random House

wiley

The papers in **PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY: Issues and Applications** provide an advanced and comprehensive introduction to the phenomenological approach to social science theory. Specially written by practicing philosophers and social scientists, they span a broad range of contemporary sociological issues including communication, interaction, organization, and groups and society.

Edited by **George Psathas,** *Boston University,* with contributions by Egon Bittner, Alexander D. Blumenstiel, Fred R. Dallmayr, Horacio Fabrega, Jr., Roger Jehenson, Peter K. Manning, John O'Neill, Herbert Spiegelberg, Helmut R. Wagner, Frances C. Waksler, Kurt H. Wolff, and Richard M. Zaner
1973 368 pages $12.50

An important contribution to the study of American politics, **NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS AND THE CASE FOR PARTY POLITICS** presents the first large-scale, comparative study of nonpartisan elections, and develops a theory relating the consequences of electoral institutions to the structural characteristics of communities. One of the few discussions of political party reform at the local level is included, and an attempt is made to move the debate concerning the advantages and disadvantages of stronger political parties from the realm of democratic theory to the arena of group conflict.

A volume in the Wiley Series in Urban Research, edited by Terry N. Clark

By **Willis D. Hawley,** *Duke University*
1973 224 pages $9.95

In **THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF RESEARCH,** a stimulating collection of original essays, ten recognized scholars of science and research join the editors in considering the social organization of research and its role in contemporary society. Some of the issues confronted are: Patterns of the Institutionalization of Research; Politics and Research; Economics of Research; and Relations Between Researchers and Practitioners.

Edited by **Saad Z. Nagi** and **Ronald G. Corwin,** *both of The Ohio State University*
1972 409 pages $13.50

Based on a national survey of religious groups in both rural and urban areas, **ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN CATHOLIC AMERICA** describes, analyzes, and explains the sociological, religious, and marital behavior of Catholic ethnic groups. By integrating empirical sociology and survey research with social history, it documents the persistence of ethnic diversity in Catholic America, taking ethnic diversity in American life as its unifying thesis. The result is an engrossing study of Catholic ethnic life, and a fresh examination of the ethnic factor in America.

By **Harold J. Abramson,** *University of Connecticut* 1973 224 pages $11.95

Two volumes in *Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science: A Wiley Series,* edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner

Based on a recently compiled multiple cross-section of data on more than 100 nations, **MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A Cross-National Causal Analysis** examines the causal processes underlying differences across nations in levels of mass political violence since World War II. It centers on domestic violence at the macro-political level, focusing on events of an anti-system nature, of immediate political significance, that involved collectivities.

By **Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.,** *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
1973 288 pages $13.95

CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH METHODS presents—for the first time in a single volume—a cohesive, logically-organized discussion of the strategies, methodologies, and problems involved in planning and conducting cross-cultural research projects. Relevant to behavioral scientists throughout the world, it emphasizes empirical approaches and the proper selection of methods and tools to facilitate meaningful data collection and to insure valid comparisons of individual behavior across cultures. In two parts it covers: general topics, such as sampling, translation of instruments, survey methods, etc.; and specific techniques, including cross-culturally appropriate psychological tests and factor analytic and other multivariate techniques.

By **Richard W. Brislin,** *Culture Learning Institute of the East-West Center, Honolulu,* and **Walter J. Lonner** and **Robert M. Thorndike,** both of *Western Washington State College* 1973 351 pages $16.95

All books are available from your
bookseller or from Dept. 093-A 4060-WI

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE
a division of JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada:
22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario
Prices subject to change without notice

WP

New and recently published–

Winthrop has the books you need for courses in:

☐ AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC POLICY

✓ **DAVID C. SAFFELL**
The Politics of American National Government
Lucid, concise and lively, this introductory text balances factual material with analysis of behavioral trends. It offers a systems approach, a discussion of current policy issues in every chapter, up-to-date statistical information through November 1972, and integrated readings which illustrate key concepts.
INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL AVAILABLE. January 1973, paper $6.50

✓ **PHILIP H. MELANSON**
Knowledge, Politics, and Public Policy: Introductory Readings in American Politics
March 1973, paper $4.95

✓ **FRANKLIN TUGWELL**
Search for Alternatives: Public Policy and the Study of the Future
March 1973, paper $5.95

✓ **FRED KRAMER**
Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy: A Reader on Organization
January 1973, paper $3.95

✓ **JAMES BURKHART et al**
Strategies for Political Participation
1972, paper $2.95

✓ **RAYMOND L. LEE and DOROTHY A. PALMER**
America in Crisis: Contemporary Political Dilemmas
1972, paper $4.95

☐ URBAN POLITICS

✓ **MURRAY STEDMAN, JR.**
Urban Politics
(In less than a year, this has become THE book in the field!)
1972, paper $6.40, cloth $7.95

☐ INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

✓ **ROBERT J. LEIBER**
Theory and World Politics
1972, paper $3.95, cloth $6.95

✓ **STEVE L. SPIEGLE and KENNETH N. WALTZ**
Conflict in World Politics
1971, paper $4.95, cloth $7.50

✓ **WAYNE WILCOX, LEO ROSE, AND R. GAVIN BOYD**
Asia and the International System
1972, paper $5.95, cloth $7.95

WINTHROP PUBLISHERS, Inc.
17 Dunster Street at Harvard Square
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

And there are more coming–

Wp

Winthrop will publish these important books in 1974:

✓ **THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY**
Steven Rosen, Brandeis University, and Walter S. Jones, Northeastern University

✓ **INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN POLITICS**
Carl S. Rosberg, University of California at Berkeley

✓ **POLITICS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS**
David E. Schmitt, Northeastern University

✓ **THE BLACK IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**
Lucius B. Barker, Washington University

✓ **POLITICAL CONCEPTS IN AMERICA**
Gordon E. Baker, University of California at Santa Barbara

✓ **INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC POLICY**
Robert H. Binstock and Peter Woll, both of Brandeis University

✓ **POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS**
L. Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon, and Joseph Olexa, Linfield College

✓ **POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW**
Martin Shapiro, Harvard University, and Douglas Hobbs, University of California at Los Angeles

✓ **INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE**
David E. Apter, Yale University

✓ **INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**
Fred Kramer, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

✓ **THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE**
Wolfram Hanreider, University of California at Santa Barbara

✓ **POLITICAL FUTURES**
Leon Lindberg, University of Wisconsin

For more information, write to Richard Marran at:

WINTHROP PUBLISHERS, Inc.
17 Dunster Street at Harvard Square
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

New from Yale

The Beliefs of Politicians

Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy **by Robert D. Putnam**

As the Watergate scandal has recently shown, the character of a country's leadership deeply affects the patterns of its politics. This study is a systematic analysis of interviews with 176 members of the British House of Commons and the Italian Chamber of Deputies that probes some of the fundamental beliefs and values of political leaders in these two contrasting democracies. In addition to providing a sophisticated refinement of the notions in the political culture literature, Mr. Putnam's work illustrates how intensive interview material can be sensitively analyzed in ways rigorous enough to meet the standards of modern, quantitative social science. "A first-rate book that will make an important contribution to political science."—Sidney Verba October publication $10.95

Building an Austrian Nation

The Political Integration of a Western State **by William T. Bluhm**

Once the crown lands of a dynastic empire, briefly after World War I an independent republic of confused identity, and subsequently an eastern appendage of Hitler's Germany, Austria since 1945 has become a modern democratic nation-state. In this detailed examination of recent Austrian political history, Mr. Bluhm uses concepts from the contemporary literature of nation building and political development and tests some of its leading hypotheses. He finds a striking parallel between the Austrian experience and the circumstances of today's emerging non-Western states. "An excellent example of a theoretically significant case study that deserves to be read by all scholars in the field of comparative government and particularly those working on the questions of nation building and political development."—Arend Lijphart $9.75

The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth Republic

by D. Bruce Marshall

A compelling synthesis of political science and history, this study examines the impact of the French colonial myth on the political elite during the constitutional crisis of 1946. It traces the evolution of the colonial myth over more than a century during which it profoundly influenced the values, perceptions, and goals of both metropolitan and native leaders. It also dissects the strategies of de Gaulle, the French Communists, the native deputies, and the other parties to the constitutional debate, showing how each sought to bargain for institutions that fit its own view of France's colonial role. French internal and international politics are described to help explain the failure of French leaders to grasp the nature of colonial nationalism and their inability to find a peaceful path to decolonization. $12.50

Authoritarian Brazil

Origins, Policies, and Future **edited by Alfred Stepan**

The development model followed by the military regime that came to power in Brazil in 1964 is one of the most controversial among the less developed countries. The regime's authoritarian structure, combined with a GNP growth rate that is one of the highest in the world, raises extremely disturbing yet fundamental questions about the relation between political authoritarianism and economic dynamism. In this book, social scientists from three continents assess the major political and economic characteristics of the Brazilian model. Because events here have important implications for other countries, there is a deliberate search throughout the volume for new conceptual frames of reference to help put the Brazilian process in a larger perspective. There is also an attempt to be explicit about what values the regime promotes and what values it denies. December publication $10.00

Yale University Press New Haven and London

From Rand McNally

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
Promise and Performance
Second Edition

Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

Professor Dahl insightfully describes, explains, and appraises the American political system in terms of its promise and performance. In doing so, he provides students with a comprehensive introduction to American government—its structure, development, democratic foundations, and unique qualities—and a perspective from which to evaluate the gap between the ideal and the reality of American democracy. Instructor's Manual available.

453 pages / $7.50 Paper

Three New Markham Books

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES
The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970s
Second Edition

Kenneth M. Dolbeare, University of Washington
and **Patricia Dolbeare,** with **Jane Hadley,** University of Washington

The second edition of this highly successful text continues its treatment of the role of ideology in the U.S., viewing established political ideologies in relation to what's happening today. Challenges by the counterideologies of Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, Women's Lib, the New Left, and various democratic and revolutionary socialists, comprise the new material of this expanded edition.

280 pages / $3.50 Paper **/ $7.95** Cloth

READINGS IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES

Edited by **Kenneth M. Dolbeare,** University of Washington,
Patricia Dolbeare, and **Jane Hadley,** University of Washington

Designed to complement the Second Edition of *American Ideologies,* this new reader contains original works by major authors on current ideologies and ideas in U.S. society and the political arena. Includes chapters on Minority Liberation, Women's Liberation, and The New Left, as well as on the mainstream political beliefs.

355 pages / $3.50 Paper **/ $7.95** Cloth

AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
An Introduction to Political Institutions

Robert S. Ross, Chico State College

Presented clearly and concisely in this small volume are the basic structural components of federal government. Introductory chapters discuss the framing of the Constitution and its underlying principles.

224 pages / $2.95 Paper **/ $7.95** Cloth

RAND McNALLY COLLEGE PUBLISHING COMPANY
Box 7600, Chicago, Illinois 60680

CNPS



VOTE FOR: Bachrach; Hoffmann; Jacob; Klotzburger; Kotler; McCoy; Ollman; Rustow; Ryan; Zonis.

The Caucus for a New Political Science is a broad coalition of scholars of varied backgrounds, professional interests, and political preference, united in intellectual commitments vital to the profession. It champions openness in the American Political Science Association and combats recurrent efforts to transfer power from the members to an exclusive, self-perpetuating group.

The Caucus believes in free inquiry and opposes any orthodoxy. Scholars should respond to social as well as methodological concerns, studying peace as well as war, revolution as well as stability, political corruption as well as institutionalization. The profession must leave room for normative theorists and "value-free" empiricists, qualitativists and quantitativists, gadflies and technicians. We must become a lively band of scholars, dedicated to the common search for truth about politics, and not a self-serving guild.

The Caucus contends that APSA must respond vigorously to mounting pressures against academic freedom, the problems of teachers at small colleges, the employment crisis, the views of students, and the special needs of women and minority groups in the profession.

The Caucus nominates alternative candidates in APSA elections, introduces resolutions, and sponsors panels at APSA meetings (1973 panel topics at New Orleans: "Corruption in American Politics" and "No More Vietnams"). The Caucus newsletter, A NEW Political Science, includes minority reports from the Council of the Association, news from other professions, correspondence, bibliographies, and other features ignored by the old political science.

Membership (including a subscription to A NEW Political Science):

☐ $6 (regular)
☐ $2 (student or unemployed).

Additional Donation: $ ____________

Name: ____________________

Address: ____________________

____

Mail to: Caucus for a New Political Science
33 West 42 Street, Room 925
New York, New York 10036



$50,000 of life insurance costs less than $100 at age 30.

That's right! For a man, age 30, the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first-year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.50, making a net payment of $97.50. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available.

If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility to apply for this or other TIAA life insurance is limited to persons employed at the time of application by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017
TIAA
sG

Please mail the Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name ______________________ Your Date of Birth ____________

Address ______________________
Street

____
City State Zip

Dependents' Ages ______________________

Nonprofit Employer ______________________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution